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F O R e w O R d 
I consider it a distinct honour and privilege to have been invited to write a 
foreword for this book, The Land Has Changed: History, Society and Gender in 
Colonial Eastern Nigeria, which is a major and significant contribution to Igbo 
studies. In this volume, the author provides a vivid account of the patterns of 
socioeconomic change in the former Eastern Region of Nigeria, but focusing 
primary attention on present Imo and Abia states. The book deals with the 
transformations of agriculture during the colonial and postcolonial eras. It is 
certainly a study whose time has come, insofar as this genre, relating specifi-
cally to the Igbo, has been in the doldrums for too long. In other words, studies 
dealing with colonial agrarian policies and their impact on the indigenous 
peoples seem thus far to have been neglected by both indigenous and foreign 
scholars. Korieh’s book, therefore, fills an important gap in the existing studies 
dealing with British colonial innovations or changes relating to agriculture in 
Nigeria. As a remedy, Korieh examines and analyzes the transformations in 
agriculture in southeastern Nigeria with a special focus on the colonial and 
postcolonial periods. 
In The Land Has Changed, a title borrowed from an agonized inter-
viewee, the author confronts the problems of modernization as perceived by 
the British and challenges the notion that British colonial agricultural poli-
cies redounded to the benefit of the colonized. Rather, the transformations 
laid the foundation for decades of resistance, the decline of agriculture, and 
the onset of perennial hunger and poverty. In the author’s words, “The book 
xi 
centres on the British attempt to transform a colonial society (continued in 
the early postcolonial period) through the modernization of agriculture and 
the experiences, actions, and perceptions of the local population whom colo-
nial officials often characterized as backward and unchanging.” In the final 
analysis, we are concerned here with, first, the dynamic processes of colonial 
and postcolonial socioeconomic engineering with their insidious conse-
quences. Secondly, we witness the patterns of local/Igbo reactions towards 
the radical changes in the political economy. 
Because of the accident of history, Nigeria (including Igboland) came un-
der British direct rule from about 1900 to 1960. With the advent of the Brit-
ish, therefore, things literally fell apart with special reference to the political 
economy (agriculture). For example, Nigeria was brought inexorably under 
the vortex of the Western capitalist system, and ipso facto was engulfed in 
the capitalist economy. This meant that agricultural production for export 
became the foundation of the new economy. In a sense, agricultural products 
for the British industries became a British colonial economic preoccupation, 
and agricultural products now became the chief contributors to Nigeria’s 
gross domestic product. Put differently, Nigeria, as well as most parts of West 
Africa, entered into what A. G. Hopkins described as the “open” phase of 
colonial economic development, meaning the entry of the economy into the 
phase of the Western capitalist economic model of colonialism – exploitation. 
Of course, this implied changes in the patterns of production and commodity 
exchange (trade). The characteristics include the export of a range of agricul-
tural and mineral products in exchange for a variety of British manufactures, 
chiefly consumer goods, the domination of some sectors of the economy by 
expatriates, and perhaps most importantly, the assertion of considerable 
influence and control over Nigerian economic policy by the British.1 These 
changes invariably heralded the age of British imperial control, or unequal 
relationship, and thus the basis of colonial exploitation and other forms of 
oppression. 
It might be pertinent at this juncture to examine the impact of the 
transformations in agriculture in the context of culture and life. We should 
emphasize the fact that agriculture (farming) was essentially the principal 
occupation of the Igbo of southeastern Nigeria from time immemorial. In 
particular, agriculture was the core of the people’s source of livelihood, and 
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agriculture dominated the Igbo/Nigerian economy up to the 1960s. Virtu-
ally every adult household (family) was engaged in farming and, accordingly, 
food production (particularly yams, the king of foodstuffs) and other crops 
like cassava, corn/maize, and a variety of vegetables formed the basic staples 
of food. Not surprisingly, most people had enough food to eat, and quite cor-
respondingly populations grew. Historically, therefore, Igboland was the land 
of plenty, where food production was ample and abundant, and people thus 
prided themselves as being blessed with surplus food and wealth. Is it any 
wonder that the elders still speak nostalgically of the “good old days,” in refer-
ence to when food was plentiful and poverty and starvation had no place in 
the land? In fact, studies show that agriculture was central to the evolution of 
the highly advanced Igbo civilization.2 
Admittedly, there were times of food scarcity/shortages and hence tem-
porary periods of hunger, known popularly as the period of Onwo. As Victor 
Uchendu explains: “By June, all the yams have been planted. A period of food 
shortage called onwo sets in…. Onwo is caused by lack of a well-developed 
system of storing surplus yams until the new crop is harvested. The chief 
staples then become cassava, cocoyams, and, in some parts of southern Igbo, 
the three-leaved yam locally known as eno.”3 These food crops are popularly 
referred to as “women’s” crops, while yam, the king crop, is known as “men’s” 
crop. 
Production for exchange, of course, was an important component of the 
Igbo political economy. “Field studies in the eastern region [of Nigeria] have 
shown that the region possesses a highly developed system of distributive 
trade. This system is not recent in origin but appears to have been developed 
over centuries of slow and unimpeded growth.”4 Indeed, food production and 
trade significantly contributed to the dynamic process of population growth, 
therefore making Igboland one of the most densely populated regions of the 
African continent, if not in the world. Yes, Robert Stevenson affirms, “There 
can be little question that the I[g]bo region in south eastern Nigeria con-
stitutes one of the greatest nodes of rural population density in all of sub-
Saharan Africa.”5 Stevenson adds that, “the very nature of the density and the 
large area involved bespeak a rather respectable antiquity.”6 
The point of emphasis here is that in Igboland food was plentiful, and 
poverty and starvation had no place in the land. But sadly, as Korieh’s study 
f o re wo rd xiii 
illustrates, this supposedly pristine and prosperous country (land) was 
“spoiled by man” – arguably the British. The proverb/idiom, “A Country is 
spoiled by men,” or alternatively, “It is man who ‘spoils’ the country,” cryp-
tically captures the Igbo ideological perception of change. Culturally and 
philosophically, the Igbo accept the principle/notion of change. In essence, 
they are fully aware that change is inevitable and can come from within or 
from without. But change, they also say, must be useful; otherwise, it must 
be rejected out of hand. Thus, in consonance with their cultural disposition 
that “life [hazards] must be faced and its problems overcome,” British colo-
nial problems via agricultural changes had to be overcome. As illustrated in 
this book and in other studies, the British were the fundamental sources of 
trouble, with particular regard to the socioeconomic and political innova-
tions that upset the apple cart. The female victims of agricultural change, 
for instance, resolutely challenged the oppressive regime, as evidenced in the 
Women’s War of 1929. In effect, British innovations triggered a variety of 
reactions, which were at times quite tragically violent in nature. 
Also reacting specifically to the transformations in agriculture and the 
restrictions placed on trade, the aggrieved women expressed their discontent 
as follows: 
Our grievances are that the land has changed and we are all 
dying. [Specifically,] since the white men came, our [palm] oil does 
not fetch money. 
Imagine our suffering [as we are] restricted from exporting 
garri [cassava flour] to the north especially when the small profit 
accruing from the trade is being exhausted…. 
[And,] consider the lives of a family, which may perish as a result 
of the measures, which have been taken to restrict the garri trade.7 
The introduction of the gender equation – voices of women – in this volume is 
critically important. It helps to call into question the assumption that African/ 
Igbo women were simply the silent victims of colonial oppression. But this and 
other studies clearly show that, because women, after all, were (and still are) the 
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backbone of the extractive (farming) sector of the economy, they could hardly re-
main aloof over colonial intrusions into their sources of livelihood. Consequently, 
any study/studies of structural change(s) in colonial/postcolonial agriculture, 
which excludes women’s voices, must certainly be declared as truncated. The 
author, therefore, makes a major contribution in Africanist scholarship and 
historiography by approaching his subject from a holistic perspective. 
Using primarily archival and oral sources (interviews), Korieh navigates 
the complex and, at times, conflicting perceptions/notions of change, as they 
relate to agriculture. In particular, he critically examines the transition from 
an essentially subsistence agriculture-based economy to a capitalist export-
oriented economy. And he further focuses attention on how colonialism and 
the international economic environment created “poor terms of trade” for 
Igbo/Nigeria’s primary agricultural exports, and the onset and consequences 
of the dependency syndrome on developed economies. 
Korieh notes, however, that from the 1970s Nigeria’s socioeconomic woes 
began with the collapse or decline of agriculture, even though ambitious 
large-scale agricultural development projects had been attempted, e.g., Op-
eration Feed the Nation, the importation of fertilizers, etc. But “Despite the 
heavy financial investments … agricultural productivity remains abysmal.” 
Several reasons are suggested for the colossal failures, including corruption 
and the crisis of governance, and the role of external factors – international 
agencies such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. In 
the final analysis, Korieh attributes the ominous decline of agriculture to the 
shift from agriculture as the base of Nigeria’s economy to reliance or depen-
dence on petroleum as the principal source of revenue from the 1970s. His 
words: 
The discovery of oil at Oloibiri in 1956 and the production [of 
oil] that began in 1958 made Nigeria the largest oil producer in 
Africa and the eleventh in the world. The 1970s coincided with the 
rise in the world oil price, and Nigeria reaped instant riches from 
petroleum. The emergence of petroleum economy [thus] ushered 
in an important new phase in Nigeria’s economy. Agriculture, 
which earned significant revenue for the [Eastern] region and the 
country before the oil boom, suffered from low investment, leaving 
f o re wo rd xv 
the rural population vulnerable. Rural regions witnessed a major 
crisis, with social, infrastructural, and economic collapse in the 
1980s.8 
The Land Has Changed: History, Society and Gender in Colonial Eastern Ni-
geria, based on carefully researched archival and oral sources, provides us 
with a wealth of knowledge about changes in the Nigerian economy during 
the colonial and postcolonial eras. Although this volume presents a rather de-
pressing picture of contemporary Nigeria faced with problems of dire hunger 
and poverty because it seems no longer self-sufficient in food production and 
now depends on the importation of food, it offers some ray of hope. Economic 
recovery under more patriotic and committed leaders might still bring Nigeria 
back to its lost reputation as the giant of Africa. 
Felix K. Ekechi 
Professor Emeritus 
Kent State University 
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I n T R O d u C T I O n : P e R s P e C T I V e s , 
s e T T I n g , s O u R C e s 
Few attempts have been made to teach the native more mod-
ern methods of farming, but in this direction the native has so 
far shown himself to be quite unteachable in this part of Nigeria. 
– Edward Morris Falk, British District Officer, Aba, 1920 
Our grievances are that the land has changed and we are all 
dying. It is a long time since the chiefs and the people who know 
book [Western-educated people] have been oppressing us. We are 
telling you that we have been oppressed. – Female Witness, Aba 
Commission of Inquiry, 1930 
“The land has changed!” This is how my father began when I asked him in the 
year 2000 to relate his experiences of the nature of change since the colonial 
period in my village, a small rural community in central Igboland. Many rural 
dwellers shared similar sentiments. However, when African people tell stories 
about the colonial period, some talk about a period of plenty while others talk 
about a period of deprivation. Grace Chidomere, a rural farmer and small-
scale trader, looked back on the colonial era with nostalgia, describing it as 
the “good old days.”1 Eighty-year-old Francis Eneremadu, who served as a tax 
assessment officer in the colonial period, remembers, with a degree of sadness, 
a period when “things were very good.”2 “People lived off what they earned 
1 
from produce sales, trading, and farming,” said Comfort Anabalam, a rural 
farmer in Mbaise.3 
Not all, however, hold the view that the colonial period was a time of 
plenty. Some associated the colonial period with mere “survival” because it 
included several periods of crisis for the rural population. The depression of 
the late 1920s and early 1930s and the economic difficulties it engendered in 
low export prices for palm oil and kernels and high costs of imported goods 
generated a crisis in the local economy for which the rural and urban popula-
tions paid the price. Reacting to the colonial restrictions imposed on African 
traders during the Second World War, for example, A. Jamola, a trader in 
Aba, who had been refused a permit to trade in gari (a local staple produced 
from cassava), expressed the following sentiments in his petition to the dis-
trict officer on 21 July 1943. 
Imagine our suffering, Sir, during this period for which I am 
restricted from exporting garri to the north especially when the 
small profit accruing from the trade is being exhausted. I can as-
sure you, Sir, that I do appreciate your point of view in this rather 
difficult question, but at the same time I would very respectfully 
and humbly ask that in addition to your viewing the matter from 
the official stand-point, you may consider the lives of a family 
which may perish as a result of the measures which have been 
taken to restrict the garri trade.4 
Jamola’s request was an act of desperation, but such sentiments were wide-
spread and reflected the diverse outcomes of colonial encounters from the 
native viewpoint. One woman’s view of the society and economy during this 
period supports this perspective: “since the white men came, our oil does not 
fetch money. Our kernels do not fetch money. If we take goats or yams to mar-
ket to sell, court messengers who wear a uniform take all these things from 
us.”5 
From the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries onward, Afri-
can societies underwent significant transformations. This is evident both in 
the regions where the attempt to transform rural agriculture was enforced 
through rural peasants and in colonies where commercial production by a 
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white settler community left indelible inequality between the settlers and 
the African population. In both cases, production for export worked to link 
African societies to the industrialized societies of Europe and provided op-
portunities for some and a struggle for others. Yet the history of agriculture 
in the twentieth century was one of growth and prosperity that was followed 
by progressive decline from the 1970s in many areas. In many parts of Africa 
at the beginning of the century, the agricultural sector was demographically 
larger, wealthier, and more productive than most other sectors of the econo-
my. The agricultural sector had become demographically smaller, poorer, and 
less productive than ever before by the end the century. Farmers at the end of 
the century had declining incomes and were worse off, on average, than those 
who did not farm. There is considerable agreement among scholars and other 
commentators that the rapid decline and disintegration of the rural economy 
accelerated under the pressure of state policies and modernization. 
In Igboland, as in most of colonial Africa, agricultural production was an 
instrument and focus of colonial governance, and high productivity was the 
ambition of officials, since government revenue depended largely upon peas-
ant taxes, export duties, and import duties. From its establishment in 1910, 
the Nigerian Department of Agriculture pursued a policy of encouraging 
indigenous development of the palm oil industry as a means of achieving eco-
nomic development and drawing rural folk into the cash economy. Colonial 
policies and European demand for palm oil and kernels led to an expansion in 
the productive capacity of Igbo households and drew them closer to the capi-
talist market. Until recent times, the Igbo region was largely dependent on 
rural agriculture, and palm oil was the most important agricultural produce 
and an important source of accumulation.6 Household members participated 
in the formal economy as producers and marketers of palm produce, and, 
for most of the colonial and early post-colonial period, they built substantial 
wealth until the agricultural decline that set in from the late 1960s. How is 
this change reflected in the history of the region and the memories of those 
who witnessed these changes? 
This book addresses this historical problem. The context for rural change 
varied across much of Africa and the decline and crisis that have occurred 
were not generally related to state policies alone. Structural changes, over 
which the rural population as much as the state had little control, the people 
i n T ro d u C T i o n 3 
themselves, and their activism, were also powerful forces of change, as this 
book suggests for the Igbo society. Rather than concentrating on state policies 
alone, the book will instead focus on the complex processes through which an 
African society responded to state intervention during the colonial and early 
post-colonial period. While I do not attempt to describe local life in its entirety, 
I use agricultural change as a lens through which to view socio-economic 
change, political struggle, cultural change, and colonial hegemony. The book 
centres on the British attempt to transform a colonial society (continued in the 
early post-colonial period) through the modernization of agriculture and the 
experiences, actions, and perceptions of the local population whom colonial 
officials often characterized as backward and unchanging. Such perceptions 
of African societies’ attitudes toward official ideas and about development 
and change would come to reflect the top-down approach in the attempt to 
modernize agriculture. 
The focus is the central Igbo region in southeastern Nigeria, defined as 
the areas included in Owerri Province in the colonial period or contemporary 
Imo State and parts of Abia State. The area lies within the oil palm belt, which 
includes, roughly, the area west of the Cross River and south of the region 
between Onitsha and Afikpo. This was one of the most important centres of 
palm oil production in the colonial and early post-colonial periods, and it is, 
therefore, an important case study in the impact of agricultural change and 
local responses. The region is also characterized by high population density, 
significant out-migration, and relatively poor soil.7 This was also an area that 
witnessed major political agitations during the colonial period, including the 
tax revolts of 1929, that were deeply rooted in the agrarian economy as de-
scribed in chapter 4. In chapter 5, I also examine the link between the rural 
economy and the forms of political consciousness that emerged as this econo-
my was threatened by the depression caused by the Second World War. These 
unique characteristics presented peculiar challenges to the population in this 
part of Igboland, but they also provide an opportunity to assess how local 
historical contexts mediate major societal transformations. The advantages 
of this regional approach include the opportunity to collect data in depth, 
to provide comparative perspectives on how different parts of Igboland re-
sponded to varying ecological niches, and to explain the varying responses to 
the transformation that came with colonialism. 
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The forms and patterns of change addressed in this book have occurred 
throughout Igboland, but it would be a mistake to assume that these trans-
formations occurred uniformly and that there were no variations. Although 
different parts of Igboland experienced unique circumstances due to diversity 
in population, ecology, and socio-economic structures, this book stresses that 
there is some level of homogeneity and continuously draws upon the collec-
tive experiences of the territory historically known as southeastern Nigeria, 
where the Igbo remain the dominant population. Therefore, I have not con-
fined myself to the central region alone. 
While the book covers the period from the middle of the nineteenth cen-
tury onward, its central concerns revolve around the periods of substantial 
growth in agriculture – the beginning of European colonization and the sub-
sequent colonial period (1880s–1960), and the (1960s–1970s), which witnessed 
a gradual but significant decline in agricultural output. These were periods 
when the majority of the population made their living from agriculture and 
the trade in agricultural produce. My study illuminates the changing nature 
of agricultural production and the rural economy over different historical 
periods and shows how the rural population responded to these changes. 
In most of colonial Africa, agricultural commodity production was seen 
as an essential engine of growth upon which the development of African 
farmers and societies depended.8 Colonial intervention increased the pace 
and scope of agricultural change in several parts of sub-Saharan Africa, lead-
ing some commentators to characterize this period as an era of agricultural 
revolution.9 The degree of social and economic changes had fundamental 
implications for agricultural sustainability and rural subsistence.10 Develop-
ment and economics-oriented studies have concluded that economic reforms 
driven by cash crop production in both the colonial and the post-colonial 
period led to agricultural decline and threatened rural survival.11 They have 
blamed contemporary agricultural decline on colonialism, government mis-
management of resources, and the effects of a global economy.12 These factors 
constitute the general explanations for the forms of agricultural change that 
have taken place in most parts of Africa, but they do not provide explanations 
for regional experiences.13 The responses and actions of the local population, 
the social context in which they produced crops, demographic factors, envi-
ronmental factors, and political changes undoubtedly contributed to the pace 
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and forms of changes that occurred – for government policies did not func-
tion in a vacuum. The policies pursued by colonial officials, at times through 
coercion, on the one hand, and the response of local farmers to the opportu-
nities created by the new economy, on the other, account for the pace, scope, 
and nature of the transformations that occurred in the twentieth century. 
Scholars are still struggling with how to explain these changes through-
out Africa and how to characterize African producers like the ones described 
in this study. Two major perspectives have been used to explain Africa’s 
disappearing farming population.14 At one end of the spectrum, scholars 
posit that Africa’s agricultural decline was the result of the incorporation of 
African economies into the world capitalist system. At the other end of the 
spectrum are scholars and international agencies such as the World Bank, the 
Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO), and the 
International Monetary Fund who argue that the causes of agrarian break-
down are rooted in the internal economic policies of African governments 
since independence.15 
The externalist argument has focused on the adverse effects of colonial-
ism and an international economic environment that created poor terms of 
trade for Africa’s primary agricultural exports and dependency on developed 
economies. This line of thought suggests that the dependency of African 
countries on the export of primary products has proven risky for both state 
and peasant revenue as the high cost of imports and very low prices for ex-
port produce lead to economic stagnation and poverty. Agricultural decline, 
therefore, is seen as a legacy of colonialism, which continues to support the 
economies of the developed countries to the detriment of primary produc-
ers in Africa.16 Indeed, Marxist-informed analyses blame the plight of Af-
rican societies on colonialism and neocolonialism. The plethora of work in 
this area is grounded on dependency theory. There is widespread agreement 
within the dependency school that the infrastructure in colonial Africa was 
built to facilitate the exploitation of local resources, particularly agricultural 
raw materials that were essential to the industries of Europe.17 This develop-
ment pattern disrupted indigenous economies and political structures and 
rendered them dependent on Europe and the developed world.18 
The British, like other colonial powers, did not have a well-articulated 
plan for agricultural development. The inability to work out a coherent and 
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long-term strategy for agricultural development, John Levi and Michael Ha-
vinden have argued, was chiefly due to the fact that “policy was unduly subject 
to passing fashions … or to pressure from powerful individuals who pursued 
particular enthusiasms.”19 According to Michael Watts, “While the success 
of metropolitan capital depended upon expanded commodity production by 
households which subsidized the reproduction of their own labor power, the 
demands of capital and the effects of commodity production simultaneously 
undermined (and occasionally threatened) the survival of those upon whom 
it ultimately depended.”20 The export market spawned new and often “con-
tradictory” forms of production in rural societies, while the form of capital 
accumulation that emerged stifled the survival of a viable local peasantry. 
The emphasis on export production turned rural peasants into producers of 
raw materials largely for the benefit of European traders and industries. In 
good years, farmers could earn a modest profit, but the structure of the colo-
nial economy did not develop an independent and self-sustaining peasantry. 
Overall, the externalist argument remains as valid today as it was two de-
cades ago. However, the dependency theory paradigm and its basic concepts 
of “incorporation” and “centre-periphery” relations ignore internal dynamics 
of change. 
Proponents of the internalist argument agree that the policies pursued 
by African leaders since independence have contributed significantly to the 
decline in agriculture. International economic and financial institutions 
such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank mainly base 
their argument on the role of the state in directing the pace and structure 
of agricultural change in many African countries. As Sara Berry notes, 
these institutions have interpreted Africa’s agrarian stagnation as “a crisis 
of production, arising in part from historical factors, but also exacerbated 
by African governments’ penchant for excessive and ill-advised regulation 
of economic activities.”21 Their contention that African states have generally 
ignored agriculture informed the imposition of structural adjustment pro-
grams in Africa. However, the biases and prescriptions of these institutions 
have been deplored. Their development models often are based on Western 
experience and a development ideology that is largely prejudiced against Af-
rican economic and social systems. 
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The internalist perspective also focuses on factors confronting many 
African societies, including high rates of population growth, the lack of ad-
equate infrastructure and industrialization, political instability, the neglect 
of agricultural investment, and environmental forces such as drought. Yet, 
the argument that the post-colonial state in Africa has produced little positive 
result in agriculture remains the dominant one. Robert Clute notes in his 
overview of the role of agriculture in African development that the continent 
remains the only part of the world to experience a decline in both agricultural 
and food indices in recent years.22 The greatest problem in African agricul-
tural development, he argues, is “the pervasiveness of political elites with an 
urban bias.”23 The marked contrasts between the ideology professed by the 
African elite and the reality of their practical actions have led to “a growing 
gap between the urban elite and the rural masses.”24 The broader issues facing 
African agriculture go beyond the development ideology pursued by the Afri-
can elite. Moreover, the focus on state intervention in the post-colonial period 
ignores the historical origins of state intervention in peasant agriculture dat-
ing back to the colonial period and the long-term impact of incorporating 
local economies into the capitalist market. 
The dichotomy that emerged in the debate has left unanswered questions 
about the dynamics and the effects of change on studied societies as well as 
about how African societies have responded to the crisis in agriculture. In-
deed, the gendered impact of social and economic change is crucial and un-
derstudied even though Ester Boserup’s groundbreaking work, Women’s Role 
in Economic Development, drew attention to the centrality of female labour in 
African farming systems.25 Boserup addressed the most important concern 
of feminist scholars – the role of women in agricultural production – while 
glossing over gender analysis,26 and important relational changes taking place 
as a result of state intervention in rural economies. Much of the scholarly 
literature about gender and socio-economic transformation in Africa has a 
long and problematic history in which gender or economic transformation 
is not analyzed in the context of studied societies. Furthermore, the fact that 
gender relations are automatically equated with women’s subordination has 
meant that important issues concerning women and men and the ways in 
which government policies impinged on the lives of rural people have not 
been well analyzed. The result is that we still lack an understanding of 
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agricultural change as one among a number of mutually constitutive factors 
such as state policy, demography, ecology, gender, the household, and other 
social and economic imperatives that order people’s lives in their locale but 
are also influenced by people’s relationships with the world beyond their own 
immediate societies. 
The key to understanding these changes has varied widely across Africa. 
Researchers in western Africa, in particular, have articulated the process 
through which rural farmers were integrated into the complex economic 
structures that developed in colonial Africa as well as the complex structures 
that influenced this process and informed its outcomes.27 Sara Berry’s study 
of how cocoa production stimulated the development of capitalist social 
structures in rural Yorubaland, including the evolution of private property 
rights in land and a land market, is a good example of the market-driven 
transformation of pre-colonial social structures. Still, the absence of a dis-
tinct class or category of labour and the availability of land in Yorubaland 
gave the development of peasant agriculture its character.28 Polly Hill’s study 
of the development of rural capitalism in Ghana may also be noted.29 
The Igbo context was different from the above examples in the process 
of incorporating the region into the colonial economy. For Igboland, J. Lage-
mann points to a “more equal distribution of agricultural resources and 
farm income as population pressure increases, and greater inequalities in the 
distribution of total income as non-farm employment becomes more impor-
tant.”30 Unlike the situation in western Nigeria and Ghana, where cocoa was 
a new crop, the oil palm was indigenous to Igboland and had been developed 
as an export product before the advent of colonialism. Access to the oil palm 
would, generally speaking, be open to most households, based on existing 
primogeniture with regard to land. Large-scale capitalization and new labour 
and land arrangements were not features of peasant farming in the oil palm 
production zones of Igboland. Susan Martin’s study of the Ngwa Igbo may be 
noted in this regard.31 
While the cocoa-producing areas in Western Nigeria and Ghana, about 
which Berry and Hill have written, attracted migrants, the Igbo area con-
tinued to be a net exporter of labour. Lineage and other forms of labour and 
land use persisted into the late colonial and post-independence periods. The 
extensive quantity of oil and kernels produced in the region was, therefore, 
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achieved by the mobilization of household labour and continued reliance on 
a land-tenure pattern based on lineage and relationships controlled by elders. 
Despite large-scale production, what emerged among the Igbo was a class of 
farmers and traders that was largely undifferentiated. 
The trajectories of change were also shaped by developments that emerged 
from the period of British disengagement from Nigeria. The mid-1950s were 
particularly significant in this regard as Nigeria entered the era of internal 
self-rule in 1954. The Lyttelton Constitution of 1954 provided for regional 
governments (Eastern, Western, and Northern) with wide powers in political 
and economic affairs at the regional level. When independence was obtained 
from Britain on October 1, 1960, the government of the Eastern Region had 
the opportunity to fully implement its economic policy and ideology. The 
new elite, under the leadership of the pragmatic premier of the Eastern Re-
gion, Dr. M. I. Okpara, rejected the colonial political order, but they inevi-
tably accepted the economic one bequeathed by the British. Agriculture was 
perceived as the source of economic development. The regional government 
focused on the establishment of community plantations and farm settlements 
for export production, although innovations were introduced to encourage 
food production and to draw farmers further into official agricultural pro-
grams.32 However, the attempt to modernize indigenous agriculture revealed 
the paradox of an elitist state that aspired to “modernize” a population that 
viewed state intervention with skepticism. 
A complex web of structural and political developments eroded the agri-
cultural base before these policies could be fully tested. By 1966, the Nigerian 
federation was in a political crisis that led to a civil war between the predomi-
nantly Igbo-speaking people of Eastern Nigeria and the rest of the federation 
in 1967. Igbo society faced several challenges because of the civil war, which 
lasted until 1970.33 Unprecedented famine followed, and agricultural crisis 
became a permanent feature of an area that was already a “food-reserve-
deficit” area before the war.34 The 1970s also witnessed major changes in the 
economic base of the Nigerian economy. The discovery of crude oil at Oloibiri 
in 1956 and the production that began in 1958 made Nigeria the largest oil 
producer in Africa and the eleventh in the world. The 1970s coincided with a 
rise in the world oil price, and Nigeria reaped instant riches from petroleum.35 
The emergence of the petroleum economy ushered in an important new phase 
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in Nigeria’s economy. Agriculture, which earned significant revenue for the 
region and the country before the oil boom, suffered from low investment, 
leaving the rural population vulnerable. Rural regions witnessed a major cri-
sis, with social, infrastructural, and economic collapse in the 1980s. 
The book pays attention to circumstances that are uniquely Igbo. An 
important one is the cultural ethos associated with farming in Igbo society, 
especially the cultural impacts of yam production – the dominant male crop 
– thereby revealing the gender and power relation that exists and the poorly 
understood connection between farming, culture, and Igbo identity. This 
book thus illuminates the shifting nature of rural identity in parts of Igbo-
land, such as central Igboland, where the agricultural crisis has been more 
severe and where non-agricultural sources of income have become more im-
portant from the 1970s onward. It reveals that the foundations upon which 
Igbo masculinities were built have shifted, gradually after the crisis of the 
Nigerian civil war (1967–70), and more dramatically in the petroleum boom 
era of the late 1970s. What has followed has been a progressive reordering of 
social relations and reinterpretations of “traditional” gender ideology despite 
the persistence of a dominating idea of male power. 
The overall pattern of change that emerged in the colonial and post- 
colonial period was inseparably linked to perceived gender roles, which lay 
at the heart of the political and economic discourse of both the colonial and 
post-colonial states.36 Indeed, the discourse on the colonial impact on agri-
culture and gender has produced two important but related lines of critique. 
First, a substantive critique has focused on the adverse impact of the neglect 
of the role of women in agriculture stemming from the patriarchal ideology 
of officials. Second, feminist economists have drawn attention to the adverse 
consequences of hidden bias in the economic theories underpinning agri-
cultural development.37 Oyeronke Oyewumi rightly claims that “theories of 
colonialism relate a dialectical world of the colonizer and the colonized that 
are often presumed as male … while it is not difficult to sustain the idea that 
the colonizer was predominantly male … the idea that the colonized was 
uniformly male is less so.”38 While represented as gender-neutral, official 
policies, which disregarded women’s work, were in fact not gender-blind. 
The character of agricultural change was therefore distinguished by the un-
anticipated impact of male-centred improvement schemes and the role that 
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gender ideology played in shaping the processes of change. During the colo-
nial period, officials excluded women from extension services, agricultural 
education, technological innovations, and agricultural loans. Thus, this study 
is also the story of the gendered nature of this encounter, particularly the co-
lonial notion of the “male farmers” and its outcomes. The institutions created 
by colonialism contrasted with pre-colonial systems, transforming the roles 
men and women had previously played in their societies while creating new 
gender and class relations.39 As systematic exploitation of colonized peoples, 
colonialism affected both men and women, but as a gendered process, it af-
fected men and women in both similar and dissimilar ways. These trends 
continued in the post-colonial era, but the patterns and assumptions about 
the role and responsibilities of the genders within rural households have been 
challenged by economic and social changes. 
The book emphasizes that economic and social changes were not the 
result of official policies and actions alone, even though the choices made 
by local farmers and traders and the rewards they received were determined 
by conditions created by the state. Therefore, this book attempts to present, 
through a particularly local dimension, the responses of rural households to 
official attempts to transform agriculture and other mechanism of state con-
trol. Since rural people were important agents of change and the instruments 
through which the state often implemented its agenda, they are the medium 
through which official policies and its outcome can be assessed. 
Economic and political forces beyond their control often influenced the 
rural populations. But these populations also exerted an influence upon the 
state by employing various strategies, including rebellions or petitioning 
authorities to seek redress for grievances. These means, by which the local 
population influenced state behaviours, were employed in greater frequency 
during the Great Depression and during the Second World War in response 
to new market forces and state control that often imposed limits on rural 
people’s ability to control their own lives. Rebellions place the colonized pop-
ulation at the centre, show them as historical actors with pliable cultures and 
communities, and provide a more accurate understanding of the processes of 
colonization, its impacts on particular groups and communities, and its role 
in social and economic change. Through their engagement in the expanding 
economy as producers and traders and the use of revolts and petitions, ordi-
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nary people accumulated political and economic capital that helped to shape 
societal transformations in the colonial period. 
Petitions to colonial officials were used extensively from the 1930s as a 
means to seek remedy for grievances over a number of actions including taxa-
tion, court decisions, and policies that directly affected the rural economy 
(production and marketing of agricultural goods). The petitions sent to co-
lonial officials are unparalleled as intimate and immediate records of life in 
colonial Nigeria, and as means for understanding African expression and the 
process of negotiating with a hegemonic colonial state. Furthermore, peti-
tions highlight the important political effects of subtle forms of resistance 
and negotiation by rural men and women in the colonial context. Overall, 
they represent local perceptions and characterizations of societal transforma-
tions and show why ordinary men and women took matters into their own 
hands and in some cases influenced the outcomes of official policies. 
Igbo farmers and traders adopted other strategies to win concessions 
when their resilience failed. They revolted and resisted when official policies 
and market forces beyond their control put their survival at risk or when co-
lonial initiatives threatened them. These struggles, which took place in the 
rural areas, markets, urban areas, and colonial courts in southeastern Nige-
ria, helped shape the political and economic landscape of the colonial state, 
formulated in imperial offices in London and colonial offices in Nigeria. As 
instruments of social and political change, rural revolts particularly helped 
create political and economic space for ordinary people. The actions of rural 
people in Igboland had parallels elsewhere. However, the Igbos’ actions took 
place in a particular cultural, historical, and economic context – within an 
economic setting that struggled with a mono-economy (dominated by palm 
produce), high population density, and severe land scarcity. It is, therefore, a 
history of an African society’s experiences, contributions, collaborations, and 
resistance to colonialism and its consequences. 
I have not attempted to discuss rural life in all its ramifications as it relates 
to colonial and post-colonial policies. The two general themes that stand out 
in this book – themes that highlight the role of the state in a colonial context 
as well as the rural population as agents of historical change – suggest that, 
despite the actions and top-down approach of official policies, the voices and 
actions of ordinary people proved critical in determining the forms of social 
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and economic changes that followed state intervention in Igbo society. These 
particular themes (state policies and peasants responses) have been chosen 
both because they are timely topics of debate among scholars of colonial-
ism and African development and because they allow for a historical narra-
tive that fully explores the processes of economic and social transformation 
among the Igbo. A critical assessment of these themes also suggests that, 
although the forces of intervention were mostly beyond the control of rural 
people, these people often negotiated as individuals and as a group, offering 
competing claims for political and economic rights throughout the colonial 
period. 
The salient features of the Igbo region in general and central Igboland in 
particular have been underscored in the literature. I will comment on them in 
order to outline the distinguishing features of this book. Some of the earlier 
commentaries included the work of Northcote W. Thomas. Thomas comment-
ed on the links among poor soil quality, the shortage of land, and subsistence 
insecurity in the densely populated parts of Eastern Nigeria at the beginning 
of the twentieth century.40 Indeed, labour migration from barren lands within 
the Onitsha-Awka axis to more favoured regions by the late nineteenth century 
provides valuable information for periodizing land scarcity and the emergence 
of an agricultural crisis in parts of Igboland before the imposition of colonial-
ism. Barry Floyd made similar observations and suggested that the soil in the 
region, which was never of high fertility even under the original high forest 
cover, was further impoverished by continued use under traditional farming 
methods.41 Central Igboland shared in these constraints. 
References to the population pressure found in missionary letters and 
travellers’ journals suggest that high population numbers were already an 
economic problem by the end of the nineteenth century.42 The “population is 
so great that if they hear we shall want carriers, they come in great numbers 
begging to be used, even during the farming season,” reported a missionary 
in the Owerri region in 1866.43 Land became so crowded in most of the region 
that fallow periods had already been shortened by the 1940s.44 G.E.K. Ofo-
mata’s recent edited collection, A Survey of the Igbo Nation, devoted consider-
able space to the ecological character of Igboland and its impact on agricul-
ture and livelihood.45 These studies provide a useful framework for the study 
of rural subsistence and survival strategies in a changing agrarian landscape. 
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Perhaps the most important aspect of these works is their usefulness in locat-
ing the origins of agricultural crisis in several parts of Igboland in the late 
nineteenth century and its increasing spread in the early twentieth century. 
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the overwhelming majority 
of the Igbo were still engaged in agriculture. Many combined subsistence 
production with the production and marketing of palm produce. Scholars 
and commentators have examined the changing nature of Igbo agriculture 
since the extensive commercialization of the economy began in the begin-
ning of the twentieth century. Trade and Imperialism by Walter Ofonagoro, 
published in 1979, is an important historical work on British commerce and 
the establishment of colonial rule in Southern Nigeria. This volume is an in-
troduction to the uneven and sometimes antagonistic process through which 
British colonial authority and commerce were extended to the southeastern 
Nigerian hinterland. With specific regard to agriculture, Eno J. Usoro’s work 
on the palm oil industry remains an important study.46 Although largely a 
quantitative analysis of the export sector, it provides a useful source for the 
study of the palm produce trade during the colonial and early post-colonial 
periods. 
A recent work by Simon Ottenberg, Farmers and Townspeople in a 
Changing Nigeria: Abakaliki during Colonial Times (1905–1960), is the story 
of successful rural farmers in the midst of an emerging town and the ethnic 
interrelationships, integration, and conflict between the town and the rural 
areas that occurred. The broad framework of this study supports my argu-
ment that the history of Africa’s encounter with colonialism is also a story of 
African responses, resistance, accommodation, and innovation. The anthro-
pological and historical approaches are welcome. The current work places lo-
cal responses and innovation in a broader historical context and framework. 
The gender dimension of agricultural and economic transformation 
among the Igbo has received significant attention from scholars. One of the 
most significant works relating to Igbo agrarian change is Susan Martin’s 
monograph, Palm Oil and Protest. Her detailed analysis of the changing 
nature of the household economy among the Ngwa Igbo enables a broader 
understanding of how the commercialization of palm oil trade spurred the 
transformation of the rural agrarian economy and changes in gender relations 
of production. Martin’s work on the Ngwa region shows that local initiatives 
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played a significant role in the patterns of export growth, capital investment, 
and the food production sector, a major deviation from both the dependency 
and the vent-for-surplus theories, which had dominated the discourse on the 
development of the export sector. Yet, Martin’s conclusions, particularly in 
regards to gender transformation and women’s ability to participate in the 
new economy, are problematic since access to land and other production re-
sources was not often under the control of lineage and household heads. Indi-
vidual land tenure, which had become widespread in most parts of Igboland 
by the beginning of the nineteenth century, had more significant implications 
for gender and the household economy than Martin acknowledged. Men and 
women shared a common basic outlook toward the colonial economy, and the 
production patterns that emerged occasionally empowered women to claim 
more economic rights and engage in the formal economy. Indeed, Martin’s 
earlier article, “Gender and Innovation: Farming, Cooking, and Palm Pro-
cessing in the Ngwa Region of Southeastern Nigeria, 1900–1930,”47 which 
analyzed the role of women in the agrarian change in this region, argues that 
women responded to the expanding oil palm economy by introducing inno-
vations, developing efficient time management strategies, and adopting new 
crops such as cassava. 
However, Martin’s conclusion that men took the lion’s share of the 
proceeds and amassed capital from palm oil production because they 
maintained political and economic control of the Ngwa lineage system of 
production ignores women’s ability to work around these social institutions 
for their own benefit. My own study shows that the transformations that oc-
curred empowered women to claim economic rights and engage in the formal 
economy. Indeed, Gloria Chuku’s Igbo Women and Economic Transformation 
in Southeastern Nigeria, 1900–1960 has outlined women’s contributions to 
agriculture, commerce, and craft manufacture.48 Chuku demonstrates that 
some women were able to seize the new opportunities offered by the colonial 
economy in the areas of export crops such as palm oil, trade, and commerce, 
despite the gendered ideology that tended to favour men. Nwando Achebe’s 
Farmers, Traders, Warriors, and Kings: Female Power and Authority in North-
ern Igboland, 1900–1960, challenges the notion of women’s invisibility in Af-
rican societies.49 As farmers, traders, potters, and weavers, some successful 
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females translated their economic successes into political and social power 
and authority. 
While these studies provide a useful framework to assess the implica-
tions of expanded commodity production for rural farmers and the way in 
which rural producers carried the burden of economic transformation, the 
present study of central Igboland underscores the centrality of rural men and 
women in the transformation of rural societies and extends the analysis by 
emphasizing how rural farmers adapted to state-induced transformations 
and market forces. By highlighting the role of rural people, this work un-
derscores a fundamental fact, which is that one cannot truly understand the 
dynamics of change in an agrarian society without a detailed understanding 
of the history of its major actors – rural farmers and traders. 
The book is important for several reasons. The book is, in many ways, a 
history of policies pursued by colonial (and, to some extent, post-colonial) 
governments in Nigeria, supplemented by voices “from below” and some de-
gree of re-interpretation of sources, in order to bring in the perspective of lo-
cal people. Most rural farmers did not leave individual sources such as diaries 
and memoirs, but they left their imprints in other places. They left records in 
the forms of petitions, letters, and memories. Drawing on an extensive array 
of previously unread colonial archival sources and oral accounts, this book 
reveals the “silent voices” in history, their resilience, adjustments, and adapta-
tions in a changing society. Their voices and concerns, as reflected in peti-
tions and supplications, challenge universalistic and essentialist categories in 
history. Capturing the “silent voices” in history, including those of women, 
local agency, and contestations of the dominant modernization ideology of 
the post-colonial elite, is at the core of this book. It puts the reader in direct 
contact with ordinary victims of colonial control, evoking a feeling of what it 
was like to live through the era. As such, it is also a social and cultural history 
of economic change and the rural farmers and traders who were important 
agents of change. 
Second to the Atlantic slave trade, no story is more important in shaping 
the history of the region than the British attempt to transform agriculture. 
Yet official policies and perceptions about the local agricultural environ-
ment, the mode of production, and the role of colonial subjects – male and 
female – reflected a narrow understanding of African production systems. 
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Local production patterns were more complex than officials realized. House-
hold production patterns and strategies were influenced by several factors, 
including market forces, kinship structures, and modes of resource alloca-
tion. The contradictions that emerged from the official construction of new 
economic and social formations and the responses of rural farmers have not 
piqued the interest of historians of colonial Eastern Nigeria – a region that 
was heavily dependent on local production in the colonial and immediate 
post-colonial periods. The significant role of local actors and local responses 
to the changes engendered by the expansion of commodity production and 
colonial intervention, and the forms of transformations that emerged, shaped 
the outcome of the colonial encounter and local economies. 
This book challenges the largely deterministic notion that the social and 
economic transformation of colonized societies was the making of the state 
alone. It shows that rural people acted as important agents of change for them-
selves and their communities. Significant internal forces also often forced of-
ficials to interrogate European discourses and strategies. The ways in which 
the British exercised power over the rural population and their response also 
reveal these interactions as negotiated encounters between colonial officials 
and natives and challenge the simplistic notions of a hegemonic colonial state 
and a compromising native population. 
The book explains the salience of agricultural change in central Igboland 
in terms of the interaction of state agency, structural, historical, and social 
factors, all induced by the opportunities to generate income from cash crops. 
The economic structures that emerged drew from the social and cultural back-
grounds of both imperial Europe and African societies. Amid several forces, 
including imperial Britain, European traders, physical and environmental 
conditions, high population density, land tenure systems, war, famine, a re-
bellious peasant population, and a gender ideology largely indifferent to the 
local context, the transformation of the rural economy presented a daunting 
task for officials and local farmers alike. The members of the African popula-
tion were impressive in their capacity to balance state demands with their 
own cultural ethos as farmers in a landscape that was changing rapidly. 
The history of socio-economic change, as depicted in the case of the 
Igbo-speaking people of southeastern Nigeria, raises far more complex – if 
less easily defined – questions than the classic debates about the long-term 
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effects of imperialism on colonized societies.50 What was the response of local 
people in southeastern Nigeria? In reconstructing a narrative of the changes 
that occurred, I have paid attention to how state policies, market forces, 
and significant events in the twentieth century, including colonialism, the 
Great Depression, and the Second World War, combined with the actions 
and responses of the African population to shape the character and nature of 
change in this region. 
a noTe on meThodology and sourCes 
Throughout this work, I use various terms, including farmers, traders, and 
peasants, to refer to the groups of people whose lives, economic activities, 
and social activities are reflected here. Despite the difficulty of finding an 
acceptable definition for African peasants, the term peasant remains useful 
in examining the lives of people who refer to themselves as farmers or trad-
ers or both. Although the classification of Africa’s agrarian social structures, 
especially the application of the term peasantry as a social category, remains 
problematic, Igbo producers of the colonial and early post-colonial periods 
embody the basic characteristics of peasants outlined by T. Shanin, namely 
the pursuit of an agricultural livelihood for subsistence and commercial pur-
poses; reliance on family labour as a unit of production; subordination to state 
authority and market forces through which peasants’ surpluses are extracted, 
and membership of a community that defines peasants’ outlook, attitude, and 
worldview.51 
While one can debate endlessly whether the Igbo and other groups in 
southeastern Nigeria fit this categorization, the majority of Igbo farmers were 
involved in an agricultural export economy, using household labour, to meet 
their survival needs and the demands (taxes, rents, and other fees) that arose 
from their incorporation into state institutions. In the colonial and early 
post-colonial periods, there were certainly those who moved from farming 
to non-farming occupations and vice versa. Whether as traders, farmers, or 
both, all were affected by the social and economic processes of these periods. 
In employing the term peasants, this book considers the term as a fluid and 
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unstable one and uses it mainly for descriptive purposes. Although the term 
peasant is employed here mainly descriptively, it should be said that the 
actions of the state and the forms of hegemony it exercised over the rural 
population highlight the extractive power of the state over the rural popula-
tion – a basic characteristic of a peasant-state relationship. 
The development of a peasant population, however, must be understood 
in the context of earlier commercial developments. The Igbo region of the 
hinterland of the Bight of Biafra was a major source of slaves for the Atlantic 
slave trade in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The trade, mostly 
facilitated by the Aro and their trading outposts throughout Igboland, linked 
the region to the economy of the Atlantic world two centuries before colo-
nialism. Commercial food production in yams and palm oil developed along 
with the slave trade to feed the market that the slave trade created. The aboli-
tion of the slave trade and the development of a trade in palm oil drew the 
region closer to the European market in the nineteenth century. The region 
represented Europe’s most important centre of the production of palm oil 
– a product that shaped the Igbo economy from the end of the Atlantic slave 
trade onward. On their own initiative, the Igbo produced palm oil to feed the 
expanding demand for tropical raw materials that developed with the Indus-
trial Revolution in Europe. The imperialism of the late nineteenth century 
made greater integration of the Igbo economy into the European economy 
inevitable. 
Thus, the transformation of the rural Igbo producers can roughly be 
associated with two historical periods. The first stage represents the period 
when the Igbo were drawn into the international economy through the nine-
teenth-century commercial transition from the slave trade to the palm pro-
duce trade. The produce trade was an important factor in the transformation 
of Igbo agriculture. Yet in this period, many members of the Igbo population 
could not be regarded as peasants simply because they produced palm oil for 
export. This was particularly true of central Igboland before the colonial pe-
riod. Igbo farmers enjoyed the freedom to produce on their own account us-
ing their labour without much external interference. The next stage coincided 
with the imposition of colonial rule, when Igbo farmers became increasingly 
commercially oriented due to the influence of the colonial state and foreign 
traders. Igbo farmers were drawn into more commercial agricultural pro-
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duction from the beginning of colonialism – the coercive instrument for the 
extraction of peasant surpluses. The farmers in this period were different 
from earlier subsistence producers. They produced more for the market. Their 
increasing incorporation into the colonial and increasing European market 
that now included other traders made them more vulnerable to state control 
and to the dictates of the world economy beyond their control – at least in 
controlling the price of produce. 
Regarding sources, I have relied on both oral sources and colonial docu-
ments to make sense of life in the colonial and early post-colonial state, the 
attempts by the state to transform the rural economy, and the ways the local 
population responded and shaped the outcomes. As Paul Thompson explains, 
“Oral history can transform the content of history by shifting the focus and 
opening new areas of inquiry, by challenging some of the assumptions and ac-
cepted judgments of historians, by bringing recognition to substantial groups 
of people who had been ignored.”52 In our context, oral sources stress African 
voices and explain agricultural change as rural people lived it; indeed, they 
provide, essentially, history “from below.”53 The use of oral history rectifies 
the omission of rural voices, which are often ignored in official historical doc-
uments and have mostly been omitted in past studies of agricultural change. 
This work is based on a people with whom I share a common language 
and culture. Situating myself in relation to the research context enabled me to 
deal with issues of representation and interpretation of the experiences of the 
informants and the social context.54 I interviewed four members of my fam-
ily: my father, mother, brother, and uncle. For my family, access to historical 
knowledge was seen as part of the process of acculturation and education 
about the past. This situation confronts the researcher with a different set 
of problems – the difference between individual and group history.55 I was 
perceived as an “insider” and provided insights into matters that might be 
denied to an “outsider.” While these claims contradict those made by crit-
ics of insider research, it does not diminish the advantage the insider has in 
understanding the complexity and nature of his/her own society. There is less 
inclination by the insider to construct opaque stereotypes of a society. An 
insider perspective also has an impact on epistemology because the insider 
may have a better understanding of the social structures that generated a par-
i n T ro d u C T i o n 21 
ticular set of oral data.56 Indeed, Ndaywel Nziem has written of the African 
researcher as one who has a double role as “observer and actor.”57 
However, I have been keenly aware of what Richard Wright called the 
“unscriptable factor” – “perspective.”58 Faced with the task of maintaining 
what Obioma Nnaemeka called “a balanced distance between alienation and 
over-identification,” I was conscious of the problems of both interpretation 
and mediation,59 since both the insider and the “outsider” perspectives pres-
ent the possibility of distortion and preconception of social reality. I was con-
scious of the fact that I too may be looked upon as an outsider, albeit in a very 
different context. However, while the historian’s own sense of personal iden-
tity may place limitations on his/her work, as Raphael Samuel rightly argues, 
at the same time, that sense of personal identity gives it thrust and direction.60 
Some informants talked freely about general trends and more reluctantly 
about some aspects of individual lives. Some of my informants were glad to 
talk to me but reluctant to discuss certain aspects of their lives for fear that 
what they said might be discussed with other people. Many informants made 
personal references in the third person. Some people generalized personal 
experiences while discussing traumatic events or poverty. I have tried to con-
ceptualize these issues by moving between different levels of analysis: from 
the social and cultural norms of the Igbo, to consideration of the privacy of 
my informant, to the collective experience of the Igbo. As an insider, it was 
possible for me to transfer some of the unspoken words and actions to the 
spoken because a phrase sometimes represents a very long story or a deep 
sense of emotion. However, the generalization of personal experiences by 
informants shows how personal reality can translate into group identity and 
group reality. Interestingly, people often used the word “we” when relating 
emotional issues such as poverty and food insecurity, as a way of depersonal-
izing their suffering. 
Oral historians must also deal with the problem of memory, on which 
oral history is heavily dependent but which is human and fallible.61 The con-
ditional acceptance of oral history is recognized. This study, however, seeks to 
present a balanced view by combining oral data with other primary sources 
and with secondary data. But as Hoopes succinctly put it, “all historical 
documents, including both oral and written, reflect the particular subjective 
minds of their creators.”62 Yet the oral sources used here “give a “feel” for the 
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“facts” that “can be provided only by one who lived with them.”63 Therefore, I 
urged informants to recount their own experiences and to remember specific 
events in the lives of their parents and families. 
I have used a wide range of other sources, some of which have not been 
previously used. I consulted various documents left by imperial Britain in 
the National Archives of Nigeria, Enugu, the Public Record Office (National 
Archives), London, and Rhodes House Library at the University of Oxford. 
The archival materials contain concrete, dateable information and data, but 
limitations abound. Statistical data and information on agricultural produc-
tion during the colonial period may not be the most reliable indicator of 
aggregate economic performance. Colonial data often did not provide an ac-
curate level of agricultural production or indicate the level of peasant produc-
tion. Often, colonial reports reflected the economic and political objectives 
of the colonial officials rather than the economic realities of the colonized 
societies. Colonial officials often relied upon data from experimental farms, 
which operated under optimum management conditions, to estimate food 
and export crop yields for the provinces and the country at large. In most 
cases, the optimum conditions differed immensely from the conditions that 
farmers faced in their natural environments. Such evidence of agricultural 
performance and conditions is problematic and unsatisfactory when used to 
reach general conclusions. 
Many bits and pieces of useful information about rural life are missing 
from these reports. The effects of the shift to an export-oriented agriculture, 
the short- and long-term implications of colonial agricultural policies on 
farmers, the implications for subsistence production, and the general quality 
of life of rural producers are not easily discernible. As in many official colonial 
records, the voices of the local people are absent, although their actions speak 
for them. Official texts also obscure the life of the rural farmer, especially 
the contribution of women to agricultural production. The expression the 
“genuine farmer” was used in the colonial reports to refer to male farmers. 
Reading between the lines of the reports reveals the gendered nature of colo-
nial policies. The colonial assumption that the farmer was male silenced the 
contributions of women and children. However, reading past the “colonial 
approach” reveals that this was an unrealistic assumption. 
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Colonial reports contain a mass of information on economic statistics 
and agricultural conditions in the colonies, but there is little information on 
the method of data collection. Generally, colonial reports tended to be too 
optimistic in their estimation and projection of production in the colonies. 
Failures were often ignored or left unexplained. This is understandable be-
cause the jobs of colonial officials depended upon positive justifications of 
their activities in the colonies. Positive and idealistic reports also guaranteed 
continued interest in the colonies by the British government. The reports are 
largely couched within an ideological framework informed by the economic 
motives of the colonial enterprise. For these reasons, I have considered the 
circumstances under which colonial reports were generated. Despite the 
problems with colonial sources, however, they document the evidence of ag-
ricultural crisis and the social conditions during the colonial period. They 
present a means of putting faces and voices behind official statistics. 
I encountered a unique type of source – petitions – while researching 
this book. The hundreds of petitions written by ordinary people and local 
political activists provide a different perspective on the colonial encounter, 
agricultural change, and rural responses. The lives of ordinary people during 
the colonial period come alive through these letters, petitions, and supplica-
tions. The personal – and often intimate – letters of Africans create a unique 
portrait of the rough-and-tumble times of the colonial period. Most of the 
letters and petitions from ordinary people began to appear from the period 
of the Great Depression, but they became very common during the Second 
World War. The ability of Africans to write or to hire professional letter writ-
ers gave them the opportunity to respond to power and establish a dialogue 
with colonial powers – a dialogue that received some level of respect. Overall, 
these petitions reveal the impact of colonial policies on peasants and their 
attitude towards these policies. 
Still, the use of colonial documents to examine changes in colonial so-
cieties and relationships between the colonizer and the colonized calls for 
some caution regarding their limitations. Indeed, questions abound. Were 
events and data recorded factually or were they reflections of the perspec-
tives of officials in the colonies? Did colonial officers make history to portray 
themselves and government programs in a good light? What kinds of docu-
ments were preserved, and what types were destroyed, as frequently hap-
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pened? The lack of local voices and their stories make it easy to promote an 
officially sanctioned point of view. As Thomas Spear has argued, every action, 
interaction, and dialogue within a colonial context ought to be assessed from 
the “perspective of the different actors to understand the particular meaning 
each gave to it.”64 This caution over perspective informed my assessment of 
colonial sources and my attempt to provide some insight into the working of 
the minds of ordinary people in this period. 
The Land Has Changed employs a diachronic and multidisciplinary ap-
proach and juxtaposes peasant production, peasant resistance, gender ide-
ology, and the culture and identity of the African farmer with the broader 
scholarship on colonialism. The approach here has been one of blending 
between two fields of historical inquiry – social history and economic history 
– using oral, secondary, and archival sources. In following this approach, the 
book links the past and the present and integrates individual and personal 
experiences to the explanation of the agricultural crisis in Igboland. This has 
created the opportunity to put text and people in context and allowed a range 
of individuals and circumstances to be understood. 
sTruCTure of The book 
The book is arranged thematically, but each chapter addresses a specific his-
torical issue from the beginning of colonial rule onward, thereby providing a 
level of chronological sequence. Chapters 1 and 2 discuss the structure of Igbo 
society, politics, and economy on the eve of colonialism and the attempt by the 
British to restructure them in order to achieve the goals of imperialism. Chap-
ter 3 examines how the mission to transform African agriculture and achieve 
uplift was implemented through the dominant Western gendered ideology of 
the male farmer – an ideology deeply embedded in colonial patriarchal think-
ing. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 take up the issues related to African responses to 
colonial policy and in relation to the major structural changes that defined 
the twentieth century, including the Great Depression and the Second World 
War. These events had a direct impact on the local society, often drawing ru-
ral peasants into the colonial economy, and at times generating considerable 
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hardship to which rural peasants responded by rebellions. Chapter 7 focuses 
on the agricultural policy of the Eastern Region after independence – its 
espousal of a development ideology that continued to espouse agriculture as 
the instrument for rural transformation. The chapter details how the agri-
cultural programs of the early post-colonial period were stifled by political 
and structural factors including the Nigerian civil war and the emergence of 
petroleum exportation as the major source of income for Nigeria. Chapter 8 is 
a reflection on agricultural crisis, responses to it, rural coping strategies, the 
resilience of rural people, and the changing social relationships engendered by 
the crisis of the 1970s and 1980s. 
The aim of the book is to write a history of Igbo agrarian change and 
societal transformation as ordinary people responded to colonial policies 
and the structural changes that came with colonialism. It was the actions, 
responses, and, at times, the resistance of these ordinary men and women 
that helped shape both the colonial society and the society the Igbo inherited 
at the end of colonialism. 
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ChapTer one 
“ w e h aV e a Lway s B e e n 
Fa R M e R s ”: s O C I e T y a n d 
e C O n O M y aT T h e C L O s e O F
T h e n I n e T e e n T h C e n T u R y 
This chapter examines the socio-economic constitution of Igbo society, espe-
cially the ways in which the intersection of agriculture with individual and 
group identity illuminates historical patterns and processes of change. It 
outlines the key elements of the economy in relation to agriculture and trade 
before the twentieth century. In so doing, it links the political and social land-
scape of the Igbo to its political economy and sources of identity and provides 
the background needed to assess the developments in all these areas from the 
beginning of the twentieth century onward. 
The Igbo-speaking people are one of the largest single ethnicities in Nige-
ria. The Igbo have been characterized in the extant literature as decentralized 
or as forming what anthropologists termed “stateless societies.” These early 
classifications, as advanced by M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard, were 
based on the relevance and centrality of the lineage system of social organi-
zation in the regulation of political relations within and outside particular 
groups.1 Under this system, the responsibility for leadership is said to rest 
on village councils. Yet scholars who have identified a much more complex 
political organization in both the centralized societies and those founded on 
the segmentary-lineage principle have challenged such a broad dichotomy as 
applied to pre-colonial African political systems. As M. G. Smith noted, all 
27 
political systems have a shared characteristic of competition at various levels 
– a competitive dimension that cuts across lineage groups for control of deci-
sion-making, creating the opportunity for the development of a hierarchical 
structure even among elementary societies.2 
Although most parts of Igboland exhibit a decentralized political struc-
ture, they embody a much more complex political system. Indeed, scholars 
have identified models that range from kinship and lineage networks to 
societies where titled persons and age-sets have controlled the instruments 
of power and authority.3 Other parts of Igboland, such as Oguta, Onitsha, 
and Umueri, have monarchical political systems. At all levels of government, 
however, the Igbo have practised a form of direct participatory and repre-
sentative democracy.4 As Raphael Njoku argues, “the distribution of power, 
authority, and the processes of local administration are the same” in both the 
monarchies and the village republics. He notes further that the “elders ruled 
[sic] by representation, participation and negotiation,” and the notion of dif-
ference is found primarily in “the king’s ceremonial objects and titles.”5 
Most important to note at this juncture, however, is the interconnected-
ness between the political structures of the Igbo and sociocultural and eco-
nomic life and how this interplay relates to agriculture. The role of indigenous 
political actors and their influence on matters of production, reproduction, 
access to productive resources, and control of labour for production provide 
the contexts within which the Igbo economy can be understood. This role re-
lates to their control of the distribution of resources and the impact on gender 
relations of production. This relational approach is important in understand-
ing the forms of economic change that have occurred and the ways in which 
they reveal the trends in the historical patterns of production as outlined in 
subsequent chapters. 
The reconstruction of the origin and antiquity of plant domestication and 
agriculture among the Igbo, as among their counterparts in many parts of 
western Africa, is largely based on conjecture.6 Like most forest dwellers, the 
Igbo shifting cultivators produced such staple root crops as yams (ji; Discorea 
spp.), cocoyam (ede), and various kinds of cultivated bananas (unere). In addi-
tion, trees such as the kola tree (oji), the oil palm (nkwu), and the raffia palm 
(ngwo) provided additional sources of food, beverage, and income.7 The long 
history of plant domestication is evident in the large variety of food crops and 
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edible plants in the Igbo subregion of West Africa.8 The variety of crops and 
plants that attest to the antiquity of agriculture in the Igbo region include 
African rice (oriza glaberrina; osikapa obara obara), Guinea corn (sorghum 
vulgare; oka okiri), bulrush millet (oka mileti), hungry rice (osikapa ocha), 
Bambara groundnuts (voandzela subterranea or ahueekere otu anya), cowpea 
(vigna unguiculata, akidi), benniseed (sesamum indicum), okra (hibiscus escu-
lenta), kaffir or Hausa potato (pectchranthus esculentus), fluted pumpkin (tel-
faria occidentalis, ugu), gourd (legenaria isiceraria, agbo nwanru), and several 
other plant species. However, root crops provided the largest percentage of 
calories in the Igbo diet, followed by oils and fats from oil palm and cereals.9 
It is possible to paint a clearer picture of agriculture in modern times. As 
elsewhere on the West African coast, contact with the Europeans from the 
fifteenth century was a major transformative factor for indigenous agricul-
ture. The arrival of the Portuguese in Benin and later on the southwestern 
lagoon coast and in the creeks of the Niger and Cross river basins resulted 
in the introduction of important food plants of central and South American 
origin. The arrival of maize (oka), cassava (akpu), groundnuts (ahu ekere), 
sweet potatoes (ji nwa nnu), tomatoes, tobacco (utagba), and several varieties 
of citrus fruits helped to diversify the region’s food plants. By the seventeenth 
century, maize in particular had become an important secondary crop in the 
forest region.10 The new food crops and fruits led to the clearing of forests and 
changes in production relations. 
The introduction of Southeast Asian crops, including certain species 
of yam, cocoyam, rice, and banana, provided new varieties of food of high 
nutritive value that made it possible to support large populations.11 Several 
species of fruits, including oranges (oroma), lime (oroma nkirisi), tangerine, 
grapefruit, and mangoes, and also sugar cane were part of this exchange. It is 
difficult to date precisely when these crops were introduced, but it is specu-
lated that they came into the Igbo region either by northern routes via Egypt 
and the Sudan, or across equatorial Africa, or by the sea route round the Cape 
of Good Hope.12 The new patterns of agriculture that emerged with the intro-
duction of these crops entailed a more efficient use of human and material 
resources in Igboland in ways that J. E. Flint characterized as “perhaps the 
most efficient in Africa.”13 
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Asian and American crops, especially cocoyams (ede), had a long-term 
impact on Igbo society, especially on gender ideology. Cocoyams came to be 
known as a woman’s crop and women performed the routine work of plant-
ing, weeding, and harvesting the crop. Control of cocoyam production gave 
women a distinct identity as they took related titles such as eze-ede (cocoyam 
king) as a mark of success in farming, just as men took the yam-related title 
of eze ji (yam king).14 Yams and cocoyams are the only crops that attained 
this status in Igbo cosmology, although they are never regarded as equals. The 
significance of both crops as expressions of male and female identity was con-
firmed by Nwanyiafo Obasi when she asked, “What is man without yams and 
what is woman without cocoyams?”15 In all, considerable dietary adjustments 
occurred among the Igbo with the adaptation of the so-called women’s crops. 
Indigenous protein-rich foods were in short supply even in normal times. 
The few sheep, goats, and chicken that were kept and wild game provided 
an irregular, but quite significant, source of protein. Cattle, which were of 
the dwarf tsetse-fly resistant variety (ehi) and poor in meat yields, were kept 
mainly for prestige and ritual purposes.16 Thus the Igbo could not by all ac-
counts be regarded as animal husbandpersons for most of their subsistence, 
aside from occasional income, did not come from keeping animals. Dried fish 
were generally bought from coastal areas until the colonial period when the 
Igbo people became the main consumers of the tons of Norwegian stockfish, 
locally known as okporoko, that were imported into Nigeria. 
Although agriculture dominated both the subsistence and exchange 
economies, the Igbo pursued other productive activities and moved between 
occupations as the demands for special goods or skills warranted. Such 
movement of goods and skills produced additional specializations like salt 
production and fishing, and also led to the formation of guilds and the rise 
of ritual specialists. Other people facilitated trade as hosts and guides.17 The 
role of the last mentioned was particularly important in a region that lacked 
a strong centralized authority to guarantee safe passage from one village to 
the other.18 
The Igbo economy had become part of a larger regional economy, that of 
the Bight of Biafra, by the seventeenth century.19 Although Europeans did not 
visit Igboland until the late nineteenth century, early European travellers to 
the coast of West Africa and the Bight of Biafra recorded life and livelihood 
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among the Igbo in connection with the regional economy of the lower Nigeria 
basin. Duarte Pacheco Pereira, a Portuguese geographer visiting in the six-
teenth century, observed a vigorous trade in salt between the hinterland and 
coastal societies of southeastern Nigeria.20 The Igbo brought forest and agri-
cultural products to the coast in exchange for salt and dried fish.21 Writing in 
1699 on Kalabari/Igbo relations, John Grazilhier notes: “The land about the 
town [Kalabari] being very barren, the inhabitants fetch all their subsistence 
from the country lying to the northward of them, called the Hackbous [Igbo] 
Blacks.” Grazilhier reported further: “In their territories there are two mar-
ket-days every week, for slaves and provisions, which Calabar Blacks keep 
very regularly, to supply themselves both with provisions and slaves, palm-
oil, palm-wine, etc. there being great plenty of the last.”22 
The commercial relations that had developed prior to European contact 
expanded with the development of the slave trade in the eighteenth century. 
The accounts of captives of Igbo origin in the New World provide a rare and 
unusual glimpse of the agricultural and exchange economy of the Igbo in the 
two centuries before European colonization. An important source is the au-
tobiography of Olaudah Equiano, who was born in an Igbo village in ca. 1745 
and sold into slavery at the age of eleven.23 Equiano recorded the social and 
economic life of eighteenth-century Igbo society in The Interesting Narrative 
of the Life of Olaudah Equiano, or Gustavas Vassa, the African, published in 
1788. Agriculture, he wrote, “is our chief employment; and everyone, even 
the children and women, are engaged in it. Thus we are all habituated to 
labour from our earliest years.”24 Equiano’s description of Igbo society and 
economy in the eighteenth century is supported by the accounts given by 
other enslaved Africans of Igbo origin. Archibald Monteith, born about 1799 
in Igboland and taken to Jamaica as a slave during the Atlantic slave trade, 
affirmed in his memoir that yams, potatoes, and Indian corn were an integral 
part of Igbo agriculture in the eighteenth century.25 
Nineteenth-century European accounts offer more perspectives on the 
Igbo agricultural past. In his journey to Bonny in 1840, Hermann Koler, 
a German doctor, took notice that the Igbo exported agricultural produce 
and metal goods to Bonny. He described Igboland as rich in natural prod-
ucts – maize, rice, yams, oil palms, dyewoods, cotton, and so forth, and as 
“quite indispensable” in the provision of staple foodstuffs for Bonny.26 W. E. 
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Carew, who visited Ndoki in 1866, was impressed by the abundance of agri-
cultural produce among other provisions in the market: “It abounds in corn, 
palm wine, rum, fish, deer’s flesh, dogs’ flesh, cat, fowls, tobacco, yam, eggs, 
spices, pineapple, palm oil, bananas, cassava, cloths, gun powder, pipes, and 
things which I could not number.”27 During an expedition to Akwete in 1897, 
A. B. Harcourt described seemingly extreme fertile land and “yam planta-
tions extending for miles in all directions.”28 In a journey to Nsugbe and Nteje 
in 1897, S. R. Smith observed what would obviously be classified as women’s 
crops: “I noticed, growing in the Ntegi farms, pepper, cotton, black rice, cas-
sava (Manihot esculenta Crantz), and several other edible useful plants.”29 
The prodigy and efficiency of the Ezza farmers of northern Igboland, 
especially “their efficient application of manure made from leaves, crop re-
mains, animal dung and night soil,” impressed European visitors in the early 
twentieth century.30 Sir W. Egerton described the Ezza as “thrifty and excel-
lent farmers.”31 Miss Holbrook, who visited Umudioka near Ogidi in 1904, 
recognized the complementary role played by both sexes in agriculture: “The 
people on the whole are very industrious, the women especially, one seldom 
finds them at leisure, very often they are out helping the men plant or tend the 
yams, or planting cassava on their own account.”32 
Much of this suggests an economy that had developed far beyond sub-
sistence levels and that met the food and exchange needs of the population 
before the colonial encounter. By the sixteenth century, settlement on the 
fringes of the Guinean rainforest and on the Sub-Guinean environment had 
produced communities of town dwellers increasingly shifting to rotational 
bush fallow cultivation instead of earlier forms of shifting cultivation.33 This 
led to a consistent use of already cleared forest rather than virgin land and 
accounts for the high population concentration in the Igbo region. 
Gender ideology played important social and economic functions in reg-
ulating production relations, the land tenure system, and the labour process. 
Traditional Igbo farming was based on the complementary participation of 
men, women, and children. In this circumstance, farming defined both male 
and female identity and instilled the value of hard work in both adult and 
young Igbo persons. Equiano recalled, “Everyone contributes something to 
the common stock; and, as we are unacquainted with idleness, we have no 
beggars.”34 It was the height of social snobbery for an Igbo person, as Victor 
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Uchendu concluded, to be referred to as ori mgbe ahia loro, – that is, one who 
depended on the market for subsistence.35 This cultural ethos defined Igbo 
identity and attitudes to farming until recent times. 
environmenT, demogr aphy, and 
eConomy 
In the past our soil was fertile because people were fewer and 
there was less cultivation. In fact, land was cultivated every four 
years. Now land is scarce because of too many people – Luke Osun-
woke, Interview, 5 January 2000. 
The physical and environmental conditions, including climate, rainfall pat-
terns, and soil formations influenced agricultural practices among the Igbo. 
Most of Igboland falls within the Guinean and Sub-Guinean environment. 
The Guinea region is characterized by an annual rainfall in excess of fifty 
inches, less than three months of dry season, and a mean monthly humid-
ity of 90 per cent or more throughout the year. For the regions in the Sub-
Guinean vegetation zone (northern Igboland), the rainfall ranges between 
forty and sixty inches in the year with a dry season lasting between three and 
four months.36 The pattern of rainfall produced two distinct patterns of veg-
etation. The southern part of the region was characterized by heavy rainfall, 
producing a dense rainforest, which thinned out northwards into a savannah. 
However, many centuries of human habitation and activities have turned the 
whole region into a secondary forest, with only pockets of forest remaining. 
Although the region is fortunate to receive a well-distributed annual rainfall 
that can support a variety of crops, the soil has never been very fertile.37 Little 
variations in the timing and quantity of rain in a growing season can upset 
the agricultural cycle, food production, and food security. Stories of unwu 
(famine) abound in local folklore. 
The demographic characteristic of southeastern Nigeria, particularly in 
the areas inhabited by the Igbo, was a major determinant of the economic life 
of the people and the social structures that emerged from it. The Igbo occupy 
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a little over half of the land area of southeastern Nigeria but comprise over 60 
per cent of the total population. The need for crop land in a rapidly expanding 
population environment led to the clearing of the original vegetation and the 
emergence of grassland dotted with oil palms and other useful trees.38 Mor-
gan observes that “the Guinean environment of the I[g]bo and Ibibio-land 
may have been comparatively easy to clear since the soil consisted mainly 
of deep, well-drained sands.”39 By the middle of the twentieth century, the 
vegetation in many parts of Igboland was already composed of palm groves 
ranging from 100 to 200 trees per acre in some areas. The palm groves have 
largely survived human activities because of the importance of the edible oil 
derived from the oil palm and its increased importance as a source of cash 
after the abolition of the Atlantic slave trade in the nineteenth century.40 
Colonial estimates and ecological characteristics are proof of both high 
population and extensive use of the land. When the population density was 
about 236 persons per square mile, the colonial Resident for Onitsha ob-
served in 1929 that land was quite limited in proportion to the population.41 
By the 1940s, a population density of 1,000 persons per square kilometre was 
recorded in parts of Igboland42 and by the 1960s the density in the Igbo areas 
was about four times the Nigerian average.43 The high population density in 
many parts of Igboland often resulted in the over-exploitation of the soil and 
consequent erosion and destruction of the top soil. According to J. R. Mackie, 
the director of the agricultural department from the 1930s: 
The Agricultural problems are extremely difficult. Much of the 
soil is a very acid sand [sic] the Onitsha and Owerri Provinces carry 
a very dense population which is far greater than the soil can sup-
port.… Once they have become exhausted beyond a certain point 
recovery under fallow takes a very long time.”44 
As people were boxed into a diminishing land space, their survival became 
dependent on their ability to remaster an already exhausted environment. 
The key to Igbo population densities and to the distinctive crowded land-
scape of compounds and oil palms lies in the social organization and the 
character of the environment and the agricultural economy. Food production, 
especially the production of yams, may account for the unusually high concen-
tration of population in central Igboland despite the large-scale enslavement 
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of people from this region during the Atlantic slave trade. Although such an 
increase in population often leads to the emergence of complex societies, this 
did not occur here in terms of the formation of large centralized organiza-
tions. A simplistic explanation will include the absence of endemic warfare 
and conflict that would have resulted in the conquest and incorporation of 
other groups to reach the size of chiefdoms, states, or empires. Even the Aro 
and the Nri did not have the capacity to embark on such wars of conquest, so 
their influence over the rest of Igboland was more ritualistic than political. 
So, most of the Igbo remained organized in small groups and lineage orga-
nizations. The desire to live near one’s own cropland, away from the author-
ity of others, appears to have overridden all other considerations. This was a 
dominant factor in the evolution of the Igbo landscape.45 Morgan and Pugh 
have argued that the “attractive environment of the homeland, and the lack 
of any but local contacts, produced an immense crowding of people.”46 The 
unique residential pattern of the Igbo has been explained by the perception 
that the Igbo think in human, not in geographical, terms.47 Voluntary shifting 
cultivation would have been impossible to practice under conditions of high 
population density.48 Local overcrowding increased the rate of agricultural 
intensification such that “probably nowhere else in West Africa is there so low 
a proportion of waste [land] and so high a proportion of cropland.”49 
Igbo farmers had a deep understanding of their environment, the way to 
manipulate it to suit their needs, and the consequences of human actions on 
productivity.50 The Igbo, for example, rated the fertility of the soil by its colour 
and its distance from the homestead.51 So, the difference in colour between 
ala nkwuru (compound land) and ala mbara (distant land) was an indicator 
of fertility and determined what crops or species of crop could be planted on 
the land. By the end of the nineteenth century, ecological and demographic 
challenges had forced farmers to devise new strategies to manage their envi-
ronment. They adopted crop rotation and shortened their fallow periods. 
The agricultural system used was rotational bush fallow (popularly known 
as swidden or shifting cultivation). Land was cleared and cultivated until its 
fertility decreased, and then the plot was left fallow to regenerate its fertility. 
During the fallow period, plant cover and litter protects the soil from the 
impact of high intensity rain, and the roots help bind the soil, increase water 
filtration, and reduce run off and soil erosion.52 In addition to providing the 
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soil with nutrients, the fallow system provides supplementary food, animal 
feed, staking materials for yam vines, firewood, and herbal medicine.53 
While the historical origins of these practices are difficult to establish, 
they probably arose in response to the limitations imposed by an increasingly 
less mobile population dating back more than two centuries.54 To sustain their 
agricultural economy, the Igbo applied a set of conscious, interrelated prac-
tices aimed at making food production possible on their land through and 
beyond the foreseeable future. Igbo farmers made use of organic fertilizer, 
cover crops, and mulching to increase the fertility of the soil and to protect 
crops. The Ezza Igbo, for example, who were the greatest yam farmers, made 
compost in open circular pits, even using human excrement.55 Their experi-
ence in farming and their efficient application of compost from leaves, crop 
remains, animal dung, and night soil surprised but impressed early colonial 
officials, who in general formed an unfavourable impression of the capabili-
ties of African farmers. They interpreted unoccupied lands as unused or spare 
territory, which Africans were incapable of developing due to lack of skill or 
initiative.56 Hence, techniques such as shifting cultivation were seen as waste-
ful. But they failed to grasp the principles underlying shifting cultivation.57 
indigenous mode of produCTion 
The work of Claude Meillassoux and other French Marxist anthropologists 
has been very instrumental in explaining the mode of production in tradi-
tional Africa.58 Yet, as an example of the economy of the so-called stateless 
society, pre-colonial Igboland did not have an egalitarian mode of production, 
where all classes and groups had equal access to the means of production. The 
patriarchal and gerontologically based mode of production under the control 
of male elders precluded class and gender equity.59 The specific method ad-
opted in subsistence production, the control of the productive forces, and the 
relations of production gave elders control over communal land, the labour of 
younger members of the lineage, and the labour of wives and children.60 
Access to land was linked to the membership of a kin-group. Until recent 
times, land ownership was predominantly communal and held in common 
T h e l a n d h a s Ch a n ged 36 
by an entire village, kindred group, or extended family.61 Such lands were ap-
portioned out to members during each agricultural season.62 As land held in 
reserve for the benefit of the whole group, communal land could not be alien-
ated without the consent of the group as a whole. This tenure system survived 
into the twentieth century in some parts of Igboland. A district officer wrote 
in 1929 that land in Owerri was “under communal control and ownership.”63 
European officials observed that land was controlled by the lineage heads 
who allocated it to relatives based on their need in Aba and Orlu areas at 
the beginning of the twentieth century.64 W. B. Morgan observed among the 
Ngwa in the 1950s that “community land is still divided by the decision of the 
elders.”65 Individual land tenure developed rapidly in the twentieth century as 
a result of population pressure and intense commoditization of land during 
the colonial period. 
Age, gender, and marital status were important elements that structured 
access to resources and assigned roles in production. The principle of senior-
ity guided relations between males and females within the lineage group, 
between co-wives, and among male and female children.66 The right to hold 
land was governed by inheritance rules and formed part of an elaborate kin-
ship structure based on patriarchy in which only men could inherit land.67 
The social organization of production and familial relationships, es-
pecially the institution of marriage, were linked. The marriage system, as a 
well-defined exogamous residential system, deprived women of the right to 
inherit land, based on the idea that they would marry and leave the group. 
So a woman’s usufruct right to land was relationally derived either through 
a husband or through children.68 This customary land practice gave women 
room to manoeuvre within a very strong patriarchal inheritance system. 
Labour was organized at the level of the nuclear family (umunne) and the 
extended family (umunna). An extended family, consisting of a group of close 
patrilineal relatives of about three or four generations, was the most important 
socio-economic unit. The household constituted the first resort for labour 
recruitment. In such a household, a man and his wife constituted the major 
organizers of farm labour, including the labour of their children. Through 
their labour contribution, dependents gained access to land, the most im-
portant means of production.69 The importance of the family as a production 
unit perhaps explains why the Igbo valued large families. Mbagwu Korieh, 
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who until the Nigeria-Biafra Civil War in 1970 was a very successful yam 
farmer, stressed the importance of human labour in Igbo agriculture: “The 
size of a man’s household, the labour he could demand from relatives and 
clients, determined his success as a farmer.”70 The more wives and children a 
man had, the greater his ability to increase production and his prestige. 
Often members of an extended family helped each other by providing 
labour. Lineage heads had access to additional labour through the oru orie 
system. In this arrangement, the entire membership of the kindred provided 
labour to the head of the lineage (usually the oldest male in the lineage or 
ofo holder). This was usually on the orie day in some parts of Igboland.71 It 
was an important traditional practice, legitimized by a gerontologically based 
ideology in which the kindred head symbolized the ancestors. As the head of 
the kindred and custodian of their ofo (symbol of authority and justice), he 
was compensated for these services.72 The system gave an advantage to the 
kindred head since he could draw on a large pool of labour.73 The formula-
tion of oru orie labour arrangements in Igbo society had its root in a strong, 
traditional kinship structure where the provision of labour guaranteed the 
younger members sustenance, shelter, and other social needs in exchange for 
labour. 
Another method of raising labour among the Igbo was an appeal to 
friends (irio oru). Under this system, the farmer appealed to friends or kin 
for help during the farming season. Men often made appeals during yam 
planting and harvesting. Women often made use of this labour system during 
the planting and harvesting of their crops. Through this work arrangement, 
women as well as men relied on social networks to execute farm work. For 
women in particular, the work arrangement gave them substantial access to 
labour. The system benefited both the host farmer and the labourer because 
the host always provided lavish entertainment on the farm and in the house 
at the end of the day’s work. An Igbo adage puts it rightly: akpuzie onye oru, 
ya abia ozo (If a labourer/worker is well fed, he/she comes again). Workers 
in this arrangement were often given parting gifts of yams and other food 
items. 
Mutual exchange of labour (owe oru) was an equally important method 
of labour recruitment. A work group was the basic system adopted in an in-
creasingly labour-intensive agrarian system to meet its labour needs. This sys-
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tem of labour organization and management was organized along the lines of 
age grades, friendship circles, or social or finance clubs (isusu). These groups 
worked in turn for their members. For women in particular, this was a very 
popular method of providing labour for cocoyam and cassava cultivation.74 
Women married into the same kindred group (ndom alu alu) often took turns 
helping each other with farm work. Cash payments were not usually made, 
but the host provided food and drinks.75 Work groups may have concentrated 
on clearing the forest (young men’s groups in particular); others may have 
concentrated on tilling the soil or other phases in the farming cycle up to the 
harvest. But the most serious groups participated in the three most important 
phases in the farming cycle: clearing the forest, planting the crop, and weed-
ing. The system was beneficial to all concerned because it solved fundamental 
labour shortage problems, especially for widows and others who did not have 
a large, family-based labour force. 
There was evidence of the wide use of unfree labor in the form of both 
slaves and pawns (ohu).76 Pawns were usually debtors who provided labour 
or other services to a creditor for a specified period or until the loan was 
repaid.77 In some instances, debtors who pawned themselves lived with the 
creditor until they worked off the debt. The debtor was not usually paid for 
his/her labour throughout the period and still had to pay the loan in full.78 
This system was important because it guaranteed constant labour throughout 
the year. The existence of the ohu system, in an otherwise egalitarian society, 
indicates the existence of poverty and social and economic differentiation. 
Labour was often organized along gender lines and many African societ-
ies distinguished between the labour of men and women. Yet, early European 
perceptions of Africa gave the impression that women did most of the farm 
work while men enjoyed much leisure time. A German trader, David van 
Nyendael, described women in late-seventeenth-century Benin as having so 
much employment that they “ought not to sit still.”79 The women of Whydah, 
Dahomey, in the same period, “Till[ed] the ground, for their husbands,”80 
and the Capuchin priest, Denis de Carli, reported that women in west-central 
Africa worked the fields while men made little or no contribution to agri-
culture.81 Walter Rodney identified the same trends in the societies of the 
Upper Guinea Coast.82 Though not an expert on the Igbo, French historian 
Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch has noted that “it was women who worked in 
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the fields” among the Igbo.83 Anthony Hopkins cites Bamenda (Cameroon) 
as an example of a pre-colonial society in which women were very impor-
tant in farming, while among the Yoruba they were much more prominent 
in trade.84 
A gendered division of labour was the underlying principle that struc-
tured production relations among the Igbo, but there was ample flexibility in 
the tasks performed by men and women.85 From Equiano’s description, the 
most important source of energy (human labour) among the Igbo remained 
relatively unchanged into the contemporary era. Equiano wrote in his auto-
biography: “Our tillage is exercised in a large plain or common, some hours 
walk from our dwellings, and all the neighbours resort thither in a body. They 
use no beasts or husbandry, and their only instruments are hoes, axes, shov-
els, and beaks, or pointed iron, to dig with.”86 
Tilling the ground for yams, planting them, and staking them were pre-
dominantly male tasks. Women and children carried out important farm 
operations such as clearing the land at the beginning of the farming season, 
weeding, planting, and tending certain crops such as melon (egusi), maize, 
cocoyams, and cassava. Men were involved in clearing virgin forests. Yet the 
division of labour was fashioned to suit the economic and demographic re-
alities. Convenience was important in dictating how the family did its work. 
Basden notes that women took their full share of tasks that were regarded 
as men’s work, especially turning the soil and mounding up the yam beds.87 
Chief Onyema states, “No taboo barred women from participating in all ag-
ricultural practices or activities.”88 Even though the cultivation of yams is 
regarded as a man’s affair, a division of labour still existed. Luke Osunwoke of 
Umuorlu, explains: “In the production of yam there was a division of labour. 
Men prepared the mounds and also measured the soil for the yam stands. 
Women weeded the land after the crop had been planted.”89 J. Harris con-
cluded that the division of labour in farm work was anything but rigid and 
few strict rules were enforced.90 Yet, women have been known to play less 
significant roles in agriculture, concentrating on trade and craft manufacture 
in some Igbo groups. Women in the Nsukka area played a less crucial role in 
agriculture, concentrating rather on cloth weaving, pottery production, and 
petty trading, while men generally dominated farming.91 
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eThos of The igbo agriCulTur al 
eConomy 
There can be little doubt that a crop as precious and as demand-
ing as the yam would in time acquire this “status of a god of life.” 
– M.J.C. Echeruo, Ahiajoku Lecture, 1979 
At the core of Igbo farming was the cultivation of yams. It was the most im-
portant symbol of prestige and other forms of identity were directly or indi-
rectly tied to its production and consumption. Until recent times, yams also 
shaped important elements of Igbo cosmology and food and dietary habits. 
Alexander Falconbridge, a British slave ship surgeon, who visited the Bight 
of Biafra during the second half of the eighteenth century, described yams as 
“the favourite food of the Eboe [Igbo].”92 D. G. Coursey referred to the Igbo as 
“the most enthusiastic yam cultivators in the world.”93 According to Reverend 
G. T. Basden, yam “stands for [the Igbo] as the potato does for the typical 
Irishman.… A shortage of yam supply is a cause of genuine distress, for no 
substitute gives the same sense of satisfaction.”94 H. H. Dobinson described 
yams as the chief product of Asaba in 1891.95 Linus Anabalam, a rural farmer 
in Mbaise, said, “A man who bought yams from the market in the olden days 
was ridiculed and regarded as lazy.”96 
Yam, a highly ritualized crop, was synonymous with the agricultural 
ethos of the Igbo people. Emmanuel Nlenanya Onwu notes: “The discovery 
of yam cultivation formed not only the economic base of Igbo civilization but 
it also carried tremendous religious import. It was of such great importance 
that it was given ritual and symbolic expressions in many areas of Igbo life.”97 
The most significant expression of the rituals was the celebration of Ahiajoku 
(the yam spirit) – a thanksgiving dedicated to the earth goddess (Ala) before 
the harvesting of new yams. The new yam festival was not just an offering 
of thanksgiving to the gods; it signified community life and social cohesion. 
Although celebrated in recent times largely as a symbolic activity and devoid 
of its ritual components, the new yam festival remains a memorial to the most 
important crop in Igbo life. 
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Associated with the Igbo penchant for the yam are cultural habits, ritu-
als, and taboos (Nso Ala) that structured yam cultivation, harvest, and con-
sumption. Nso Ala forbade certain conduct and practices, such as stealing 
yams and cocoyams. Edward Morris Falk, remarking on the customs and 
practices of the Igbo in the Aba Division in 1920s, observed: 
Stealing from a farm or farm produce, livestock etc. is consid-
ered to be a very serious crime indeed, even though only a trifle of 
small value be stolen. The Chiefs never fail to complain that the 
punishment which they are allowed to inflict is utterly inadequate 
to act as a deterrent.98 
Breaking these taboos called for an elaborate cleaning ritual to appease Ala. 
The domination of this ritual knowledge by the Nri Igbo, which reached its 
peak of power between 1200 and 1640 but declined between 1650 and 1900, 
gave the Nri a level of imperial control over the rest of Igboland.99 According 
to Dike and Ekejiuba, the Nri rose to prominence because “they set themselves 
up as the chief representatives of powerful spiritual forces, especially the key 
agricultural deities of the Igbo.”100 In essence, Echeruo argues, “Nri was the 
immediate outgrowth of an agricultural revolution in the fertile valley of the 
Anambra River. That revolution, consecrated in the worship of the Earth (Ala) 
and of the Yam (Ji; Fejioku) was accelerated by the introduction of metal work, 
and the implements of agriculture which followed.”101 The precious artifacts 
discovered at Igbo-Ukwu, while attesting to the wealth and influence of the 
Nri Empire, are also evidence of the wealth generated by its agriculture-fund-
ed, long distance trade and exchange.102 
Yam signified life, masculinity, cohesion, and the value of hard work 
among the Igbo people. Since yam was closely linked to male identity, an Igbo 
man’s yam barn was his most important sacred space. Yam-based status was 
perhaps the most valued of commonly accepted male identity-linked pur-
suits, until the early twentieth century. Local political, social, and economic 
lives were woven around a man’s success as a yam farmer in many parts of 
Igboland. “What is a farm without yams; what is a man without a yam barn?” 
asked an Mbaise elder.103 Nze James Eboh of Alike Obowo, noted: “A man 
would be proud of all his assets, but he was nothing if he had no yams. This is 
how a dimkpa [successful man] was measured in the past. Things are not the 
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same anymore.”104 In Ohafia, like many other parts of the Igbo country, part 
of a man’s status or dignity derived from the performance of four yam-related 
rituals: (1) Ike Oba (Barn Raising), (2) Igwa Oba (Barn Sanctification) dur-
ing which the Ifejuoku/Nfujuoku/Njuoku ji (Njoku Ji) shrine is constructed. 
Usually the chief celebrant places the biggest edible yam from his harvest on 
the Njoku Ji shrine; (3) Igwa Nnu (Consecration of the first 400 yams (aka 
oba)), and (4) Ime Okere Nkwa (a drumming celebration of achievement and 
the dignity of labour). To host the Ime Okere Nkwa festival, the farmer must 
have more than 2,800 yams (aka oba ji asaa). During the celebration, the 
chief celebrant places 2,800 yams at measured distances from his barn to his 
hamlet arena.105 Such yam-based status conferred on men prestige at home 
and in the public arena, tied them together in associations of high achievers 
and differentiated them from less successful farmers. 
Chinua Achebe’s Things Fall Apart captures the Igbo attitude toward 
yams and the link between the crop and male identity. Okonkwo’s work eth-
ics and determination to build a barn through sharecropping exemplify this 
ethos.106 The depiction of Unoka, Okonkwo’s father, as a lazy, unsuccessful 
farmer whose perennially poor yam harvest was a source of ridicule in his vil-
lage is reflected in the different statuses of the two men in their community. 
The link between environment and agricultural production is also reflected 
in this dialogue between Unoka and the priestess of Ala (the earth goddess): 
Every year before I put any crop in the earth, I sacrifice a cock 
to Ani, the owner of all land. It is the law of our fathers. I also kill a 
cock at the shrine of Ifejioku, the god of yams. I clear the bush and 
set fire to it when it is dry. I sow the yams when the first rain has 
fallen, and stake them when the young tendrils appear. I weed.107 
The priestess’s response reveals a deep connection between agriculture, Igbo 
cosmology, and agricultural practice and environment: 
You have offended neither the gods nor your fathers. And when 
a man is at peace with his gods and his ancestors, his harvest will 
be good or bad according to the strength of his arm. You, Unoka, 
are known in all the clan for the weakness of your machete and 
your hoe. When neighbors go out with their axe to cut down virgin 
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forests you sow your yams on exhausted farms that take no labor 
to clear. They cross seven rivers to make their farms; you stay at 
home and offer sacrifices to a reluctant soil. Go home and work 
like a man.108 
Another fictional work, The Seed Yams Have Been Eaten by Phanuel Egejuru, 
further captures the importance of the yam among the Igbo and the transfor-
mations that have taken place since the Nigerian Civil War.109 Egejuru wrote: 
“We young ones are happy now because we shall not go to the farm again as 
all seed yams have been eaten by the soldiers, both our soldiers and enemy 
soldiers. We now eat cassava and women go all the way to Umuagwo to collect 
cassava.”110 The dilemma faced by the protagonist Jiwundu [yam is life] in the 
story and his resolve to perpetuate his name by striving to build his life around 
yam production show the complexity of Igbo economic rationality as well as 
the centrality of yam in Igbo cultural life. The disappearance of the yam and 
the concomitant decline of the Ahiajoku ritual threatened communal cohe-
sion and collective identities.111 
Although these are fictional works, they depict the values attached to yam 
production among the Igbo, but most importantly, they provide an insight 
into how the Igbo speak about yams and the link with male identity. Both 
works also depict a society where notions of acceptable gender role affected 
the agricultural pattern – labour, crop, and identity. Achebe wrote in relation 
to Okonkwo’s work ethic: “His mother and sisters worked hard enough … but 
they grew women’s crops like cocoyams [ede], beans and cassava. Yam, the 
king of crops was a man’s crop.”112 Achebe was also presenting the Igbo work 
ethic in general. As the “male” crop, the Igbo granted the yam privilege over 
other crops and its production was closely integrated to male identity. Early 
colonial observers noted a distinctly gendered pattern in crops cultivated in 
Igboland. The district officer for Owerri District noted in 1928 that yams were 
the principal crop and “the remaining crops are all women’s crops, grown, 
maintained and sold by them.”113 The celebration of the yam as a symbol of 
masculinity and the cultural and spiritual essence of Igbo manhood is obvi-
ous in such male names as Ezeji (a title meaning yam king) and Jiwundi. As 
an example of Igbo philosophizing about the importance of the yam, Jibundu 
means that the yam is life, and it builds a home, a community, and a town.114 
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That, to be sure, suggests a long antiquity of the cultivation and use of yams 
and the existence of deeply rooted cultural and ritual practices associated 
with yams. 
While it is difficult to trace the origin of the gender ideology associated 
with yam production, some of the patriarchal ideas related to yam production 
may have become more elaborate following the introduction of cocoyams and 
cassava. The myths and rituals associated with yam cultivation, it seems, were 
part of the power dynamics that evolved in a predominantly decentralized 
society in which sociopolitical and economic power was very amorphous. 
The high social status derived from successful yam cultivation became an 
important means of affirming male authority, identity, and status. 
The intensive nature of yam production required large amounts of labour 
and a high rate of soil depletion. Basden concluded in his study of Igboland 
in the 1920s that “From an agricultural point of view, the yam is a very ex-
travagant vegetable to grow. Each tuber requires a full square yard of land, 
which in itself, is a big demand. For seven or eight months, regular attention 
must be given to its care, absorbing much time and labor.” Basden noted that 
“If wages had to be paid, it is doubtful whether a yam farm would pay its way, 
let alone yield profit.”115 The concern raised early in the twentieth century 
became more pronounced by the end of the century, as farmers faced the 
problems of degraded land and dwindling availability of labour and cost. 
These factors have challenged the traditional cropping and dietary patterns, 
changing them in favor of cassava – the so-called women’s crop. 
However, when the Igbo talk about farming, they talk about yams, espe-
cially in defining male identity.116 How did yams come to hold this prominent 
place in the agricultural and cultural life of the Igbo? The elevation of the 
yam to high status appears to have had its origin in the people’s agricultural 
past. The yam was certainly one of the earliest crops to be domesticated by the 
Igbo.117 Legends about the origin of the yam enable us to speculate not only 
about the prevailing ideology but also about the gendered nature of yam pro-
duction in the Igbo habitat. One version of such a legend recorded by Basden 
states: 
In the olden times, there was nothing to eat, so Eze Nri consid-
ered what should be done to remedy the defect. He took the drastic 
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course of killing his eldest son, cutting the body in small pieces 
and burying them. His daughter shared a similar fate. Strange to 
say, five months later, yam tendrils were observed to be growing at 
the very places where the dismembered parts of the son’s body had 
been planted. In similar fashion ‘edde’ [cocoyam] began to grow 
where the remains of the daughter had been buried. In the sixth 
month, the Eze Nri dug up fine large yams from his son’s grave and 
‘edde’ from the place where he had buried his daughter. He cooked 
both and found them sweet.118 
While this legend may not explain the actual origin of yams, it reveals the 
prevailing ideology about yams and agriculture. In this legend, the yam repre-
sents masculinity, having grown out of the dismembered parts of the son, and 
the cocoyam represents femininity, for it grew out of the daughter’s grave. 
Yams were much more than a food crop. The development of a yam cul-
ture and settled life supported the emergence of the complex social and ritual 
systems associated with yam cultivation and the development of settlements 
and communal property.119 Yam cultivation was the major incentive for the 
development of technology suited to the extensive clearance of the original 
rainforest and the more effective mastery of the forest. The rituals associated 
with the yam cult themselves also express important aspects of power rela-
tions in traditional society: namely, the domination of ritual functions by 
men and the social prestige attached to the status of Ezeji, a title only men 
could take. Yam production, perhaps, also triggered the era of property own-
ership, in which land was controlled by wealthy yam farmers, the emergence 
of the early formation of agrarian communes, and the distinction between 
the poor farmer and the rich one. Yams brought tremendous changes in the 
life of the Igbo, including population growth, the elaboration of archetypical 
social institutions, and the evolution of a cosmological system in which the 
Earth (Ala) became deified and occupied the central place as the ordainer and 
guardian of morality, the source of law and customs.120 
Production relations, land tenure systems, and land use are shaped by 
this culturally defined ethos centred on yam production. Social status, gender 
ideology and identity, taboos, and rituals associated with yams and cocoyams 
form an essential part of the cultural ethos. The extended family (umunna) 
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may have originally been organized to sustain yam production because yams 
required abundant labour and care from planting to harvest. This is probably 
true of most peasant agriculture. The labour required for yam cultivation led 
to the development of marriage alliances and the institution of polygamy. 
Marriage ensured the continued reproduction of the lineage and the avail-
ability of women’s and children’s labour. The consumption of yam followed 
the ties of kinship, comradeship, and friendship and its distribution generated 
new ties, trade, and social alliances.121 By dominating yam production, men 
controlled the most important factors of production – land and the labour of 
wives, children, and younger lineage members. 
Yet, women successfully exploited the flexibility inherent in the Igbo land 
use and tenure system to maximize their own production through intercrop-
ping a variety of other crops in the spaces provided by the yam mounds. This 
enabled women to perform important roles related to the overall diet and 
food security. They also performed important roles during the unwu period 
before the crops were harvested. Women dug up the first yams, known as 
nwa agwagwa erie, which helped people survive the lean periods, a task seen 
as demeaning for men.122 These roles attest to the centrality of women in the 
food security arrangements. 
pre- Colonial CommerCe 
Until the mid-seventeenth century, the economy of most of Igboland was still 
largely a subsistence economy, based on complementary ecological niches 
suited for particular types of crop production, fishing, and craft manufac-
ture. However, although pre-colonial Igbo farmers produced primarily for 
their own subsistence, they also produced for exchange and extra income. 
The commercial system served as an efficient means of exchange and distri-
bution of agro-based goods among other consumables. Agricultural produce 
dominated the local market as Elizabeth Isichei noted of the traditional Igbo 
market: “Merchandise was plentiful and varied, but common to all markets 
were yams, cocoyams, meat, fish, salt, maize cobs, beans, leaves, banana, paw 
paws, groundnuts, chickens, goats, sheep and dogs, palm oil, palm kernels, 
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pepper, kola nuts and so on.”123 The predominance of agricultural produce in 
the Igbo markets was an indication of the link between agriculture and com-
merce. This, of course, was the case in most pre-industrial societies where the 
need for food was of primary concern. 
A high level of intensive internal exchange had developed in the region 
before the overseas trade in slaves.124 Long-distance trade depended on what 
Ukwu I. Ukwu described as “specialist groups and individuals,” and mostly 
relied on “covenants at the personal level, Igbandu, as the principal means 
of guaranteeing freedom of movement across the country and safety among 
strangers.”125 Both the Aro and the Nri-Awka, who dominated early long-
distance trade in Igboland and beyond, relied on the existence of a relay of 
hosts and trade pacts that developed into a great network of ritually based 
commercial relations.126 As in most such societies, the demand for high value 
goods was not entirely absent prior to the contact with Europeans. The trade 
in such goods, which included salt, beads, ivory, dyes, cloth, carving, charms, 
and ironmongery, Ukwu argues, was for the most part “irregular and scarce-
ly created new markets within an area.”127 But the skills of the Awka people, 
whose prestige derived from the repute of their Agbala deity and their skills 
as diviners and doctors, were “useful in establishing markets for their wares,” 
including luxury goods such as “ivory and coral beads from the Anambra 
and Igala country.”128 The Awka trading arrangement was integrated into 
agriculture as Awka people became Ahiakoku ritual specialists. The Awka 
trade diaspora did not establish permanent settlements, as the Aro did from 
the seventeenth century, yet the nature of their organization enhanced the 
exchange of goods and services throughout the Igbo country. 
The Aro influence in the development of commercial relation in Igboland 
and beyond is legendary. The Aros’ success was contingent on the establish-
ment of well-coordinated trading networks based on settlements by members 
of the Aro diaspora and trade fairs.129 The Aros’ location in the escarpment 
between the central Igbo districts and the Cross River helped them to con-
trol several trade routes along the Awka-Orlu-Okigwi axis and as far away as 
Nike in northern Igboland. Their reach was felt throughout Afikpo, Uburu, 
Izza, and Izzi in the northeast. To the south, their commercial relations ex-
tended to Bende and Uzuakoli. Like the Nri-Awka before them, Aro traders 
distributed luxury item including horses and cattle “for ritual purposes.”130 
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The Aro called upon their network of trade routes and settlements in the era 
of the slave trade, which they dominated from the eighteenth century. 
Two separate but related economic systems existed in Igboland in the 
pre-colonial period: a trade in slaves and a trade in palm oil, which devel-
oped after the abolition of the Atlantic slave trade. The Atlantic slave trade 
provided the initial link with the external market and the impetus for greater 
European economic contact in later years. Until the mid-nineteenth century, 
slaves were the most important export from Igboland. David Eltis and David 
Richardson estimate that about one in seven Africans shipped to the New 
World during the whole era of the transatlantic slave trade originated from 
the Bight of Biafra.131 This corresponds to the estimated 11.9 per cent of the 
total number for which data are available via the Du Bois CD-ROM data-
base.132 Trade in the region grew steadily from the 1730s, reaching a peak of 
22,500 captives annually in the 1780s and expanded further to about 40,800 
in the 1830s and 1840s.133 Douglas Chambers suggests that, of the 11.6 mil-
lion people estimated to have been shipped to the New World between 1470 
and 1860, some 1.7 million were transported from the Bight of Biafra.134 He 
estimates that 80 per cent of the people shipped from the Bight of Biafra were 
Igbo-speaking and reached the Americas in British ships.135 
The Aro were the most important facilitators of the trade in the Bight of 
Biafra hinterland. The trade linked several parts of the Cross River trading 
system. Market routes branched in several directions within the Bight of Bi-
afra hinterland from the major markets of Uburu and Bende. Nike or Aku in 
the north, Okigwi in the centre, and Awka in the centre-west were linked to 
these two major markets. Onitsha, Ossamari, and Aboh on the Niger, Akwete 
on the Imo River, and Itu on the Cross River were major routes linking the 
overland routes and waterways that moved goods.136 
Important demographic and economic changes occurred as a result of 
the slave trade. The slave traffic resulted in concentrations of population in 
some coastal regions and clearance of the surrounding forest for agricul-
ture.137 Given the demand for local foodstuffs, local people understood the 
added importance of producing a greater surplus. Slaves were fed until they 
were sold in the Americas, in most cases on diets to which they were accus-
tomed, on the odious journey known as the middle passage. The demand for 
provisions on slave ships increased the demand for local foodstuffs, includ-
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ing cassava, yams, and palm oil.138 The Bight of Biafra became an important 
source of commercial foodstuffs as the external slave trade developed. 
Yam production, in particular, rose in importance as an important source 
of food for those shipped from the Bight of Biafra into the overseas slave trade. 
There was considerable trade in yams in the seventeenth and early eighteenth 
century in the Bight of Biafra according to the accounts of John and James 
Barbot. European slavers were advised to carry no less than 100,000 yams for 
every 500 slaves on ships. James Barbot took only 50,000 and suffered because 
of a shortage of yams.139 Although the seasonal nature, bulk, and difficulty of 
storage of yams constituted problems for slavers, the demand was substantial 
along the Bight. It is impossible to estimate accurately the quantities of yams 
bought in the Bight of Biafra. Jones estimated an annual export of more than 
a million yams based on Captain Adam’s estimates of 20,000 slaves from the 
Rio Real and half the recommended quantity of 100,000 yams for a cargo of 
500 slaves.140 Between 1801 and 1867 when the external trade was winding 
down, about 217,781 slaves were exported from the Bight of Biafra, suggesting 
that a substantial quantity of yams was still being purchased in the Bight.141 
Thus, local production in the Bight and its hinterland was in part struc-
tured around providing food items for the slave market. Slavers, on their 
part, were interested in the dietary habits of their African victims. Alexander 
Falconbridge, a British slave ship surgeon, recorded: “The diet of the negroes, 
while on board, consists chiefly of horse-beans, boiled to the consistence of 
a pulp; of boiled yams and rice, and sometimes of a small quantity of beef or 
pork.” Different African ethnic groups were identified with particular kinds 
of food. “Yams are the favorites food of the Eboe, or Bight Negroes, and rice 
or corn, of those from the Gold and Windward Coasts; each preferring the 
produce of their native soil,” Falconbridge noted.142 
The early commercialization of food production created a diverse econ-
omy in which the Ngwa Igbo and Anang Ibibio became well-known yam 
producers who fed the Atlantic market. Indeed, the production cycle in the 
region influenced slavers’ traffic in the region. Barbot made a connection be-
tween the availability of yams, the famine (unwu) period, when yams had been 
planted, and the ability of European slavers to achieve a quick turn around 
in the Bight of Biafra. “Yams are not fit to be taken out of the ground before 
July and August. Europeans account these two months the best season of the 
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year, because of the continual rains which refresh the air and give natives an 
opportunity to apply themselves wholly to commerce up the land for getting 
slaves with expedition but more especially in August and September,” Barbot 
wrote. “But in August and September and so on to March these eatables grow 
very dear among them insomuch that some ships have been forced to fall 
down to Amboses and Cameroons river in May and June to buy plantains.… 
To avoid this long delay it is much better for a ship bound to this place from 
Europe to stop at Cape Tres Pontas or at Anamabon on the Gold Coast to buy 
Indian wheat or corn there,” he warned.143 
Although Barbot was wrong about the time when yams were scarce (usu-
ally from March to June), the seasonal nature of yam production and African 
marketing strategies influenced the time Europeans felt it was best to trade 
– the dry season. Grazilhier, who traded in the Bight at the beginning of the 
eighteenth century, understood this, according to the information he gave to 
British slaver James Barbot: 
In the months of August and September a man may get in his 
complements of slaves much sooner than he can have the neces-
sary quantity of yams to subsist them, but a ship leading slaves in 
January, February etc., when yams are very plentiful, the first thing 
to do is to take them in and then the slaves.144 
These descriptions provide insights into the link between the developing At-
lantic commerce and the rural agricultural economy of the regions on the West 
African coast. Slavers were forced to use local foodstuffs, thereby stimulating 
increased production of these food items in response to the new demands. We 
can assume that most of the yams bought at Bonny and New Calabar came 
from the forest region bordering the Imo River and from the marginal savan-
nah of the Niger riverain area.145 
The long-term impact of the abolition of the slave trade was also agrarian 
in nature. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the market facilitated ef-
fective exchange, which helped in the capitalization of aspects of the agricul-
tural system.146 Increased interest in tropical agricultural products followed 
the abolition of the Atlantic slave trade.147 The growing industrial development 
of Europe created a need for palm oil and palm kernels. The Igbo responded 
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to the transition from the slave trade to a commodity trade by introducing 
innovations that enabled them to increase export quantities. By the 1860s, the 
trade in palm oil, which began in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
had replaced the trade in slaves. The development of the trade in palm oil and 
later kernels helped in the further occupation of the rainforest and perhaps 
the further expansion of food crop production to support the demands cre-
ated during the period of the slave trade. As early colonial reports suggest, 
the Igbo were expanding into the southeastern portions of the Guinean forest 
from the seventeenth century onward, a process that led to the cutting down 
of the forests and “replacing them by villages and hamlets surrounded by 
oil palm groves, farmlands and forest remnants.”148 By the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, a considerable quantity of palm oil was being exported 
to Liverpool and other European destinations.149 The original development of 
the palm oil trade was therefore associated with the slave traffic but increased 
in importance after the slave trade’s abolition. 
By the mid-nineteenth century, some British officials and traders on the 
West African coasts strongly espoused the “liberating” tendency of so-called 
legitimate commerce within official colonial circles. When Captain Joseph 
Denman testified before the Select Committee on the West Coast of Africa 
in 1842, he assured its members: “When once the trade is interrupted at any 
place, people are not in the habit of sending traders up the country for slaves, 
and traders from the interior cease to bring slaves down to them there, and 
there is great difficulty felt in resuming ‘the trade’.” He argued that such dis-
ruption “in almost every instance” caused legitimate commerce to grow and 
helped to supply the “wants of the natives.”150 Benjamin Campbell, British 
consul at Lagos from 1853 to 1859, and Richard Hutchinson, consul for the 
Bight of Biafra from 1855 to 1860, both declared the liberating potential of 
“legitimate” trade.151 
The export of palm oil to Liverpool from the Bight of Biafra in 1806 
was 150 tons, and by 1829 it had reached over 8,000 tons.152 The trade from 
the Bight of Biafra increased from 4,700 tons of palm oil in 1827 to about 
13,945 tons in 1834.153 By the 1830s, Britain was importing about 10,000 tons 
of palm oil a year.154 Between 1855 and 1856, the entire African production 
of palm oil was about 40,000–42,000 tons. Out of this figure, 26,000 tons 
exported through the Bight of Biafra, although the amount that came from 
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an early method of commercial palm oil production. (reproduced with the kind permission of 
the bodleian library, university of oxford.) 
the interior is not clear.155 The output of palm oil from all the Niger mar-
kets between 1886 and 1888 was about 6,000 tons.156 From the 1860s onward, 
when palm oil prices fell, and the 1880s, when the long process of establishing 
colonial hegemony began, the implication for the local agrarian economy of 
the dependence on palm produce became apparent, a legacy that was exacer-
bated with the imposition of colonial rule. Although the volume of the trade 
in palm oil was considerably low before 1900, Captain H. L. Gallwey, Her 
Majesty’s vice-consul for the Oil Rivers Protectorate, had noted in the 1890s 
that trade on the Benin River was chiefly in palm oil with a substantial trade 
in kernels as well. This was the case for many other communities in the Niger 
Delta.157 The limited quantity produced in the decades immediately before 
1900 accounts for the reportedly high price demanded by native producers on 
the West African coast for palm oil.158 
Palm kernels became an export item after 1860 as a result of the demand 
for soap making, margarine manufacture, and residue for cattle food.159 
Women and children performed the slow laborious process of cracking the 
nuts: “In 1862, 272 tons were imported into Great Britain.”160 Exports from 
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Old Calabar reached 1,000 tons at two shillings per bushel when the trade 
began at this port in 1869 and exports had doubled two years later at eight 
shillings per bushel. Exports had reached 10,000 tons by 1875 and 22,031 
tons by 1885. Substantial quantities of kernels were being exported to other 
European countries, especially Germany, toward the end of the nineteenth 
century. By 1903, Nigerian kernel exports had reached 131,900 tons, mostly 
going to Germany. 
This trade was buttressed by new waterways that were developed to move 
oil and kernels to the coast. The development of agriculture, particularly 
the palm oil trade, led to the large-scale development of the internal slave 
trade and an extensive use of unfree labour in parts of Igboland. The trade 
in commodities also engendered significant speculation and investment in 
land, with significant sociological consequences. The demands of the oil palm 
trade, Michael Echeruo says, 
… created the adventurer class in Igboland, the dare-devil en-
trepreneur who knew how to accumulate capital. Banking, for ex-
ample, which under Nri, was a glorified loan-scheme, guaranteed 
by the higher fees to be paid by new initiates, became a truly capi-
talist enterprise. It is not an accident that the resulting accumula-
tion of cash capital was more pronounced among the Aro than the 
Nri who continued to commit their reserves into mansions and 
objects of art/prestige, while the Aro provided the cash credit on 
which a mercantilist economy could thrive.161 
We can trace the domination of aspects of Igbo life (ritual and commercial) 
before, during, and after the slave trade by the Nri and Aro and the linking 
of Igboland into a sort of economic and ritual commonwealth, and we can 
also see how the internal economic crisis the Nri and Aro faced toward the 
end of the nineteenth century reflected on other parts of Igboland. When one 
examines the case of Nri, as Michael Echeruo argues, prosperity in earlier pe-
riods “led to urban and later to imperial interests – which in turn nurtured a 
parasitic tradition of rituals that in time dominated Nri life, and made agricul-
ture itself secondary to the system of sinecures on which Nri opulence came 
to depend.” In Echeruo’s view, the rural agricultural virtues and ethos of the 
fertile valley “gave way to the aristocratic feudal lifestyle of a metropolitan 
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capital and its satellite communities.” The Nri tradition of ritualized culture 
had so “debased the economic function of the yam that production took a 
secondary place to celebration,” while the very basis of the rise of the Nri – the 
internal sufficiency in food supply on which its dense population depended 
– was “seriously, even permanently, eroded, leaving the region “subject to the 
great hunger which would lead it to large-scale emigrations in the earlier part 
of the next century.”162 
The period was one of crisis for the Aro and other African traders who 
had to give up their long domination and control of the market. The pro-
duction and marketing systems the Igbo and other traders in the Delta had 
enjoyed until toward the end of the nineteenth century underwent funda-
mental changes. Kenneth O. Dike and Felicia Ekejiuba have documented the 
extensive involvement of the Aro in the lives and fortunes of the Igbo and 
their neighbours, including the Efik, Ekoi, Igala, Ijo, Jukun, Idoma, and Tiv, 
a process that combined to transform eastern Nigeria socio-economically in 
the three centuries during which the Aro “rose to prominence.”163 Waibite 
Wariboko and Kenneth Dike, among others, have examined the attempt by 
African middlemen to hold their ground in the face of increased European 
encroachment.164 African producers and traders frequently found themselves 
in unforeseen and unusual situations faced with the increasing interference 
in local trade by European traders, often encouraged by imperial officials. 
The volatility and unpredictability of the new trading and marketing rela-
tionships forced many Africans to respond in diverse ways. Two divergent 
socio-economic models competed for the upper hand in the African market: 
British ideas of free trade, which were attempting to break the old monopolies 
of African traders, and African trading systems that had largely relied on 
the structures of the Atlantic slave trade, which empowered some individuals 
and trading houses to act as major brokers of the palm oil trade. 
Both the trade in slaves and the transition from the Atlantic slave trade 
to the palm oil trade had implications for gender. Anthony Hopkins called 
attention to changing gender relations that may have resulted from the high 
male slave export from West Africa.165 How did traditional gender ideolo-
gies change in the wake of the transition to the palm oil trade? In a major 
contribution analyzing the gender dimensions of the commercial transition, 
Susan Martin argued that “the key to a man’s success in commercial palm 
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production lay in control of women’s labor.”166 Martin maintained that despite 
women’s contribution to the production of palm oil and yams, men claimed 
ownership of these products as heads of households. Martin suggests that by 
the end of the nineteenth century, the “division of labor acquired ideologi-
cal significance, which strongly favoured men.”167 With specific reference to 
palm oil processing, Martin argued that “given the sexual division of labor 
and property rights, the opportunity clearly existed for Ngwa households and 
lineage heads to acquire wealth.” This they did by “organizing yam and palm 
oil export production to serve the nineteenth century provisioning and palm 
oil export trade.” On the other hand, “little pressure,” she argues, was “put on 
their male labor resources by the palm oil industry in particular, since palms 
were harvested throughout the year and men’s contribution to processing 
though vigorous, was brief, while women’s work in palm oil extraction was 
both laborious and time consuming.”168 
Margaret Stone, like many other scholars, has shown that the imposition 
of capitalism on subsistence economies had fundamental implications for the 
sexual division of labour in farming and ideological construction of male and 
female status and power.169 Most importantly, the European attitude towards 
African women helped magnify the differences between men’s and women’s 
access to resources and participation in commerce. Morgan notes that “Eu-
ropean intervention brought economic changes which are reflected in new 
attitudes to land, cultivation and stock rearing, and these have produced 
further landscape modification.”170 But the reality of the palm oil trade’s part 
in the transformation is more mundane than the picture painted by these 
scholars. 
Admittedly, the impulse created by the new commerce tilted in favour 
of men, but there was also contestation for control between men and women. 
But scholars have often overestimated the ability of Igbo men to control the 
new trade in palm produce. Susan Martin, for example, ignores the fact that 
palm oil had little commercial value for either men or women prior to its 
commercialization at the end of the slave trade in the nineteenth century. 
And women remained important in both production and marketing from the 
late nineteenth century onward. They were not only entitled to some of the 
palm oil; they were entitled to the kernels, which became quite important in 
the export market. The evidence from the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
T h e l a n d h a s Ch a n ged 56 
centuries confirms the important role played by women in the commercial 
economy of the transition era. Adolphe Burdo, a member of the Belgian 
Geographical Society who visited Igboland in the late nineteenth century, 
for example, described Onitsha women who “traverse the country to collect 
palm oil and ivory.”171 Basden reported that women traders dominated the 
trade in palm produce and imported goods into Onitsha from the turn of the 
twentieth century until the depression of 1929.172 
Women traders were active in the distributive trade from the time of the 
opening up of the countryside to European goods. Raymond Gore Clough, 
who joined McNair, Henderson and Company as an assistant agent in 1919, 
described the tenacity of the African trading “mammies,” most of whom were 
certainly Igbo, including Madams Unuka, Osika, and Omvaro. “My custom-
ers were not only the canoemen who brought in palm oil; there were also 
the African trading mammies who took large quantities of a wide range of 
goods,” he wrote in his memoir.173 The women in turn peddled these goods 
through their own shops or through subagents in the various markets. Clough 
describes these women as “ladies of standing among their own people and I 
could not help watching, with fascination, their dignified movements as they 
examined the brightly coloured earthenware bowls or basins, or cotton goods 
on display in the store.” It seemed that there was no anxiety about extending 
credit to these women traders. “There was a strict code of honour between 
the trading mammies and the traders, and it was extremely rare that credit 
granted was abused,” Clough recalled.174 
Richard Henderson confirmed that women controlled the trade with Eu-
ropean firms until the early twentieth century. Indeed, women resented male 
intrusion, when many men began to enter the trade.175 Up to the beginning 
of the twentieth century, Nina Mba notes, women in the riverain Igbo areas 
who “controlled the markets, constituted the local and long-distance traders, 
were in a position to amass more wealth than the men.”176 Although men 
were often taunted “for doing women’s work,” some men could not resist the 
opportunities offered by the retail trade and supply of European goods.177 F. 
Hives, district officer for Okigwe, reported in 1917 that “trading in oil, or ker-
nels in the market, in small quantities is done chiefly by women.”178 Women’s 
roles as producers and marketers of palm oil in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries challenge the perceived invisibility of women in this era. Like the 
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members of many other societies in Africa, the Igbo were not hidebound by 
custom. 
Nonetheless, the changes that occurred with the emergence of colonial-
ism at the beginning of the twentieth century, in addition to the patriarchal 
ideology of European officials, had a direct impact on the nature of agrar-
ian change and gender relations of production. Evidently, Igboland faced 
significant transformations in the economy and social relations, as trade in 
palm produce expanded and as the Igbo adopted new sources of status and 
power at the beginning of the twentieth century. The transformative power 
of colonialism and market-driven changes fuelled by a cash economy chal-
lenged the old structures and institutions of Igbo society, including existing 
relations of production and means of acquiring income. Like other parts of 
Africa, Igboland was dragged further into the capitalist world following the 
establishment of colonial rule in 1900. 
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On March 15, 1903, British forces occupied the Sokoto Caliphate. A New York 
Times report aptly gave the event this headline: “Big Territory Added to the 
British Empire.”1 Frederick Lugard, who was to become the first governor 
of colonial Nigeria, was heartily congratulated by Chamberlain and other 
officials of the British Government. In recognition of this feat, the Pall Mall 
Gazette wrote in an editorial: “We have to thank the bold initiative of Sir Fred-
erick Lugard, a typical specimen of the sort of tool of empire building which is, 
perhaps, the one product of British industry which our rivals cannot imitate.”2 
This important event, which reflected the sentiments of many in Britain on 
imperialism toward the end of the nineteenth century, was the climax of the 
gradual occupation of what was to become Britain’s most important posses-
sion in western Africa and an important milestone in the expansion of the 
British Empire.3 
The economic goals were urgent and the mandate clear. The Hon. W.G.A. 
Ormsby-Gore, parliamentary undersecretary of state for the colonies, on a 
visit to West Africa in 1926 reiterated the most important economic goal of 
the British Empire. “The wealth of West Africa lies primarily in its agricul-
tural and forest products,” he wrote, and “the economic progress of the Colo-
nies depends on the development of their vast agricultural and sylvicultural 
resources.”4 
Although several parts of what became Nigeria had already been incor-
porated into the British Empire a decade earlier,5 the Igbo of southeastern 
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Nigeria were only incorporated into the empire at the beginning of the twen-
tieth century. The expansion of agriculture, the transformation of the pro-
duction system, and the restructuring of the Igbo political system remained 
the most urgent tasks of the colonial administration for nearly two decades. 
The expansion of the palm oil industry was at the core of colonial economic 
policy for the Igbo region and the other areas lying in the palm oil belt. This 
had important consequences for both the politics and the economy of the 
Igbo. 
Behind the thinking of British officials at the time of the conquest of 
Nigeria was the idea that the northern and the western parts of the country 
had achieved higher levels of political development and civilization before 
European contact. Achieving the economic objectives and control of the re-
gion required considerable restructuring of the political institutions of the 
Igbo. The men who carried out these tasks had a mindset of a dysfunctional 
political system and evinced little regard for existing institutions. Revenue 
Commissioner H. P. Palmer, on a visit to Southern Nigeria in 1913, remarked: 
The Eastern Provinces is [sic] some centuries behind the coun-
tries west of the Niger in natural development. Consequently, 
the social organization of its peoples is less easy for a European 
administration to deal with than the National organization of 
peoples like the Yorubas and Hausa. “Native” ideas, Native laws, 
and Native administrative machinery are so far remote from their 
European counterparts, that the destructive force of any European 
administration at all is proportionately greater than when applied 
to countries whose conceptions are more advanced and obvious.6 
These words represent perhaps the most important perceptions as well as goals 
of the early colonial administrators – the notions of a backward peasantry and 
a “primitive” political system – notions that would determine colonial policy 
among the Igbo for the next half century. They also represent what would be 
sources of frustration for both the British and the Igbo people in the Anglo-
Igbo relationship for most of the colonial period. The British sought to reorga-
nize the indigenous polity of the Igbo as part of the economic mission. 
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reorganizing The indigenous poliT y 
Official British intervention in the area of what became Nigeria started in 1849 
with the appointment of a consul for the Bight of Biafra to protect British com-
mercial interests and impose anti-slave trade. Britain dominated much of the 
trade in the Bight of Biafra and had concluded treaties of “protection” with 
several chiefs in the Niger Delta, but British control remained very loose and 
limited to the major trading regions, known as the Oil Rivers, until 1885. The 
United Africa Company, an amalgamation of all the major British firms trad-
ing along the Niger Coast and in the Niger Delta, was also busy signing treaties 
with the chiefs along the banks of the Rivers Niger and Benue. Establishing 
effective British control in Nigeria became rather urgent after the enactment 
of the Berlin Act of 1885. The notification of the creation of the Oil Rivers 
Protectorate (1885–1893) was published in the London Gazette of June 5, 1885, 
and read in part as follows: 
Under and by virtue of certain treaties concluded between the 
month of July last and the present data and by other lawful means 
the territory [sic] on the West Coast of Africa hereinafter referred 
to as the Niger District were placed under the protection of Her 
Majesty the Queen from the date of the said treaties respectively.7 
The proclamation and the appointment of a consul-general at Calabar and the 
posting of consuls and vice-consuls at district levels was a major step in the 
establishment of effective British administration in southern Nigeria.8 
The nature of the commercial and political relations between the British 
and Africans was influenced by the activities of the Royal Niger Company 
from the 1880s to the first years of the twentieth century.9 The expansion of the 
company’s administrative authority over the Lower Niger and its adjoining ter-
ritories, from New Calabar to Oguta in the Igbo country, led to a steady curtail-
ing of African economic control relative to European traders toward the end of 
the nineteenth century. Conflict often occurred between African intermediaries 
and European traders as the latter, by virtue of the company’s royal charter, in-
creasingly laid claim to what Africans perceived as their market. The company’s 
regulations, Waibinte Wariboko argues, were “designed specifically to frustrate 
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the African middlemen competitors.”10 The attempt by New Calabar traders, for 
example, to evade these regulations led the Royal Niger Company to expel them 
from Oguta, Omoku, and Idu in 1887. In 1888, the European agents in Brass ob-
served that the Brass chiefs had “become [greatly] impoverished by the loss of 
their Niger trade.”11 By 1895, Nembe-Brass’s middleman position had become “a 
thing of the past,” according to E. J. Alagoa.12 These developments had a direct 
impact on the hinterland communities as the delta intermediaries increasingly 
relocated trading stations to positions closer to the sources of palm produce.13 
From 1891 onward, London asserted its authority as both British officials 
and traders began pushing beyond the coast.14 The pacification of the region, 
the British argued, was necessary to eliminate internal slavery and expand 
the production of palm oil. Much of the coast had indeed been brought un-
der British control and the protectorate was renamed the Niger Coast Pro-
tectorate with its headquarters at Calabar and Sir Ralph Moore as its first 
consul-general in 1893. The new protectorate, which covered a wider area and 
extended further inland than the old one, was placed under the supervision 
of the Foreign Office in London. The protectorate recorded very significant 
achievements in the exploration of the hinterland and the expansion of trade, 
such that by 1896, Major A. G. Leonard, an official of the Niger Coast Protec-
torate, had travelled over one hundred miles into the hinterland. 
The Niger Coast Protectorate became the Protectorate of Southern Ni-
geria on January 1, 1900. The new protectorate incorporated the territories 
formerly administered by the Royal Niger Company and the Niger Coast Pro-
tectorate. The consul-general became the high commissioner, while consuls 
and vice-consuls became district commissioners and assistant district com-
missioners, respectively. The headquarters of the new Protectorate of South-
ern Nigeria remained at Calabar until 1906 when it was transferred to Lagos. 
The creation of the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria marked the end of the 
consular period. In 1906, the Southern Protectorate absorbed the Colony and 
Protectorate of Lagos. The Southern Protectorate was formally amalgamated 
in 1914 with the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria. With the amalgamation, 
British political control of what became Nigeria was fully established with 
Frederick Lugard as governor-general. 
Sir Ralph Moore’s tenure as head of Her Britannic Majesty’s Government 
in the Bights of Benin and Biafra was crucial in the history of the establishment 
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of effective British administrative control in Southern Nigeria. The British 
attempt to establish political authority in the region was achieved through 
military expeditions. In 1900, the Southern Nigeria Regiment, West African 
Frontier Force, was created and soon launched “military patrols” into many 
parts of Southern Nigeria. Military expedition beyond the coast began with 
the Aro Expedition of 1901–1902.15 In November 1901, the Southern Nigeria 
Regiment attacked the Aro and the so-called Long Juju Shrine or Ibini Uk-
pabia – the centre of the Aro slave trading oligarchy and its cult of human 
sacrifice. The British attack on the Aro was justified as an attempt to end 
internal slavery and open up the areas beyond the coast to free trade, thus 
blocking the Aro from the control of trade, including the slave trade, over 
which they had exercised control for more than two centuries.16 Although 
the British were mistaken in believing that they had destroyed the oracle, 
upon which much of the Aro influence depended, the expedition marked the 
beginning of effective incorporation of the Igbo country into British colonial 
territory and a considerable decline of Aro influence in the region. Yet the 
expeditions against the Aro did not end resentment against British control. 
The expansion into Igboland met significant local resistance. Don C. 
Ohadike’s The Ekumeku Movement: Western Igbo Resistance to the British 
Conquest of Nigeria, 1883–1914, captures the spirited resistance of the West-
ern Igbo (Anioma) people to British colonialism. His work demonstrates that 
some of the strongest African opposition to British rule in Nigeria came from 
small communities.17 In 1896, a punitive expedition was sent against Obohia 
and Ohuru in the Opobo District. In the same year, Sir Ralph Moore sent an 
expedition to Akwete for the opening of friendly relations with its chiefs and 
people. The extension of the British colonial frontier in the Igbo country was 
not a coordinated and orderly advance, but a spasmodic struggle for control 
of Igbo societies. Repeated waves of resistance by the Ekumeku movement 
had to be put down forcefully in 1902, 1904, and 1909.18 Other military expe-
ditions included those to Orokpo (1901), Uzere (1903), Etua (1904), Ezionum 
(1905), Ahiara (1905), Ezza (1905), and Achara (1905).19 
Generally, the British conquest was difficult and unwelcome, and pockets 
of isolated resistance continued throughout the period of British colonialism 
in the region. For over a decade, following the first incursion into the Igbo 
country, the British could not claim control of the region despite their often 
2: PA x b ritAn n i c A a n d T h e d e v elo pm en T o f agri Cu lT u re 63 
bold attempt to extend colonial authority far into the interior. Yet there were 
some parts of Igboland where people resigned themselves to the presence of 
the British in their lives rather than face a British punitive expedition and a 
no-win situation. 
The igbo and indireCT rule 
A major characteristic of British colonial government in Africa was its decen-
tralized structure characterized by indirect rule or native administration.20 
Indirect rule was conceptualized as an indigenization of the colonial admin-
istration – a process that allowed Africans a certain degree of internal self-
control. The system, which was elevated to a political ideology by Sir Frederick 
Lugard, was applied vigorously throughout Nigeria from the 1920s onward. 
Lugard, the first colonial governor of Nigeria and often regarded as the model 
British colonial administrator, emphasized: 
If continuity and decentralization are, as I have said, the first 
and most important conditions in maintaining an effective ad-
ministration, co-operation is the key-note of success in its applica-
tion – continuous co-operation between every link in the chain, 
from the head of the administration to its most junior member, 
co-operation between the Government and the commercial com-
munity, and, above all, between the provincial staff and the native 
rulers … with as little interference as possible with native customs 
and modes of thought.21 
Despite the ethnocentric and racist views expressed in The Dual Mandate 
and other writings, Lugard recognized the practical realities on the ground, 
including the shortage of European personnel and funds. Indeed, not all 
colonial subjects found colonial rule an encumbrance as the British did not 
readily dismiss African institutions upon conquest. A 1928 circular from the 
secretary, Northern Provinces, to all Residents in the area, which outlined 
the methods for training of junior officers in the implementation of indi-
rect rule, is informative on the rationale for the policy. As outlined in the 
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circular, indirect rule was adopted because Lugard realized that he “could not 
effectively administer the enormous area to [sic] the Northern Provinces with 
the utterly inadequate staff at his disposal, and that therefore he must enlist 
the assistance of the Native Chiefs.”22 His initial policy, the circular contin-
ued, “was carried on by his successor Sir Percy Girouard, … and especially 
the present Lieutenant-Governor, Northern Provinces, to whom, among other 
important matters, was due the creation of native treasuries, the most essential 
corollary to indirect rule.”23 The pressure of economic development, according 
to the secretary to the Northern Provinces, 
… makes it increasingly necessary to utilize the productive and 
energising capacity of all native institutions (which is very great) 
to the full, and to avoid arbitrary or empiric changes of method 
to which the people are not accustomed and which may produce 
discontent and dissatisfaction or ultimately inefficiency in the es-
sential duty of keeping order.24 
The British conquest of Northern Nigeria curtailed the power of the old ar-
istocracy, but Britain did not embark on a project of dismantling the Islamic 
structures and social institutions of the caliphate. As part of the compromise, 
the emirs accepted British authority, abandoned the slave trade, and cooperat-
ed with British officials in creating a new administration. Consequently, some 
structures of the caliphate, including the legal system, particularly matters 
relating to marriage, property, inheritance, and divorce, were incorporated 
into the colonial bureaucracy.25 Through this process, the British generated 
patriotism among some elements in colonial Northern Nigeria and reduced 
local resistance.26 
The success of indirect rule in Northern Nigeria, officials argued, was “so 
striking and the development of the Native Administrations was so rapid that 
the Colonial Office have adopted it as the basis of administration in every 
tropical African dependency where it is still not too late to introduce it.”27 It 
became the model for other European powers. A year before the outbreak of 
the First World War, Dr. Solf, the German colonial minister, who had visited 
Northern Nigeria, ordered that the Northern Nigerian model of administra-
tion be adopted in German Cameroons. This was followed by a visit to Kano 
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by Von Raben, the German resident at Dikwa, to study the system. General 
Lyautey, a French administrator in northern Africa, followed the Northern 
Nigerian model in developing what was seen as one of the successful colonial 
administrations in the French African colonies.28 The success of indirect rule 
in Northern Nigeria and its extension, with remarkable results in parts of 
the Southern Provinces, including Oyo and Abeokuta, was reason enough to 
attempt to replicate it in the rest of the Southern Provinces.29 
Officials were convinced of the efficiency of the model. One such official 
noted: “It is not likely, in view of the results achieved, and of the backing of 
the policy by the distinguished officers mentioned above, that there could 
be anything wrong with the theory of indirect rule.”30 Another official con-
curred: “The policy of Lord Lugard in the Northern Provinces, of governing 
through the Fulani Emirs appeared so successful from the outset that the 
British Government decided to adopt it throughout Nigeria.”31 Lugard had 
argued that: “Principles do not change, but their mode of application may and 
should vary with the customs, the traditions, and the prejudices of each unit.” 
The Lugardian ideology held that: 
The task of the administrative officer is to clothe his principles 
in the garb of evolution, of revolution; to make it apparent alike to 
the educated native, the conservative Moslem, and the primitive 
pagan, in his own degree, that the policy of the Government is not 
antagonistic but progressive – sympathetic to his aspiration and 
the guardian of his natural rights.32 
It was Lugard’s view that the so-called primitive tribes should be allowed to 
develop self-government and institutions along the line of those of the Muslim 
states without compromising their own local independence.33 In fact, a delega-
tion of the Empire Parliamentary Association, after visiting Nigeria in 1927 
and 1929, recognized the inherent problem in enforcing colonial rule but also 
agreed that indirect rule offered the best prospects. 
The great problem of co-operation between European and non-
European races also arises in Nigeria. It is being tackled there with 
at least as great energy and freshness of outlook as anywhere in 
the British Empire. The guiding principle is that known as indirect 
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rule. This envisages the extension everywhere of executive Afri-
can administration, building on the units of African government 
evolved locally by traditions and custom, and on the foundations 
which Africans themselves have in the past laid down.34 
The need to expand indirect rule to the rest of Southern Nigeria was not in 
doubt, but the problem was how and when to do it. The British had the good 
fortune to encounter centralized political institutions in northern and west-
ern Nigeria that allowed the successful implementation of the policy of native 
administration. Although there were those who assumed that the chieftaincy 
system, including village war leaders, which made the northern Nigeria ex-
periment very successful, “existed with modification throughout Africa,”35 
this idea was proved wrong among the Igbo and other societies in southeast-
ern Nigeria, where the British imposed the indirect rule system in a radically 
different context. 
The Igbo, whom European ethnographers described as belonging to 
stateless societies, did not share identical social forms, as existed among the 
inhabitants of the northern and southwestern areas. With no hereditary chief-
taincy institutions, save for a few exceptional cases such as that of Onitsha, 
the British created the warrant chief system. Native authorities were created 
by the regrouping of minor, less organized, units into provinces (divided into 
divisions) headed by Residents.36 
But Alex J. Braham, a district agent of the Royal Niger Company (1898– 
1902), noted in his memoir that “Chieftaincy amongst the Ibos is rather based 
on commercial principle, than on any courage, or special fitness of the leader-
ship of men.” He observed that “Any freeborn man possessed of land merely 
has to acquire sufficient wealth to make certain presents, and arrange a fetish 
feast; to which he invites the existing chiefs.”37 Although Braham confused 
the acquisition of an honorary status such as ozo with chieftaincy, a lack 
of centralized political authority dominated by a single individual was the 
norm. Ormsby-Gore observed: 
There are no outstanding rulers of any importance, and it is not 
certain whether this state of affairs among the Ibos or Ibibios is 
due to the decay of a higher type of organization or whether they 
had ever evolved any organized form of government. As things are 
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now, they live in villages, and no one village bears any relation to, 
or recognizes any affinity with, the people of the next village who 
may be only a few miles away.38 
The task of the government, Ormsby-Gore suggested, was to cultivate among 
these people “a sense of common interest sufficient to enable a native admin-
istration to be set up, bearing, if possible, a definite relation to the structure of 
the tribal institutions.”39 
Some British officials who worked among the Igbo echoed similar sen-
timents. Edward M. Falk, District Officer for Aba, noted that the so-called 
pagan, unlike the Muslim, had 
… no institutions of which he is proud and jealous; he is being 
moulded like wax by his European teachers, he is as imitative of 
them as a simian and will retain little of his pre-twentieth cen-
tury self but the vices which are inherent in the negro character to 
which are being added those of his conquerors.40 
These biases lay deep even in the ivory towers of imperial Britain. The uni-
versities of Oxford and Cambridge played their part in the preparation of 
the administrative cadre by offering Colonial Service courses. An important 
component of the colonial officers’ training was the acquisition of African lan-
guages. Hausa was the language of choice and it remained the lingua franca, 
even in the Nigeria Regiment as late as the Second World War. 
Perceiving the Igbo political and economic system as primitive and 
archaic, colonial officials argued for a different rate of assimilation into a 
modern society for them. In the officials’ view, the lack of chieftaincy and 
centralized political institutions among the Igbo called for a more measured 
approach to the task of incorporating the Igbo into the colonial state. Palmer 
remarked: 
It is true that permanent Chiefs comparable to the Emirs of the 
North or the Alafin or Oba of Benin do not exist. This is however 
not to be expected among people still in the “clan” stage – where 
the (Chief – Eze in Ibo) like the Arab Sheikh or Tuareg Amanokel 
is little more than the elder brother of the clan, the experienced 
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senior who is consulted in important questions, but not necessarily 
obeyed.41 
Yet Palmer observed rudimentary forms of chieftaincy institutions among the 
Igbo that would serve as the basis for more rapid progress in the establishment 
of colonial institutions in line with existing traditional political institutions. 
“That there are Eze (Chiefs) of this nature all over the Ibo country is beyond 
question,” he wrote. He maintained that 
The septs which make up the clans are the so-called “towns” or 
“countries” – The various towns in a clan speak of each other as 
“brothers,” and invariably acknowledge one of their members as 
elder brother i.e. head or senior town. It will usually be found that 
the head of that town was the acknowledged leader of the clan in 
war, and entitled to certain perquisites when the clan went hunting 
and was the arbitrator in land disputes.42 
Some colonial officials admitted the difficulty of implementing the system, yet 
they were more concerned with applying the idealistic philosophy of the native 
administration project than dealing with the contradictions inherent in the 
Igbo political system. Indeed the confrontations that would occur between 
the British and the Igbo when the system of warrant chiefs was imposed from 
the first decade of the twentieth century onward did not arise from a cultural 
misunderstanding on the part of officials, but an avowed prosecution of an 
imperial policy that had been elevated to the status of ideology. 
Palmer noted the cautious approach in the introduction of British rule 
among the Igbo from the early days of occupation: 
Those responsible for the administration of the country sought 
to avoid the wholesome introduction of British Law and European 
methods. A means was sought whereby “Native Customs” should 
be applied in the settlement of Native Disputes, so controlled, as it 
were, by the Government that it should be “pure” and not “corrupt.” 
District Commissioners felt and still feel the practical necessity 
of their having power to use common sense and summary juris-
diction in dealing with primitive people. Courts called “Native 
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a colonial assistant district officer hearing complaints (reproduced with kind permission of 
the bodleian library, university of oxford). 
Courts” were therefore designed to be … “Provincial Courts,” 
in which the District Officer would always sit, but would not be 
bound by the letter of the English law when sitting there.43 
J.G.C. Allen, who arrived in Nigeria in 1926 and served as a district officer 
in Eastern Nigeria, recalled in his memoir, “From the Government’s point of 
view this system had the advantage of being decidedly more efficient than gov-
ernment by a vague and inchoate council of elders.”44 
Yet the process of selecting warrant chiefs was arbitrary and bizarre in 
some cases. Often the British appointed willing participants, most of whom 
had made their wealth in the palm oil business as produce buyers. One of-
ficial, A.F.B. Bridges, who joined the colonial service in 1921 and became 
district officer for Onitsha, recalled in his memoir: 
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It was, therefore the practice, when a Warrant Chief was to be 
appointed, for the D.O. to visit the town or quarter concerned and 
hold a public meeting. At this meeting all candidates would be put 
forward and required to weigh their claims before the public, the 
D.O. endeavoring to weigh the claims against one another and 
gauge both the validity of the claims and the degree of support 
for each candidate. If one of them had some obvious standing as a 
descendant of the founder, he was likely to be chosen but whatever 
the claims it was usually the majority vote that decided the issue, 
unless there was evidence that the meeting had been rigged. Other 
things being equal, the people tended more and more as time went 
on to vote for candidates who were literate and knew something of 
the outside world.45 
The British approach to elevating the people in Eastern Nigeria in political 
and economic terms was often contradictory to the philosophy of indirect rule 
that they sought to implement. Those on the ground realized very early on the 
difficulties of applying indirect rule among the Igbo. Another official recalled 
the difficulties of the early days of colonial rule among the Igbo: 
The interpreters were either content to tell the Europeans what 
they thought they wanted to know or to extend a helping and 
well-greased hand to … ambitious individuals, and the difficulties 
of the Ibo language and the timidity of the people prevented the 
Administrative Officers until many years later from learning the 
truth. Therefore, at the outset of the British regime each village was 
called upon to nominate its “Chief” who was promptly presented 
with a cap and staff of office and a warrant formally appointing 
him as a representative of the Government.46 
Other cases did not fit this model. In the case of Umuchieze, a village in Mbaise, 
Owerri Province, for example, oral sources say that the warrant chief was a 
twenty-two-year-old man, Philip Eluwa, who, out of curiosity or stupidity, re-
fused to run away when other members of the village took to the bush on the 
arrival of the British in his village. For this act of “bravery,” he was appointed 
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the warrant chief of the village.47 Under normal circumstances, Umudionu, 
the oldest lineage in the village, would have produced the warrant chief. But 
Chief Eluwa was chosen from Uhuala, the last in the hierarchy among the four 
lineages that make up the town. J.G.C. Allen, a former district officer in east-
ern Nigeria, recalled similar circumstances. In some cases some powerful men 
“persuaded their people to nominate them but in others the people, fearing a 
trap, selected the most insignificant individual in the village – in some cases 
even a slave – in the hope thereby of being freed from official interference with 
the village administration.” Allen further noted: “The Government, believing 
that they had won the support of the traditional authorities exaggerated their 
status and granted them an increasing share in the day to day administration 
of the area.”48 
At the centre of the native administration system were the Provincial 
Courts, operated by European administrative officers, which tried serious of-
fences or any other cases regarded as repugnant to Western moral concepts, 
even if they were accepted under local law and custom. The native courts, 
which dealt with offences against customary law or similar civil cases be-
came part of the new administrative changes in Igboland. The warrant chiefs 
adjudicated cases at the native courts. The new authority given to the war-
rant chiefs and enhanced by the native court system led to the exercising of 
power unprecedented in pre-colonial times and challenged the core of the 
Igbo traditional political system – government by consensus – in which deci-
sions were made by protracted debate and general agreement. The men who 
became warrant chiefs, one official wrote, 
Soon enjoyed power and authority to which they possessed no 
traditional right or title and most of them created an entirely ar-
tificial administrative structure in which the elders were pushed 
aside and authority was granted to a cadre of “Headmen” whose 
only qualifications [sic] for their position were a tough and ruthless 
personality and a capacity for blind obedience to the dictates of the 
“Warrant Chief.”49 
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Chiefs sitting in court with a district officer (reproduced with kind permission of the bodleian 
library, university of oxford). 
These headmen known as idimala (a corruption of headman) in some areas, be-
came as arrogant as the warrant chiefs and a source of exploitation of villagers. 
In some areas, the “Warrant Chiefs established a form of personal dictatorship 
and the traditional administrative system started to disintegrate.”50 Their ar-
rogance and intimidation are still remembered. Onyegbule Korieh remembers 
these men as gods. “They seized other people’s land, bicycle, and took young 
women without paying bridewealth. Some took other people’s wives or other 
properties that they fancied.”51 
There were practical reasons for adopting the warrant chief system and 
for the relatively high level of support given to the new administration by 
many of the newly appointed warrant chiefs. An official noted that the war-
rant chief system and the judicial system that was adopted “formed a cheap 
and expeditious form of justice.”52 African officials had some practical reasons 
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for embracing the system, since it offered opportunities for the accumulation 
of wealth and the achievement of high status in societies where such desires 
fitted into the social dynamics of the Igbo. Part of the tax collected went to the 
native administration and for the payment of the chiefs. The political changes 
that occurred due to the introduction of native authorities and the creation of 
the warrant chief system created a class of wealthy individuals by the 1920s. 
The chiefs, who had become salaried officials of the colonial government, 
reinvested their wealth in the produce trade and invested in people by marry-
ing several wives and having numerous children. They built mansions roofed 
with corrugated iron sheets. Court clerks whose “opportunities for talking 
bribes are great,” as A. E. Cooks, district officer for Owerri District wrote in 
his memoir, also exhibited their newfound wealth by investing in wives and 
building large homes.53 
Falk, who became the district officer for Aba in December 1920, observed 
the changes during the decades following European colonization: 
Rapidly increasing wealth is everywhere raising the standard of 
comfort with amazing rapidity. Chiefs who a few years ago could 
hardly boast of the possession of a decent garment to cover their 
nakedness now dress in the latest European style complete from 
sun helmet to patent leather boots and drive about in their own 
motors. The progress of the people apart from the villagers who 
still till the soil is corresponding.54 
Palmer recalled that some form of strong individual authority in the villages 
was undoubtedly necessary in the early days of pacification, but the admin-
istration had not “divined that it had quite inadvertently and with the best 
intentions imposed on the hapless villagers a form of autocracy entirely for-
eign to their custom.”55 Many colonial officials, like Palmer, admitted that the 
native courts had, however, “developed in a manner quite contrary to the spirit 
in which they were designed.”56 Indeed, J.G.C. Allen noted that many of the 
warrant chiefs “led a very precarious existence the perils of which were not 
always offset by their illicit gains.” Many of them, he noted, “died suddenly in 
suspicious circumstances and although their bodies were exhumed and exam-
ined it was never possible to discover sufficient evidence to support a charge 
of murder.”57 
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The new administrative structure was very patriarchal, despite the visible 
role played by women in both the economy and politics. While some Igbo 
men participated in the local administration as interpreters, messengers, po-
licemen, army recruits, and warrant chiefs, the British ignored women. Colo-
nial anthropologist, Sylvia Leith-Ross, commented on the women and on the 
failure of the colonial administration to recognize their role in Igbo society: 
It is a pity that, from the beginning, some executive local pow-
ers had not been given to them. At that time, the men would not 
have resented it, as it would have meant little more than official 
recognition of powers the women already possessed. Now, too 
many vested interests are involved.58 
This created significant problems for the administration and resentment 
among the Igbo. The 1929 Women’s Revolt and other protests (discussed fully 
in chapter 4) were largely a reaction to the warrant chief system among other 
issues, such as taxation and the Great Depression. 
Overall, some officials, notably Palmer, acknowledged the ideological 
consequences of native administration on societies such as those of the Igbo. 
In his view the attempt to preserve native custom “have so far resulted in 
steadily destroying it and among these relatively primitive peoples full Euro-
peanized individualistic government is being introduced.… The Government 
machine is steadily grinding to powder all that is ‘Native’ and transforming 
the people into ‘black Englishmen.’” Complimenting the state on effecting this 
change, he argued, included the “spread of Missionaries and Education.”59 
There were those who disagreed with Palmer’s assessment. The commis-
sioner of Calabar Province did not see any wisdom in challenging a policy 
formulated by officials highly regarded within colonial circles: 
It will be interesting to ascertain if when making such a sweep-
ing condemnation of the Government’s Policy, the writer con-
sidered who were responsible for the building up of the existing 
system of administration. The names of Sir Claude MacDonald, 
Sir Ralph Moor, and Sir Walter Egerton might have occurred to 
his mind. All these were men of mark and each one continued the 
policy on the lines of his predecessor.60 
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Reiterating the so-called backwardness of the Igbo, the commissioner re-
marked: 
It is obvious that the inhabitants of the Eastern provinces are 
of a much inferior mental caliber than those in the West of the 
Niger.… This fact was very quickly ascertained by former Admin-
istrators of the protectorate (old Southern Nigeria) and the system 
of native courts instituted for the simple reason that the object 
aimed at was to try and educate the native and to bring him on a 
higher scale also by the said system of Native Courts to make the 
Chiefs (so called) feel that they were Chiefs not only in name but 
as such were responsible for the welfare of their country. To this 
end not only successive Governors but all Political Officers have 
striven and striven hard. Mr. Palmer beyond his tour through the 
Provinces has I believe no experience of the type of native his re-
port deals with.61 
This reaction to Palmer’s observations points to the extent to which policy was 
driven by ideology and why it witnessed little in the way of a shift until the 
1929 Women’s Revolt. 
The new structures and institutions, nevertheless, became important in-
struments for the expansion of an economy based not only on the production 
and marketing of palm produce but also on the greater opportunity offered 
for marketing an extensive array of foreign commodities. 
The developmenT of agriCulTure 
The potential wealth from the trade in palm produce was not lost on British 
imperial and trading interests. Imperial policies and the rhetoric of the era 
bears this out. The opening of the Igbo country or what Governor Sir Walter 
Egerton described as the “richest part of the country”62 led High Commis-
sioner Sir Ralph Moore to predict that effective occupation of the interior pro-
duce market would “result in largely increased prosperity both to the Admin-
istration, the commercial community, and to the natives themselves.”63 The 
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quotations above reflect the attitude of European officials as they embarked 
on the mission to civilize and develop the region in the early part of the 
twentieth century. 
Indeed, advocates of the abolition agenda of the mid-nineteenth century 
outlined the revolutionary potential of so-called legitimate commerce. To 
them, the trade in agricultural and other commodities had the potential to 
liberate African slaves, provide opportunities to all and sundry to participate 
in commerce, increase accumulation, and modernize African economies. 
While a few economic and political leaders dominated the slave trade, the 
trade in oil was not capital intensive. Wealth, therefore, could be gained from 
individual enterprise.64 Although the new trade was influenced by the exist-
ing social, political, and economic structures, access to oil palms and labour 
remained the most critical factors in the new trade for many communities 
in the Bight of Biafra and its hinterland, where the transition to the palm 
oil economy necessitated structural changes to meet the labour required for 
oil production. New economic relations developed upon the ashes of the old 
trade in slaves, but palm produce was a driving force for the economic and 
political developments in this region from the mid-nineteenth century. The 
quantity of palm produce exports after the abolition and the expansion from 
the period of colonialism reveals major changes in the rural economy in re-
sponse to new demands. But this does not in itself tell us much about how 
this expansion was achieved. The development of trade and commerce in the 
post-abolition era did not depend upon local initiative alone. It was achieved 
through the double imperial ethos of “civilization” and “commerce.” This im-
perial ethos had fundamental implications for both the socio-economic and 
the political structures of the Igbo and other African communities.65 
Colonial officials were obsessed with the agrarian question. To many offi-
cials, this was the main purpose of imperial acquisitions in Africa. Therefore, 
until the later development of minerals as an important part of the colonial 
economy, the African population, the European administrators, and the Eu-
ropean traders were linked in the desire to expand African production of cash 
crops. Although the Igbo and other peoples of the Bight of Biafra hinterland 
were already exporting palm oil and kernels from the time of the abolition of 
the external slave trade, the incorporation of the region as a British colonial 
possession created a new market for palm produce and increased access to 
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the world market for many small-scale producers.66 As in many other societ-
ies in western Africa, relations between Europeans and Africans during the 
colonial period were rooted in the attempt to transform agriculture. From 
the beginning of the twentieth century through the end of colonial rule, of-
ficials and local farmers alike redirected local labour and resources to meet 
the demands of European markets for palm oil and kernels.67 
The imposition of British rule in Nigeria was followed by the acquisi-
tion of land by the Forest Department, the precursor to the Department of 
Agriculture.68 But the development of colonial agriculture can be traced to 
the work of Sir Alfred Maloney and the establishment of a botanical station at 
Lagos in 1887. The station started with a modest expenditure of £300 a year, 
and its superintendent was expected to grow different kinds of useful trees, 
plants, and herbs as well as a model kitchen garden.69 In 1888, the Royal Niger 
Company began a plantation at Asaba, which was transferred to the govern-
ment in 1901, in addition to a station at Nkissi. A garden was started in 1903 at 
Calabar under the administration of Sir Claude MacDonald. Advances made 
between 1903 and 1905 led to the formation of the Botanical, Agricultural, 
and Forestry Departments in the colonies of Lagos and Southern Nigeria 
under the headship of Mr. H. N. Thompson. By 1910, the departments were 
separated and the Agricultural Department became autonomous. The new 
department focusing on agriculture was firmly established from this time 
onward under the directorship of Mr. W. H. Johnson, who rapidly developed 
it into one of the most important departments in the colonial bureaucracy. 
After the amalgamation of Southern and Northern Nigeria, Mr. Johnson 
remained the director of agriculture in the Southern Provinces.70 The agri-
cultural structure began to assume new forms in a European colonial society 
obsessed with rural transformation and an African society forced to adapt 
“modernity” and a new consumer culture. 
The advance into Igboland was prompted specifically by the desire to 
remove barriers to the palm oil trade. The colonial government took steps to 
encourage the production of palm oil and kernels among the Igbo and other 
communities lying within the palm oil belt of what became Nigeria. Most of 
southeastern Nigeria was particularly suited to the expansion of the palm 
industry. Wild groves dotted the landscape and little capital was required 
to produce palm products in minimum commercial quantities. But the 
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transformation of the local agrarian society was the result of both local ini-
tiatives and the aggressive attempt by colonial officials to create a peasant so-
ciety dependent on the production of agricultural produce. Fredrick Lugard, 
the first colonial governor of Nigeria, summed up British economic interests: 
“It is in order to foster the growth of the trade of this country [Britain], that 
our far-seeing statesmen and our commercial men advocate colonial expan-
sion.”71 This expansion was essential because revenue from peasant produc-
tion would support the local administration and provide the essential raw 
materials for British industries. 
The expansion of colonial control and the development of roads and 
transport stimulated peasant production of palm oil and kernels. As early 
as 1902, colonial district officers were employing forced labour to construct 
roads, courthouses, and government rest houses. H. M. Douglas, for example, 
who joined the colonial service in 1894 and served in various capacities until 
1920, personified what Felix Ekechi called the “uncrowned monarchs” and 
imperial autocrats. Douglas’s role in planting British rule in Eastern Nigeria, 
including the use of forced labour to construct roads, is legendary. His phi-
losophy of opening up the country through the construction of roads yielded 
significant results. By 1906, when he was transferred to Onitsha as district 
officer, Douglas had constructed over two hundred miles of motorable roads 
linking different parts of the Owerri district, earning him the nickname of 
Beke ogbu ama, the road-building Whiteman.72 
The Pax Britannica, bringing new incentives and opportunities to expand 
domestic production for the market, was accompanied by increased produc-
tion of palm oil from the Igbo region. In 1905, for example, Governor Walter 
Egerton, visiting Oguta, reported that there was an “Enormous quantity of 
oil in the store, ready for export on the rise of the river.”73 By 1914, exports 
from Owerri Province were valued at over one million pounds.74 Opening up 
Igboland attracted European trading firms to Oguta, Owerri, Owerrinta, Ife, 
and other places. Coastal traders from Okrika, Bonny, and other areas also 
followed as the region opened up with the spread of roads. 
Control over local production was achieved through political and ad-
ministrative measures. Governor Hugh Clifford was clear about this when he 
wrote in 1920: “The administration was not to engage in commercial enter-
prises of any kind but would prepare and maintain the conditions – political, 
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moral, and material – upon which the success or failure of such enterprises 
depended.”75 This policy was in response to the attempts of a Liverpool indus-
trialist, William Lever, to develop oil palm plantations in Sierra Leone and 
Nigeria.76 In a speech delivered at a dinner in honour of Sir Hugh Clifford, 
governor of Nigeria, at Liverpool on 9 July 1924, Lord Leverhulme, used the 
occasion to attempt to persuade the colonial authorities to give freehold rights 
to Europeans for the development of palm oil plantations in West Africa. The 
Leverhulme experiment in Sierra Leone had shown that plantations could 
not be successful without a carefully controlled labour force and secure land 
tenure. Leverhulme argued: “You cannot have prosperous business without 
some security of the capital invested in it.” He charged: “We had not [sic] 
right for the palm-trees in Sierra Leone. We had no rights to collect the fruit 
ourselves or to force the Natives to collect it, with the result that there was 
such an irregular supply of fruit that when our 20,000 [pounds] capital was 
exhausted we packed up and went away.” He reminded his audience of the 
difficulty facing European investors and of a widely held assumption about 
the African producers: “I don’t know of better material anywhere for labour 
in the tropics than the Natives of West Africa, but they are not organizers.”77 
In Leverhulme’s view, 
Whatever merit the African native has, it has been proved by the 
opportunities he has had in the United States that he has not got 
organizing abilities. Now the organizing ability is the particular 
trait and character of the white man.… Do you think we shall be 
allowed to keep our present position of responsibility to the coun-
tries within the Empire if we do not make some organized effort to 
develop them on sound lines? That can only be done with capital, 
but capital will not flow without security. There is no rabbit so tim-
id as your capitalist. The remedy for trade stagnation is to restore 
confidence. Leave our business men alone, but give them security 
in all that is reasonable and right. Our immense Empire will only 
be held if we administer it for the best interest of the people, on a 
wide, broad policy, without maudlin sentimentality or brutality.78 
Indeed, Leverhulme stated with much confidence that “the African Native will 
be happier, produce the best, and live under the larger conditions of prosperity 
T h e l a n d h a s Ch a n ged 80 
when his labour is directed and organized by his white brother who has all 
these million years’ start of him.”79 
Critics like Governor Hugh Clifford were opposed to the creation of 
European owned and managed plantations for both political and economic 
reasons. They believed that local agricultural production had a “firmer root” 
in the hands of the local farmers since they would be self-supporting in terms 
of labour. Moreover, the prevailing land tenure system and the population 
density of the Igbo region, which was as high as 1,000 per square mile in some 
parts, would impede the plantation system. Lugard also recognized the pecu-
liar population problem in Eastern Nigeria. Unlike Northern Nigeria, where 
the Native Ordinance of 1910 vested the freehold of the land in the governor, 
in the east the colonial government adopted a laissez-faire attitude to the land 
question. The Land and Native Rights Ordinances of 1910 and 1917 ensured 
that land for agricultural production remained in the hands of the local farm-
ers.80 The implications of the plantation model for the eastern part of Nigeria 
were clear in 1932 when the director of agriculture stated: 
Speaking generally and broadly, the people of the “palm belt” 
have already not enough land for food crops. If they start generally 
to plant palms on their farmlands, they will have to cut down the 
groves and use that land for farming. Such a change-over might 
not compare quite so badly with grove replacement as might be 
thought: for ordinary farm crops can be and are grown between 
the young palms on a “straight plantation” for two or three years, 
whereas the shade from the old palms in groves under direct re-
placement … is too heavy.81 
In addition, conditions in West Africa were different from those in the Belgian 
Congo and East Indies where successful experiments had paid dividends. Oil 
palm plantations dominated by European firms would have created a class 
of landless labourers and social problems for the colonial authority in West 
Africa.82 The government was also wary of providing compulsory labour for 
private profit or protecting monopoly rights, as was done in the Congo. Planta-
tion experiments in the former Gold Coast and in Sierra Leone had shown that 
European-owned oil palm plantations could be profitable without government 
assistance and subsidies.83 Peasant production seemed the cheapest method 
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for officials and gave local people the ability to pay their taxes in order to assist 
in maintaining self-sustaining colonies. Colonial officials were convinced of 
the built-in efficiency of peasant production, for local producers were meeting 
the needs of European industries.84 
For most of the colonial era, local farmers undertook production and 
trade in palm products with simple techniques often described as primitive 
and crude.85 Yet great strides were achieved in palm oil production, which 
remained the single most important export product for the Igbo and the 
country as a whole. Indeed palm oil production and export had shown a 
steady increase in Nigeria from 1901 to 1943. The production of kernels also 
doubled from the 1911 levels and in 1942, “exports were three times those of 
1901–1905 period.”86 A delegation of the Empire Parliamentary Association, 
which visited Nigeria in 1927/28, described the oil palm as “the axis of the 
prosperity of the West Coast rainbelt.”87 In their view, there will be an obvi-
ous link between the “prosperity of the whole palm belt … and the power of 
absorption of British goods.”88 In 1920, Nigeria produced about 52,771 tons 
of oil, valued at £1,655,914. About 153,354 tons of palm kernels, valued at 
£2,831,688 were produced in the same year.89 Exports of palm oil and palm 
kernels increased to 246,638 tons and 127,111 tons respectively in 1928,90 
contributing 62 per cent of Nigeria’s export earnings.91 The value of exports 
had increased more than sevenfold and export volume multiplied fivefold 
by 1929.92 Revenue from palm kernels increased from £3,189,000 in 1921 to 
£4,429,000 in 1930. Government revenue from palm oil also increased signifi-
cantly, from £2,520,000 in 1921 to £3,375,000 in 1930.93 
Amid these broad economic shifts, daily life in the countryside remained 
much the same. Considerable human energy was expended in extracting the 
thousands of tons exported annually until the development of mechanical 
crackers. The increase in export quantities during this time was the result of 
large-scale exploitation of wild palm groves that drew on the labour of men, 
women, and children. 
Oil extraction was a labour-intensive, laborious exercise. The children 
removed the nuts from the husk, and the women directed the extraction of 
the oil. In the soft oil process, the nuts were boiled in water until they became 
tender. They then were pounded in a big mortar (ikwe nkwu), and the nuts 
were separated from the fibre. The resultant fibre was pressed by hand to 
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Table 2.1. exports of palm oil and kernels; five-yearly averages. 
years palm oil (Tons) palm kernels (Tons) 
1901–05 56,740 125,432 
1906–10 70,435 143,072 
1911–15 76,099 170,301 
1916–20 82,868 195,305 
1921–25 99,003 216,204 
1926–30 124,233 252,839 
1931–35 123,667 285,131 
1936–40 135,501 314,286 
1941 127,777 378,120 
1942 151,287 356,588 
1943 135,268 331,292 
Source: rh, mss afr. s. 823(4), r. J. mackie papers. 
extract the oil.94 In the hard oil process, the fresh nuts were pounded, and 
water was then poured over the pulp. The resulting surface oil was skimmed 
and boiled, and the oil was extracted.95 
Producing kernels was even more tedious as each nut was cracked be-
tween two stones to extract the nut inside the hard outer layer. Women and 
children obtained kernels by cracking the nuts between stones.96 I can relate 
this to my own personal experience. The drudgery of cracking palm kernels 
between two stones was one of the tasks I most hated as a child. 
The division of labour involved the allocation of routine and light work to 
women and children and the assignment of more arduous, “dangerous,” and 
heavy duties to men.97 However, women’s work was much more varied than 
men’s work. Christiana Marizu remarked that “It required a lot of work and 
effort to produce even the smallest quantity of oil.… You start by fetching the 
wood and water even before production can begin.”98 
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Some early European administrators remarked on the changing land-
scape as the Igbo encountered European rule and embraced the new consum-
er culture that came in its wake. A major stimulus for African production was 
the desire for European goods. Raymond Gore Clough, a European trader, 
had suggested that Africans should be induced to bring their oil to the traders 
by stimulating their interest in “imported goods and creating a desire … for 
all the attractive articles displayed in the factory store.”99 By the 1920s, the 
African population was demanding a greater variety of goods, beyond salt, 
gin, tobacco, stockfish, and cloth, which had been the predominant articles 
of trade in the past. 
Edward Morris Falk, who became the district officer for Aba Division in 
December 1920, noted the changing structure of the Igbo economy: 
The native produces food stuffs, palm oil and kernels. He is a 
consumer of a long list of European commodities such as clothing 
and textiles, liquor, imported food stuffs, ironmongery, crockery, 
kerosene oil, gunpowder, soap, matches, tobacco, camp equipment, 
cheap imitation jewelry, cycles, in fact anything which the natives 
sees the white man use from gramophones and sewing machines 
to tinned salmon or boot laces.100 
The buoyancy of the palm produce trade in the post–First World War era 
created a demand for tools and equipment that aided practical skills and en-
hanced leisure. Raymond Gore Clough, trading on the Oil River, recalled in 
his memoir that African traders and produce agents were demanding sewing 
machines, phonographs, and bicycles for resale to an increasingly prosperous 
African community.101 But to many Igbo people, these items were not regarded 
as luxury goods. Michael Echeruo has argued that “Typically, the Igbo did 
not expend their meager resources on these essentially luxury goods. How-
ever, their availability meant that some members of the community that could 
afford them became visible and triumphant successes. What was otherwise 
considered as wasteful frills became marks of real success to be emulated.”102 
Yet only a very few people invested their money in such luxury goods as radio 
and phonographs. On the other hand, bicycles, the most common means of 
transport, were used for haulage and trade. A. E. Cooks, district officer for 
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Owerri, noted that the bicycle was an important factor in the economic life of 
the Igbo in the 1920s: 
Not only is it used to transport palm oil in four gallon petrol or 
kerosene tins and palm kernels in sacks from the bush markets to 
collecting centres on the main roads where the produce is trans-
ferred to lorries for export, but it is also used extensively in internal 
trade.103 
An important trade developed out of the introduction of bicycles. Cooks 
observed that bicycle repairing “developed into a major industry and repair 
shacks are to be found dotted all over the division, especially at cross-roads, 
large markets, etc. The Owerri Ibo is a genius at improvisation and it is aston-
ishing how long he manages to keep a bicycle on the road considering how 
grossly he overloads it.”104 The bicycle was increasingly also used for passenger 
traffic, including in the urban towns. 
By the 1920s, most of southeastern Nigeria had been drawn into the ex-
panding market for oil. The palm produce trade was the means through which 
many households met their basic need for food and other expenditures. Euge-
nia Otuonye recalled that she relied on income from palm oil and kernels to 
clothe and feed her children and pay their school fees. “Many people had no 
other means,” she said.105 Cooks confirmed this: 
In the eastern area of the division generally known as Nguru 
area, the people are too thick on the ground to live off it and are 
obliged to buy large quantities of foodstuffs, mainly cassava, from 
other areas. Fortunately, this area is rich in oil-palm and it is main-
ly from the sale of oil and kernels that the people obtain the cash to 
buy the food they cannot grow.106 
Agricultural development stimulated changes in production relations and 
internal trade. The large increase in male participation in the produce trade 
led to the creation of new economic opportunities. The development of the 
commodity trade led to the rise of produce agents, mostly men, who also 
controlled the supply of European goods.107 Women engaged in the new trade 
as producers and distributors and supplied the increasing urban population 
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with foodstuffs. These changes associated with the production of palm oil and 
kernels were unquestionably the most dynamic features of rural economic life 
and accounted for the growth in per capita income throughout the colonial 
era. 
Attempts at innovations in production methods were made from the 
late 1920s to encourage production and improve the quality of oil. Experi-
mental farms were opened at Umudike in 1926 and Nkwere in 1930.108 From 
1927, the department of agriculture introduced a policy of encouraging the 
development of locally owned palm oil plantations. Twenty-seven acres of 
experimental palm plots were established in the Aba Division in 1927. There 
was a substantial rise in the number of locally owned plantations from 9 in 
1928, covering 70 acres, to 88 in 1931, covering 377 acres.109 The number of 
plantations rose to about 200 by 1932 in the Southern Provinces.110 However, 
progress was slow as rural farmers viewed government-backed programs with 
suspicion. F. D. Carr, the colonial Resident for Owerri Province remarked 
that while “agricultural officers strove valiantly and set up model and experi-
mental farms and though interest in them was considerable they were, gener-
ally, written off by the Ibo farmer as being excellent for the European but of 
little practical use for him.”111 The lack of enthusiasm for oil palm plantation 
was strongest in Owerri Province, a region with a very high population and 
very little land. Chief Enweremadu, a local administrative officer during the 
1930s, remembers that there was fear among rural farmers that they could 
lose their land and oil palms to the government.112 The director of the agri-
cultural department confirmed the high level of apprehension among rural 
farmers when he wrote: “So strong has this sentiment proved that repeat-
edly individuals or families have decided to try planting palms, but have later 
given in to the strong adverse public opinion of their neighbors.”113 
There were, of course, other factors that explain the lack of enthusiasm 
for innovation among Igbo farmers in Owerri Province besides the fact that 
Carr describes the Igbo as “intensely jealous of his land and strongly and 
violently resented any form whatsoever of Government intervention.”114 The 
environmental and demographic factors in the province also explain this lack 
of enthusiasm among farmers. In fact, Carr acknowledged that progress in 
improved methods of agriculture was slow due mainly to the system of land 
tenure and consequent fragmentation. In the region, the need for improved 
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methods of farming was obvious, for the rapid increase in population neces-
sitated more intense cultivation, which had seriously depleted the fertility of 
the soil. Carr recalled that by the 1920s the average size of yams, the staple 
diet, “had decreased by almost half and the less demanding coco-yam and 
cassava [sic] were rapidly becoming more and more in evidence.”115 
Local producers were also encouraged to purchase hand presses for the 
extraction of the oil.116 The Duchacher press, manufactured by a Luxembourg 
firm, proved to be most satisfactory in terms of cost, quality, and quantity 
of oil extracted. About 80 of these presses, capable of extracting oil with a 5 
per cent lower free fatty acid (FFA) content were in use by the early 1930s.117 
However, there was no large-scale adoption of these presses by local produc-
ers, despite the improvement in quality and quantity of oil produced with 
these presses, because the oil producer did not make sufficient extra profit to 
warrant such an investment. 
Attempts were also made to increase the quality of produce meant for the 
European market. In 1928, the government introduced produce inspection 
– enforced grading and inspection of palm oil and kernels by government 
agents to ensure quality. The government considered exempting plantation 
quality oil from export duties following the demands of the United Africa 
Company, which had argued that it could not compete with cheaper products 
from Malaya and Sumatra. The issue of export duty was problematic for the 
government in Nigeria. Downing Street was of the view that such an exemp-
tion should extend to Africans who produced products of similar quality.118 
Colonial efforts to restructure the local economy achieved success due to 
the collaboration of local people. Most Igbo peasants embraced the opportu-
nities provided by the colonial economy because they were drawn inexorably 
into it. As many commentators have noted, colonial demands of taxes and 
labour imposed added burdens upon peasant households, although crop sales 
and wages also provided them with cash.119 Still, the change in the character of 
the economy was not achieved by any large-scale transition from subsistence 
economy to large-scale appropriation of land devoted to palm oil production, 
for two main reasons. First, the palm oil economy was already well developed 
following the abolition of the Atlantic slave trade and the transition to com-
modity trade based on palm oil. Second, the history of combining subsistence 
agriculture with market production within a physical environment littered 
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with palm groves had proved effective in meeting European demands. Only 
in a very few cases were significant amounts of land devoted to planting new 
oil palms. 
Although many farmers did not devote whole plots of land to oil palms, 
they took risks when the prospects for gain justified this. A small number of 
businessmen who were in a position to acquire land and risk capital answered 
the call of the agricultural research departments to invest in commercial 
oil palm production. The introduction of motor transport contributed sig-
nificantly to this expansion as African businessmen invested in the transport 
sector. By the 1920s, trucks were moving people and goods and bringing the 
whole region into the vortex of the world market. Rural farmers understood 
the importance of the palm oil industry and cash crops to their economy. 
They devoted more time to the care and protection of wild oil palms on their 
plots and often planted new ones on the boundaries (oke) that demarcated 
individually owned plots of land. However, struggles over ownership of palm 
trees and land, Onyegbule Korieh noted, “became more frequent.”120 Some 
rural farmers also often planted a few cocoa or coffee plants on compound 
plots as the demand for these products increased. 
At the same time, rural farmers experienced major changes in kinship 
and community organization, especially in access to land. Under the tra-
ditional tenure system, pieces of communal land were divided among each 
family in the town, and heads of families would in turn allocate land to their 
own family members. British officials observed in the 1920s that considerable 
changes in the land tenure system had already taken place among commu-
nities in Owerri Province, resulting in frequent reports of land disputes in 
colonial reports. “Land cases and disputes are of annual occurrence, this year 
though numerous, no untoward event has occurred,” the Resident for Owerri 
Province wrote in 1920. Mr. Ingles, writing from Okigwe Division, noted: 
“The Division has been quiet with the exception of a few minor disturbances 
– chiefly over land claims.” Mr. Ferguson in Owerri Division, observed that 
the “usual land dispute, customary at this season caused a certain amount of 
excitement at the time, but died away when yams have [sic] been planted.” The 
communities in Aba Division had also seen transformations in access to land 
by this period.121 
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The ethos of village life and the values attached to farming were also 
changing rapidly. By the second decade of colonial rule, many young men 
were shunning farming for the prestigious and attractive opportunities in the 
expanding colonial towns and in the public service. New trade patterns, mi-
gration, and new consumer habits were disrupting the old kinship structures 
that redistributed wealth, as individuals chose to leave the village to seek 
their fortunes elsewhere. For younger people in particular, migration enabled 
them to escape the control of the elders in the villages, but many named rural 
poverty as their reason for migrating to urban as well as rural areas in other 
parts of the country. Over time, women effectively began to take up the op-
portunities offered by the emerging urban areas by establishing small retail 
shops or establishing themselves as prostitutes. “A purely consuming class 
of Government employees, mission school teachers, motor drivers and other 
callings is only now arising,” an official noted:122 
The greatest danger ahead is that the number of people who 
have taken to other means of making a living than farming is rap-
idly increasing. Experience teaches that the school boy who has 
learnt the rudiments of writing or those in the services of Europe-
ans will not go back to the land to work on it though they may go 
back to their homes to trade or live on their wits as letter writers or 
money lenders. As a result, there is a rapid increase of consumers 
and of non producers. The people are flocking to the larger settle-
ments where money is made easily by honest and dishonest means 
without physical effort. The Southeast is thus faced with a serious 
food problem, which may prove to be a difficult matter to solve in 
the future. Already the prices demanded for locally produced food 
stuffs are soaring upwards.123 
Trade and social relations increased in the aftermath of the establishment of 
British colonial control. Significant trading links developed between the Igbo 
interior and coastal middlemen who established trading posts along the water 
highways in the interior of the Bight of Biafra. The emergence of the so-called 
“water sides” connected hinterland producing areas to the coastal towns of 
Okrika, Bonny, Calabar, and other trading posts. The booming oil markets 
attracted coastal merchants, and thus established not only economic rela-
2: PA x b ritAn n i c A a n d T h e d e v elo pm en T o f agri Cu lT u re 89 
tions but also long-lasting cultural connections. Coastal merchants and the 
burgeoning numbers of local traders in the interior helped to create a fluid 
and multicultural town identity in trading posts such as Oguta and Ife, along 
the Imo River. The story of Joshua Adinembo, who established himself as a 
produce merchant after the First World War at Ife in Mbaise, is typical of the 
way the new trade created new forms of economic and social relations. An 
Izhon (Ijo) oil produce merchant and trader from Okrika, by the time of his 
death in the 1940s, Adinembo was married to several women, many of whom 
were from Ife and Ezinihitte along the Imo River in Igbo-speaking territory.124 
food produCTion 
Colonial officials did not show much enthusiasm for the development of local 
food production. Reporting on the food situation in eastern Nigeria as early as 
1912, the director of agriculture noted: 
In some districts and even divisions, we have not yet been able 
to get even one tiny plot of palms planted by any farmer. And it 
is in these areas, with their heavy populations of trees and palms 
that the matter is of most urgency. This is not merely because this 
is the “palm belt” par excellence, nor even merely because neither 
the people nor ourselves know of any other export crop which will 
succeed on these poor acid soils. A more important reason for the 
urgency of this work in these areas lies in the poor food crops that 
the poor soil yields and their inadequacy to feed such a heavy pop-
ulation. If the yield of the areas that are occupied by palms could 
be doubled, as they easily could by the substitution of plantations 
for wild trees and groves, then more land would be available for 
food crops or much more money would be obtained wherewith the 
people could purchase food imported from other parts of Nigeria 
or from abroad.125 
In his memoir as a colonial administrator, which included service in Aba Dis-
trict, Edward M. Falk observed the decline in the production of food items and 
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the lack of interest in rural life and agriculture on the part of young people. 
“So low is the output of the individual that the question of feeding the non 
producers of food stuffs is already becoming a serious question,” Falk observed 
in the Aba District in 1920.126 This grim assessment of the food crisis only 
worsened over time. 
O. T. Faulkner, one-time director of the department, admitted in 1922 
that the department was focusing most of its attention on export production 
without a corresponding interest in food production. Faulkner explained: 
In reviewing the appearance of work, on which the department 
has embarked, it may appear that it deals too largely with products, 
which are, or might be exported … but it must be remembered that 
it is much easier for us to help the farmer to take advantage of the 
changed conditions resulting from opening to him of the world’s 
market, than to teach him how to improve his method of grow-
ing his foods – methods which are the winnowing of centuries of 
experience, sifted to suit his ancestral conditions by generations of 
his forefathers.127 
In a report written after his visit to West Africa in 1926, Ormsby-Gore clearly 
argued for a balanced agricultural policy that would include food production: 
The foundation of sound agricultural policy must necessarily 
begin with the production of food for the people. Food comes first, 
and economic crops for export should come second.… The devel-
opment of economic crops at the expense of production of food for 
local consumption is most undesirable, and a plentiful supply of 
cheap food, both for the native and non-native inhabitants of the 
countries, is the first essential.128 
Officials did not often follow Ormsby-Gore’s advice. 
Productivity in the area of local foodstuffs declined rapidly following 
colonial intervention. The Chief Secretary’s Office acknowledged that the 
decrease in the production of local foods resulted in higher prices for these 
food items.129 In its determination to maintain the momentum and expand 
the production of other cash crops, the government ignored the threat that 
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the expansion of the oil palm export sector posed for rural farmers and food 
security. 
The rising cost of food was also linked to climatic and structural condi-
tions. Colonial reports from the first decade of the twentieth century show an 
erratic rainfall pattern that often affected the fortunes of local farmers. This 
was a recurring pattern in the years for which records are available. Diseases 
such as the influenza epidemic of 1918, officials reported, forced farmers to 
abandon their farms.130 The First World War, the annual report of 1918 noted, 
combined with other factors to increase inflation and the cost of local food-
stuffs in most alarming manners.131 The report for 1919 is worth quoting in 
some length: 
The much reduced import of foodstuff, deficient rainfall and 
the inflation of the currency have been effective together in con-
tinuing the increase in the price of agricultural foodstuffs, and the 
heightened cost of these has been further operative in generally 
increasing the price of native foodstuffs not directly of agricultural 
origin, such as smoked fish and meat produced by the natives. The 
importance of the latter circumstance lies in the fact that the con-
sequently reduced availability of such products for purchase by the 
poorer classes leads to a decrease in the important protein, ren-
dered all the more difficult to make up owing to the fact that prices 
of the chief vegetable protein bearers, beanstuffs, have in turn been 
greatly enhanced.132 
In spite of the developments in the rural economy and the emergence of a rela-
tively viable peasant economy, poverty and impoverishment were evident in 
the colonial period. By the 1930s, for example, reports of men pawning them-
selves, their spouses, or their children were rampant as peasants struggled to 
produce for the market and to meet colonial demands for taxes.133 Although 
pawning was practised in pre-colonial Igbo society, Linus Anabalam con-
firmed that there was an increase in pawning due to colonial demands for 
taxes.134 Some pawns lacked access to labour to exploit the land, as John Illife 
has noted. Others were young, able-bodied men, who lacked access to land (or 
other resources) and were unable to sell their labour power at a price “sufficient 
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to meet their minimum needs.”135 J. S. Harris has shown that lack of access to 
land forced many to become casual labourers in the 1940s.136 
The demographic features of the region had economic implications. In 
1921, barely two decades into the colonial period, there were nearly 4 million 
people living in Igboland.137 C. K. Meek, who studied the Igbo in the 1930s, 
noted that the high population density found in some parts of the region was 
a major source of economic problems. Using the Nigerian census estimates 
of 1921, Meek noted that there was already a shortage of farmland among 
the Oratta (Uratta) and Isu groups in the Owerri area. He observed that the 
population might increase “beyond the limits of the productivity of the land, 
thereby giving rise to a non-agricultural floating population with nothing to 
give in exchange for the food it requires.”138 Margaret M. Green, who studied 
the Agbaja Igbo in the 1930s, remarked: “The pressure of population on land 
is so great that every square yard of it belongs to definite small land-own-
ing groups which may consist three or four males.”139 In 1952, for example, 
Okigwe Division, with an area of 587 square miles and a total population 
of 422,706, had an average population of 720 persons per square mile. Orlu 
Division had an average of 873 persons per square mile. In the areas around 
Owerri, the density was no less than 500 to the square mile.140 According 
to Udo, the most densely populated areas included Mbaise and Ikeduru in 
central Igboland, and northern Ngwaland where rural densities of over 1,000 
persons per square mile were common. The Onitsha and Awka areas of Ig-
boland were already facing food insecurity by this period. They depended on 
other regions to meet their subsistence needs.141 Although the crops and the 
farming system were similar to those of other parts of Igboland, Udo notes 
that palm oil was very important in ensuring the survival of the dense popu-
lation in the uplands of Awka and other parts of Igboland.142 
Overall, the colonial government’s agricultural development strategy was 
seen as the quickest way to introduce to Nigeria the benefits of “civilization” 
and modernization. This was the strategy of Hugh Clifford (governor-general 
of colonial Nigeria, 1919–25) for the economic development of the colony. Yet 
the Western ideologies of modernization were problematic for African agri-
culture because they neglected local production systems and often imposed 
a top-down approach to modern farming.143 The perception that the local 
farmer was primitive and resistant to change stems from a narrow under-
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standing of the socio-cultural context that influenced economic production. 
Rural farmers tried to balance their risks. But according to G. I. Jones, the 
“experts” made no allowance for the fact “that the Nigerian farmer and his 
family have to produce enough food to support a large group of people and 
cannot therefore afford to take risks.”144 
Yet the local agricultural economy was more sophisticated, developed, 
and adaptive to changing socio-economic conditions than colonial commen-
tators thought. The growth in the palm produce trade was not just a reflec-
tion of the encouragement given by European traders and officials; African 
initiative was important in the expanding trade. Still, in this region, as in 
many parts of colonial Africa, the state acted, in the words of Bill Freund, as 
a “tribute-taker rather than an organizing agency for capital producers as in 
a developed capitalist society.”145 The changes that occurred were also shaped 
by the colonial ideology of the “male farmer.” The colonial government cre-
ated boundaries of economic and social difference based on gender. How-
ever, while colonial policies reinforced patriarchy, the new economy liberated 
women in some ways. Ironically, women subsidized the colonial state and the 
peasant household as agricultural labourers and peasant producers. Overall, 
women and men reaped a “mixed harvest” due to the ambivalent nature of 
colonial policy. Commercialization did not often translate into economic 
well-being. Prices and demands for palm produce fluctuated according to Eu-
ropean economic and political conditions, creating dependence on the export 
trade and instability in the local agrarian economy. Colonial taxation and the 
high cost of living deprived peasants of any surplus. 
The first two decades following the establishment of British colonialism 
witnessed irrevocable changes in the rural economic base. The response of 
the Igbo to the commercial incentives of the colonial period was influenced 
by the various contexts – local, external, and colonial – in which they found 
themselves. Primary production provided new means for achieving power 
and influence in the society. However, the concentration of resources in cash 
crop production increased the vulnerability of households to food insecurity. 
Farmers had neither control over the price of their produce nor the power to 
influence the price of imported foodstuffs.146 
Yet the period of conquest, ironically, was also a period of considerable 
growth in agriculture. But the level of growth in the first two decades of the 
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colonial period owed as much to the initiative of the local population as to 
the political and social restructuring that occurred in the first two colonial 
decades, including the demand for labour, the imposition of taxation, and 
the growth in Western education. The transformations that followed and the 
forms of the changes that occurred were, however, shaped by the capitalist 
interest of the colonial state as much as by the precapitalist structures of Igbo 
societies, including their kinship structures. But it was the Igbos’ desire to 
acquire wealth, their desire for Western education, and their desire and ap-
petite for Western culture that would have the most important impact on the 
economic and social structures of their society after a very short period of 
European contact. 
Local farmers invested more labour and resources in cash cropping and 
trade, and palm oil and kernels became significant in reshaping the local 
economy as much as the relationship between colonial officials and their Af-
rican subjects. Colonial policies contributed to further commercialization of 
agriculture and increased the number of small-scale traders in the produce 
and retail trades. But the emphasis on the production of cash crops disrupted 
the way the local population balanced production for exchange and produc-
tion for subsistence as the palm oil trade dominated the economy in most 
parts of the Igbo country. 
The process through which the goals of economic expansion and politi-
cal transformation occurred was complex. Clearly, the hegemonic power of 
the colonial state helped create new modes of capital accumulation, but these 
could not have evolved without the participation, and sometimes the initia-
tive, of the local people.147 In southeastern Nigeria, where local people were al-
ready participating in the emerging capitalist economy of the late nineteenth 
century, by producing palm oil and later kernels for the European market, the 
colonial state became a powerful instrument for creating new opportunities 
for capital accumulation. Yet its unique features lay in the way local people 
were often able to manoeuvre to pursue other interests. The existing social, 
political, and economic structures that the Igbo population called upon in-
fluenced the changes that occurred in what was obviously a rapidly changing 
society. 
Colonial agricultural policy was at best ambivalent, sometimes encour-
aging export crop production and at other times limiting it, as administrators 
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struggled to balance competing African and European interests.148 The state 
influenced what was grown, how it was grown, and how it was priced and 
marketed. This intervention was partly effected by “policing the countryside,” 
in Walter Rodney’s phrase.149 At the same time, foreign trade was increasingly 
controlled by European traders, mainly British. Over time, indigenous entre-
preneurs were turned into agents of the foreign merchants. The monopoliza-
tion of the most lucrative export and import trade in agricultural products 
and the repatriation of profits by foreign traders stunted the transformation 
of peasant agriculture and the flow of capital from trade into agriculture. For 
the Igbo, the changes that followed the colonial agricultural transformation 
were neither progressive nor regressive; rather, they represented what Hal 
Barron calls a “hybrid” of change and continuity.150 Yet the classification of 
men and women as farmers and farmers’ wives, respectively, remained an 
important part of colonial agricultural policy, which I shall examine in the 
next chapter. 
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ChapTer Three 
g e n d e R a n d C O L O n I a L
a g R I C u LT u R a L P O L I C y 
Colonial records provide an index from which the official view of the role of 
men and women in agriculture in the colonial period can be derived. From the 
beginning of the colonial agricultural experiment, officials had a fixed mindset 
about what to produce and who should produce it. Whether they emphasized 
cash crop production, soil conservation, or improved production methods, co-
lonial officials had one thing in common: they believed improved agricultural 
production was important for the state and the local people. But colonial of-
ficials constantly imposed European gender ideas on Igbo society. As it did in 
the political arena, British rule transformed the context of traditional society 
by creating institutions and class differences based on European notions of 
gender roles.1 By focusing on men as cash crop farmers, bureaucratic efforts to 
improve agriculture encouraged the men even in areas that men and women 
had previously complemented each other. While official policy did not reflect 
a blatant discrimination against women, colonial educational and extension 
schemes aimed at improving agricultural production excluded women. Yet up 
to the end of colonial rule, the expansion in production in both the palm oil 
economy and food production was as much the making of rural women as it 
was the product of men’s expanding interest in the production and marketing 
of agricultural goods. 
Igbo societies had a well-developed sense of gender distinction, but 
the idea of a very strict division of labour along gender lines did not exist. 
Gender roles were marked by a high level of fluidity in the roles women and 
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men performed.2 Indeed gender structures and ideology, as social categories, 
and their relationship with identities, as Igor Kopytoff observed, were based 
on what people do (roles) rather than any existential category.3 Thus, a sepa-
rate sexual world for men and women was not the norm. But the fluidity and 
complementarity that defined Igbo gender relations of production were at 
odds with the rigid colonial ideology regarding the role of men and women. 
Although women brought their own experiences and labour into most areas 
of production, colonial policies fostered the notion of “male farmers” and 
farmers’ wives, who were not seen as independent contributors engaged in 
farming.4 The most important area of bias centred on the exclusion of women 
from all agricultural extension and support services offered to local farmers. 
women, agriCulTur al eduC aTion and 
ex Tension serviCes 
As early as 1888 the Kew Bulletin suggested that the superintendent of agricul-
ture consider the apprenticeship of refugee (ex-slave) boys and the industrial 
education of sons of chiefs as part of the early colonial agricultural policy.5 
By 1913, the colonial department of agriculture in eastern Nigeria was offer-
ing agricultural instruction and practical demonstrations to school teachers 
and their senior pupils.6 By 1918, seven male pupils were offered theoretical 
instruction in farming by the Department of Agriculture.7 With the merger 
of the agriculture departments of the Northern and Southern Provinces in 
1921, the parent department widened its horizon and intensified its activities 
in the dissemination of agricultural techniques, research results, training, and 
extension services. Even these early experiments focused on boys. 
In 1922, the Department of Agriculture explained the direction of sub-
sequent educational services and extension programs to assist the native 
farmer. The Director of Agriculture, O. T. Faulkner, proposed two courses 
(a lower and a higher) of agricultural education at Ibadan in Western Nigeria 
to cater to the interest of Nigerian farmers. The lower course was for boys 
with only primary school education and the upper course for boys with the 
Cambridge Junior Examination.8 The aim of the course was to introduce new 
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modes of production, limited mechanization, soil management techniques, 
and general agricultural processing improvements to these boys. No such 
course or program was devoted to women. 
By the end of the 1920s, innovations were introduced in the palm oil 
industry. In the Awka and Nsukka divisions in 1929, the Department of 
Agriculture was selecting boys for training in palm oil extraction and nut-
cracking machines operation.9 In 1934, the Department of Agriculture began 
offering instruction to those who wished to derive a living from farming by 
targeting “farmers’ sons.” In a memorandum to superintendents of agricul-
ture throughout the southern Provinces, H. G. Poynter, assistant director of 
agriculture, instructed that the government’s agricultural education should 
consist of a course of three months’ duration in practical work and demon-
stration supplemented by lectures “for boys who wish to farm” rather than 
train them as assistants in the department.10 According to O. T. Faulkner, 
Director of Agriculture, thirteen boys attended the first course when the pro-
gram took off in March 1934 at the Moor Plantation in Ibadan. The course 
consisted of practical and demonstration work on the field as well as instruc-
tion in crop science, elementary mathematics, and bookkeeping. Faulkner 
triumphantly noted that “those who attended the course returned to their fa-
ther’s farms, except one who is acting as secretary of a cooperative cocoa mar-
keting society.”11 Limiting such programs to farmers’ sons had unintended 
consequences and remains an excellent example of colonial perception about 
women’s role in agriculture. 
These measures did not have the desired effect because they failed to at-
tract the boys as intended. A district officer remarked: 
I find that boys whose educational attainment would qualify 
them for this course are not at all anxious to take advantage of 
the offer. It seems that any who has acquired a slight knowledge 
of reading and writing consider farming, or for that matter any 
manual labor, beneath his dignity.12 
The acting district officer for Onitsha Division confirmed the unwillingness of 
boys to take advantage of the program. When B. C. Stone wrote to his superior 
in 1934, he was frustrated by the lack of interest in farming for young boys: 
“I have not so far found any candidate for the instruction course for farmers’ 
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sons. The only boys who have presented themselves were unwilling to proceed 
with the idea when they found that there was no likelihood of the course lead-
ing to a subsequent Government appointment.”13 District Officer B. W. Walter 
of Udi wrote that there were no candidates from his division.14 
Special courses were also offered for school teachers under a school farm 
program. The first agricultural course for teachers under the rural educa-
tion scheme began at Ibadan in 1937. Although some theoretical courses in 
agriculture had been offered to teachers at the Moor Plantation earlier, the 
rural education course aimed to provide instruction in practical agriculture 
and in methods of managing school farms and the teaching of elementary 
science. Norman Herington, agricultural education officer “insisted that the 
new courses must cover at least a complete growing season, starting with the 
planting of crops in March and finishing with the harvest in October or No-
vember.”15 Since most of the teachers came from mission schools, Herington 
also suggested that the Missions or Voluntary Agencies should send “only 
trained teachers with some seniority” and that married teachers “should be 
allowed to bring their wives.” He hoped that such a group would give the 
work some status in the schools.16 
Herington had laid a solid foundation for a similar agricultural course for 
teachers in eastern Nigeria. A large area of land near the Agricultural Experi-
mental Station at Umudike belonging to the Government College, Umuahia, 
had been chosen when he arrived at Umuahia on 23 December 1938. Thirty 
teachers, mostly drawn from mission schools, arrived for the course in March 
1939. The group included the headmaster of a Roman Catholic school at Egbu 
near Owerri and a member of staff of St. Charles’ Teacher Training College 
at Onitsha.17 The syllabus for the course was flexible and largely based on 
“the seasonal work of the farm” and included instructions on planting and 
cultivation of crops soil science, seed germination, the science of air and wa-
ter and plant growth. Herington wrote: “I was anxious that the educational 
value of the school farms should be recognized and appreciated and that this 
work should be linked with the school curriculum as whole and give a practi-
cal introduction to suitable elementary science.”18 The teachers were awarded 
Grade I Teachers Certificate on successful completion of the course. 
At Achi in Onitsha Province, the agricultural department acquired 
ninety acres of land for a practical school farm that officials argued would 
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train the “sons of genuine farmers in improved agricultural practice.”19 The 
trainees, who were supposed to be “sons of bona-fide farmers,” were expected 
to “return to the family land and practice what has been taught.”20 Again, 
officials were too optimistic that these young men would return to farming 
rather than white-collar employment. Officials failed to consider the attitude 
of young men toward farming and the influence wage labour had on rural 
life.21 For many young men, farming was becoming increasingly unattractive 
while migration and non-farm income offered opportunity for independence 
from elders who controlled rural labour and land. 
In 1940, the registrar of cooperative societies, E.F.G. Haig, recommended 
that the Southern Nigerian government should give serious consideration to 
the establishment of cooperative farm settlements for boys. He wrote that 
“The plight of thousands of Nigerian lads who leave school at the end of the 
elementary stage is a miserable one.” Haig emphasized: “In view of their par-
tial education they believe, wrongly, no doubt, but with a deplorable strength 
of conviction that they are fit for clerical posts and unfit for manual labor. 
Whenever a clerical vacancy is advertised they send in their applications by 
the hundreds.”22 It was his view that some form of legislation was necessary in 
order to compel or force these boys to take “their traditional occupation.”23 To 
ensure that the target group would be effectively redirected to farming, Haig 
advised that the number of boys admitted into schools be limited through 
stiffened selection examinations. This would limit the number of candidates 
in schools and, conversely, increase the number of rural labourers for agri-
culture.24 
By 1946, several schools had been established in which the teachers were 
expected to be instruments of rural transformation through school farms. 
By this time, The Niger Diocese at Onitsha had come to play a significant 
role in school farm inspections under Reverend Kenneth Prior of the United 
Church of Canada. Reverend Prior, who had been appointed as an Agricul-
tural Missionary by the Church Missionary Society, played a valuable role 
in inspecting school farms belonging to the diocese. The school farms were 
not very successful in stemming rural drift especially for young boys. The 
persistent attitude was that “the schools were being used to get the boys back 
to farm work rather than give them the education needed for better paid work 
that most parents wanted.” The curriculum of the rural school was criticized 
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rural education Course for Teacher’s school farm program, umuahia, 1946. (reproduced with 
the kind permission of the bodleian library, university of oxford.) 
for “being out of touch with the educational needs of village people” and was 
blamed for “the drift of school leavers into the towns in search of work” be-
cause the curriculum lacked an “agricultural bias.”25 
In a speech to the Conference of Christian Rural Workers held at Ibadan 
in 1955, Herington remarked: “The schools cannot be blamed for the drift 
of population brought about by changing social and economic conditions. 
In the badly over-populated rural areas of the Eastern Region many people 
are obliged to go elsewhere to find work and the village schools should assist 
in this development rather than try to discourage it.” The attitudes toward 
farming had worsened by the 1950s. Herington accepted: “Boys cannot be 
forced to become farmers against their will and attempts to impose an agri-
cultural bias would probably be resented by parents and teachers alike.”26 He 
suggested the course for school teachers should be called Rural Science rather 
than Agricultural Education and the centres at Ibadan and Umuahia became 
Rural Education Centres.27 
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Well into the 1950s, colonial officials were still very frustrated with what 
they termed the conservatism of Igbo farmers and the lack of interest towards 
farming by young boys. Michael Mann, community development officer for 
Okigwe Division, wrote: 
The conservatism of the Ibo farmer is well known, and indeed 
he does not differ from farmers all over the world. Many Ibo [sic] 
farming practices are not only inefficient, but are actually harmful 
and destructive to the soil. ‘Ala’ – the Okigwi Ibo word for land, is 
also used for ‘our soil’, ‘our country’ and it is their most precious 
possession, which is most jealously guarded, and over which sus-
picions and ill feelings are most readily aroused. 
Mann was particularly frustrated with the number of Igbo young people mi-
grating to the towns for non-existent jobs instead of settling to life as modern 
farmers in the rural areas. This was particularly so for people in Owerri Prov-
ince, where education was seen as the route to a better life for the boys as well 
as their families. 
One of the major problems confronting us in the Eastern Prov-
inces, and especially in Owerri Province, is that of the Standard 
VI schoolboy on leaving school. The family contributes in order to 
send the young boy to school, and often at great sacrifice, maintain 
him until he reaches Standard VI. Then the young boy, for a mul-
titude of reasons – lack of funds, shortage of secondary education, 
competition in examinations – is thrown on to the labor market 
and his own resources. He as a result of his education, considers 
himself a cut above his uneducated brethren, and looks for em-
ployment for which his education has been training him.28 
However, very few could find suitable employment based on their level of edu-
cation, leading to high levels of what Mann described as “acute disappoint-
ments and disillusionment.”29 
Given their investment in their children’s education, families expected 
some return for the “money expended, and are angry and disappointed the 
young boy is unable to secure employment.” Despite the low prospect of jobs 
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in the urban areas, officials described as alarming the drift of the youth to-
wards the towns, where, away from the discipline of their village and advice 
of their elders, they became easy prey for the disgruntled politicians. These 
youths became a class of “unemployable and irresponsible fortune seekers.”30 
How to resolve this concern was a recurring problem for many officials. 
The obvious answer according Mann “is that the boy on leaving school should 
be absorbed into his village.” To solve this problem, he proposed that: i) The 
village must be made more attractive by means of increased social services 
and social improvements; ii) the prestige of farming must be raised and meth-
ods brought up to date; iii) local industries be set up to employ the young girls 
and boys in their own villages.31 
Mann set up an agricultural team, consisting of a member of the agri-
cultural department and some labourers who would offer demonstrations, 
advice, and encouragement to “those farmers who will listen.… Time is not 
wasted in talking to those who are opposed to change, but a great effort is 
made to convert the young men and the more progressive farmers to such 
simple improvements as composting and feeding of livestock.”32 The team 
would select the most intelligent of willing farmers for a course at the Uturu 
Trade Centre. There they would farm under instruction on poor land with 
improved methods in order to show them that “improved methods will bring 
them more money as well as improving their land.”33 The trainees were ex-
pected to return to their farms in the villages and continue to have advice 
and regular visit from officials of the agricultural department. It was hoped 
that, by adopting improved farming methods, the progressive farmer would 
see the benefits and advantages of improved methods more easily than “his 
neighbor who carries on as usual.”34 
When the government of the Eastern Region introduced an agricultural 
extension services known as the “On-the-Job” training program, the scheme 
was initiated by the department of agriculture to enable the “men to improve 
their farming.”35 The evidence we have for the Onitsha Province shows that 
men came in groups for a month at a time to receive practical training in 
soil conservation, compost making, and the care of seedlings and of such 
permanent crops as citrus and oil palms. 
There were a few farmers who attempted to modernize their production 
methods. One such person was seventeen-year-old Mark Nwadike of Ubahu 
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Okigwe whose father died when he was young and left him a lot of land, but 
little money. When Mark finished schooling at the Methodist School Ihube, 
reading up to standard VI, he returned to his village and tried to put into 
practice some of the things he had learnt on the school farm. Colonial Ad-
ministration recorded that Mark travelled to Okigwe to look at the Govern-
ment Agricultural plot and to consult the Agricultural Assistant. He started 
to put compost around some of his yams, and dug a compost pit near his 
house, into which the compound sweeping are placed each day.36 Mark wit-
nessed improvement in his farming as well as in his living condition. Such 
success stories were part of the campaign to encourage young men to go back 
to the land instead of “wandering off to the towns.” Felix Dibia of Umuariam 
Obowo in Okigwe Division was another of the few who went back to agricul-
ture in the village. Felix had been trained at the Government Agricultural 
Farm at Umudike. Despite “skeptical remarks and jeers of his neighbors,” he 
was determined to put what he had learned into practice in his own farm. He 
had set up a small poultry with a Rhode Island Red cockerel and five pullets 
he had obtained from the Government and planned to expand into piggery. 
His feeding of the chicken, according to Michael Mann, “caused conversation 
amongst his neighbors who asked, ‘Why feed a chicken, it is meant to feed 
us?’”37 Such was the prevailing view of many people and their attitude to in-
novation. 
Overall, the attempt to modernize agriculture focused attention on the 
men and the boys. The colonial government did not really draw the female 
folk into its modernizing program, despite the central role they played in 
agriculture. For women, the concept of the “private sphere” informed the 
colonial development program that targeted women specifically. Although 
British officials were operating in a different and changing historical context, 
women’s work was seen as belonging largely to the domestic sphere. 
To address the issue of women in the developmental process, women’s 
training centres were opened to create opportunity and provide training 
for women. The Women’s Training Centre, opened at Obowo in June 1950, 
provided a daily class where women were taught the making of fairly simple 
embroidered mats, tray cloths and other linen work. They paid a monthly 
subscription, which covered the cost of materials, and they sold their work for 
“their own profit.” Man commented that this system has made these centres 
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extremely popular, as the “women are not considered by their husbands to be 
‘Wasting Time.’”38 
Christian missions were also involved in the broader rural development 
agenda, but they had a clear notion of the role of women in a Christian home. 
Mission schools played a significant role in actualizing this ideology through 
the establishment of a rural development centre and by actively collaborating 
with the Government under the school farm program. The Anglican Diocese 
of the Niger, the Methodist Church in Eastern Nigeria, and the Church of 
Biafra (Presbyterian), for example, were aided with a grant from the Govern-
ment and worked closely with agricultural and educational agencies to offer 
training to young men and women in the rural areas. The information and 
visitors’ guide of the Rural Training Center at Asaba declared: “The aim of 
the center is to help young people become better farmers and home makers, 
that they may lead the way towards an improved and enriched Christian rural 
life.”39 Fourteen ex-Standard VI boys began a two-year course in farming in 
November 1951, followed by twenty other boys. On their part, each boy was 
allocated a half-acre to farm: 3/10 acre of yams in the flood area, and 2/10 acre 
rotation plot in the upland. After deducting cost of seed, labour, and plough-
ing by tractor, etc, all profits went to the student. 
Colonial programs were male driven, regardless of obvious female par-
ticipation in agriculture and the difference women farmers could have made 
to agricultural productivity. The first class of girls at the Rural Training Cen-
ter at Asaba began with seven girls for a two-year course in domestic science 
and homemaking. The Girls’ Cottages offered the practical training useful for 
homemaking: 
The girls learn how to be good homemakers by doing just that in 
their own cottages. They do their own marketing and food prepa-
ration, cooking on a smokeless Indian stove, built chiefly of mud. 
They eat together in family style, and have their own living room. 
They learn to sew, not only by hand, but on the Centre’s sewing 
machines.… The girls operate their own kitchen near their cottag-
es. They also have some work with poultry, and will later have their 
own flock of chickens.… Improved diets, a more hygienic mode of 
living and wiser motherhood are emphasized in the course.40 
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Yet in the rural context of the colonial society, officials clearly ignored women 
and concentrated efforts on men, who were more likely to leave the rural areas. 
This ideology was more often the result of ignorance or ideological bias than 
an objective assessment and a clear perspective of the local agricultural sys-
tem. The improvement schemes targeted a group that was becoming increas-
ingly interested in earning cash income outside agriculture and neglected the 
women, the major agricultural labour force.41 
Behind the thinking of colonial officials was a model in which agricul-
ture would continue to be central to the income of the overwhelming ma-
jority of the rural population and one in which it would be modernized to 
attract young men to continue to take farming as a profession. They, however, 
failed to recognize several factors that worked against such thinking and the 
potential of rural agriculture. A report by the secretary for community devel-
opment to the Eastern Nigerian government noted the improbable conditions 
that worked against government policy in Igboland: 
The flight of the Standard VI boy from the land is the theme of 
especial lament by both educated Africans and Europeans, but it 
is difficult to see what there is to keep him. The social organization 
of the village does not encourage individual enterprise; many of 
the amenities, the existence of which his schooling has acquainted 
him with just do not extend to his village; and the main form of 
employment – agriculture – has such a low status and gives such 
a low return that the greater variety of employment offered in the 
towns and the social status of the white collar jobs are bound to 
exert a strong attraction.… Should the Standard VI boy stay in the 
village there is little enough to maintain his educational attain-
ment, let alone stimulate him to improve it. The intellectual isola-
tion of the educated man is enough to dissuade all but the really 
dedicated and the mediocre from taking up rural teaching.42 
There were other reasons alluded to by a colonial official. Prospects for a better 
life and opportunities remained a major motivation behind the “drift from 
the land,” he noted. “To the individual this might mean regular income, better 
health and educational provision, and the stimulus of the urban environment 
with its variety of cultural outlets. But deep down beneath this reasoning lies 
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the knowledge that there is no future on the land for the majority. The third or 
fourth son knows that his chances of inheriting the father’s farm are slight.” He 
also alluded to the population density in parts of Igboland and the difficul-
ties of surviving on farming in such areas where land hunger remained the 
greatest source of litigation in the Native Authority courts. In parts of Owerri 
Division, with an estimated population as high as 1,000 per square mile, the 
drift from the land “is sheer necessity,” this official argued. In his view, “The 
productivity of the land cannot be significantly increased without capital, and 
this will not be available in sufficient amounts until a smaller farming popula-
tion is able to win a reasonable surplus from its land and efforts.”43 
British policy was similar in other colonial possessions but some colonial 
officials recognized that this policy was wrong. J. B. Brown, an agricultural 
officer in Bamenda, Cameroon, tacitly acknowledged this when he wrote: 
3 : gen d er a n d Co lo n i a l agri Cu lT u r a l p o l i C y 109 
“Programs for future agricultural development … ought to be aimed at 
women and at making the younger generation of males favourably disposed 
towards agriculture.”44 Despite women’s indispensable role in the agricultural 
economy, colonial authorities continued with a policy that often misdirected 
services to improve agriculture throughout the country. 
Changes to the dominant notion of the male farmer remained in place 
until the beginning of 1950. The increasing role that the African elite began 
to play in domestic politics from the early 1950s and the regional autonomy 
achieved in 1954 would eventually lead to some cosmetic changes in the gen-
dered nature of state policy in agriculture. This period was a turning point in 
economic policy because the government of the Eastern Region introduced 
some changes to existing policy, particularly in the agricultural sector. The 
main emphasis beginning in 1952 was on extension work and agricultural 
shows to stimulate the farmers’ interest in new farming techniques and 
“proper” land utilization.45 This scheme continued to be offered to male 
farmers until 1956, when the Agricultural Department started a scheme of 
“non-residential” practical farm schools in two villages. The farmers, who 
included women, received training in the use of fertilizers and techniques 
for citrus farming and soil conservation. The new scheme, according to the 
government, was to require minimum intellectual effort and disruption of 
rural life, and “fitted into the normal social and economic life of the village.”46 
This change in policy is a tacit acknowledgment that past policies had been 
misdirected and ignored local realities, but it also showed that officials still 
believed that local farmers were ignorant and incapable of adopting sophisti-
cated innovation independently. 
There was still no consistent effort or commitment to see women as im-
portant actors in agricultural development thought. For example, by 1960, 
the School of Agriculture at Umudike, Umuahia, which revolutionized agri-
cultural training and extension work in the region, had a class of forty-one 
agricultural assistants and seven field overseers, which included only one 
female student, the first to be recruited since the school’s inception in 1955.47 
The gender bias in colonial support for local farmers was not limited to 
the extension services and improvement schemes. Colonial financial support 
schemes discriminated against women farmers. The co-operative section of 
the department of agriculture introduced a loan scheme in 1931 to improve 
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family production and assist farmers in buying palm oil processing presses. 
By the 1940s, farmers were applying for loans as individuals or collectives 
from the Nigerian Local Development Board to develop palm oil and cocoa 
plantations. This pattern continued for most of the remaining part of the co-
lonial period. In 1952, for example, the agricultural department in the Aro 
District supplied 1,250 palm seedlings to local farmers for the extension and 
establishment of plots.48 All the private individuals supported in the scheme 
were males, a pattern seemingly replicated in other parts of the region. The 
available data on distribution of loans on 31 March 1958 indicates that 165 
were given for general agriculture in the amount of £157,369. The share for ag-
ricultural industries, including palm oil mills, rice mills, corn mills, cassava 
graters, and copra plantation and factory, was 46 in the amount of £91,301.49 
What is remarkable about this is that all the borrowers listed from various 
divisions in Eastern Nigeria were men. Further, except for a few cases where 
farmers were given loans for mixed farming, all individual loans, which 
ranged from £250 to over £4,000, were given for the sole purpose of develop-
ing cash crops, mainly palm oil plantations.50 These policies prevented in-
novations trickling down to women who carried out the bulk of farm work, 
and thus did not have the desired effect of transforming African agriculture. 
gender and innovaTion 
The first three decades of the colonial era were marked by continuity in ag-
ricultural processing technology in the palm oil industry. In this era, 90 per 
cent of palm oil and palm kernels were obtained from natural groves with 
minimal capital investment.51 The production, marketing, and transport 
systems were described as still most “primitive” and wasteful, compared to 
the alternative method of mechanical extraction.52 Emphasis, therefore, was 
placed on improved quality through produce inspection and the adoption of 
new processing methods and improvement schemes.53 In 1915, the Colonial 
Secretary, Bonar Law, appointed a committee to study the trade in palm prod-
ucts and make a recommendation for “the promotion in the United Kingdom 
of the industries dependent thereon.”54 The committee reported in May 1916 
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and recommended improvement strategies that were eventually adopted.55 By 
1920, the government was ready to adopt measures to improve the quality of 
palm oil and reduce what was described as the wastage associated with the 
traditional hand extraction method. Toward the end of the 1930s, the demand 
for more efficient production methods, in general, and improved quality of oil, 
in particular, resulted in the adoption of new processing technology: palm oil 
presses and palm oil mills. 
The colonial officials, as earlier indicated, began increasingly to advocate 
for the cultivation of oil palms on plantation lines.56 So strong was the pres-
sure on farmers to convert their farms to oil palm plantations that colonial of-
ficials relaxed an earlier policy that strongly resisted any attempts to influence 
indigenous production. By 1932, there were about 119 native-owned palm 
plots in Owerri region and about 36 in the Onitsha area.57 In economic terms, 
the expansion of the palm oil industry, in particular, meant that Igboland 
was saddled with the burden of producing export goods to meet European 
demand, and this threatened the local agricultural economy. For most people 
in the region, the changing social and economic systems were affecting ag-
ricultural sustainability. As Dei argued, one can trace the harm to effective 
sustainable development in Africa to intensified appropriation of wealth from 
the rural peasants by the state.58 The conditions fostered by commercializa-
tion eroded the agricultural base of Igbo societies. 
The government’s effort to encourage palm oil production received a 
boost with the introduction of palm oil presses. By February 1933, twenty-
one Duchscher presses were in operation in Eastern Nigeria. The 1938 An-
nual Report of the Agricultural Department indicates that the number of 
hand presses increased from 58 in 1932 to 834 in 1938.59 However, statistics 
are part of the story. Despite the high rate of increase in the installation of 
these presses between 1933 and 1938, hundreds of thousands of producers 
engaged in the oil industry still relied on traditional production methods. By 
1938, Nigeria’s position as the world’s largest supplier of palm products had 
been surpassed by Indonesia and Malaysia, but some fundamental changes 
occurred in the way peasants produced oil and kernels. 
As officials promoted new production regimes for local farmers, hand 
presses caused the re-distribution of traditional labour among men, women, 
and children, increasing men’s participation in palm oil and kernels process-
T h e l a n d h a s Ch a n ged 112 
ing and marketing. Hand presses extracted about 65 per cent more oil than 
the traditional method, and they were reported to be in common use by the 
end of the Second World War.60 A.F.B. Bridges compared the labour and 
quantity of oil extracted by the hand press and the traditional method in 
1929. He recorded that it took 4 women about 9 hours to produce 331 lbs of 
oil, but 2 men and 2 boys about 2 hours to extract 491 lbs of oil from the same 
quantity of fruits.61 Eno Usoro also compared the man-hours spent using the 
pre-war traditional method of preparing oil with the post–Second World War 
method using the hand press. Total production-hours spent by men increased 
from 600 to 1,050, while production-hours of women and children declined 
from 1,450 to 992 after the introduction of agricultural innovations.62 
By the 1940s, the colonial government encouraged the new Nigeria Oil 
Produce Marketing Board and the Eastern Nigeria Regional Produce Devel-
opment Board to supervise the installation of what became known as “pioneer 
oil mills.” In 1946, the installation of palm oil mills began in the Igbo com-
munities of Owerrinta and Azumini.63 The pioneer oil mills were intended for 
large-scale production and processing of palm products. However, farmers 
continued to fear that “the building of mills meant that the Government was 
going to take over the palm trees.”64 Morgan is right to argue that chang-
ing circumstances may demand changes in agricultural technique, but all 
suggestions for improvement “must face the fact that Ibo farming practice is 
careful and based on long experience and that the environmental conditions 
offer limitations unknown to Europeans.”65 Nevertheless, the introduction of 
the pioneer oil palm scheme, marked by innovation in processing technology 
and methods, further affected the local agrarian economy in some parts of 
Igboland. 
Morgan observed in the 1950s that despite the restrictions imposed by 
physical conditions and despite a conservative outlook, Igbo farmers were 
gradually changing their methods in response, “firstly to changing social 
and economic circumstances, and secondly to influence of Government De-
partments, particularly the Department of Agriculture.”66 The expansion of 
trade offered improved markets for palm products. Still, innovations were 
gradually entering the Igbo region. Export from Aba Division increased with 
fluctuation to 39,427 tons of oil and 21,523 tons of kernels in 1952. And by 
1960, there were 3,236 hand presses, 153 powered nut crackers, 172 rice mills, 
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and 30 cassava graters.67 Obviously adequate attention was not given to the 
food sector. 
The Agricultural Department could not persuade women to use hand 
presses even though they extracted about 20 per cent more oil than the man-
ual method.68 The installation of oil mills moved the production process out 
of the home and eliminated women’s access to produce. The introduction of 
palm nut cracking machines also slowly challenged women and children’s 
role in the production of kernels, a process that threatened women’s income 
from the sales of kernels. The threat to women’s participation in palm oil 
and kernel production was resisted in parts of Eastern Nigeria. Susan Martin 
documented how Ngwa women in central Igboland mounted spirited pro-
tests.69 Women resisted the attempts by foreign men (European firms) to buy 
the uncracked nuts.70 Women carried similar oil protests in other parts of 
the province. In 1951, for example, women attacked men as they returned 
from the market and seized the palm fruits they bought. Women’s refusal to 
deal with the pioneer oil mills gave men an advantage that women protested. 
The District Officer for Opobo reported that the women refuse to deal with 
the Pioneer Oil Mills, as they were “unable to compete with the men.” He 
added that women were losing their traditional means of income and their 
only prospect seems to be “ever-increasing dependence on their men-folk.” 
This prospect, he argued was “not attractive to these vigorously independent 
women.”71 In Abak, Midim/Nung Okot in the Opobo Division, women pro-
tested the purchase of palm fruits by men from the local market.72 
The protests against the installation of oil mills were an indication of the 
important role of palm kernels as a source of independent income for women. 
Moreover, the innovation in production methods was not uniform through-
out Igboland. The oil mills and presses were concentrated in the Ngwa and 
Azumini areas. Yet the revolutionary impact of the new technology has been 
exaggerated. The new technology, it appears, was not the most significant ele-
ment of change because mechanization did little to diminish women’s control 
over production in many parts of Igboland, where they continued to use tra-
ditional methods of production. M. M. Green, a British anthropologist who 
studied the Agbaja people in the 1930s, recorded that there was only one hand 
press in the village in which she worked.73 In Mbaise area, hand presses were 
not common until recent times according to several informants.74 
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Indeed, colonial attempts to shape the direction of agriculture and the 
exclusion of women ignored the importance of female labour. Yet, previous 
studies of the dynamics of commercialization of agriculture and technologi-
cal innovation have sometimes fostered confusion over how these influenced 
gender relations. Susan Martin has pointed to the profound changes in gen-
der relations of production following the expansion of the palm oil industry 
among the Ngwa of Eastern Nigeria from the late nineteenth century. As the 
commercialization of agriculture became a critical source of income and 
new forms of identity, the pre-commercialization division of labour, Martin 
argues, “acquired ideological significance,” which strongly favoured men.75 
Margaret Stone has also drawn attention to what she refers to as the “ideo-
logical constructs of male and female status and power” and the transfor-
mation of sexual division of labour as rural societies were drawn into the 
capitalist world.76 Basil Ukaegbu suggested that the production of palm oil 
was women’s prerogative and was essentially used for household consump-
tion until the trade with Europe developed.77 The export potential of palm oil 
made it an attractive economic opportunity for men who could acquire goods 
such as guns and spirits with income earned from the palm oil trade.78 
These works have drawn attention to the use of gender as a framework for 
understanding social transformation, in particular why allocation of resources 
was transformed in ways that often favoured men. This is probably true for 
most parts of Africa, although the real impact at the household level may have 
been exaggerated. These models emphasize social structures (culture) as the 
engine of history, when in fact social structures were products of historical 
processes of social change. Sara Berry’s study of how cocoa production for 
export stimulated the development of capitalist social structures in rural Yo-
rubaland, including the evolution of private property rights in land, is a good 
example of this market driven transformation of social structures.79 
The expansion of export production led to fundamental changes in the 
local economy, most of which affected gender relations. The commercializa-
tion of agriculture in Igbo societies introduced new elements, particularly in 
the mode of production and gender relations, but like many other societies in 
colonial Africa, the Igbo were adjusting both their economic orientation and 
social relations, including gender, to commercialization and the demands of the 
colonial state. The changing economy was a “mobile” one and the opportunity 
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provided by the palm oil trade allowed both men and women to advance eco-
nomic opportunities – for women through their participation in the produc-
tion process and role in marketing. Fewer women become large-scale brokers, 
but they were central to small-scale marketing, which provided women sig-
nificant economic opportunity and livelihood. Indeed, women continued to 
play important roles as producers and marketers of palm produce at the local 
level. Reporting on the Ekwerazu and Ahiara Clans in the Owerri Division in 
the 1930s, G. I. Stockley, Assistant District Officer for Owerri Division noted 
that: “The only traders from outside who visit the area in any number are the 
Isu middlemen who buy palm oil in the local markets principally from the 
women and carry it to the European firms.”80 
Indeed, the control of palm oil was being renegotiated as the Igbo re-
sponded to new challenges from the mid-nineteenth century. The commer-
cial importance of palm oil was very limited prior to this period. It largely 
fell under the purview of household subsistence need. In fact, its commercial 
importance did not increase in some parts of Igboland until the colonial pe-
riod. An oral interview collected in Ogbe Mbaise in 1972 by A. M. Iheaturu 
is insightful. Eighty-year-old Andrew Anyanwu recalled, “People started 
of late to boil palm nuts and to sell oil and kernels. In the olden days, our 
people only made eketeke from fresh palm nuts, which they used for cooking. 
Palm kernel was thrown away, nobody bought them in the markets. Before 
we started selling oil and kernels, it was ohu [slaves], that people bought and 
sold to Nkwerre and Aro people.”81 But the commercialization of the oil palm 
industry and the income it offered was attractive to both men and women. 
Both men and women, it appears, re-negotiated their production relation-
ships in the face of new challenges and opportunities. Colonial demands in 
taxes and rates, often increased the burden of rural households, particularly 
those of the men, and they explain the interest men developed in the trade. 
Moreover, the incorporation of households into a capitalist market economy 
required fundamental adjustments in resource allocation. The nature of the 
transformation in the palm oil industry was also shaped by the fact that men 
controlled the most important factors of production: land and household 
labour. In spite of a gendered colonial policy, however, women continued to 
play important roles in both the formal and domestic economy. 
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persisTenCe of women in produCTion 
Women participated in palm oil industry despite colonial neglect. Although 
men were increasingly drawn into the new economy, and disproportionately 
favoured by it, the trade in palm oil was not entirely dominated by men. Wom-
en played important roles as producers and marketers of oil. Early twentieth 
century European reports noted that women usually brought palm oil to the 
markets.82 Some women, such as Omu Okwei of Ossomari and Ruth Onu-
monu Uzoaru of Oguta, acted as produce agents, buying from local producers 
and re-selling to European factories from the late 1920s.83 Besides acting as 
buying agents for produce in the palm oil industry, women performed the task 
of “bulking and of breaking bulk in produce-buying, both activities facilitat-
ing exchange at quantity and cost levels appropriate to the scale of production 
and buying habits of the customers.”84 Women almost dominated cash crop 
trade at the local level, and they often combined their activities in the palm oil 
trade with the sale of cooked food, as the expanding commercial sector offered 
new opportunities for capital accumulation.85 
Oral accounts from the Mbaise region confirm the significant role of 
women in the local palm oil trade and their reduced reliance on farming in 
the colonial period. According to one informant, women frequented the buy-
ing stations at Umuahia, Ife, and Udo beaches in Mbaise, from where palm 
produce was transported by river to the coast.86 Linus Anabalam, who was 
a small produce buyer in Mbaise in the 1940s, recalls buying mostly from 
women.87 An informant stated that women were in control of production and 
marketing at the local level. She argued that the expansion of the palm oil 
market actually enabled women to obtain independent incomes.88 
Given bicycles and motor lorries, however, men were able to cover longer 
distances to market produce that women had previously been able to sell. The 
ability to move oil and kernels in bulk and men’s domination of the system 
of haulage gave them a substantial advantage over women produce buyers.89 
Women only joined the long distance trade in later years, when motor lorry 
became the major means of transportation to distant markets.90 
Yet, both men and women sought advancement in the new economy by 
dedicating more time to the production and marketing of palm products.91 
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Women particularly cashed in on the increased demands for palm kernels, 
despite the laborious nature of its production.92 Therefore, primary produc-
tion drew men and women away from subsistence production under which 
subsistence increasingly depended on the market. In historical perspective, 
changes in the colonial economy diminished women’s levels of control of 
commercial production and significantly influenced the subsistence economy 
as well. Overall, commercialization in the Igbo region created an environ-
ment for men and women to diversify income generation strategies in the 
area of trade and production while significantly reducing farming activities 
over time. However, as the importance of cash crops for export grew, men and 
women became vulnerable because of their dependency on the export market 
and their reduced reliance on the traditional system of household subsistence. 
This not only diminished interest in other aspects of agriculture but also 
increased household food insecurity. The struggle over spheres of influence 
in the new economy increased tension between women and men, as women 
often threatened the men, and at times, called on the colonial authorities to 
protect their interest in the export or domestic economy.93 
There was a dramatic response by both men and women to cash incen-
tives offered by the produce sector. Apart from the cash incentives following 
the increased export of palm products in particular, the limited resources of 
the early colonial administration, as Martin Klein argued in another con-
text, forced colonial officials to systematically extract wealth from colonized 
peoples.94 The need to meet increased financial obligations (direct taxes and 
rates to the colonial administration) and the export potential of palm oil en-
couraged men to participate more in its production and marketing. Changes 
occurred in Igbo gender relations of production when the export of oil and 
kernels became the source of cash income and an important means to pur-
chase the European goods that increasingly became part of the new consumer 
culture. The new cash nexus that emerged with the oil trade dissolved the old 
economic order based on subsistence agriculture, while rising consumption 
needs of the new society and colonial demands for taxes and rates forced 
upon the Igbo peasantry a burden their subsistence economy could not bear. 
Some scholars have argued that the export-crop innovations took place 
and flourished without or perhaps in spite of the advice of European experts. 
Others stress the important contributions of research and innovations brought 
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by the colonial regime. The truth, Hart suggests, is “probably somewhere in 
between.”95 The colonial administration included some basic training in its 
agricultural development program, but agricultural extension schemes rep-
resented the most ambitious effort by the government to enhance agricultural 
production. Although ignorant of the complementary nature of production 
and resource allocation at the household level, these improvements neverthe-
less offered a chance for higher productivity and improved quality. 
In the end, the expansion of the agricultural sector, particularly the oil 
palm industry, was a result of colonial intervention as much as the outcome 
of the actions of African households. Although women constituted the main 
subsistence producers and an indispensable part of commercial production, 
they were generally denied extension services, agricultural loans, and agri-
cultural training provided by the agricultural department. Women were an 
invisible factor in rural agriculture. However, women’s labour played an im-
portant part in sustaining peasant farming, despite the constraints imposed 
by colonial rule and the ideology of the “male farmer.” Women continued 
to participate in the production and marketing of cash crops and adopted 
new strategies to meet the demands of the changing agricultural economy. 
Contrary to the findings of some scholars, the commercialization of palm 
oil production did not radically alter the production process and women’s 
participation in the economy at the household level. While men increasingly 
dominated the “middleman” position in the trading system, women contin-
ued to control the marketing of palm oil and palm kernels at the household 
level. But production at the household level continued in the same manner 
except for the isolated installation of oil mills and other innovations in parts 
of Igboland. 
But, the new economy also liberated women in some ways. Women en-
gaged in the new trade as producers, while some became distributors. Many 
became suppliers of foodstuff to the increasing urban population and became 
involved in the wider colonial and international economies. However, the 
government’s agricultural and development policy, the changes in the gen-
dered division of labour, and the control over and exploitation of the local 
agricultural resource base did not often stimulate peasant interest. Since the 
new economic structure was predicated on the patriarchal ideology of the 
“male farmer,” the neglect of women farmers that intensified with colonial 
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exploitation of peasant agriculture is important in explaining the political 
economy of colonialism, the impact on men and women’s autonomy, and the 
responses of women in particular to their exclusion from official agricultural 
programs and the transformation of their society. Ironically, women, as ag-
ricultural labourers and peasant producers subsidized the colonial state and 
peasant household. 
European commentators observed the persistence of women in food pro-
duction. Writing in 1955 about the Ngwa and Ikwere Igbo, Morgan delineated 
a clearly gendered pattern of crop production and control: 
Generally, amongst the Ngwa and Ikwerri the men plant and 
tend those crops and trees needing most attention, leaving the 
remaining food production to women. Thus men’s crops include 
yams, pineapples, oil and raffia palms, coconut palms, plantains 
and bananas, and oranges, African pear, kola, oil bean and ‘veg-
etable leaf ’ trees. Women’s crops are cassava, maize, cocoyams, 
beans, groundnuts, pumpkins, calabash, melons, okra, chillies and 
peppers.96 
Women in some parts of Igboland devoted considerable time to cassava pro-
duction, which became quite lucrative in the early 1940s. The demands for 
processed cassava flour [gari] in the urban areas increased women’s interest 
in cassava production.97 As elaborated in chapter five, the food crisis that oc-
curred during the Second World War also increased the importance of gari as 
a substitute to imported food items such as rice. In 1949, for example, about 
5,530 tons of gari was railed to the North, and by 1952, it had increased to 
22,170 tons.98 Farmers concentrated on food production in this period because 
of the lucrative market for food items. As the expansion of the economy, based 
on cash crops, forced peasants – male and female – into trading and other 
activities, they became increasingly less reliant on farming. In addition to the 
thousands of people whose livelihoods were directly affected by participating 
in the production of oil and kernels, many more became involved in small-
scale trade. They would buy a bag of kernels or a few tins of oil at a time for 
resale to middlemen, for whom large-scale bulking of these goods became a 
full time occupation. 
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The expanding bureaucracy and the emergence of urban towns and cities 
inadvertently created the opportunities that arose from European interven-
tion. As elsewhere in Africa, the urban population in Nigerian cities grew at an 
astronomical rate of more than 15 per cent annually in the first decades of the 
colonial period. By the 1920s, the population of cities such as Onitsha, Enugu, 
and Port Harcourt in eastern Nigeria had increased tremendously. Enugu and 
Onitsha grew from a combined population of a little over 1.1 million in 1931 
to a population of about 1.77 million in 1952.99 The urban population created 
a market for food produced in rural areas. Thus, the production of foodstuffs 
to feed the urban population increased despite the lack of colonial support for 
the sector. In this sector, women held advantage. 
Overall, colonial officials navigated an uneven terrain in their attempt to 
balance competing gender interests, colonial policy, and the maintenance of 
a stable political economy. The development model pursued by the Depart-
ment of Agriculture and other colonial officials aimed to transform the local 
economy and to meet European demands for palm produce. However, it also 
broke down “traditional” production relations, but balanced competing inter-
ests effectively enough to ensure continued production. At the same time, the 
development ideology of the colonial agricultural department, particularly 
the neglect of women farmers, combined with colonial extraction measures, 
limited the progress that could be made in local agriculture. 





          
           
            
        
            
              
            
       
           
         
           
          
             
          
          
          
             
            
           
ChapTer four 
P e a s a n T s , d e P R e s s I O n , a n d 
R u R a L R e V O LT s 
I never saw women demonstrating in that manner before. I have 
seen them play many a time but this was obviously entirely differ-
ent and there was no doubt whatever that they were out for trouble. 
– Henry Alexander Miller, Aba Commission of Inquiry, 1930 
I wish to tell you what made the women move about and remain 
here for about five days. We do not want women to pay tax and we 
want the tax on men to be abolished. – 129th witness, Oguta, Aba 
Commission of Inquiry Notes of Evidence, 1930, 278 
The market is our strength. When the market is spoiled, we are 
useless. – Witness, Aba Commission of Inquiry Notes of Evidence 
James Scott’s Weapon of the Weak outlines why open peasant revolts have 
been rare and “everyday forms of resistance make no headlines.”1 According 
to Scott, peasant actions, where they occur, are often limited in scope and lack 
a collective consciousness and well-outlined plans for action. They are also 
characterized by informal structure and a lack of direct confrontation with 
authority.2 Yet, whatever forms of consciousness have developed are rooted in 
what Scott described in his earlier study in Burma and Vietnam as the “moral 
economy of the peasant.”3 This moral economy, and the system of values that 
it contains, explains why peasant revolts are irrevocably linked to issues of 
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peasant subsistence and survival. African peasants have shared values simi-
lar to those of their counterparts in other parts of the developing world, even 
though Goran Hyden claims that the poor sectors of the population in Africa 
“are much less aware of their exploitation than their counterparts in Asia and 
Latin America.”4 But have African peasants in truth been less conscious of 
their exploitation than their Asian and Latin American counterparts? 
This chapter explores the economic roots and the consequences of these 
revolts and protests. It traces the responses of the local population to the de-
clining price of palm products and the introduction of direct taxation in 1928 
and shows how these events became part of local political discourse. In doing 
so, the chapter places the economic and social conditions of Igboland in this 
period within the context of the political restructuring of the indirect rule 
system and the worldwide depression heralded by the slump in 1929. 
Indeed, agrarian concerns remained the major source of rural protest in 
colonial Africa. Even recent competing claims to the state in contemporary 
Africa have been linked to rural consciousness. Contrary to the urban-cen-
tred model of war proposed by many scholars, Paul Richards has argued that 
the roots of the recent Liberia and Sierra Leone conflicts, for example, were 
agrarian and that these conflicts arose from rural poverty.5 The Igbo provide 
an important example of rural people in colonial Africa protesting when their 
subsistence came under threat from colonial from colonial policies. 
Rural Igbo men and women were certainly aware of the impact of state 
regulations, controlled prices, and market forces on their income. They did 
something about it by protesting against colonial policies in a variety of ways. 
From the 1920s onward, and for good reasons, Igbo farmers and petty traders 
frequently linked their declining fortunes in the palm oil trade to the policies 
of European officials and the activities of foreign trading firms. Subtle acts 
of resistance such as adulteration of produce and refusal to pay taxes were 
employed by rural men and women in Igboland to address their concerns.6 
But Igbo farmers and traders also adopted strategies that included direct 
confrontations with colonial authorities. These confrontations, which were 
mostly organized by women, became very frequent from the mid-1920s on-
ward. The articulation and framing of these protests show that Igbo women 
were not passive recipients of change but articulated their interests and acted 
in the interest of their class. Because the actions taken by Igbo women had 
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long-term political consequences, and because those actions were designed by 
them to protect their own interests, the women who articulated these move-
ments among the Igbo would emerge as “peasant intellectuals,” in Steven 
Feierman’s appropriate classification of such groups in his study of Tanzania.7 
In Nigeria, the rural population did not accept the impacts of colonial 
policies and the depression on their lives with passive resignation. The ma-
jor peasant revolts that occurred in Igbo society during the colonial period 
were directly linked to the oil palm industry. The local way of life, which had 
been tied to the oil trade, became very precarious due to the depression in the 
global demand for oil toward the end of the 1920s and the periodic decline 
in prices that occurred afterward. The centrality of the palm oil trade to the 
income of many rural households and the consciousness among rural peas-
ants that the colonial state, its agencies, and the European trading firms had 
means of exerting hegemonic control over their lives and the rural economy 
led to discontent among rural people.8 
One important example of the rural protest that occurred was the 
Women’s War that broke out in Owerri and Calabar provinces in 1929. Al-
though not all of Igboland participated in the 1929 revolt, the economic and 
sociopolitical conditions that gave rise to it were not limited to the areas that 
participated in the revolt. The 1929 revolt was the most violent, but it was 
neither the first nor the last protest directed against the colonial masters that 
was rooted in the rural agrarian economy. 
The 1929 women’s revolT 
On 23 November 1929, a remarkable incident occurred at Oloko, a rural com-
munity in Bende Division in colonial eastern Nigeria. Nwanyereuwa, a rural 
peasant woman, challenged the foundation of British authority in Nigeria by 
her simple act of refusing to be counted for the purpose of an impending co-
lonial tax. The revolt, styled the “Aba Riot” by the British and the “Women’s 
War” (Ogu Umunwanyi) by women, quickly spread to other parts of the Owerri 
and Calabar provinces, turning into an all-out revolt against all aspects of 
the political establishment and the European trading companies. Thousands 
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of ordinary women took matters into their own hands and stormed colonial 
administrative centres and later, the important commercial city of Aba, which 
housed several European trading companies. They took on the warrant chiefs 
appointed by the government, demanding their caps (the most important 
symbol of their authority). 
The impetus for the 1929 Women’s Revolt stems from the perceived de-
ficiency of the enumeration exercise in April 1927, upon which the 1928 tax 
was based. The 1927 assessments had been based on what an Assistant Dis-
trict Officer Captain J. Cook of Bende District described as “incomplete and 
probably inaccurate” information.9 In September 1929, Captain Cooks was 
sent to take over the Bende division temporarily from the district officer, Mr. 
Weir, until the return of Captain Hill from leave in November. Upon taking 
over, Cook found the original nominal rolls for taxation inadequate because 
they did not include details of the number of wives, children, and livestock 
in each household. Cook set about to revise the nominal roll, announcing the 
intent to a few chiefs in Oloko native Court; the counting began on or about 
14 October 1929. Although this data was not required for accurate assessment 
of the tax rate on the men, colonial officials saw this information as neces-
sary for the annual statistics and for accurately “gauging the wealth of the 
individual and community.”10 Consequently, when in 1929 District Officer 
Cook proceeded to elicit nominal rolls that would gather such information, 
instructions were given to the ezeala (traditional leaders) in some cases and 
to members of the native court tribunals to provide suitable individuals for 
the counting. 
About five towns had been reassessed without incident but then came 
the incident at Oloko. But the incident that led to the revolt began when 
Nwanyeruwa, the wife of an Oloko man, was approached by a local school-
teacher Mark Emeruwa, who had come to assess her possessions for the 
purpose of estimating income tax. A quarrel broke out between Nwayereuwa 
and Mark, who had been appointed by Chief Okugo, the warrant chief of 
Oloko, to carry out the enumeration exercise. After this incident, the women 
of Oloko went to Okugo to demand explanations on why women were being 
assessed for taxation. When Okugo did not give a satisfactory explanation, 
the women of Oloko and neighbouring towns assembled at Okugo’s house 
on Sunday, 24 November 1929, and employed women’s traditional protest 
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a sketch of the areas affected by the women’s revolt in okigwe and bende divisions (pro, Co 
583/22). 
strategy described as “sitting on a man.”11 This strategy involved gathering 
in his house, calling out insults, and sometimes exposing their nakedness to 
humiliate him. Tempers flared when Okugo ordered his servants to drive the 
women away. The ensuing protest drew thousands of women from different 
parts of Owerri Province. The women’s protest would come to constitute the 
most significant challenge to British authority in Nigeria. The protest spread 
to most of the Owerri and Calabar provinces, stretching from Okigwe in the 
north to Andoni close to the Kwa Ibo River (in the south), and from Owerri 
on the west to Umon and Itu on the Cross River (east). The revolt left death 
and destruction in its wake, including the killing of fifty-three women, the 
destruction of a large amount of public and private property, and the looting 
of European-owned companies at Imo River, Aba, Mbawsi, and Amata.12 
Scholars of Igbo Studies and other commentators have written more on 
the 1929 Women’s Revolt than on any other single event in the history of 
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colonial Nigeria. The early writings on the revolt centred on two important el-
ements. The first is the general conditions prevailing in this part of the colony, 
relative to other parts of colonial Nigeria at the time. The second is the role, 
place, and condition of women in the colonial context, including the exclu-
sion of women from colonial institutions. Sylvia Leith-Ross’s seminal work, 
African Women (1939), addressed the above issues.13 Margery Perham, Harry 
Gailey, and Adiele Afigbo saw the revolt as an early expression of African 
nationalism. U. C. Onwuteaka, like Afigbo, linked the women’s revolt to the 
implementation of indirect rule in Eastern Nigeria, which they argued was 
foreign to existing political structures.14 As I will discuss later in this chapter, 
as far as rural people were concerned, the impact of the political conditions 
in Igboland in 1929 was directly related to the economic conditions that gave 
rise to the revolt. 
Feminist scholars have also found the revolt fertile ground for a gen-
dered analysis of the colonial encounter and the visibility of the women of 
eastern Nigeria. Most have drawn on the revolt to assert women’s autonomy 
and independence in pre-colonial times, the threat that colonialism posed 
to that autonomy, and the exhibition of female agency, as much as women’s 
resistance to colonialism.15 One of the early feminist commentators on the 
1929 revolt, Judith Van Allen, portrayed the revolt primarily as a political 
protest in which women employed a feminist method of protest, “sitting on 
a man,” to regain their pre-colonial political roles.16 Nkiru Nzegwu suggests 
that the revolt was an attempt by the women to prevent the erosion of their 
rights and an expression of a female consciousness and solidarity.17 Women’s 
political consciousness was directed toward the restoration of equitable gen-
der relations, which had been disrupted by the colonial patriarchal social and 
political order. 18 
Scholars have also stressed the exceptionalism of Igbo women in colonial 
Nigeria. The women who struck back at the colonial authority in 1929, when 
they feared that their livelihood and lifestyle were in jeopardy, were not led 
by well-organized political leaders. Their actions were not framed around 
any major ideology, but their peasant roots informed their consciousness. In-
deed, they were ordinary women who led routine lives as peasants, wives, and 
mothers. Their exceptionalism, in comparison to women elsewhere in colo-
nial Nigeria, can be found in the structures of Igbo society and the significant 
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social and economic authority that women enjoyed in an area characterized 
by a high degree of complementarity of male and female roles. Even though 
the colonial institution did not include women, they were not completely dis-
empowered. Their action in 1929 was perplexing to colonial officials and de-
fied their expectations of women’s behaviour. So, in the sixty years of contact 
between the Igbo and imperial Britain, the 1929 women’s rebellion stands as 
the most notable of the many revolts and confrontations that characterized 
Anglo-Igbo relations and became important in redefining colonial policy in 
Nigeria. 
While this incident has received considerable attention, we can draw 
conclusions that have hitherto been neglected, including its roots in the 
agrarian economy, by re-examining two important questions that are central 
to a re-evaluation of the incident. What were the causes of the revolt? And to 
what extent were they rooted in the crisis in the agrarian economy of the Igbo 
in the 1920s? The following sections will explore these questions, by empha-
sizing the rebellion’s agrarian roots and by linking other political and social 
grievances raised by the agitators to the economic condition in the rural areas 
in this period. 
The agr arian eConomy and rur al 
proTesT 
Few minor protests related to socio-economic conditions had occurred in Ow-
erri Province prior to the 1929 Women’s Revolt. But the declining economy in 
mid-1920s provided fertile ground for the protests that frequently occurred 
among the Igbo in this period. One was the 1925 women’s “Dance Movement,” 
which called for Europeans to leave. This movement came to be known as the 
nwaobia la (literally, strangers leave) protest. The protest started in Atta, in 
Okigwe Division of Owerri Province, as a result of a message said to have been 
received from God.19 The message included forbidding men from growing 
cassava, regarded as the women’s prerogative. Parts of the demand included 
banning the use of European coins, fixing prices of foodstuffs in the markets, 
and regulating the cloth that women and girls wore.20 
4 : pe a sa n T s , d epressi o n , a n d ru r a l re vo lT s 129 
The protest was anti-European and anti-Christian but its economic root 
was evident.21 The “dancing women” were aggrieved about the high cost of 
staples in the market. This movement soon affected most parts of Igboland. 
The women complained about the moral laxity that came in the wake of co-
lonialism and Christianity. Undoubtedly, women regarded colonial adminis-
trators, the missionaries, and the European traders as one entity – foreigners 
whose intervention was responsible for economic and social upheaval. They 
demanded that there be “no more Government and no more Native Courts” 
and that there should be a return to “old customs.”22 
Officials like the senior Resident for Onitsha Province were clearly con-
cerned about what the Resident described as bands of women “preaching their 
own ideas of desirable reforms.”23 While officials interpreted the women’s 
movement as a disturbance of the peace and order, they failed to comprehend 
the level of discontent among the African population as a result of the low 
price for palm products and the general economic distress in the rural areas, 
which was also caused by the incessant price increases in basic staples. De-
spite being framed around traditional values and a rejection of what was seen 
as European, the 1925 revolt was rooted in the peasant economy.24 
Sporadic protests continued for the following two years, mostly related to 
the produce trade, particularly the introduction of produce inspection and a 
new system of buying produce by weight. In 1926, women protested against 
the low prices of palm oil and kernels as well as the new method of buying 
produce by weight, which replaced the old method of buying by measure. 
Most upsetting to rural farmers was the steep decline in revenue. In March 
1927, palm oil sold for £20 per ton in parts of Owerri Province. By December, 
it had declined to about £18 per ton, although kernels sold for between £13 
and £14 per ton in the same period.25 In Aba District, the price had gone from 
7 shillings to 5 shillings. Attempts by the buying agents and the international 
trading companies to control prices forced producers to demand price stabi-
lization. Groups of women petitioned colonial officials and European firms 
asking for “fair prices” for palm produce. The demands made by Obowo 
women in a petition to the district officer of Okigwe District included fixing 
the price of one tin of palm oil at 10 shillings, and fixing the price of a bushel 
of palm kernels at 7 shillings. They threatened that “no products [will] be sold 
if these proposals are not granted.”26 
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In these lean periods, the colonial authorities introduced new measures 
to stabilize and sustain the local economy – measures that rural people per-
ceived as a threat to their own survival. The year 1928 also saw the introduc-
tion of produce inspection to improve the quality of produce. As the effect of 
produce inspections was increasingly felt among local producers, the discon-
tent that grew, especially among women, culminated in petitions to colonial 
officials. Women complained about the inspection, which they regarded as 
undue interference with their trade.27 In Okigwe Division, women com-
plained about the interference of produce inspectors in local trade.28 Some 
women suggested strikes and curtailing production of oil and kernels to force 
concessions and increase prices.29 Certainly, withholding the supply of palm 
produce on a large scale could have had an impact on prices, since Eastern 
Nigeria supplied the bulk of the total world output. However, it was unclear 
how these protest measures could be implemented under a production sys-
tem dominated by thousands of independent small-scale producers. The 
geographical spread of producing areas and the lack of rural organizational 
structure that could represent producers certainly precluded any outright cut 
in the supply of palm produce. 
With their dwindling income, the region’s farmers severely felt the impact 
of the depression years. The situation was probably worse for women because 
of their role in providing the bulk of household food needs. In subtle and less 
subtle ways, women in Owerri Province responded to the growing insecu-
rity in the local economy. Caught by the fall in prices and insecure incomes, 
“women adulterated palm oil and cut back production and mixed palm oil 
with water to increase the volume,” Eliazer Ihediwa remembers.30 Producers 
partially cracked kernels, and mixed cracked kernels with uncracked ones, to 
increase the weight. Rural men and women grumbled against government, 
believing that officials and the European trading companies were responsible 
for the fall in the price of palm oil. This conviction and the impact of the 
depression on the local economy ultimately influenced the timing of the 1929 
Women’s Revolt. 
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The depression and agr arian rooTs of 
rur al proTesT 
The world economy was in a depression toward the end of 1929 because the 
economic crisis that began with the crash of the American stock market in 
1929 had dire effects all over the world. Obviously, as the most severe peacetime 
economic crisis of the twentieth century in colonial Africa, it hit the majority 
of rural Africans with great force.31 But the depression began much earlier for 
many in rural Africa. Among the Igbo, rural producers whose livelihood was 
dependent on the sale of palm produce and who had not enjoyed relatively 
good prices after the First World War, found themselves struggling to sell their 
oil and kernels even at very low prices. Although the depression in 1929 was by 
no means the first time farmers had experienced economic hardship and low 
prices for agricultural produce, it was clearly the worst period and the effects 
were more biting than at other bad times. 
Even European traders were not spared the changing economic fortunes 
brought about by the depression. They had been directed by their parent 
companies in Europe to reduce their purchases of oil palm due to rising un-
employment and an economic downturn in Europe. It was without much en-
thusiasm that the directive was implemented by European traders. Many had 
come to develop personal relationships with African traders who had dealt 
with them over time. One such trader who witnessed the social and politi-
cal changes taking place and who sympathized profoundly with local traders 
severely affected by the slump and the decline in the demand for oil palm was 
Raymond Gore Clough. Clough, who had joined the Niger Company a year 
before the outbreak of the Women’s Revolt, wrote in his memoir that “things 
reached their depth” in the last quarter of 1929. “Merchandise ordered long 
before,” he remembered, “continued on its unhurried way to the beaches of 
Olomo, at the same time as the traders were taking less and less palm oil.”32 
The whole process was “bewildering to the Africans who saw the factories 
bulging with goods which the Whiteman had introduced to them, and which 
had become a need, and sometimes a craving.”33 
Company agents in Eastern Nigeria were left to manage the impending 
crisis. Clough noted the “sullen looks on the faces of the hitherto friendly ca-
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noemen as they went from factory to factory demanding better Good For’s for 
their casks of oil.”34 Madam Umunna and Madam Osika, who had been regu-
lar customers at Megwana trading post at Olomo, expressed the sentiments of 
many local traders when they spoke to Alexander MacKay, the district agent 
of the Niger Company at Megwana beach: 
Mackay, sah, we come to tell you they be plenty palaver for bush 
– the people no savvy why Megwana, Sunflower, and the other fac-
tories say ‘no’ for the palm oil when they done bring am when for 
long time you and all the Agents give plenty Good For [,] for palm 
oil. The people want salt, cloth and gin, but the factories no fit to 
give am now, though the people know you all get plenty for store 
– plenty, plenty!35 
The sale of produce was governed by the demand from the commercial com-
panies. Although European agents did their best to explain the worldwide 
depression in simple terms, local traders did not follow such reasoning or 
comprehend how events outside their local environment could alter their for-
tunes drastically within a very short period. Many local traders believed that 
the slump was a manoeuvre by the traders and was linked to the tax imposed 
by the government. With the small size of the police presence, many European 
factories and trading stations were at the mercy of the women. Trading facto-
ries were closed as agents waited to see a resolution. 
In Nigeria, as in many other colonial territories, the kinds of social pro-
grams that ameliorated the effects of the depression in Europe and the United 
States were lacking.36 The Igbo region, which depended on a single product 
(palm oil), was even more vulnerable when the depression set in as it was 
subjected to severe price fluctuation and shortages.37 Basden wrote about the 
precarious nature of the palm oil trade and local perceptions of the change 
in the economy during the depression: “The fluctuation of price for this raw 
product is a very disturbing element. The untaught native does not under-
stand the vagaries of world markets and, when there is a slump, he is puzzled, 
not to say disgruntled, when he cannot sell his oil, or can only dispose of it at 
a low price.”38 The depression left producers with “less money to spend, and 
that means that all prices depreciate proportionately,” Basden observed. At 
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the same time, “The cost of food has more than doubled” since the beginning 
of the twentieth century, while “there is a much wider variety of imported 
foodstuffs on sale.”39 Households faced rising inflation. Consequently, the 
difficulty of meeting household food requirements increased women’s tasks 
in both agriculture and trade. The inability of many men to meet colonial 
tax obligations also increased the burden on women, who often paid taxes 
for their indigent spouses or sons.40 These problems were compounded by 
the significant fall in produce prices. In fact, from 1929 onward, the value 
of palm produce trade dropped progressively, declining by over 70 per cent 
by 1935. This led to a substantial decrease in peasant incomes and govern-
ment revenue.41 Thus, the condition was ripe for the revolt that would occur 
towards the end of 1929. We must then look for the causes of the revolt in 1929 
in the economic crisis originating from the severe economic depression of the 
late 1920s, characterized by falling prices for export goods, especially palm 
oil and kernels. The tax incident only lit the fire on an already tense situation. 
Raymond Clough wrote in his memoir that “By some queer twist of rea-
soning,” African women “associated the tax and the sudden recession in the 
trade with each other.”42 But their grievance was not an imaginary one. In 
Umuahia and surrounding districts, the price of mixed oil fell from 6 shil-
lings and 11 pence in January 1929 to 5 shillings and 5 pence in December 
1929. The price of edible oil fell from 7 shillings and 4 pence to 5 shillings 
and 11 pence in the same period. The palm kernel price fell from 5 shillings 
and 10 pence to 4 shillings and 5 pence in the same period.43 Women’s re-
sponses and testimonies further substantiate the agrarian and economic root 
of the women’s protest. On 4 December 1929, for example, women gathered 
at Umuahia to discuss the low prices of produce. By this time, the price of a 
four-gallon tin of palm oil in Umuahia District had fallen from six shillings 
and eight pence to five shillings. 
At the Aba Commission of Inquiry on the women’s revolt, women seized 
the opportunity whenever they were asked to state their grievances to put for-
ward the low price of produce as one of them.44 One women’s leader, Nwan-
wanyi, during a meeting with company agents at Umuahia said: “We wish to 
discuss the price of produce. We have no desire or intention of making any 
trouble but we have fixed a certain price for palm oil and kernels and if we get 
that we will bring them in. We want 10 shillings a [4 gallon] tin for oil and 9 
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shillings a bushel for kernels.”45 This paints a broad picture of the economic 
dilemma that rural households faced during the 1920s and 1930s as well as 
their actions to ameliorate their difficulties. 
The effects of the slump were felt in some areas more than others. The 
Mbaise, Etiti, and Obowo areas of Owerri Province suffered the double effects 
of over-population and poor soil quality.46 Intelligence reports from these ar-
eas confirmed the widespread dependency on palm oil exports by households 
and the general level of insecurity that came with the Great Depression.47 The 
assistant district officer for Owerri Division reported that the principal prod-
ucts sold in this area in the 1930s were farm produce, palm produce, native 
baskets and clay pots, cloths, and other articles bought from European stores. 
The Ekwerazu and Ahiara clans were so poor in resources that they could 
not support themselves on foodstuffs produced locally. Yams and cassava 
were brought from Oratta and Ngwa areas to the south and west to supple-
ment what they produced, noted colonial officials. The only commodities the 
people of Ekwerazu and Ahiara could offer to sell to the outside world were 
palm oil and kernels.48 The threat to the palm oil economy, their sole means 
of livelihood, hit them hardest and threatened their very existence. N.A.P.G. 
MacKenzie, a British assistant district officer, noted the vulnerability of the 
Obowo clan in Okigwe Division. MacKenzie linked the inability of young 
men to marry and settle on the land to the poverty in the area. According to 
him, only half the women of marriageable age had husbands, and only half 
the men had wives.49 MacKenzie’s emphasis on marriage, which he saw as 
critical to the stability of local societies, suggests that the labour of women 
was very important in household production and economic stability. Women 
from such parts of Igboland would be active in the 1929 protests for obvious 
economic and social reasons. 
To fully understand the timing of the revolt, however, we must situate it 
in the context of the political decision made to introduce direct taxation in 
1928 and the impact of the taxation on household income. 
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The rur al eConomy, Ta x aTion, and 
rur al uprising 
Taxes were used everywhere in colonial Africa to force peasants to pro-
duce more for the market or sell their labour.50 Far from being the sign of 
humiliating servitude, taxation was seen by colonialists rather as proof that 
the African was “beginning to rise on the ladder of humanity … [and had] 
entered upon the path of civilization.”51 In Nigeria, the 1917 Revenue Ordi-
nance, which applied originally to the Northern Provinces, was first extended 
to parts of Southern Nigeria, including the old provinces of Abeokuta, Oyo, 
and parts of Benin (including Asaba Division), Ondo (1919 and 1920). By 1927, 
it was extended to the rest of the Southern Provinces.52 There was no income 
tax in eastern Nigeria until 1928. Since the cost of government was underwrit-
ten by export taxes, the need to finance government expenditure, including 
expenditure on public works, was an important reason to extend taxation to 
the Igbo country. For colonial officials, the answer lay in the introduction of 
taxes to be paid in European currency. 
Taxation was seen as a corollary to the abolition of the slave trade, the 
civilizing mission of colonialism, and the uplifting of the dignity of the Af-
rican population.53 Frederick Lugard, first governor general of colonial Nige-
ria, and a main architect of British policy in tropical Africa, had also argued 
that direct taxation was of moral benefit to the people and would stimulate 
industry and production, promote the circulation of currency, and expand 
trade.54 Another benefit of direct taxation, according to Lugard, was its “great 
importance as an acknowledgement of British Suzerainty.”55 In Lugard’s 
judgment, contact between Africans and colonialists during the assessment 
and collection of taxes would bring African “tribes into touch with civilizing 
influences, and [would promote] confidence and appreciation of the aims of 
Government.”56 The debate around taxation was viewed as a moral crusade 
and part of the “mission to civilize,” that would create and enforce native 
authority, lead to the evolution of “tribal” societies, and end internal slavery, 
which was still prevalent in this period.57 
When Sir Graeme Thomson became governor of Nigeria in 1925, it was 
apparent to him that some reorganization was necessary in order to intro-
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duce direct taxation to the Colony of Lagos and the five provinces in the 
south where direct taxation had not been introduced. W.G.A. Ormsby-Gore, 
parliamentary under-secretary for the colonies, had emphasized the political 
and financial importance of taxation during his visit to West Africa in 1926: 
It is important to remember that the acknowledgement of au-
thority and the rendering of some kind of tax or gift to that au-
thority are inseparable conceptions in the native mind. No Afri-
can recognizes the authority of the chief to whom he does not pay 
something in cash, or kind, or in service, and any refusal to pay tax 
amounts to an actual or potential refusal to obey authority.58 
The justifications for taxation were contentious from the beginning for several 
reasons and did not sit well with many Africans who saw it as unwarranted 
interference in their lives. The local response was generally negative, although 
not coordinated between different parts of the protectorate. Considerable op-
position came from local chiefs and leaders. The government was aware of the 
potential for conflict. The Legislative Council in Nigeria was asked to increase 
the police force by 500 men to curb any disturbances if the situation warranted 
such an action.59 However, in Owerri Province, colonial officials reported that 
“the general attitude throughout the whole Province is most satisfactory.”60 
Other district officials were less optimistic. “Considerable difficulty is 
anticipated,” the Resident of Onitsha Province wrote in May 1928.61 “There 
is no active opposition, but the measure is very unpopular; escorts may be 
required for District Officers in the bush at first,” wrote colonial officials 
from Calabar Province.62 Deputy Governor Baddeley noted that there was 
considerable “agitation against the tax” from Awka.63 However, considerable 
progress was made in the enumeration exercise in Awka until November 
1927, when itinerate Awka blacksmiths began to return to the area. Agitation 
about the tax began and oaths were sworn in many areas of Awka to “refuse 
payment of the tax” and “boycott the Awka Native Court.” The agitation at 
Awka led to reductions in the number of cases brought to the native courts. 
The district officer for Awka had hoped that chiefs would help in quashing the 
movements. W. Buchanan Smith, Resident for Onitsha Province reported: 
“the prospects of obtaining payment from the rest of the Division depend 
entirely on the payment first by Awka itself; the question of ‘breaking the 
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oath’ is in this instance more important than usual.”64 Awka agitators began 
collecting subscriptions from their people to petition the English king. Bu-
chanan has argued that delays in implementing the Native Revenue Amend-
ment Ordinance of 1927 were creating an opportunity for the agitators to line 
their pockets with the money collected from what Buchanan characterized as 
“poor deluded people.”65 
It had become sufficiently clear to officials how Africans would respond 
to the imposition of taxation. W. Buchanan Smith, Resident in Onitsha Prov-
ince, noted in 1928 that, despite many meetings held by the district officer 
in Awgu Division to explain his position, and although the temper of the 
male population was markedly good humoured, the women were less so and 
made definite attempts to break up some meetings by indulging in unceasing 
song.66 The general attitude of the people from Obubra, Ikom, Ogoja, and 
Afikpo “seems to be one of acquiescence,” although it was unclear what their 
attitude would be when the “actual demand for payment is made,” the Resi-
dent of Ogoja Province wrote.67 In early 1928, the district officer in Abaki-
liki Division found it difficult to obtain an accurate count of the adult male 
population, particularly among some of the Ezzi clans, as people evaded the 
enumerators. Awareness of the impending taxation was created by people 
moving between districts as traders or employees of the colonial government. 
The Ezzi chiefs, in their petition against taxation, seem to have been informed 
of the impending taxation by persons from Aba and Onitsha districts con-
nected with road construction in the area.68 Officials remained pessimistic 
and “prepared for considerable difficulty in the collection of the tax.”69 One 
tactic adopted by the Ezzi to avoid enumeration was to go to the farms, thus 
avoiding direct conflict with officials, forcing officials to prosecute a number 
of people before some figures could be obtained. 
Perhaps the most frequent means of protest was that of individuals who 
petitioned colonial officials. Individuals made a great variety of requests and 
complaints to district officers or Residents, including petitions for exception 
from taxation or reduction of income tax based on their economic condi-
tions. Native court chiefs in Abakiliki District petitioned the Secretary of 
State for the colonies in January 1929. In their petition, they noted that people 
under their jurisdiction were opposed to a poll tax, arguing that “many male 
adults in Abakiliki District do not at one time possess 7 shillings,” obviously a 
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considerable amount for many rural people.70 Thus, many local people sought 
ways to evade taxes altogether or reduce their tax burden. A. E. Cooks, who 
served for fifteen years as an administrative officer in colonial Nigeria, recalls 
in his memoirs: “Tax evasion is a popular pastime, in fact it is hardly an 
exaggeration to say that each of the three thousand or so family heads in the 
Division … is continuously engaged in a grim struggle to effect, by hook or by 
crook, a reduction in the tax assessment of his family.”71 
Almost all opposed the introduction of direct taxation. For the newly 
appointed warrant chiefs, the collection of taxes constituted one of their most 
important functions and symbolized their power over the villages where they 
reigned. The collaboration of the new powerful indigenous chiefs stemmed 
the tide of protest in some areas. Chief Onyeama of Enugu was one of those 
that stood on the side of the administration. As a willing collaborator, On-
yeama was responsible for allegedly throwing out some “anti-tax agitators” 
from Awka.72 Onyeama, like many other warrant chiefs, benefited directly 
from taxation. These chiefs’ salaries and allowances were directly dependent 
on the amount of tax collected in their areas. 
Following the enactment of the Native Revenue Amendment Ordinance, 
direct taxation was introduced in April 1928 based on 2.5 per cent of per-
sonal income, after the careful propaganda of the preceding year.73 A special 
police unit, which then numbered 417, was used to maintain the peace. An 
additional 250 were to be recruited for the 1929 and 1930 tax period.74 But 
opposition continued because the tax burden caused a significant amount 
of stress for the local population and forced many to devise ways of avoiding 
intimidation by local tax collectors and officials. 
Additionally, the imposition of taxation coincided with the slump in 
palm produce prices, which was the principal source of income used for the 
assessment of incomes in 1927. The enumeration exercise in Oloko Umuahia, 
which included the counting of women and livestock, raised suspicions that 
women would be taxed as the men.75 Women expressed the view that the tax 
on men was already a big burden on the household as some men had been 
forced to pawn themselves or their children in order to pay taxes.76 In Ngwa 
region, taxation forced communities to collect palm fruit communally, for 
a period of three months in the year, in order “to give everyone a means of 
paying tax.”77 Indeed, the district officer for Owerri had noted in 1928: “The 
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amount of petty trade done by women does not appear to warrant separate 
assessment as it consists largely of sale or barter of farm or palm produce.”78 
However, the general belief that women were about to be taxed raised a gen-
eral level of apprehension among them.79 
Since the historiography is deficient in its treatment of the economic roots 
of the revolt in relation to the local economy when taxation was introduced, 
let us turn to the voices of rural women and men as recorded in the “Notes of 
Evidence” taken by the commission of inquiry set up to examine the causes 
of the revolt. Their voices allow us to understand the range of their emotions, 
their motives, and what they believed were their responsibilities to their fami-
lies and communities and the responsibilities of the colonial government to 
them. Ikodia, one of the women of Oloko who participated in the revolt, sum-
marized the feeling of women: “We heard that women were being counted by 
their chiefs. Women became annoyed at this … as they did not wish to accept 
it.… We, women, therefore held a large meeting at which we decided to wait 
until we heard definitely from one person that women were to be taxed, in 
which case we would make trouble, as we did not mind to be killed for doing 
so.”80 Nwakaji, of Ekweli in Oloko, asked: “How could women who have no 
means themselves to buy food or clothing pay tax?” And Uligbo of Awon 
Uku, Oloko, asked how women who depended on their husbands could pay 
tax: “we cannot buy food or clothe ourselves: how shall we get money to pay 
tax?”81 Nwanyiafo Obasi, whose mother participated in the revolts in Mbaise, 
confirmed that women were infuriated by the prospect of new taxation. Ac-
cording to her, “in Igbo tradition women were not required to make cash 
contributions to community development, but the white people were trying 
to introduce a new rule and women rejected it.”82 Enyidia, another leader of 
the women’s movement from Oloko, lamented: “What have we women done 
to warrant our being taxed? We women are like trees, which bear fruit. You 
should tell us the reason why we who bear seeds should be counted.”83 
Women did not expect to be taxed on account of their femininity and 
reproductive roles. Adiele Afigbo noted that the reference to women as fruit-
bearing trees or reproducers of humans and the perception that they would 
be taxed raised a “very strong moral and psychological dilemma” that “lies 
at the root of certain aspects of indigenous social and ethical philosophy.”84 
Thus, just as “one cannot, in the interest of human beings deal lightly with the 
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survival of fruit-bearing trees, one could not play with the fate of women.”85 
The contrast between local ideas of taxation of women and British ideas of 
personal income tax also touched on certain ethical aspects of Igbo society. 
Indeed the Native Revenue Amendment Ordinance was introduced 
with a comparatively small knowledge base on the social organizations of 
the southeastern provinces.86 In Owerri Province, for example, the extended 
family or village group formed the responsible units, and the emphasis on 
“individual responsibility” challenged communal responsibility and the sort 
of communal humane living that defined Igbo social relations. S. M. Jacob, 
former government statistician, wrote that English law as applied to Nigeria 
did not admit “communal responsibility for tax payment.”87 The Aba Com-
mission confirmed that: 
It was the expressed intention of the Government in extending 
direct taxation to these Provinces to fix and make definitely known 
the liability of the individual and the doctrine that the individual’s 
default is to be made good by the community collectively seems to 
us a misinterpretation of the declared policy.88 
The method of assessment, West Africa noted, was a cause for uneasiness. 
The newspaper noted that some members of the local population had become 
suspicious due to interference with their land tenure by the Department of 
Agriculture in order to “establish small palmeries.” When the enumeration ex-
ercise of 1926 was carried out, the Resident of Owerri was not open about why 
the enumeration was being carried out; the people felt deceived when taxation 
was later introduced. There was complete loss of popular faith, both in the 
administration and in those chiefs who sought to carry out its orders. This 
popular mistrust reached what West Africa termed a “dangerous level” three 
years later when the acting district officer for Bende, on his own initiative tried 
to update the tax system.89 
The timing of the revolt, therefore, has to be linked to the frustration 
of the local population, who associated the introduction of taxation to the 
economic conditions of the time, particularly the fall in the price of palm pro-
duce.90 The low price of palm produce and the high price for imported com-
modities, now out of the reach of many households, offer some perspectives 
on what fuelled women’s anger in 1929, the reasons for their hostility to the 
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colonial state, to European firms, and to the firms’ representatives.91 Because 
the colonial administration failed to recognize the interdependent nature of 
the domestic and formal economy, the officials had the false impression that 
men were better off than women. But the women’s response suggested other-
wise. Hence, the women’s demand extended to the abolition of taxation on 
males, an increase in prices of produce (palm oil and kernels), and a decrease 
in the prices of imported goods.92 
There were also other factors responsible for the revolt. Beyond the eco-
nomic factors was the deep distrust for the new political institutions intro-
duced under colonialism, especially the indirect rule system imposed on the 
Igbo. 
poliTiC al and soCial rooTs of The 
revolT 
The political and class divisions created by the imposition of colonial rule had 
deepened by the late 1920s. The Igbo were antagonistic to the warrant chief 
system and the political and economic privileges the warrant chiefs enjoyed 
under the new dispensation. The emerging political elite with economic and 
political interests to protect clearly sided the British as indicated earlier. In re-
sponse, local people openly expressed detestation for the warrant chiefs, who 
acted in a manner contrary to local political ethic. Besides, their methods of 
dispensing justice under the new administrative system drained the people’s 
resources. The testimony of many people at the Aba Commission of Inquiry 
reflected this antagonistic relationship between the chiefs and local people. 
Nwanyeruwa of Oloko told the commission: “Okugo became a rich man be-
cause of the money he got from us. If he had not got money from us, he would 
not have been able to provide for himself.”93 In addition, some warrant chiefs 
were noted for their ability to exploit their subjects with impunity. Okugo, for 
example, was said to have imposed levies on the entire community in the pre-
text that he had the mandate of the district officer. Nwanyeruwa narrated such 
incidents to the commission. On one occasion, Okugo had called both men 
and women together and told them that the district officer had ordered that 
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money should be collected for him to build a house. The villagers contributed 
20 pounds towards this project. On another occasion, Okugo told villagers 
that the district officer “had been worrying him for a young wife and that both 
men and women should collect money to pay the dowry of a young wife for 
the District Officer. We collected the sum of 20 pounds sterling and gave it to 
him.… We are sure these women were not given to the District Officer.”94 Al-
though most villagers were aware that European officials were not responsible 
for these levies, many could not speak out for fear of reprisals. These practices 
were common among warrant chiefs and members of the native courts. 
In the memories of those who lived through the era, native court mem-
bers were worse than many European officials. They were often bribed by 
litigants and many grew rich and powerful in the process. The warrant chief 
of my own town, Philip Eluwa, was illiterate, yet he, like many others, sat as 
a judge of civil and criminal cases. The warrant chiefs learned on the job, 
Eze Enyeribe Onuoha remembered, and soon became “experts” in “handling 
cases.”95 “I wish to say something about Chiefs,” Ahudi, a female witness from 
Nsidimo, told the Aba Commission of Inquiry. 
Women are very much annoyed. If I had a case with another in 
the Native Courts, that case would not be heard until I kept bor-
rowing money, about £10 in all. If I do not borrow money, the case 
would be kept waiting for six months. That is what Chiefs do.… 
I want to tell you that these disturbances will go on perhaps for 
fifteen years unless these Chiefs are decapped.… Otherwise the 
trouble will go on.96 
These testimonies were worded in such a manner as to demand change and 
not to attract sympathy. Initially, the women had directed their attacks against 
the warrant chiefs and their courts, but the revolt soon was directed against 
the colonial administration and the factories of European traders. Until this 
point, how to attack the native authority system was a perplexing problem 
for the local people. It appears also that the colonial authorities in Eastern 
Nigeria were remarkably ignorant of the level of corruption in the native au-
thority system. During the rebellion, Native courts were destroyed or dam-
aged and the chiefs were challenged because the native courts were seen as 
the outward symbol of the colonial government. The warrant chiefs, as a class 
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a court-house destroyed during the women’s revolt. (reproduced with the kind permission of 
the bodleian library, university of oxford.) rh, mss afr. s. 1000,  edward morris falk papers. 
villagers gather at a court-house destroyed during the women’s revolt. (reproduced with the 
kind permission of the bodleian library, university of oxford.) rh, mss afr. s. 1000, edward 
morris falk papers. 
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group of villagers standing near a court-house during the revolt. (reproduced with the kind 
permission of the bodleian library, university of oxford.) rh, mss afr. s. 1000, edward morris 
falk papers. 
Colonial troops used to suppress the revolt. (reproduced with the kind permission of the 
bodleian library, university of oxford.) rh, mss afr. s. 1000, edward morris falk papers. 
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and as members of the local administrative system, were seen as the instru-
ments of a European government. “The Court Members whether customary 
heads or not were assaulted or had property damaged without discrimina-
tion,” the Resident for Owerri Province wrote in a memo to the secretary of the 
Southern Provinces. “Of approximately 150 Court Members in the Division 
the members who escaped some form of indignity could be counted on both 
hands,” he remarked.97 The women “only attacked houses belonging to court 
officials and people connected in some way with the court,” the district officer 
for Ahoada wrote. “About 31 court members suffered damage,” he concluded. 
And in Okigwe, the district officer related that several court members were 
attacked and their houses looted.98 
Many chiefs were unjust. Overwhelming evidence was provided at the 
commission’s hearings regarding the “persecution, extortion, bribery and 
corruption in the native courts.”99 The commission rightly believed that polit-
ical discontent over the “persecution, extortion and corruption by the native 
court members (Warrant Chiefs) was [a] principal contributory cause.”100 The 
commission concluded that “although allegations of corruption and bribery 
were of a general nature, we heard enough to be satisfied that persecution by 
native courts members and corruption in the native courts are a source of 
very considerable discontent among the people.”101 
Overall, the immediate cause of the revolt has to be located in the eco-
nomic conditions of eastern Nigeria, the depression in the economy from 
the beginning of the 1920s, the agrarian economy and link to a capitalist 
world market, which directly affected the lives of Igbo peasants. Indeed, the 
political grievances articulated by the peasants during the revolt were deeply 
rooted in the economic stress in the rural society in the 1920s. Although co-
lonial officials admitted the existence of widespread economic distress due 
to the introduction of tax and the slump in produce prices,102 they were not 
sympathetic to the communities that engaged in the revolt. For the colonial 
government, the imposition of a collective punishment would deter future 
revolts and perhaps teach the men a lesson or prevent their wives from engag-
ing in such acts in the future. 
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a pound of flesh: The ColleCTive 
punishmenT 
In connection with the disturbances generally, I think a bit too 
much fuss has been raised by the fact that the victims were of the 
gentler sex. We are liable to forget that the Kings of Dahomey’s 
Amazon bodyguard was not a fiction, but an unpleasant fact, and 
if a howling mob of excited female savages who would be quite 
ready to tear a man in pieces with their hands is about the place, 
the only thing to do is to take strong action. It is quite easy for us to 
criticize them here, but I wonder what anyone in this Office would 
do in a similar situation – Colonial Office, London, 1930, PRO, CO 
583/176/9 
The position of the Colonial Office, as expressed above, was probably shared by 
many officials in the colony. The protest was seen by British officials as a threat 
to authority and a disruption of economic and political life. Europeans in the 
colony had hoped that the revolt would end quickly. Mrs. Falk, whose husband 
was the district officer for Calabar, wrote in her journal on 8 December 1929 
that steps were taken as soon as the outbreak of violence occurred “to frighten 
all the other grumblers sufficiently to keep the peace.” The troops, she wrote, 
were “simply dying to be called in.… A few of the young officers … are itching 
to go and get a chance to shoot. They fervently hope that the political officers 
will not be able to settle the affair with the help of the police only.”103 However, 
things got worse. A. B. Henderson, supervising agent of the United Africa 
Company noted that the attitude of the revolting women “was far from peace-
ful.” According to R. L. Attwood of West African Motors, Aba, “the women 
were all in very aggressive mood, right from the start, and most of them were 
armed with heavy sticks, which they did not hesitate to use to damage prop-
erty.”104 The assistant district officer for Bende, J. Cook, told the commission of 
inquiry that there was determined attitude of hostility towards Okugo as more 
and more women from distant towns gathered at Oloko market.105 
As such, the government took drastic measures to suppress the revolt. 
The police and a detachment of the army were used at various hot spots to 
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disperse the women. This became inevitable after the looting and destruction 
of European trading posts at Mbawsi and Aba and the threat of extending the 
rampage to the coastal trading stations. The colonial Resident addressed the 
European traders at Olomo about an impending attack on the trading posts 
in the Delta and the measures being taken to safeguard life and property. 
“Some show of force makes it clear that we shall have to take drastic measures 
to halt the spread of this astonishing hysteria,” he noted. “We have informa-
tion that the women are massing several thousand strong at various villages 
and markets in the forest behind this creek. So far, everything has been done 
to avoid conflict, but now the Government in Lagos has instructed us that 
a firm stand, with the use of force if necessary, must be made to bring the 
chaotic position to an end.”106 
The impact of the revolt was felt by all within the affected areas. The Brit-
ish made sure that the local population paid for the damages in cash. The re-
volt was estimated to have led to the destruction of goods and infrastructure 
valued at £60,000.107 Estimates were based on the claims submitted by firms 
and private individuals and testimonies of witnesses and the value of the loot 
taken by each village was estimated by “dividing the total amount amongst 
the total number of women in proportion of each village incriminated.”108 
This is perhaps an under-estimation, considering the destruction of personal 
property and the large number of police and army members that were trans-
ported and fed while the revolt lasted. 
Throughout the affected areas, huge sums of money were collected by 
local district officers as compensation for aiding the revolt or for personal 
and government property destroyed by the rebels. The British idea of male 
complicity meant that men directly bore the cost of the revolt. In doing so, 
the British were hoping to teach the men a lesson and make them do a better 
job of controlling their wives in the future. 
The Igbo have an adage, which says: Otu aka ruta nmanu, ya ezuo ibe ya 
(When one finger is dipped into palm oil, it smears the other fingers). The 
collective punishment imposed by the British on participating communities 
was their “pound of flesh,” and as in the Igbo adage, it smeared all fingers. 
The amount collected from each community was based on the adult male 
population and a percentage of the tax rate and on the level of participation. 
The amounts imposed varied from a few pounds for communities that did 
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Table 4.1. Collective fines on nguru area, owerri division.
Town fine imposed
£ s d 
inyogugu 626 11 3 
umunama Town 94 5 0 
nguru 774 1 3 
onicha 25 1 0 
umuhu 218 15 0 
lagwa 218 8 9 
avuvu Town 275 0 0 
ibeku Town 186 10 6 
azaraegbelu 10 6 3 
udo 96 8 6 
ahiara Town  1,000 0 0 
(nguru area) 
amuzi 171 12 11 
umuokrika 160 0 0 
amumara 420 0 0 
itu 258 2 0 
obizi 351 5 3 
eziborgu 150 8 9 
oboama 193 18 9 
ahiara 43 0 0 
akaba (nguru) 79 1 3 
ihitte 280 0 0 
ogtuama 44 1 3 
eziudo 417 0 0 
ugiri 60 6 3 
amumara 50 0 0 
okpofe 215 0 0 
mpam 294 0 0 
ihitteafuku 320 0 0 
Total 7,033 3 11 
Source: nae, umprof, file no. C.53/1929, vol. 26. 
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Table 4.2. statement of deposits taken from towns. 
Town dePOsIT inCidenCe area reason 
(£) (s/d) 
nguru 250 1/8 nguru deposit taken by Captain wauton, 
reason not known. 
umuhu 30 2/– nguru Took active part in disturbances 
hence incidence* 3/– more than 25% 
of tax incidence. 
ime onicha 475 7/– nguru Took active part in disturbances, 
truculent and a murder was commit-
ted in this town hence 5/3 over 25% 
of tax incidence. 
onicha ama 375 7/– nguru same as in ime onicha. 
ngor 50 1/6 ngor deposit taken by Captain wauton; 
reason for incidence not known. 
ntu 30 1/– ngor same as in ngor. 
obokwe 10 1/4 ngor Took no active part, hence –/5 under 
25% of Tax incidence. 
umukabia 20 2/– ngor same as in umuhu. 
nguru 50 1/4 ngor Took no active part, hence –/5 under 
25% of Tax incidence. 
obike 80 1/4 ngor Took no active part, hence –/5 under 
25% of Tax incidence. 
emweinwe 95 1/4 ngor Took no active part, hence –/5 under 
25% of Tax incidence. 
umukam 50 1/4 ngor same as above. 
orisa eze 20 1/4 ngor same as above. 
muokoro 5 1/4 ngor same as above. 
elelma 25 1/4 ngor same as above. 
ngwoma 30 2/6 ngor Took part in attack on olakwo on 
21/12/29 and in demonstration 
against Troops on 22/12/29 hence –/9 
over 25% of Tax incidence. 
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Table 4.2. (cont’d) 
Town dePOsIT inCidenCe area reason 
(£) (s/d) 
loghara 90 2/6 ngor same as in ngwoma. 
umohiagu 100 2/6 ngor same as above. 
umowa 60 3/– ngor Took active part in closing main 
owerri-aba road, hence 1/3 over 25% 
of Tax incidence. 
ihitte 65 3/– ngor same as umowa. 
isubiangu 120 3/2 ngor lead attack on olakwo on 21/12/29 
and had demonstration against 
troops on 22/12/29 hence 1/5 over Tax 
incidence. 
obokwe 30 2/8 ok-
pala 
Took active part in disturbances 
hence –/11. 
norio 55 2/6 ok-
pala 
Took active part in disturbances, 
hence more than 25% of Tax inci-
dence. 
eziama 300 3/9 ok-
pala 
spread disturbances area and thence 
into ngor hence 2/– more than 25% 
Tax incidence. 
oboro 24 2/9 ok-
pala 
Took active part in disturbances, 
hence 1/– more than 25% of Tax 
incidence. 
Source: nae, umprof 1/5/21, file no. C.53/1929, vol. 21, district officer, owerri, to resident, owerri 
province, 19 January 1930. 
*incidence is probably the normal tax rate for the community. 
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Table 4.3. obowo Court area reasons for detailed statements of deposits. 
Town male amounT inCidenCe/(penCe) 
populaTion deposiTed 
(pounds) 
amumi 393 20 12.2 
alike 821 40 11.69 
okwohia 330 5 3.6 
avutu 657 30 11.0 
umuoke 472 10 5.1 
umilogro 276 5 4.3 
umunachi 365 5 3.3 
ehume 376 5 3.19 
odenkume 305 5 3.9 
umuarian 747 10 3.2 
atchara 151 3 8.0 
umuosochie 228 5 5.26 
umungwa 188 5 6.4 
amanze 216 5 5.5 
umuegehu 416 7 4.0 
amakohia 713 10 3.3 
nkumato 336 5 3.57 
umuihi 510 10 4.7 
amainyi 748 10 3.2 
umunakano 1,143 10 2.1 
lowa onicha 645 10 3.7 
ikperejere 395 5 3.0 
abeke-uku 586 10 4.1 
nsu 1,346 10 1.78 
Total 12,363 240 
Source: nae, umprof, 1/5/21, file no. C.53/1929, vol. 21, resident, owerri province, to the secretary, southern 
provinces, 20 January 1930. 
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not take an active part in the revolt to £2000 for the hardest hit areas. In 
Nguru Court Area, Captain Wauton collected £1130 from Nguru, Umuhu, 
Ime Onicha, and Onicha Ama for “taking active part in the disturbances” 
and other unknown reasons.109 The Obowo Court Area, with an adult male 
population of 12,363, provided £240. Obohia Native Tribunal Area, which 
colonial officials described as inhabited by sophisticated and comparatively 
wealthy individuals, was expected to pay a substantial amount of money into 
the colonial treasury. Women in these towns aided by the young men were 
said to have set colonial courts and native administration buildings on fire 
and rescued fourteen convicted prisoners after the Peace Preservation Order 
had been proclaimed. Houses belonging to members of the native courts were 
attacked and looted. Damage to property was estimated at £200, and property 
worth £550 was looted. For their severe crime, the towns of Akwete, Oham-
bele, Obako, Obanko, Obohia, Ohanko, Ohuru, Ohanso, Obunku, Mkpo-
robo, and Umuosi in the Obohia Native Tribunal Area paid a combined sum 
of £2,942. The fine imposed on each community was based on 25 per cent of 
the normal tax rate (7/–) plus or minus a varying amount depending on the 
degree of culpability of the town in the revolt. 
The 1929 revolt has been presented as gender-specific and has often been 
portrayed as an anomaly. Why was the revolt dominated by women? What 
role did men play? What impact did it have on men, women, and the com-
munities involved? If we consider the 1929 revolt as a feminist revolt, as some 
scholars have presented it, we overlook critically important dimensions of 
rural political activism, their gendered nature, and the broader context in 
which the women placed their demands with regard to the British colonial 
authorities and the few African men who served in local administration. 
Admittedly, women drew upon traditional forms of political language and 
discourse to articulate their demands. They used female-specific ideology in 
framing their actions, but they did not act in the interest of women alone. As 
one colonial official acknowledged, women suggested that even men “should 
not be taxed.”110 Therefore, the women’s revolt reflects the collective experi-
ence of the rural population as a social group or class rather than experience 
along gender lines.111 
Although opportunities for women remained limited, women did not 
often question the existence of the empire, as they had accepted it as an 
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inevitable part of their lives by the 1920s. “We wish relations between us and 
government to be as cordial as those existing between us and the Reverend 
Fathers,” a group of women wrote in a petition to the government. “If there is 
co-operation between us and government we shall be able to select new men 
to take the place of those chiefs who have been oppressing us.”112 So, the revolt 
was a struggle triggered by conflicts deeply rooted in the colonial extraction 
of peasant resources and declining incomes. A combination of economic 
concerns existed: the perceived unfairness of colonial trading patterns, price 
controls, and rising inflation underscored the revolt as a peasant protest that 
had significance in relation to subsistence and survival. 
Women’s domination of the revolt was a mark of their importance in the 
economy in general and the produce trade in particular. The women were 
fighting for the survival of the household. The comment of the district officer 
for Owerri reflects this view: 
The introduction of Tax and the consequent necessity of provid-
ing ready money has resulted in women having more work to do in 
preparation of produce. The fact that the fall in prices of produce 
has resulted in less money being forthcoming from this extra work 
than would have been the case had prices been maintained at their 
former level, has caused discontent among the women.113 
Onwatugo of Akabo in Owerri Division told the commission that “we have no 
money to maintain our children, how much more then can we afford to pay 
tax? If a woman has four or five children, the first thing she does in the morn-
ing is to get money to buy food to feed the children.”114 
While we clearly hear the voices of the women who planned and took 
part in the uprising, it was the view of many officials that men helped the 
revolt actively through craven inaction. Colonial officials blamed the men for 
pushing the women into the open while lying low in the background. The Co-
lonial Office concluded that there was apparently no seditious goal to “arouse 
the women to action; it was simply a case of the movement growing beyond 
the powers of the leaders to control the worst sections.”115 While African men 
remained aloof during the protest movement, where their loyalty lay was not 
in doubt. The domination of these protests by women raised a serious ideo-
logical dilemma for the British administration. Some officials propounded 
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pseudo-scientific theories to explain the women’s reaction. The secretary of 
the Southern Provinces in a memorandum opined: “In the dry season women 
are in a more neurotic condition than other seasons and consequently are 
more liable to break out in disorder.”116 
Although men had dominated the earlier conflicts and resistance to co-
lonialism, the women saw this fight as their own. Indeed the British had cur-
tailed men’s ability to protest on a large scale by the time the women’s revolt 
broke out in 1929. The brute force of previous British military expeditions was 
still fresh in the minds of many Igbo people. In the areas that became Mbaise, 
an important site of the women’s revolt, for example, the Ahiara massacre of 
1905 was fresh in the memory of many. The British expeditionary force had 
massacred many villagers for killing a white man, J. F. Stewart. In the area 
affected by the revolt of 1929, many other communities had witnessed the 
military power of the British during the pacification period. But there was a 
widespread perception, according to Onyegbule Korieh, “that the colonial of-
ficials would not use such force against women.”117 Apparently this perception 
was wrong, considering the number of women killed during the 1929 revolt. 
Overall, Ogu Umunwayi bore a classic resemblance to social movements 
elsewhere. Sociologist Clifton A. Marsh has argued that “Economic inequal-
ity, denial of a voice in the political process, and a subordinate social status … 
are breeding grounds for social conflict.”118 Yet the event of 1929 was defined 
by its agrarian roots and its mobilization of women that would irrevocably 
change British administration in Nigeria and the lives of many ordinary 
people. Frustrated by the low prices of palm produce and the treatment they 
received at the hands of the British-appointed native chiefs, peasant women 
turned their anger against political institutions in the effort to secure their 
rights. These women represented a new voice and a vanguard that would 
eventually force the colonial administration to rethink its administrative 
philosophy toward the Igbo people, whom most of the British administrators 
had come to regard as the most intractable of all Nigerian groups. 
The character of the revolt and its widespread appeal to women over most 
of Owerri Province and Opobo exposed the growing chasm between local 
people and the colonial authority symbolized by the native administration 
system, which excluded the majority of the local people and their voices. But 
the dispute at Oloko and the wider crisis that followed had their roots in the 
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structure of the colonial economy and the further integration of the Igbo into 
the world market. The local economy was under enormous stress during the 
depression of the late 1920s and early 1930s. The roots of the conflict in the 
economic decline of the late 1920s and the colonial government’s imposition 
of direct taxation are underscored by numerous references to the low price 
of palm produce in the testimonies of men and women, some of whom had 
participated in the protests.119 The event at Oloko revealed the tenuous nature 
of African-European relations under colonial rule and the attempt by rural 
farmers and traders to protect a local economy that had come to depend on 
the palm produce trade. The revolt in 1929 shared certain basic aims: eco-
nomic emancipation, social freedom, and an improvement in conditions. Yet 
its agricultural roots, ideology, and domination by women set it apart from 
any previous social movements in colonial Nigeria. 
Igbo peasants did not often achieve all of their objectives, but their actions 
ultimately forced reforms. Given the dozens of complainants from witnesses 
at the Aba Commission of Inquiry, colonial officials knew that allegations of 
judicial corruption could not be swept under the carpet. The response was 
drastic and came in the form of suspension from native courts, withdrawal 
of warrants, imprisonment, or all of these. Warrant chiefs like Ezewuro of 
Ahiara, Iwuala of Akpoku, Chiaka of Umunama, Chiaka of Umuokirika, 
Wachuku of Mbutu, Wachuku of Obokiri, Nwankwo of Aluru, Wigwe of Ife, 
Ihekoronye of Uvuru, Njoku of Oburu, and Nwachukueze of Umudimoka 
were suspended in February and March 1930 for various offenses including 
judicial corruption. Some like Ezewuro, Iwuala, and Chiaka of Umunama 
were imprisoned for six months.120 The warrants of Chief Ezima of Ihie, Chief 
Ochinga of Obegu, and Chief Nwalozie of Umuaro, among many others, were 
cancelled for alleged misconduct during the disturbances.121 
Major administrative reforms followed the revolt. The arbitrary ap-
pointment of warrant chiefs without consultation with the local people was 
scrapped. Local authority holders or ezeala were appointed to replace the war-
rant chiefs following the administrative reforms that were introduced in the 
1930s. For the first time, women were appointed members of the native courts 
in Nguru Mbaise, Umuakpo, and Okpala.122 Among the most prominent of 
these women was Ahebi Ugbabe of Enugu-Ezike, popularly called “Agamega” 
or “The Female Leopard.”123 
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Although the reforms that followed the 1929 revolt have been seen as 
dramatic, they did not do much to calm official apprehensions about the Af-
rican population or the agitation of the local people. Nothing could more 
clearly show that the British attempt to calm the Igbo did not succeed than 
the protests that continued in Owerri Province soon after the 1929 revolt. 
Like other protests before them, the rural protests that took place in the 1930s 
were defined by their economic/agrarian roots. 
ConTinuiT y of rur al proTesT 
F. B. Carr, colonial Resident in Owerri Province in the 1930s, wrote in his 
memoir that eastern Nigeria “had always been the trouble spot of Nigeria.” 
Even though there was no major disturbance after the 1929 Women’s War,124 
the unpopularity of tax and discontent remained high in the countryside more 
than a year afterward. This was particularly so in parts of Owerri Province. 
The police report in 1931 noted that all the inhabitants of most of the divi-
sion in Owerri Province were “against both the rate and principles of tax,” 
despite the propaganda promoting the benefits of taxation. Although the rate 
of income tax was reduced from 7/– for an adult male to 5/– in Nguru area and 
6/– in the Isu area of Owerri Division, the people remained unsatisfied and 
demanded further reductions.125 The report noted that the people in Nguru 
area “are very poor” and suffered from considerable hardship even in paying 
the 5/– demanded as income tax.126 
Grievances remained. A police report in February 1931 warned: “On the 
surface the Division is quiet, underneath there is considerable unrest and 
discontent.” A considerable police presence was required to maintain order 
and collect tax. In fact, F. W. Tristram, the assistant commissioner of police 
in charge of Okpala in Owerri, wrote in a memo on 15 February 1931 that the 
local native administration “exists in name only.” The newly appointed chiefs 
“have as a rule, no authority whatever,” and as a link between the district 
officer and the people “they are useless, as they neither pass on the messages 
sent out by the D.O. for the benefits of the people nor do they report matters 
of interest to the D.O.”127 
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The “feelings of women against the old Court members is still high,” a 
former official noted in the 1930s.128 The same can be said of the endemic 
corruption and bribery within the native courts. While things had been 
generally brought under control by 1930, there was still, in the opinion of 
some officials, the danger of a general movement by women, and a significant 
increase in surveillance was implemented to monitor the activities of women. 
Meetings of women, aside from burials, marriages, and similar gatherings, 
the police advised, “Should not be ignored.”129 Officials were aware that real 
troubles could arise from small meetings, as the police observed: 
The women are just as determined as ever that tax must be 
abolished and the old court members removed.… The Organiza-
tion of women known as ‘OHANDUM’ is well established in the 
Nguru, Ngor, Okpala and Isu areas of the [Owerri] division and if 
they receive recognition or encouragement in any way the work of 
building up a Native Administration may be seriously impeded or 
even rendered impossible.130 
Post-1929 revolts were also rooted in the peasant economy. Some of the pro-
tests that continued sporadically in the 1930s came to centre on the intro-
duction of produce inspection, although taxation continued to be an issue 
of concern for the rest of the colonial period. One such protest occurred in 
1930 when a new system of testing palm oil, known as the “one-shilling test,” 
was introduced.131 In May and June 1930, the United Africa Company (UAC) 
complained that some shipments of palm oil to New York from Opobo had 
been shown to contain as much as 3.9 to 5.5 per cent of extraneous matter.132 
The UAC’s complaints prompted the introduction of produce inspectors and 
a more rigorous inspection procedure. This was a departure from the guess-
work that had characterized the previous inspection procedures. Overzealous 
produce inspectors introduced the “shilling test” in an attempt to remove 
the inconsistencies in palm oil inspection. Inspectors conceived the test as a 
process of determining whether palm oil contained as much as 2 per cent of 
impurities. Oil would be rejected if the residue covered a shilling piece.133 The 
shilling test was introduced in Oguta after the UAC’s complaints, but the issue 
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of inspection had already emerged in the women’s protest of the previous year. 
Many traders chastised produce inspectors for interfering in local trade. 
The new inspection procedure, which one official described as an “un-
wise and unwarrantable action,” had a significant impact on supplies. The ef-
fect, he argued, “has been not only to cause a drop in the quantity of palm oil 
brought at Oguta from about 200 tons in the week ending 20th September to 
nothing at the present time.” He was concerned that the policy had started the 
women’s movement again, as women were barricading trade routes and hold-
ing up trucks to exact tolls. He noted that the policy had “created widespread 
alarm in the Onithsa and Owerri Provinces” and necessitated the calling in 
of more police to the area and generally “added to the anxieties of an already 
sufficiently harassed administrative staff.”134 The shilling test was abolished 
on 7 December 1930, but disagreements continued over other regulations, 
including the rules governing the drying of palm kernels. 
The problems that confronted the Nigerian oil palm industry in this pe-
riod did not arise out of the depression alone. By the 1930s, the oil industry 
was facing increasing competition from the well-established plantations of 
Sumatra and Malaya. In 1933, the United Africa Company (UAC) wrote to 
the governor of Nigeria from London, stressing the need to improve produc-
tion by adopting the plantation model. The UAC maintained that “the future 
of the Nigerian palm oil industry appears to us to be gravely compromised by 
the development of the industry in Sumatra and Malaya … unless the African 
can be induced and enabled to adapt his methods of cultivation to modern 
methods the natural palm industry of Nigeria is in serious danger.” Years of 
research and cultivation of selected varieties of palm had led to the expansion 
in production in Asia. The UAC was convinced that the “immediate future of 
the palm industry in Nigeria lies in the development of plantings of oil palm 
trees from selected seed properly cultivated and maintained.”135 
The unrest that occurred in 1938 in Okigwe Division was a constant 
reminder that the effects of the introduction of taxes were still felt in the 
countryside. Early in December 1938, crowds of men numbering about 400 
in each case gathered at Isuikwato and Eluama, southwest of Okigwe, to ex-
press their grievances against high taxation and low prices for produce. A 
few days later, a crowd of women gathered at Okigwe demanding a reduction 
in tax. The women, according to the governor, dispersed after indulging in 
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“frenzied outbursts of singing and dancing.” However, armed with sticks, 
the crowd increased the next day at Isuikwato and threatened to destroy the 
livestock of those who paid their tax and to destroy the properties of the tax 
collectors.136 The protest covered an area of approximately 545 square miles, 
including the Isukwuato, Uturu, Nneato, Isuochi, Umuchieze, Otanzu, and 
Otanchara communities of Okigwe Division and reaching the Alayi, Item, 
and Umuimenyi communities of Bende Division, attracting approximately 
127,000 people. There was passive resistance to demands for tax payment in 
the affected area. A month after collection should have commenced in the 
area, the colonial governor reported that “no payment had been made and 
attempts by the administrative staff to reason with the people and persuade 
them to pay were unsuccessful.”137 
Aside from the issue of taxation, an important cause of the disturbance 
was the belief that the low prices offered for produce were artificially con-
trolled. Although the government concluded that the tax rate was reasonable, 
it believed that the system of tax assessment and marketing of produce needed 
modification. While the scale and extent of this protest pale in comparison 
with the 1929 revolt, it nevertheless represented a familiar trend among peas-
ants across much of southeastern Nigeria. As with previous revolts, the roots 
of the 1938 revolt lay in the peasant economy that continued to be under 
stress.138 Indeed, the acting secretary of the Southern Provinces conceded 
that the administration was not able to make proper allowance for the effects 
of trade decline in adjusting taxes. In his view, “the assessment of the flat rate 
should be more scientific than it is now.”139 
Peasant protests continued in the 1940s in response to the introduction 
of innovations in the oil palm industry. Attempts were made in this period to 
introduce palm oil mills in eastern Nigeria. This was followed by widespread 
protests in parts of Owerri and Calabar provinces. Women were the most 
vocal opponents of the mills for a number of reasons. The introduction of 
the mills would and did certainly shift production from the household to 
the mills. There was a feeling among women that their husbands would sell 
palm fruits directly to the mills, thereby depriving the women of the income 
they derived from palm kernels.140 Others perceived the introduction of these 
mills as a prelude to the takeover of their land and palm trees by the govern-
ment.141 
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The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that there is consider-
able agreement on the origin of these revolts in the extension of the Native 
Revenue Ordinance into this part of the Southern Provinces, yet its agrar-
ian roots have been under-estimated. Far from being a feminist revolt fed by 
female consciousness, the 1929 Women’s Revolt and the others that followed 
emerged from genuine peasant consciousness in which women, as part of 
the peasant class, spearheaded the revolt and its framing. The chapter also 
restores women to their rightful place, reveals their human agency, and chal-
lenges the view expressed by officials like C. H. Ward, who argued that women 
in Owerri Province customarily “have no authority in their towns.”142 While 
the tax issue helped to shape the nature and scope of the rural response, the 
revolt itself was a synthesis of many factors. The decline in the price of palm 
produce played a significant role in the timing of the revolt. In addition, the 
fact that the focus of the debate often shifted from the tax issue to the na-
tive administration system and the blatant corruption of the African political 
class highlights the multifaceted factors that led to the revolt. Overall, the 
historical analysis presented in this chapter exposes the role of violence in 
maintaining colonial domination and provides important insights into the 
gender relations of production in an otherwise patriarchal colonial setting 
and into the rural agrarian roots of the revolt of 1929. 
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ChapTer five 
T h e s e C O n d w O R L d wa R , 
T h e R u R a L e C O n O M y, a n d 
a F R I C a n s 
We are in the midst of the most destructive war the world has 
yet seen, and it is the duty of every citizen of this country, as it is 
of every liberty-loving soul in every part of the world, to bear the 
greatest sacrifice ungrudgingly and contribute his maximum in 
every way possible, little or great to bring the success of the Allied 
forces nearer. – West African Pilot, 12 February 1942 
… by the allocation of 4 bags monthly as compared to my previ-
ous shipment of 50 to 100 bags, my business will be very much 
crippled and the life of my entire family placed in jeopardy. – Amos 
Okafor to District Officer, Aba, 8 July 1943 
We require 200 bags of gari to feed our selected laborers on the 
Tenti Dam Construction and shall be obliged if you will issue per-
mit.… We certify that Tenti Dam is for our hydro-electric works 
generating power for the tin fields and can be justly described as 
a war effort. – J.E.A. FitzGerald to Assistant Food Controller, Aba, 
10 July 1943 
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The advent of the Second World War and its immediate aftermath had an im-
pact on several areas concerning the rural economy in colonial Africa. The war 
had “far greater local impact and indeed was to lead to far reaching changes,” 
according to F. B. Carr, who served as the Resident for Owerri Province and 
later as the Chief Commissioner in charge of the Eastern Provinces in 1943.1 
The conditions of rural life in the East were less than satisfactory on many 
fronts before the war began. The new Native Administration system, which 
was still on trial, had not improved local access to resources. Carr noted that 
there were “many problems of more material nature which had to be tackled” 
and many demands for “improved material conditions many of which though 
far beyond resources led to heightened interest in progress and highlighted 
the urgent need for development on a vast scale.”2 This was the state of the 
local society when the war broke out. Still, there was the desire to pitch in, no 
matter how little, on the part of the local population. Carr recalled the desire 
to support the war effort by the African population: 
At the outset raising money for war purposes became a domi-
nant feature of daily life and the response was quite astonishing. 
“Win the War Fund” and “Spitfire Funds” were fully supported 
and even the poorest – and none was particularly well off in those 
days – gave their bit. The salaried classes, clerks and the like with 
a meager average of, say £50 a year volunteered a monthly deduc-
tion from their pay.… Indeed, a wave of loyalty seemed to sweep 
through the country and even in the remote villages all seemed to 
want to help.3 
This chapter examines how the wartime mobilization of African labour af-
fected Igbo villages, towns, and cities from 1938 when the mobilization began 
to the end of the war in 1945. It outlines the key changes in the colonial ag-
ricultural policy in relation to the production of much-needed raw materials 
such as palm oil and the increased mobilization of the local population for 
food production. It also examines the new regulations and laws introduced 
during the war to control the local agrarian economy and commerce. The 
chapter links the political and economic landscape of the war era and their 
impacts on African population to the unique forms of protest that occurred in 
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response to British wartime policies as reflected in the petitions they wrote to 
colonial officials during the war. 
Changes in agriCulTur al poliCy 
Until the Second World War, the colonial department of agriculture focused on 
the expansion of palm oil production, improvement in the quality of produce, 
and the efficient marketing of agricultural produce.4 Progress was made in the 
export and commercial sectors of agriculture, but the government faltered on 
the development of the subsistence sector. Nigeria, like other colonial territo-
ries, experienced rising food prices and increased importation of food items 
during this time. The impact of past policies became evident toward the end of 
the 1930s and government became increasingly aware of the need to encour-
age the production of food. The government remarked in the 1938 report of 
the department of agriculture: “The production of export crops, important as 
this is to the wealth of the country and to the revenue of the government, must 
not be subordinated to the production of foodstuff for local consumption, for 
those who are underfed cannot do the maximum amount of work.”5 While the 
government recognized the need to improve local food production, it did not 
provide any direct incentive to farmers until the outbreak of the war. On the 
outbreak of war, colonial officials were asked by the imperial government to 
carry out the task necessary to secure the local resources needed from Nige-
ria to support the war effort. Thus, officials embarked on a double strategy of 
encouraging more export production and a more aggressive drive to increase 
local food production. 
The exporT seCTor 
The colonial government initiated a broad range of measures designed to in-
crease the supply of palm oil and kernels and commodities such as wild rub-
ber, which were desperately needed during the war. Palm oil was particularly 
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important in war production and the manufacture of cooking oil and mar-
garine for British citizens. Indeed, Carr described the production of palm oil 
and kernels as “a matter of first priority.”6 The loss of the British Far Eastern 
colonies increased Nigeria’s strategic importance as a supplier of palm oil. The 
Ministry of Food in London was vested with the power to purchase Nigeria’s 
palm produce as part of the measures to ensure an efficient supply system. The 
prices of palm oil and kernels were raised to encourage production for export.7 
In a dispatch to the colonial administration in Nigeria, the secretary of state 
for the colonies urged it to “exert every possible effort to obtain maximum 
production of export crops.”8 The war also exposed the need for new export 
crops independent of the market for oils and fats.9 
The strategic importance of Eastern Nigerian peasants during the war 
is reflected in the reorganization of the colonial administrative personnel to 
ensure maximum mobilization of the local population. Despite their already 
depleted numbers, administrative officer were appointed, “for the sole duty 
of urging and supervising maximum production.”10 As a result, all of Eastern 
Nigeria witnessed an extensive demand for cash crops, exploitation of for-
est resources, and forced labour because of British demand during the war. 
Colonial officials campaigned through the press and placed posters at strate-
gic locations, calling on farmers to harvest and process their palm produce. 
Schools and churches were incorporated into the campaign through the orga-
nization of palm kernel cracking competitions.11 A palm produce drive team 
was formed in 1943 to stimulate production, collect information on produc-
tion and marketing, and examine ways to improve both.12 Additional produce 
buying centres were established at Owerri, Okigwe, and Oloko Item. Palm 
nut cracking machines were installed at various locations in the region.13 The 
export duty on rubber was abolished to encourage increased harvesting of 
wild rubber.14 The government also encouraged internal migration from Aba-
ja in Udi Division, the migrants being hired in Awka Division to harvest oil 
palms. The deputy controller of palm produce, Mr. L. T. Chubb, advised the 
government to exempt these migrant villages from recruitment for the army 
and the coal-mines until the government achieved its objectives.15 Significant 
progress was made towards export production, but not always to the satis-
faction of imperial officials like Lord Swinton, who was appointed Resident 
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Table 5.1. palm produce export data, 1939–46. 











1939–40 157,970 342,580 £5:19s: 3d £5: 2s: 9d 
1940–41 141,703 262,575 6:3:4 4:11:6 
1941–42 147,678 344,820 6:3:3 4:13:0 
1942–43 153,537 323,555 9:4:6 5:14:4 
1943–44 134,664 330,647 10:1:0 7:16:4 
1944–45 139,464 320,764 12:6:6 8:14:0 
1945–46 110,242 283,471 13:1:6 9:4:0 
Source: Calculated from report of the mission appointed to enquire into the production and Trans-
port of vegetable oils and oilseeds in west african Territories (london, 1947), 57. 
Minister during the war. “With characteristic energy and drive he spurred 
on everybody and demanded greater and greater efforts,” wrote F. B. Carr.16 
The demand for palm oil and kernels from the region helped to facilitate 
further developments in the rural economy; farmers responded positively and 
increased production.17 In 1941, for example, the department of agriculture 
acknowledged that the demand for all the principal crops and products of 
Nigeria had increased on an unprecedented scale and had led to an increased 
output from peasants.18 Nevertheless, export figures fluctuated, despite mar-
ginal increases in prices from 1942, due to the internal market for palm oil in 
Northern Nigeria. 
The state did not always garner popular support from farmers, because 
the structural changes implemented were not always accompanied by higher 
prices for peasant produce. Additionally, some wartime and post-war devel-
opments affected the export of palm produce from Nigeria. These included a 
significant increase in the export of oil from the Belgian Congo, which rose 
from 60,000 metric tons during 1934–38 to 118,000 metric tons between 1948 
and 1950. This trend would continue. Exports would rise to 140,000 metric 
tons by 1953.19 
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Measures adopted by different European nations to protect their own 
economies directly affected African farmers who depended on the export of 
primary produce. Germany, for example, was a major importer of Nigeria’s 
palm kernels in the interwar period. Trade with Germany became impossible. 
When the Depression hit Germany, the country imposed very high tariffs on 
foreign sources of oil and subsidized domestically produced mustard seed 
and linseed. The country’s importation of vegetable oil, which was valued at 
70 million marks in 1929, fell to 27 million in 1935 and continued to slide 
thereafter.20 Before the Second World War, the United States imported about 
8 per cent of its oil from Nigeria. The imposition of high tariffs on imported 
oil raised domestic oil prices by approximately 100 per cent. This measure 
significantly reduced U.S. oil imports from 164,000 metric tons in 1936 to an 
annual average of 70,000 metric tons in the following years.21 
In the United Kingdom, war hampered trade and supplies and led to 
a lower demand for imported goods, including palm produce, as the war 
progressed. The Ministry of Food in Britain called for a reduction of palm 
kernel production because of unfavourable conditions in Britain and the 
austerity measures implemented.22 Although the restriction was imposed 
on most parts of the western provinces in August 1940, Eastern Nigeria was 
spared because the region had no alternative export. To avoid what officials 
described as “undue hardship” for the people of eastern Nigeria, the depart-
ment of agriculture allowed the region to produce kernels on a quota basis. 
The quota was based on the average quantity purchased in the previous three 
years.23 The restriction on palm kernels was lifted in May 1941, when demand 
increased again in Europe.24 
Indeed, there was no consistent policy. By October 1940, considerable 
debate was going on between the department of agriculture and officials at 
the Nigerian Secretariat, Lagos, over the provision of the necessary fund 
required by the department to reorganize production to meet its objectives. 
J. R. Mackie’s frustration was evident when he wrote on 19 October 1940: 
In the course of the very frank discussion which I have had re-
cently with you and your staff I have gathered that, as has so often 
happened in the past the instructions which I have received from 
the Government and the policy laid down by it for my Department 
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are incompatible with the financial resources of the country. As 
such a state of affairs is liable to misunderstanding between your 
branch of the Secretariat and myself and to cause a great deal of 
unnecessary work, before submitting to you further proposals 
and before preparing my estimates for 1941–42. I should be most 
grateful if you would be good enough to give me a frank and clear 
answer to the following questions:– (i) is the work of my Depart-
ment still considered to be essential for the prosecution of the war? 
(ii) If so can I expect to be supported by sufficient funds to enable 
my officers to work to their absolute maximum?25 
While the government considered the work of the department of agriculture 
essential to the war effort, the desire of the government to maximize produc-
tion in Nigeria was going to be based on increasing the level of peasant pro-
duction with minimum additional resources. 
The first response of the British was to increase palm oil production. As 
soon as it became clear that palm produce in particular was not required in 
the quantities originally anticipated, they tried to reduce or increase it de-
pending on demand in Europe. But what actually determined local produc-
ers’ response to demands was the price of produce. Many farmers were indif-
ferent to the call for increased production of palm oil when produce prices 
were low. The production of kernels in Onitsha, Awka, and Agwu Divisions 
and Nnewi District fell from 14,359 tons in 1939 to 10,100 tons in 1942.26 
Eleazer Ihediwa recalls that “Low prices forced many people to abandon the 
harvest of oil palms.”27 An agent of the United African Company at Ogru-
gru in Onitsha Province reported in 1939 that “little produce was coming 
in.”28 After a meeting with middlemen and producers in 1939, the Resident 
for Onitsha Province agreed: “There is no doubt whatever that the people are 
holding up production – and if we are going to consider extended palm pro-
duce production the question of a guaranteed price must be answered.” In his 
view, “even without increased production, something needs to be done and 
the guaranteed price or government ‘subsidy’ or other expedient should be 
adopted.”29 The government was willing to adopt measures to compel farmers 
to expand production. 
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CoerCion and resTriCTions 
The war was a catalyst for new forms of colonial control and major changes in 
imperial policy in Africa. The new forms of control – or what John Iliffe calls 
“new colonialism”– was marked by direct intervention in the local economy. 
In the words of Basil Davidson, the pressure brought on the local peasantry in 
the form of forced and selective production of crops and marketing reforms 
“upset rural stability,” and according to David Anderson and David Throup, 
this period marked an “important transition in British attitude to Africa.”30 
The Nigerian experience of this period supports this analysis. In Nigeria, of-
ficials restricted the movement of food items, especially gari (the most com-
mon local staple produced from cassava tuber) from one part of the country 
to another. They controlled prices on other local and imported food items and 
initiated an unprecedented mobilization and control of peasants for food and 
export production. 
The colonial approach to extraction in this period is reflected in the laws 
and regulations implemented to control peasant production, marketing, and 
accumulation, and in the local reactions. Enforcement through Nigeria De-
fense (Oil Palm Production) Regulation No. 55 of 1943 began to chip away at 
peasant autonomy. This regulation made it compulsory for farmers to harvest 
and process their oil palms, or face incarceration. The regulation also em-
powered the deputy controller of oil palm production to order the harvesting, 
processing, and marketing of palm produce. Furthermore, Defense Regula-
tion No. 89 of 1945 compelled native authorities to ensure the implementation 
of Regulation No. 55 or face possible prosecution. Through this regulation, 
the colonial state increased its pressure on the peasantry. In Owerri Province, 
where the regulation resulted in prosecutions, the palm production officer, 
P. L. Allpress, noted that: “Palm production has greatly fallen off, and from 
the unharvested areas I have found in the Aba Division one must conclude 
that this is to some extent due to the dilatoriness of the people. No amount 
of talk has any effect on the people unless one’s threats are backed by action 
now and then.”31 
The colonial authorities doubled the tax rate as a penalty in areas where 
oil palm owners refused to harvest their crops. The government was com-
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mitted to the recruitment of labour for the harvesting of oil palms where 
the rightful owners failed to do it. To increase its resource base further, the 
colonial government increased the exploitation of other forest products, such 
as wild rubber, wild silk, honey, beeswax, gum copal, charcoal fuel, Calabar 
ordeal beans, raffia, and bamboo. There was initial enthusiasm for wild rub-
ber exploitation in parts of Ogoja, Onitsha, and Owerri Provinces, although 
the harvesting was discontinued in 1945 because of the high cost of extract-
ing the rubber.32 And by this time, the war was essentially over. 
The failure to meet official expectations led to the prosecution of many 
local farmers. Between 1943 and 1944, for example, available records show 
that over a thousand persons were prosecuted in Obudu District for failing to 
crack palm kernels or harvest oil palms.33 The crackdown associated with the 
export drive in the period was widespread.34 Fines ranged from £1 to £5 or 
terms of imprisonment of one month or more. The low price of export com-
modities and the forced labour policy imposed on rural peasants provided 
the context in which many rural dwellers shifted attention to food produc-
tion, which attracted high returns. 
food seCTor 
The greatest problem facing the colonial administration was how to curb the 
rising cost of living that became more pronounced when the Second World 
War broke out in 1939. The British mounted a vigorous propaganda campaign, 
pointing out the importance of increasing the amounts of food and export 
products to support the British war effort. There was a tremendous outpour-
ing of patriotic passion on the part of the British. They expected Africans to 
react in a similar way by producing more food and raw materials. This did 
happen sometimes, even though the local people had other interests and were 
more concerned with matters of immediate and practical nature – their own 
subsistence. The West African Pilot wrote in an editorial of 23 February 1942: 
“if we cannot produce munitions, we can certainly produce raw materials and 
food products which are equally important for the successful prosecution of 
the war.”35 
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The war made the colonial authorities nervous about reliance on import-
ed food. Furthermore, the constraints on world shipping made it extremely 
difficult to rely on imports.36 As the war went on, it created an increasing 
number of immediate problems. These included low levels of imports and 
exports, shortage of food, and rising prices for locally produced food items, 
such as rice, yams, and pepper, as well as high prices of imported items. There 
was a perception that Nigeria was capable of producing enough food to feed 
the country’s population and to meet Britain’s import needs in wartime.37 In-
deed, Nigeria occupied a unique position among British colonial possessions 
in West Africa with its enormous agricultural potential and population. 
Beginning in September 1939, the agricultural officers were fully occu-
pied with the effort to mobilize human and material resources to achieve a 
level of local self-sufficiency and increase food production.38 In a dispatch to 
the colonial administration in Nigeria, the secretary of state for the colonies 
urged it to “exert every possible effort to obtain maximum production of 
export crops.”39 Sir Frank Stockdale, who was appointed to inquire into the 
production and transportation of vegetable oils and oil seeds produced in the 
West African colonies, advised the director of the Agricultural Department, 
J. R. Mackie, after his visit to Nigeria in 1938, that Nigeria, like other colonial 
territories, should endeavour to be self-sufficient in food supplies.40 
The department of agriculture made plans to deal with the uncertain-
ties of war. In a circular issued to all agricultural officers, the Agricultural 
Department summarized its goals to meet the needs of the war as follows: 
(a) To be ready to help the Imperial Government by producing 
such crops as it may ask; 
(b) To ensure that Nigeria is, as far as possible, self-sufficient in 
foodstuffs including those that are normally imported from 
elsewhere; and 
(c) To do what we can to make the West African colonies as a 
whole self-supporting.41 
Officials pursued these goals with great zeal. The view of one such official, 
J.A.G. McCall, who was appointed the controller of palm oil production, 
perhaps summarizes the prevailing view: “The production business is our 
particular war effort, and surely that should come first, even if other duties of 
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Table 5.2. imported foodstuffs for the year 1938 for african consumption. 
CommodiTy QuanTiTy value (£) 
fish 212,000 396,000 
salt 1,000,000 267,000 
rice 186,000 96,000 
sugar 140,000 105,000 
bread and biscuits 20,000 47,000 
flour 50,000 46,000 
Source: l. wale oyemakinde, “The pullen marketing scheme: a Trial in food price Control in nige-
ria, 1941–1947,” Journal of the Historical Society of nigeria 6, no. 4 (1972): 414. 
Table 5.3. imported foodstuffs for the year 1938 (mainly for european consumption). 
CommodiTy QuanTiTy (lbs) value (£) 
milk 1,205,000 35,000 
butter 256,000 15,000 
lard 153,000 4,700 
meat 12,000 ctw 47,000 
bread and biscuit 20,000 47,000 
vegetables (fresh) 1,603,000 7,8000 
Tea 226,000 14,000 
Jam 220,000 7,2000 
Confectionery 332,000 13,200 
fruit (dried) 97,000 1,500 
Source: l. wale oyemakinde, “The pullen marketing scheme: a Trial in food price Control in nige-
ria, 1941–1947,” Journal of the Historical Society of nigeria 6, no. 4 (1972): 414. 
administration have to suffer thereby.”42 By 1941, the importation of rice into 
the country had virtually ceased, falling from 14,900 tons in 1936, thereby 
creating a food crisis during the war.43 The frantic urgency of the food produc-
tion drive contrasted with the laissez-faire pace of pre-war agricultural plan-
ning. The department intensified experimentation in wheat, potato, and rice 
production and established a fisheries section to replace the supplies formerly 
obtained from overseas.44 The Agricultural Department was particularly 
anxious to introduce upland rice, a new and unknown crop in the area.45 The 
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colonial administration increased the budget allocation to agriculture from 
£136,726 in the 1939–40 fiscal year to £397,260 in the 1945–46 fiscal years.46 
Although research continued to be an important item on the agenda for the 
Department of Agriculture, the war era marked the beginning of direct inter-
vention in the local agrarian economy. 
In further pursuit of its wartime goals, the colonial government set up 
a supplies department in September 1942 under Dr. Bryoe as chief supply 
officer and four administrative assistants. Earlier, in November 1939, the de-
partment of agriculture had appointed Mr. E. McL. Watson as marketing of-
ficer. The creation of this post anticipated increased production and the need 
to develop both the internal and international trades in foodstuffs. The duty 
of the supply unit was to organize grain supplies for the army, the mines, 
and government reserves. By the end of March 1943, the government had 
purchased 10,300 tons of millet, 2,700 tons of rice, 7,000 tons of yams, 18,200 
tons of guinea corn, and 3,400 tons of maize.47 
The food scheme was not very successful. The government’s effort to 
improve food sufficiency concentrated on the cultivation of rice, and the De-
partment of Agriculture was directed to slow down or discontinue other lines 
of agricultural production, including the oil palm planting program.48 The 
department asked for the authority to convert funds allocated for the palm 
oil program to food production and propaganda, although it was not clear 
if it received this authority. The cultivation of rice received a boost in some 
parts of Igboland, although local people preferred imported rice to locally 
produced rice because of its higher quality. In Onitsha Province, the acreage 
devoted to rice rose to 5,000 in 1943 due to the war.49 However, a combina-
tion of drought and poor management led to a yield of only 2,000 tons in 
1943. Ironically, the colonial emphasis on the production of exotic food crops, 
such as rice, potatoes, and various vegetables, did not improve food security. 
The emphasis on vegetable production, for example, catered to the needs of 
European residents and the army, while the production of rice was meant to 
reduce dependence upon imports. The failure of the production drive, how-
ever, led to increased control of locally produced food items, especially yams 
and gari, which were the most important food items for both the rural and 
the urban population. 
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Mobilization for the war created an opportunity for African entrepre-
neurship and facilitated the rise of an enterprising class of traders cashing in 
on the increasing demand for local foodstuffs, especially gari. By the 1930s, 
a lucrative market in locally produced food items had developed. Farmers 
expanded food production due to increased demand for gari and palm oil in 
Northern Nigeria. In the Ozuitem area, for example, farmers concentrated 
on growing yams and, partly or completely turned to palm produce when 
the European traders paid high prices.50 Significant quantities of gari were 
railed to Northern Nigerian towns from the late 1930s. The quantity of gari 
railed to Northern Nigeria increased progressively from 1,414 tons in 1937, 
worth about £4,989, to about 5,428 tons, when the war began. In the first 
half of 1942, the quality railed to the North had reached 6.804 tons, worth 
about £57,661.51 Growing concern over the threat of urban and rural food in-
security prompted the colonial authorities to regulate the distribution of both 
imported and locally produced foodstuffs. 
food resTriCTions and r aTioning 
On 22 April 1941, S.A.S. Leslie, the colonial food controller, issued a circular 
that outlined the general scheme for food control in Nigeria. In a seemingly ar-
bitrary manner, the food controller was empowered to direct the distribution 
of available supplies while deputy food controllers and their assistants initiated 
and administered rationing in local areas. Although the supply of food items 
in this period, except for milk and flour, which were already rationed in Lagos, 
were not seriously threatened by the war, the government was making plans 
to ensure that rationing would follow periods of severe shortfall.52 Importing 
firms in Lagos, Nigeria’s largest city, were required to ensure that consumers 
purchased all of their supplies from a single source in order to regulate the dis-
tribution of essential commodities. Consumers were required to nominate the 
firm with which they wished to deal. This enabled the government to compile 
a list of customers, which would then be circulated among the firms.53 
Control was extended to the rural areas. By 1942, rural farmers and trad-
ers were cashing in on the increased demand for local foodstuff in Northern 
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Nigeria. Large quantities of yams, cocoyams, coconuts, and maize were being 
transported to the North for sale. The colonial administration imposed strict 
restrictions on the movement of food items, such as yams, cocoyams, and 
gari, within the Eastern Region. District officials, alarmed by the quantity 
of food items moving out of the region, began to implement restrictions in 
order to stave off crisis within their districts. Some district officers regulated 
the quantity of local food items, such as yams, cocoyams, and gari that could 
be moved from particular districts to other areas by invoking the Nigeria 
General Defense Regulations (Law No. 75 of 1941), which came into effect 
during the war. 
In 1943, the transportation of these food items from the Aba railway sta-
tion to the North had increased by a very large amount from the previous 
year (see Table 5.4). J.V. Dewhurst, district officer for Aba, was so alarmed at 
the rate of outward movement of these food items that he suggested the need 
to prohibit the movement of yams from the district. Writing to the Resident, 
he noted: “The increase in the export of yams is very great indeed and, in 
view of the fact that Aba normally imports yams, disquieting. So too is the in-
crease in the export of maize and I am not certain that the export of this also 
ought not to be prohibited.”54 In June 1945, the acting district officer for Ikon 
Division issued a memorandum that stated: “no person shall export yams 
and cocoyam from the Ikom Division except under permit from the District 
Officer.”55 Farmers in most parts of Abakiliki Division faced difficulties in 
obtaining seed yams due to a combination of drought and the scarcity of seed 
yams in the market.56 In a similar fashion, the Resident for Ogoja Province 
prohibited the movement of yams from the province. According to his order, 
“no person shall export yams by rail from the Ogoja Province except under 
permit from the district officer in Afikpo.”57 In Awgu Division, the resident, 
Dermot O’Connor, issued an order restricting the movement of yams outside 
the division.58 In Onitsha Province, the colonial resident issued an order re-
stricting the movement of gari and yams from Udi Division “except under 
permit signed by ‘Competent Authority.’”59 
The intervention of the government and the controls imposed could be 
justified as food prices rose beyond the reach of the average household. Al-
though many farmers and traders were unhappy with the regulations, the 
reaction of district officials made a certain kind of sense. The West African 
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Table 5.4. Quantities of food items railed from aba station in 1942 and 1943. 
foodsTuff no of baskeTs railed in no of baskeTs railed in 
July 1942 July 1943 
yams 35 573 
Cocoyams 23 96 
Coconuts 523 1589 
maize 3 143 
Source: nae, abadisT,1/26/958. 
note: The weight of a basket varied between 1.5 and 2 cwts.
Pilot agreed that “war conditions and profiteering” caused a rise in the cost of 
essential goods, including food.60 The district officers in the food-producing 
areas were reacting to potential tensions that could arise with severe food 
scarcity. They did not want food riots on their hands. But they were also in-
terested in playing their part in the war effort by ensuring that local food 
products were fairly distributed, particularly in this period of low imports. 
Indeed, food producers and marketers were cashing in on the scarcity of 
imported food and increased demand for local products. By 1944, the price 
of gari had increased considerably from about 1/– 6d to about 9/– in urban 
markets. In a report to the district officer, Aba, in May 1944, the Nigerian 
Police wrote that gari producers “are making an exorbitant profit when one 
considers that they found it worth while to make gari up to 1940 and sell at 
1/6d – 2/– a bag.” Prices were even higher in places such as Uyo, where it was 
suspected that large quantities of gari were being exported to Fernando Po, 
where a large number of Igbo and Ibibio migrant labourers were working in 
Spanish plantations.61 Such an escalation of food scarcity and high prices was 
considered a threat to political and social stability. 
The restrictions imposed by officials had enormous effects on the lo-
cal population. Restrictions disrupted food security arrangements and the 
internal trading network that linked the region into a form of economic 
commonwealth. Women farmers could not sell excess produce, such as co-
coyams and cassava, to their traditional trading partners, and many Igbo 
men and women expressed concerns over the difficulties they faced in carry-
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ing out local trading. Colonial officials were inundated with petitions, com-
plaints, and requests, as local people faced increasing difficulty in meeting 
their subsistence needs. 
The low prices of export produce, the high cost of imported goods, and 
the government-imposed restrictions exacerbated discontent and disillusion-
ment. In particular, the government’s control of locally produced foodstuffs 
and distribution implemented during the war left little room for dealing with 
mounting food scarcity. It also created an atmosphere of crisis and conflict. 
The records do not tell exactly the level of the food crisis in the region and 
the interruption of local and regional trade, but by 1943, several petitions 
and appeals from local traders to colonial officials had asked for permission 
to transport food items within the region or to the North. Yet the colonial 
officials provided few satisfying measures even as peasants were called upon 
to work much harder than before to support the colonial state. 
The food supply problem remained the most pressing issue during the 
war. Both the imperial government and governments in the individual colo-
nies provided some incentive for peasants to increase production, but the 
authorities also used coercion to ensure that peasants complied with their 
demands. Colonial officials, despite their attempt to encourage free trade 
and uninhibited access to the market for local people, were also noted for 
restrictions and intervention in production and marketing of local produce. 
The war helped to create barriers and officials enacted legislation, not only 
to prevent the free flow of local products such as gari and yams, but also to 
determine the price at which they could be sold. 
ConTrolled priCe 
By 1941, the colonial government was forced to impose price controls to deal 
with the looming food crisis. Shortages of food had been anticipated right from 
the outbreak of the war in 1939, which prompted the directive that provincial 
and district officers should watch food price trends and adopt measures to 
conserve available food.62 The purchase of locally produced food items by the 
government at a fixed price was common during this era. But colonial price 
controls extended to both imported and locally produced foodstuffs.63 
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Although the agricultural department noted in its 1940 report that Nige-
rian peasants regarded the restriction and loss of income “as a contribution 
towards the prosecution of the war,”64 many peasants were visibly discontent-
ed with the restrictions. Opposition to price controls and regulations was not 
confined to inter-regional traders and urban associations. The long-standing 
tradition of women’s opposition to state intervention in the rural economy 
arose again in the rural areas and markets. Their acts of protest gave women 
a voice. The opposition to price controls, championed by rural women, swept 
through most of southeastern Nigeria. The Omuma Native Court, Aba Divi-
sion, reported women’s protests against the imposition of price controls on 
gari by government officials in November 1944. Some of the women who at-
tended protest meetings, he wrote, “do not make gari,” but they followed oth-
ers in these meetings.65 As in previous protests, the participation of non-gari 
producers is a mark of the solidarity and consciousness that existed, and still 
exists, among Igbo women. 
In Owerri Province and in the Bende Division in 1944, women protested 
against the colonial government’s attempt to control the price of gari, the 
most important staple in the area. The purchase of gari by officials at a con-
trolled price threatened the income of the women who controlled the pro-
duction and sale of the product.66 To the women who produced the gari, the 
action of the government officials was seen as an attempt to take over their 
cassava farms. As in earlier years, women fought against this threat to their 
livelihood in an already precarious agricultural economy. On 1 July 1942, rice 
and bean traders in the city of Onitsha petitioned the resident for Onitsha 
Province regarding the imposition of price controls carried out in the market 
by the police on 16 June 1942. In a carefully detailed calculation, the traders 
estimated the losses they incurred due to the price controls.67 On 17 July 1942, 
an Onitsha gari trader and twenty others petitioned the district officer for 
Onitsha, suggesting that the authorities reconsider the price control imposed 
on gari. In their petition, the traders noted that the recommended price of 1d 
for 5 cups and ten shillings per bag was below the estimated delivery price 
of twelve shillings per bag of gari from Aba, from which Onitsha traders got 
their goods.68 Protests and petitions remained a means that peasants used to 
confront the intervention in the rural economy in this period. 
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Table 5.5. price control of foodstuffs at enugu market, 16 february 1942 to 25 august 1942. 
iTem priCe noT exCeeding QuanTiTy 
south african salt 3 d per lb. 
boneless beef steak 5 d per lb. 
other beef cuts 41/2 d per lb. 
shoulder or leg of mutton 6 d per lb. 
shoulder or leg of pork 9 d per lb. 
ox tongue 4 d per lb. 
gari 1 d 6 cigarette tins 
eggs 1/2 d each 
yams 11/2 d 2 lb. 
Cassava (prepared) 2 1/2 d per lump 
groundnuts 2 1/2 d per lb. 
beans 1 1/2 d (or 3 d) per lb. (2 lb.) 
millet 1 1/2 d per lb. 
guinea corn 2 d per lb. 
rice (nigerian grown) 6 d per lb. 
egusi 1 d per lb. 
pepper (dried) 1 1/2 d per cigarette tin 
Chickens 8 d–1/- 2 d according to size 
palm oil 2 1/2 d per gin bottle 
potatoes 14/- 4 d 56 lb. 
Sources: nae, ep, opC, 122, vol. vii, ondisT, 13/1/2, “public notice,” b. w. walter, local authority, 
enugu, 28 october 1942. 
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Table 5.6. Control of local foodstuffs in abakaliki division. 











































rice (local) 24 1/– 8 cups 1/– 10 cups 1/– 
gari 12 1 d 6 cups 1 d 8 cups 1 d 
egg (hen) 4 1 d 2 1 d 4 1 d 
egg (duck) 2 1 d 2 1 d 2 1 d 
pepper 2 Cigarette 1 d 1 Cigarette 1 d 2 Cigarette 1 d 
cups cup cups 
plantain 10 1/2 d 6 1/2 d 8 1/2 d 
banana 
(ripe) 
12 1/2 d 8 1/2 d 12 1/2 d 
oranges 10 1/2 d 5 1/2 d 6 1/2 d 
okro 40  
Capsules 
1/2 d 15 1/2 d 20 1/2 d 
Cassava large  
basket 
3 d large basket 6 d large 
basket 
5 d 
Coco yam 8 1 d 8 1 d 8 1 d 
ground- 24 cups 1 d 4 cups 1 d 6 cups 1 d 
nuts 
palm oil 1 bottle 6 d 1 bottle 9 d 1 bottle 8 d 
palm wine Calabash 2 d Calabash 3 d –4 d Calabash 2 d 
ideal milk 6 oz tin 4 d 6 oz tin 8 d 6 oz tin 6 d 
Source: nae, Calprof, 3/1/2329, district officer abakiliki, 9 november 1942. 
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afriC an responses To Colonial ConTrol: 
peTiTions and suppliC aTions 
The power of the written word, the “book” juju, is taking a hold 
on Nigeria, a sad but inevitable consequence of the spread of edu-
cation. – A. E. Cooks, District officer, Owerri Province 
The restrictions imposed on food items were the most stressful of all the de-
mands made from the local population. It was evident to the rural and urban 
population that they would have to adopt desperate measures to survive. But 
their strategies did not often succeed. The British, on their part, were even less 
successful in handling such hard times. For the societies of Eastern Nigeria, 
the dependency on palm produce and the vulnerability of the rural population 
to the slightest change in market prices created a much more hostile relation-
ship between colonial officials and the indigenous people. This period was the 
beginning of the consolidation of peasant consciousness as well as a period of 
awakening political consciousness.69 
Petitions and supplications were Africans’ preferred method of appeal-
ing to colonial authorities regarding their conditions or protesting against 
policies.70 The personal – and often intimate – letters of African traders 
and farmers paint a unique portrait of a rough-and-tumble time. The dan-
ger posed by the restrictions was made explicit in the lives of small traders, 
farmers, traders, and the urban population. On 11 July 1943, for example, a 
local trader, Mr. O. O. Muoma, wrote to the British district officer for Aba. 
In his petition titled “Injustice: Gari Railing to the North,” he told the dis-
trict officer that his name had been deleted from the list of traders permitted 
by the government to export gari to Northern Nigeria. Muoma considered 
this development “abnormal” and an “injustice.” Cutting him out of the gari 
trade, he argued, deprived him of his livelihood and threatened the lives and 
subsistence of his two sons, who lived in the northern city of Kano.71 Another 
trader, J. O. Okorocha of Mbawsi, wrote to the District Officer, protesting 
the allocation of a meagre quota of ten bags of gari to him. Mr. Okorocha, 
who had exported 209 bags of gari to Northern Nigeria in 1942, stated: “my 
quota is too poor considering my intensive trade last year.… I beg of you to 
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remedy the situation and award me what is due.”72 For Muoma and Okorocha, 
like many others, the war economy was not only the cause of hardship and 
despair but also a time of opportunity and entrepreneurship that expanded as 
the scarcity of imported food items provided opportunities for the expansion 
of trade in locally produced foods. Still, the war revealed the reality of daily 
life for ordinary people in colonial Eastern Nigeria. 
The case of a certain Mr. Udeh, who lived at Abalikiki, is typical of a 
problem that many farmers faced. Mr. Udeh had applied to the District Of-
ficer for Abakiliki Division on previous occasions for permission to transport 
seed yams to Awka for planting. On 19 May 1945, he wrote again, after his 
previous requests had been ignored: “I am still asking you about a permit 
which I will use in carrying down seed yams down to Nawfia[,] Awka. The 
reason why I say very much about it is that the time of planting is passing.… I 
beg your Honour that you may consider about it.”73 With the farming season 
ending, Mr. Udeh wrote the District officer again. He had become desperate. 
“In my first and second letters that I wrote to you, I begged you to give a 
special permit to transport one trip of seed yam to Nawfia in Awka District. I 
told you that I have lived [in] Abakiliki for 25 years and I have not get any yam 
to plant in my town. Now this season of yams plantation is coming to end.… 
Yam plantation remains not more than 20 days now.”74 
While the outcome of Mr. Udeh’s petition is not known, his was not just 
an isolated case. J. E. Akajiofo of Mbawsi wrote to the district officer for Aba 
on 1 September 1943 requesting a permit to rail his yams to Northern Nigeria 
for sale. Mr. Akajiofo wrote: 
Sir, I have the honour most respectfully to forward this humble 
application to your worship. My request is that your servant bought 
16 tons of yams during the month of July. The yams should have 
been railed that month, but unfortunately for me, one of my sons 
died. Then I had to leave the yams in the railways station, and go to 
my town. I returned on the 11th of August, and on the 14th of the 
same month a consignment was issued me by the station master, 
Mbawsi. The next morning when I came to weigh the yams the 
station master informed me that he received a letter from the Dis-
trict officer, Aba restricting the exportation of yams to the north. 
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I respectfully pray that your worship may render me the necessary 
help to rail the yams.75 
An application written by an Umuahia trader shows that the effects of the 
restrictions on the movement of goods were widespread. Mr. Eze, who had 
been a long-time yam trader, wrote to the district officer, Aba, for permission 
to transport yams to Kano and Jos in northern Nigeria. He had yams ready to 
be railed up north but was unaware of the new requirement for a permit. He 
pleaded: 
I humbly beg to state that on absent of the previous knowledge, 
that yams shall be under permit, I t[a]ke the liberty to ask your 
worship to grant me a special permit to rail out those baskets I 
have already got at the Station.… Therefore I humbly crave for 
your mercy consideration and attend to this matter immediately 
by granting me the permit as requested otherwise my said food 
stuff will rot due to long stay in the shed.76 
“I regret I cannot accede to your request,” the District Officer wrote to Mr. 
Eze.77 This was a familiar response. 
The appeal of an Aba trader, A. Jamola, to the District Officer, Aba, for a 
reconsideration of an earlier petition that was denied, like many others, is an 
excellent indication of the suffering of rural peasants. Jamola wrote asking 
for a sympathetic reconsideration of his humble request for permission to 
rail gari to the North. “I am a stranger in this community with a family of 
wife and children who are dependent upon me for subsistence.… Since the 
early part of this year I was engaged in gari trade with the north and our lives 
depended entirely upon the small profit occasionally derived therefrom.”78 
Like many others, Jamola was caught in the colonial attempt to manage 
the deteriorating economic conditions that confronted the imperial as well 
as the colonial governments. The tearful and emotional petitions by Akajiofo 
and others were striking evidence of the increased intervention of the colo-
nial administration and the effect on their lives. David H. Kubiri, when he 
sought a permit to sell gari in the north, wrote: 
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I with all civility prostrate to ask earnestly, in the name of your 
families and home, in the name of British justice, which makes an 
Englishman superior to other races, in the name of all [unclear 
word], and in the name of your past honour and trust, which has 
designated his worship as a capable and able rule[r]. [T]hat the per-
mit of gari might be rendered to your humbly servant the families 
may not die away for starvation.79 
These emotions were expressed in many petitions and reveal the levels of 
dissatisfaction within the local society, but the humble phrases used in these 
petitions remind one of the paternalistic structures of the colonial society. In 
the experiences of Udeh, Ajajiofo, Jamola, and others, one sees a persistent 
marginalization of local interests in this period and the intensified insecurity 
created by the colonial economy. In some ways, it seems to have been the trad-
ers who suffered the most. 
Urban areas were not spared the agony and hardship of the war. Sig-
nificantly, the rural areas played an important part in the supply of food to 
the urban areas. Urban households that depended on food supplies from the 
rural areas faced both physical food shortages and restricted access to food. 
The disruption of local trade was felt in areas such as Aba and Onitsha. The 
West African Pilot’s editorial of 5 June 1942 wrote of the city of Aba: “Black 
market masters seem to have things all their own way and, of course, the 
people suffer.” The paper, like the average person in the urban areas, was con-
cerned about the rising cost of local food materials. The Aba Community 
League wrote to the District Officer in August 1943 regarding the effects of 
food restrictions on the residents of the town: 
I am directed to bring to your notice the very grave danger of 
famine which is threatening this township consequent upon the 
present restriction of the railment [sic] of gari to the North which 
has led to the adversely affected traders seeking other avenues of 
business and have tapped the scanty resources of the township of 
yams, plantains, cocoyams, corn and other articles of food. Time 
was when these lines of foodstuffs came into the local market from 
Onitsha, Itu and other places which in addition to local resources 
barely met the requirements of the township.80 
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While reliable data on urban employment and welfare during the colonial 
period are scarce, wages for non-agricultural labour were very low.81 In 1933, 
for instance, Native Administration road labourers received ten shillings per 
month. Railway track gangs received a wage of eight pennies per diem. Casual 
labourers received between three and four pennies per diem without food.82 
The difficult economic situation that culminated in restrictions on food was 
felt in the cities in the form of dwindling food supplies and a rising cost of 
living. 
The letter from the Aba Community League quoted above demonstrates 
that concerns about the regulations were not expressed by individuals alone. 
In a petition to the Resident, Owerri Province, the Aba Gari Traders Associa-
tion expressed its dissatisfaction with the quota system implemented by the 
District Officer for Aba. The association argued that “the method will anni-
hilate the gari trade, and undoubtedly impoverish the average trader involved 
and render life ‘not worth living.’”83 The association further noted: “As free 
citizens of the Empire,” the association argued, “we have a right to live, and 
this right [sic] we pray for an amendment to the method or system of control 
of the railment of the commodity as advanced by the District Officer, Aba.”84 
Transportation also presented problems and restricted the ability of pro-
ducers to move products. As the Aba Gari Traders Association indicated in its 
petition to the Resident for Owerri Province, the restrictions imposed on the 
gari trade created additional burdens for rural traders who already suffered 
from the restrictions on transportation because of the war. The petitioners 
noted: “We are ever willing to speculate on the produce trade, but transport 
forms a great barrier. During those days of unrestricted transport facilities, 
produce flowed into the township from Okpala, Ulakwo, Owerri, Nguru, 
Okigwi, Ife etc. Today, the damage of Owerrinta Bridge and motor transport 
restrictions have barred that trade.”85 
The efforts to implement colonial restrictions and control were not always 
successful. Archival records describe an informal market system that began 
to emerge because of government control. In August 1943, the secretary of the 
Aba Community League wrote to the district officer, Aba, regarding what he 
described as “unauthorized markets outside the township.”86 In July 1944, the 
government estimated that about 200 tons of gari, more than the permitted 
quota, were exported to the North under illegal conditions.87 
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Nevertheless, the war had some positive effects on the internal market 
for foodstuffs. The market for food items created an incentive for farmers 
to increase production. Despite the problems generated by the war, urban 
demands for food supply from the hinterland provided opportunities for Af-
rican producers, most of whom had been supplying foodstuff from the time 
of the emergence of urban centres in the 1920s. The increased demand for 
gari and palm oil in northern Nigeria worked against external export. J. S. 
Harris, in his study of the local economy of the Ozuitem Igbo noted that 
farmers concentrated on yam production but turned to palm produce when 
prices were high.88 Men and women reacted in many parts of Igboland, mov-
ing from export crop production to food production, depending on which 
attracted higher price.89 Between June 1943 and May 1944, 5,825 tons of gari 
were railed to northern Nigeria from Ogwe, Aba, Omoba, Mbawsi, Umuahia 
and Uzuakoli railway stations.90 
Control was probably enforced on the railways because they could be 
policed. But traders were able to circumvent officially approved channels of 
trade. Some traders moved between different buying stations to maximize 
their profits and to increase the quota allocated to them. This prompted the 
Resident for Owerri Province, Mr. A.F.B. Bridges, colonial Resident for Ow-
erri Province, to invoke the “Nigeria General Defense Regulation 1941 (Food 
Control).” Bridges was within the authority conferred by the Defense Regu-
lations when he implemented the “(Gari – Owerri Province Non-Removal 
Order 1944),” which stated: “No person shall export Gari by rail from the 
Owerri Province to any station north of Enugu except under permit signed by 
the competent authority, or by a person authorized by the competent author-
ity.”91 A personal allowance of 8 lbs. per person for travellers was allowed. The 
threat of famine and the breakdown of existing trading relationships forced 
the most vulnerable districts to introduce measures to preserve food.92 
In September 1944, Mr. H.L.M. Butcher, who had become the District 
Officer for Aba, introduced measures that were even more radical. In a cir-
cular directed to native councils and Courts Clerks, he directed that all gari 
permits granted to middlemen and traders be cancelled with effect from 1 
September. Butcher regretted that: “traders have not adhered to the conditions 
of the permit issued to them, but have induced the Railway staff to send up 
far more that they were allowed.” He accused the local agents of gari dealers 
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in the North of selling gari there at “grossly excessive prices,” which resulted 
in shortages in the Aba Division and unduly high prices in the North.93 He 
proposed that Mr. Bleasby, a European and manager of Gibbons Transport 
Aba, act as the government’s agent for buying gari at designated centres in 
the District and arrange for its distribution to Native Administrations in 
the Northern Provinces. He further proposed to set up a committee made 
of middlemen and producers who would sit monthly and fix the price of gari 
for the following month to ensure that gari was available and cheap locally.94 
Similar action had been taken in Calabar, where African traders were forced 
to supply gari to Mr. Nicholas, another European. 
The responses of African traders were predictable. In a resolution passed 
at Aba on 23 August 1944, an association of gari traders noted that its mem-
bers’ role as traders contributed toward “the defeat of Hitlerism and all that 
it stands for in order that Democracy will rule the world and all forms of 
man’s inhumanity to man be wiped off the face of the earth.” The association 
described the colonial government’s restrictions as “definite discrimination 
against the Africans.”95 It appeared to the association’s members that the gov-
ernment failed to recognize African contribution to the war effort. 
Although the petitions mostly came from men, suggesting their domina-
tion of the lucrative long distance trade between the eastern and northern 
Nigeria, some came from associations that may have included both men and 
women. Yet there were those written by women which brought their own 
perspective to the events of this period. Their letters shared the common 
concerns but also drew upon their femininity. Agnes Garuba opened her 
letter of petition with “Your maid servant humbly and respectfully begs to 
submit this my humble petition to you as a father.” Her unique perspective is 
worth quoting: 
I am now as a widow, the Government only is my husband since 
my husband was transferred from Hausa down to Enugu and from 
Enugu now to overseas, I depend upon nothing than gari trad-
ing, buying from the natives and selling in the station, now many 
people had been stopped not to buy, and therefore I see no way of 
selling and maintain my life [sic] with my families which my hus-
band left to me and sign soldiers work and went away. If [am] not 
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trading my former trade in gari then sure we must die for starva-
tion.… May our heavenly father help my Lord the D.O. to put this 
my supplication in different consideration and to fulfill my wish, 
for we all are in the same flag that’s why we don’t care to send our 
husbands, brothers and young fathers to fight for the same flag.96 
These traders did not fit into a typical profile. There were those like S. O. Eny-
iomah of Aba who had been trading in gari since 1927. He and four other 
traders requested the District Officer for Aba to consider their longevity in the 
gari trade and grant them permits. They stated: “we, the said petitioners are 
the only first and original people who engaged in the railing of gari from Aba 
to Northern Nigeria since the year 1927 and 1928 respectively up to the present 
moment without any confusion and trouble in our own part.”97 Others like 
Ikebudu Nzekwe, who started his gari trade in 1942, had rushed into the trade 
on account of the crisis created by the war.98 There were women who retailed 
gari in northern Nigeria and were increasingly making a profession out of it. 
Agnes Garuba, like other women, had taken up the gari trader because her 
husband, the family breadwinner, had gone to fight in the war.99 Many young 
men were sent to the north to represent major traders who regularly railed gari 
to them from Aba and other railing stations such as Umuahia and Omoba. 
C. O. Muoma put it well when he argued that the restriction of the internal 
export trade was not just an injustice to him but would threaten his two boys 
in Kano who will “lack maintenance as they will not get any supply of even 
their own food.”100 
Whether the petitioners were men or women, they worded their petitions 
or appeals in such a way as to gain as much sympathy or redress as possible. 
Still, the most vocal criticisms of colonial control in this period came from 
women, most of whom protested the imposition of price controls by local offi-
cials. The ability of Africans to write or to hire professional letter writers gave 
local people the ability and opportunity to speak back to power. It gave local 
people not only the opportunity to speak about their concerns but to establish 
a dialogue with colonial powers – a dialogue that received some level of ac-
ceptance because it fit into the structure of European habits of expression. 
We can read beyond African voices in these letters and petitions. They of-
fer a lens through which we can understand the broader attempts by colonial 
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administrators to control the colonized through the restriction of movement, 
through surveillance, and through the extraction of resources. Yet these let-
ters and petitions also place people in the colonial context and present the 
diverse life-stories and points of view of African individuals. The letters and 
petitions of this lowly class of peasants and traders not only defy the per-
ceived social and political order of the colonial state but show the unappreci-
ated contribution of Africans to the Allied war effort. Indeed, the demand for 
local foodstuffs imposed a heavy burden on the local population due to the 
scarcity and high prices created by the war. 
posT-seCond world war developmenTs 
The end of the war was followed by unparalleled social and economic transfor-
mations. The immediate impact was created by the demobilization of African 
soldiers in 1946. The returning solders brought significant amounts of money 
into the economy. One of the most significant social and economic impacts 
was on bride price. The cost of marrying a wife became so high that the gov-
ernment was forced to intervene and regulate the cost of bride-price. 
The problem of post-war reconstruction in Europe led to changes in 
colonial policies. It was envisaged that the colonies would play a significant 
role in post-war reconstruction through a more efficient exploitation of local 
resources.101 The welfarist nature of development planning in this period was 
rationalized by the argument that greater expenditure on the welfare of colo-
nists was a recognition of their contribution to the war effort.102 Government 
assistance under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1945 provided 
funds for long-term economic development. An offshoot of the act was the 
Nigerian Ten-Year Plan for Development.103 
These innovations were introduced within the context of an economi-
cally weak British Empire, rising nationalism in the colonies, and a welfare-
minded Labour government. The envisaged changes were often not reflected 
in the actions and opinions of the men on the spot. The government was 
not particularly enthusiastic about a proposal in September 1945 to grant 
credit facilities to farmers, peasant industries, and demobilized soldiers. L. T. 
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Chubb, secretary for the Eastern Provinces, argued that such schemes would 
likely fail in the Eastern Provinces. “With the difficult agricultural problems 
existing in the Eastern Provinces,” acting assistant director of agriculture for 
the Eastern Provinces wrote in the Report of the Mission Appointed to Enquire 
into the Production and Transport of Vegetable Oils and Oilseeds in West Afri-
can Territories , “I think that opportunities for constructive and economically 
sound assistance to peasant farmers in the form of credit facilities are likely 
to remain very limited until agricultural research has made more progress. 
We have no straightforward and proved system of agriculture such as mixed 
farming in the Northern Provinces.”104 On 1 November 1945, the government 
in the Eastern Provinces disbanded the palm production team, which was 
set up during the Second World War, and the Residents were requested to 
give a month’s notice for the termination to the African staff.105 Indeed the 
enthusiasm for agricultural development died down quickly after the war. 
The most important structural change in the post-war period was the es-
tablishment of produce marketing boards. The origin of the marketing board 
system can be traced to the harsh global economic condition of the late 1930s, 
which had triggered a wave of anti-colonial protests.106 These protests, it has 
been argued, led “British officials to consider greater state involvement in co-
lonial economies.”107 With the outbreak of the Second World War, European 
businesses, including the United African Company (UAC), pressed for con-
trolled marketing to “reduce the riskiness of the West African trade, and the 
Colonial Office acceded.”108 The West African Cocoa Control Board and the 
West African Produce Control Board, set up in 1940 and 1942 respectively, 
formed the roots of the marketing board system and the large surplus accu-
mulated by the boards played an important part in the decision to continue 
statutory marketing of export products after the war.109 
The Oil Palm Marketing Boards was incorporated in 1949.110 The emer-
gence of these boards led to greater colonial involvement in local economies. 
The boards were required to cater to palm produce and maintain an efficient 
organization of licensed buying agents to undertake the handling of produce 
and its delivery to the boards. Like other marketing boards, the Oil Palm 
Marketing Board was required to maintain legally prescribed grades and 
standards to improve the quality of export produce and allocate funds in the 
form of grants, loans, investments, and endowments for the purposes of eco-
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nomic development and research.111 The actual purchasing of produce was left 
to licensed buying agents.112 
The Eastern Nigerian Marketing Board was charged with the task of 
ensuring the maximum production of palm oil and palm kernels.113 H. A. 
Oluwasanmi has described the system of licensing buying agents as a contin-
uation of the “status quo ante bellum.”114 In the case of oil palms, prospective 
buying agents were required to show evidence that they could purchase, with 
reasonable regularity, at least 400 tons of palm kernels and 200 tons of palm 
oil in their first year of operation. In addition, licensed buying agents were 
required to produce “acceptable evidence of their ability to provide the neces-
sary capital to finance their purchases.”115 This limited the ability of Nigerians 
to become licensed buying agents. Therefore, expatriate firms dominated the 
produce trade until the 1960s, when Nigerians became important players.116 
Although the boards were supposed to ensure the stability of producer 
incomes and act as buffers for African peasants, they diverted a large por-
tion of the gross income of farmers to finance development in infrastructure, 
plantations, farm settlements, and research.117 The differences between pro-
ducer prices and market prices, P. T. Bauer noted, left the primary producers 
at roughly the same income level as they had been before the Second World 
War.118 Still, post-war conditions generated a certain measure of socio-eco-
nomic progress and development. Higher prices introduced by the govern-
ment as well as improved processing techniques accounted for the boom in 
peasant production in the 1950s.119 The period witnessed an increase in the 
role of indigenous entrepreneurs in the economy. Investments in transport 
and the distributive trade were also made in this period. This era also wit-
nessed a remarkable number of co-operative societies catering to the interests 
of rural farmers.120 
soCioCulTur al developmenTs 
The Second World War accelerated the rate of social change, and this created 
uncertainties and reduced the motivation of young men in particular to re-
main in the villages. A young man, Gilbert Uzor, discouraged by the poverty 
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Table 5.7. provincial details of palm oil target figures and actual tonnage passed for export, 
april 1945–46. 





onitsha 9,104 4,655 4,449 
ogoja 797 423 365 
Calabar 41,451 32,014 9,437 
owerri 38,663 32,679 5,984 
Total 90,015 69,771 20,235 
Source: nae, file no. 1642/vol. 11, abadisT, 1/26/908, “palm produce production,” m. e. broughton 
to director of supplies, nigerian secretariat lagos, 6 march 1946. 
of rural life in his village of Umunomo, was encouraged by the financial ben-
efits that would accrue to him to join the army during the Second World War. 
Gilbert shared the view of many young men in the villages that the war created 
an opportunity to escape rural poverty. The army provided him the resources 
he needed to marry his wife Nwaeke and establish a home in Port Harcourt at 
the end of the war.121 
The war changed the way people lived their lives. In fact, the war acceler-
ated the increase in migration that had developed earlier, forcing more young 
people to leave their towns and villages. Linus Anabalam, who left his village 
with many other young men after the war, remarked: 
After the war, the eye of the world was opened and people began 
to migrate out of the rural areas. Many of us wanted to copy the 
life style of the returning soldiers, including the way they dressed. 
This encouraged many young men and some women to leave the 
villages because there was money to be made outside the village 
and quickly too.122 
The implications of colonial policy for the people of Nigeria went beyond food 
security problems. Colonial policy also affected the people’s everyday lives. 
Informants emphasized that many adult males could not fulfill social obliga-
tions, such as the payment of bride-wealth.123 Young men were forced by such 
economic and social obligations to migrate from the villages as the monetiza-
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tion of the local economy increased. Anex Ibeh, who migrated as a young man, 
notes: “When European money was introduced, one could not live on farming 
alone. I walked on foot to the mid-west and worked in the timber industry to 
accumulate enough money to start a family.”124 For many men in the Mbaise 
area, for example, wage labour and migration took them away from their own 
fields. Subsistence, marriage, and conformation to a new life style drove many 
to migrate out of Igboland.125 
In some parts of the region, however, the rural economy benefited from 
the growing expenditures on transportation and communication, rail and 
road development.126 Between 1943 and 1946, the government allocated a 
substantial sum of money for the construction of rural roads to facilitate the 
evacuation of palm oil and kernels. The development of local feeder roads 
further integrated rural households into the colonial and war economy.127 
The development of roads and other forms of communication increased the 
ability of rural peasants to leave the villages. They migrated to the towns, 
taking advantage of the opportunities in the construction industry and in the 
expanding bureaucracy. Large numbers of Igbo labourers were attracted by 
the opportunities offered by plantations in the mid-western area of Nigeria 
and the timber industry in Benin. The increase in the migration of men and 
young boys tended to heighten frustration with the local economy, but migra-
tion provided a ready source of capital accumulation, a break from rural life, 
and opportunities that were absent from rural Igboland. 
The Igbo formed the bulk of new migrants into the emerging cit-
ies throughout Nigeria in the post-war period. Their rate of migration was 
stimulated by the “increased income which migrants earned from abroad,” 
Chief Eneremadu recalls.128 The scarcity of agricultural land, the declining 
soil fertility, and the high population density of parts of the Owerri, Okigwe, 
Orlu, Awka, and Onitsha areas increased the rate of migration from these 
regions in the post-war period.129 
Still, the developments in Eastern Nigeria in this period must be analyzed 
in relation to the environmental and demographic conditions of the region. 
Unlike many other parts of the country, the extensive exploitation of natural 
resources and the expansion of cash crop production took place in an increas-
ingly fragile environment overburdened with high population density. East-
ern Nigeria, like many other parts of tropical Africa, experienced a dramatic 
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rate of deforestation during the colonial period. Although deforestation had 
a deep history, most of Igboland lost its forest cover in the first half of the 
twentieth century due to the expansion of cash cropping and agricultural 
intensification. An informant recalled the disappearance of different species 
of mushrooms, edible plants, and roots in the last fifty years.130 Informants 
remember when people could make a meal out of collecting wild vegetables 
and tubers from the forest.131 
Overall, colonial policies in this era demonstrated a serious anti-peasant 
bias and threw the burden of the war on the African population. Farmers 
did not have the capacity to meet the challenges imposed on them, and few 
colonial administrators had the capacity to relate production to local condi-
tions or to peasant strategies. Intervention in the rural economy disturbed 
production and reduced the incomes of farmers.132 The contradictory policy 
of the colonial authorities created the reality faced by the indigenous farmers 
who produced according to the demands of the European market. 
The need for food and raw materials was central to British policy dur-
ing the Second World War and it significantly altered peasant-state relations. 
Some peasants withdrew from the local economy and many migrated out of 
the region, due in part to the drop in the prices of palm oil and kernels and in 
part to the coercive nature of colonial policy in this period. While the prices 
of food items rose in the 1940s, the prices of palm oil and kernels did not. The 
instability in farmers’ incomes contributed to the rate of agricultural involu-
tion after the Second World War. 
The Second World War was a major cause of change for men and women 
from Igbo societies as they sought to negotiate their livelihood within an in-
creasingly intrusive colonial society. As farmers and traders, they came to 
witness the increased intervention of the colonial state in their affairs through 
new market regulations, restrictions, and price controls. With the demands 
of the war, rural peasants were called upon to contribute to the British war 
effort through the production of palm produce and other export goods in 
addition to food items. In some cases, Igbo peasants capitalized on the op-
portunities provided by the war to produce more palm oil and food to meet 
increased demands. At other times they resisted the intrusion of the colonial 
state and its regulatory powers. They did this by subtle and less subtle forms 
of resistance, including the use of petitions and supplication. 
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The post-war period witnessed major attempts by the colonial authority to 
transform the colonial economy and increase the welfare of colonial subjects. 
These reforms were not always successful as the policies were at times at odds 
with the realities in the colonies. Yet government policy under the Colonial 
Development and Welfare Act of 1945, which provided funds for long-term 
economic development, formed the foundation of the economic development 
policy of the Eastern Region of Nigeria after political independence. The na-
ture of agricultural policy and peasant response in the post-colonial period is 
the focus of the next chapter. 
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ChapTer six 
T h e a F R I C a n e L I T e , a g R a R I a n 
R e V O L u T I O n , a n d s O C I O -
P O L I T I C a L C h a n g e , 1 9 5 4 – 8 0 
In 1954, the Lyttelton Constitution, adopted as part of British political reform 
in Nigeria, transferred aspects of economic planning to the regional govern-
ments.1 By this time, agriculture was still contributing about 60 per cent of 
national income and subsistence for over 70 per cent of the population.2 In the 
Eastern Region, agriculture was seen as the most important route to economic 
development and increased welfare for the population.3 The palm produce 
trade still dominated the rural economy. Key policies focused around cash 
crop production on plantation models, incorporation of rural farmers into the 
government’s agricultural programs, and the expansion of food production 
as a corollary of the government’s overall agricultural program. However, the 
post-independence boom was short. By the mid-1960s, political and structural 
problems were holding back the progress and any gains made. Economically, 
this set the stage for the agricultural crisis that engulfed most of rural Igboland 
from the 1970s. This chapter examines the attempts made by the indigenous 
elite to expand agricultural production and the successes and failures of the 
agricultural programs implemented under the supervision of local state ac-
tors. It also explores how the unintended consequences of major political 
and structural changes in Nigeria, i.e., the Nigeria Civil War (1967–70), and 
later, the expansion of the petroleum industry from the late 1970s, affected 
the trajectory of agriculture. These two factors would drastically reduce the 
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contribution of agriculture to the total export earnings of the region in par-
ticular, and the country in general, and threaten the subsistence and ability of 
the rural population to survive through agricultural production. 
pre- independenCe indigenous reforms 
The establishment of the Eastern Nigerian Development Corporation (ENDC) 
and Eastern Regional Development Board (ERDB) in 1954 marked an impor-
tant step in the government’s attempt to accelerate the pace of agricultural 
development, especially the oil palm industry. This pilot scheme, which began 
in Abak and Uyo Provinces, was extended to Owerri Province in 1954. It also 
marked the beginning of the indigenization of agricultural policy in Eastern 
Nigeria and the transformation of the nature and scope of government sup-
port for agriculture.4 The mid-1950s also witnessed further development of 
earlier programs. Extension services and demonstrations to improve the skills 
of local farmers were introduced.5 Practical school farms, field days, and ag-
ricultural shows were instituted to stimulate farmers’ interest in new farming 
techniques.6 Extension work became available to all the divisions of the region 
with the opening of the new School of Agriculture at Umuahia in 1955. The 
Eastern Regional Production Development Board also encouraged peasant 
participation by paying a subsidy of £5 to individuals or communities for the 
rehabilitation of palm grooves.7 
The desire to improve quality led to the introduction of innovations in 
palm oil production methods. According to Eno Usoro, the survival of local 
producers in the industry “depended upon changes in processing to meet the 
marketing board’s export quality requirements, especially since low grade oil 
was no longer purchased by the boards.”8 One of the significant innovations 
introduced was the hand press for extracting oil. Oil press operatives often 
carried out digesting and pressing procedures, after which the farmers took 
away their oil and kernels. Indeed, hand presses were much more success-
ful than the manual method, extracting about 20 per cent more oil than the 
manual method.9 The traditional method was also more laborious. Owners 
of hand presses often provided their facilities to farmers for a fee. It was the 
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farmer’s responsibility to strip the bunch and cook the fruit. The use of the 
hand press gained currency as a cheap competitor with the pioneer oil pro-
duced in the mills established by the government. There were over 3,200 hand 
presses operating in the Eastern Region by 1959.10 
Another innovation introduced by the government was the installation 
of palm oil mills following the establishment of pioneer oil palm projects. 
The mills involved a simple factory process designed to process about three-
quarters of a ton of fruit per hour. Between 1949 and 1954, the Board of the 
ENDC spent about £925,200, or 64 per cent of its expenditure, on the erec-
tion of oil mills.11 By 1954, the 56 oil mills operating in the region employed 
a labour force of about 1,368 people.12 The mills processed a total of 33,609 
tons of fruits, producing 5,716 tons of oil and 2,331 tons of kernels, in the 
first quarter of 1953.13 The export of palm products gained momentum from 
the mid-1950s onward, with the Eastern Region producing over 40,000 tons 
of palm kernel and over 170,000 tons of palm oil per quarter by 1959.14 The 
numbers of mills would increase to more than 200 in 1962, producing about 
25,000 tons of oil.15 
However, there was resistance to the introduction of oil mills in some 
parts of Igboland.16 Women resisted the introduction of both hand presses 
and pioneer oil mills in Ngwa and neighbouring areas because these innova-
tions threatened their control over palm kernels.17 They particularly resisted 
the attempts by European firms to buy the uncracked nuts.18 The innovations 
were resisted for other reasons. According to Chief Eneremadu, “There was 
widespread mistrust of the government’s real intentions and fear that the 
introduction of these mills would result in loss of land and oil palms to the 
government.”19 In addition, the substantial cost involved in acquiring hand 
presses discouraged many. The price of a press rose from about £45 in 1945 
to an average of £65 by 1953 due to increased demand.20 Overall, the 1950s 
witnessed significant increase in innovation and a corresponding increase in 
levels of production. The pace of government participation would accelerate 
after Nigeria gained full political independence from Britain in 1960. 
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independenCe and The regional 
agriCulTur al iniTiaTive 
“Agrarian revolution” became a household slogan in Eastern Nigeria from 
1960 onward. The population was still overwhelmingly rural and the economy 
was based on the production of palm oil and kernels and on services related 
to the bulking and transportation of the products to major produce-buying 
centres. Therefore, agricultural development was seen as an essential part of 
the process of modernization after independence. The region’s agricultural 
revolution was shaped by the vision of the first premier of the Eastern Region, 
M. I. Okpara, and the minister for agriculture, P. N. Okeke-Ojiudu. Okpara 
was a strong advocate of what he called “pragmatic socialism.” Okpara be-
lieved that the region’s development lay in an agricultural revolution that cre-
ated wealth for both the state and peasant farmers. As a pragmatist, he owned 
a large farm in his hometown. His proactive stance on agriculture was inspired 
by the desire to transform the countryside by creating an ideal agricultural 
economy that would embrace peasants. 
The trust of the Eastern Region’s agricultural development strategy was 
the creation of large-scale state-run farm projects under its tree crop pro-
gram. The tree crop initiative was a composite of three main programs: the 
Oil Palm Rehabilitation Scheme (OPRS), aimed at replanting 24,000 hectares 
(60,000 acres) with new hybrid palms,21 community plantations, and farm 
settlements. During the First Development Plan (1962–68), the government 
allocated £30.4 m, or about 37 per cent of its capital expenditure, to agricul-
ture.22 Approximately 62 per cent of the investment in agriculture was al-
located to tree crops.23 
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dr. m. i. okpara: The architect 
of the agricultural revolution. 
(reproduced with the kind 
permission of the national 
archives, london. pro, inf 
10/253.) 
oil pal m rehabiliTaTion sCheme (oprs) 
The OPRS began in 1962 as part of the first six-year development plan and 
was arguably the most import project under the tree crop program in terms 
of its scope. The government aimed to tie the government’s agricultural pro-
grams to peasant producers through intensified oil palm rehabilitation. The 
major objective was the improvement and replacement of old oil palms with 
seeds capable of improved yields per acre, producing fruits with increased oil 
content.24 The department of agriculture supplied free seedlings and fertilizer 
and offered extension services for the first five years to participating farmers. 
Participating farmers were also paid up to $28.00 per acre over the five-year 
period in which crops were expected to mature.25 The incentives offered by the 
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government generated enthusiasm on the part of rural farmers. Philip Njoku, 
who started commercial farming in 1961, recalls: “We were given free advice 
by extension officers as well as £5 per annum in cash from the government.”26 
The OPRS accounted for 8.4 per cent of the total proposed expenditure on tree 
crops and by the end of 1966, about 50,000 acres had been planted with oil 
palm out of targeted acreage of 60,000, while over 4,000 farmers participated 
in the scheme in its first five years of operation.27 
easTern nigeria developmenT
Corpor aTion (endC) pl anTaTions/esTaTes 
The Eastern Nigeria Development Corporation plantations represented the 
most ambitious of the agrarian development programs.28 In principle, the 
ENDC plantation project represented a major step towards the achievement of 
a comprehensive agricultural development policy. A total of 148,930 acres was 
acquired for plantation development in twenty-two locations in the first five 
years after independence.29 By the end of 1965, 67,000 acres had been planted 
with cash crops, with 85 per cent coverage projected by the end of 1968.30 
However, the conditions in most parts of the Eastern Region posed a 
challenge to the project. While some of the plantations were located in areas 
of relatively “low” population density in the Calabar and Uyo Provinces, the 
rubber plantations at Ameke in Umuahia Division, Emeabiam and Obiti in 
Owerri Division were located in high-density areas. By national standards, 
even areas of “low” population density in Igboland have historically been 
relatively high in density.31 People living in these highly populated areas 
suffered the effects of large-scale land alienation. In addition, the establish-
ment of plantations created land tenure problems and weakened local food 
security.32 Disputes between village groups over the ownership of particular 
tracts of land occurred frequently. This continues to generate tension between 
communities and the government to the present day. Furthermore, loss of 
peasant lands forced many to depend largely on the market for subsistence. 
Oral sources from Emeabiam, where a rubber plantation was established 
under the government’s plantation scheme, emphasize that local peasants 
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Table 6.1. eastern nigeria development Corporation, agricultural and plantations division 
situation report, 1963. 
name of planTaTion daTe sTarTed aCreage  
aCQuired 
aCreage  
planTed by 1963 
Calaro oil palm estate prior to 1960 11,000 7,700 
kwa falls oil palm estate prior to 1960 3,724 3,563 
ikom Cocoa estate prior to 1960 4,707 3,089 
oghe Cashew industry prior to 1960 1,870 1,870 
bonny Coconut estate prior to 1960 1,000 860 
elele oil palm estate 1960 7,500 3,100 
abia/bendeghe Cocoa 1960 6,000 3,514 
estate 
umuahia Cocoa estate 1960 2,000 1,541 
arochukwu Cocoa estate 1960 2,000 1,591 
eket oil palm estate 1961 8,965 85 
elele rubber estate 1961 5,500 1,200 
obubra Cocoa estate 1961 3,000 1,605 
obubra rubber estate 1961 10,000 380 
ibiae oil palm estate 1962 12,000 120 
emeabiam rubber estate 1962 8,000 800 
amaeke abam rubber 1962 8,000 300 
estate 
biakpan rubber estate 1962 8,000 300 
etche rubber estate 1962 15,000 500 
obrenyi Cocoa estate 1962 4,000 103 
boje Cocoa estate 1962 2,500 637 
nsadop oil palm estate 1963 18,000 nil 
Source: nae, esiala, 64/1/1. 
resisted the alienation of their land for the rubber plantation. According to a 
former employee of the Emeabiam Rubber Estate, “the government has never 
compensated us adequately for our farm land which they took for the rubber 
estate.”33 
The plantation projects faced other problems, including inaccurate fea-
sibility studies and topographic, pedologic, and cadastral map surveys. The 
lack of soil analysis and the planting of crops on unsuitable soils led to crop 
failures.34 The Ubani section of the Umuahia Cocoa Estate and much of the 
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onitsha agricultural show, c. 1962. (reproduced from the library of the national archives, 
enugu.) 
Tractor laying plastic water pipe at the umudike agricultural research station, 1963. pro inf 
10/250. (reproduced from the library of the national archives, enugu.) 
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Arochukwu and Obubra Cocoa Estates failed to produce healthy trees, despite 
the heavy cost involved in the initial establishment of the plantations.35 The 
Ubani and Arochukwu plantations were replaced with coffee and oil palm 
respectively because cocoa could not do well in these estates. 
The mechanized nature of their operation did not generate the desired 
employment. It was estimated that the plantations would employ 80,000 
elementary school graduates, 15,000 school certificate holders, and 2,000 
university graduates.36 Judging from the employment figures in 1966, the 
plantations did not create the desired employment.37 In addition, agriculture 
by this time had become unattractive for young school leavers.38 Planners 
also ignored questions of gender as officials followed a technocratic approach 
to agricultural development.39 Zebulon Ofurum, who worked at the rubber 
plantation, located at Emeabiam near Owerri, remembers, “Women were not 
employed in the rubber plantations because the work was seen as men’s work.” 
They were employed occasionally to “weed the plantation,” he recalled.40 
CommuniT y pl anTaTions 
The community plantation program was an important component of the first 
six-year development plan. The scheme aimed to change and modernize “vil-
lage life in toto,” based on communal self-help, economies of scale, and crop 
specialization, and to maximize marketed output.41 There was the desire also 
to change the traditional land tenure patterns in order to guarantee larger 
land holdings to practising farmers and use local resources, especially “abun-
dant labour, as a substitute for scarce capital.”42 Selected farmers received free 
seedlings and fertilizer to maintain their crops on land leased to individual 
members of farmers’ cooperatives by the government.43 In addition to the 
main crop of oil palm, each farmer was required to grow food crops to sup-
port himself and his family. By 1965, there were twelve community plantations 
with 970 participants, occupying 11,750 acres of land.44 The establishment of 
these plantations marked the beginning of what Floyd called the “plantation 
decade.”45 
6: The afriCan eliTe, agrarian revoluTion, and soCio-poliTiCal Change 205 
Nevertheless, there were obstacles to the successful implementation of 
the community plantation projects. A key requirement for participation in 
the new community farms was a farmer’s ability to provide a minimum of 
five acres. But very few farmers had access to five contiguous acres that could 
be devoted entirely to oil palm. Indeed, over 85 per cent of the region’s farm-
ers cultivated less than 2.5 acres in 1963.46 Most of central Igboland, includ-
ing Mbaise, Owerri, Mbano, and Obowo, were already facing severe land 
scarcity. The communal land-tenure system in most parts of Igboland also 
precluded any large-scale organization of land to accommodate those who 
might have had an interest in participating in the program. The modernizing 
model adopted ignored the realities of rural life in Igboland. There were men 
and women who could have taken up cash crop farming on the scale envi-
sioned by the government but abandoned such ideas. Substantial capital was 
required to employ farm labour and to rent or lease land. Farmers who did 
not have access to their own or family land could spend as much as £300 to 
purchase land.47 Women faced even more obstacles than men did. They could 
not rely on family, friends, cooperatives, and isusu (thrift societies), among 
other sources, for loans as did men. 
Although labour was readily available, it was expensive. Most of the 
labour was not family labour, and farmers hired men and women to clear 
the land, plant seedlings, and maintain groves on a daily basis. In the 1960s, 
farmers paid high wages to labourers in a combination of cash and provision 
of meals. Male labourers earned an average of 3 shillings and 7 pence with 
food and 4 shillings and 3 pence without food per day. Women earned about 
10 or 11 pence less than men did. Wages for both male and female labourers 
were about 8 pence per day less when they were provided with meals.48 In 
addition, the patriarchal assumptions about farmers and land tenure systems, 
which effectively vested land rights in men, limited the opportunity for wom-
en to participate in official agricultural programs. Philip Njoku, a beneficiary 
of the government’s support for local farmers, recalls that men dominated 
oil palm production on the plantation model. He remembers, “Our oil palm 
cooperative had a membership of 100 men and two women.”49 Since women 
did not generally belong to the agricultural cooperatives, male-dominated 
cooperative societies defined the community agricultural schemes. 
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farm seT TlemenTs 
The most elaborate of the government’s agricultural programs was the farm 
settlement scheme. In 1961, the premier of the Eastern Region, Dr. M. I. Ok-
para, travelled on an economic mission, which took him to Israel, Malaya, 
Ceylon, India, West Germany, and the United Kingdom.50 His visit to Israel, in 
particular, played a critical role in the development of the settlement schemes 
in the Eastern Region. On his return with a team of Israeli experts, the premier 
announced in a speech in 1961 that a number of farm settlements would be 
established at a cost of £500,000 each. Each settlement was expected to employ 
about 400 young settlers and their families on individual farms and villages 
with government financial and technical support.51 The government’s vision of 
settler life was informed by an ideology referred to as “pragmatic African So-
cialism.”52 P. N. Okeke, the minister for agriculture, noted that the farm settle-
ments would serve as a model for the masses of the peasant farmers to emulate. 
This was the most important long-term aim of the scheme.53 The government 
believed that the trickle-down effects of the scheme would ultimately improve 
peasant production, provide career opportunities for school leavers, and stem 
rural-urban drift.54 The achievement of these objectives was predicated upon 
the availability of boys who would make careers in modern farming.55 
The scheme was based on the Israeli model of the “smallholder village” 
(moshavin), where settlers have secure title to their holdings as part of a larger 
cooperative.56 The settlement scheme was expected to provide an alterna-
tive to the system of extension services, as a means of disseminating new 
techniques to farmers throughout the region, as well as to promote the social 
integration of different ethnic groups and communities.57 The government 
enlisted the help of international agencies and organizations to assist in the 
realization of its agricultural development program.58 In 1963, U.S. Agency 
for International Development (USAID) provided technical assistance in the 
form of a poultry specialist and an irrigation engineer.59 During the same 
period, Israel provided technical assistance to the region for the planning and 
implementation of the farm settlement scheme.60 
By 1965, the government had acquired about 148,930 acres in 22 lo-
cations for various schemes under the plantation development program.61 
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Source: h. i. ajaegbu, Urban and rural Development in nigeria (london: heinemann, 1976), 65. 
The government set up six farm settlements covering 61,775 acres at Ohaji, 
Igbariam, Erei, Boki, Ulonna South, Ulonna North, and Uzouwani.62 With 
1,070 settlers in 1966, about 7,829.05 acres were planted with various cash 
crops, including oil palm, rubber, and citrus fruit.63 The settlers were re-
quired to cultivate food crops, such as yams, cocoyams, and maize on their 
compound plots for their own subsistence. Equipped with modern facilities 
including maternity homes, schools, and modern farming equipment, these 
plantations represented the most ambitious of the government’s agricultural 
development programs and its attempt to create “modern,” self-supporting 
farming households. 
The scheme did not work in practice for several reasons. The government 
hoped that there would be a steady inflow of foreign capital, to the tune of 
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prospective settlers being interviewed for admission to a farm settlement. (reproduced from 
the library of the national archives, enugu.) 
nearly half of the total outlay of the budget. This was not realized.64 In addi-
tion, conditions in Eastern Nigeria were different from the conditions in Is-
rael upon which the government modelled the settlement project. The success 
of farm settlements in Israel is related to the peculiar historical circumstances 
in which the members of the Jewish Diaspora found themselves. With little 
agricultural experience, the scheme offered them the opportunity to acquire 
agricultural skills in a new environment.65 On the other hand, the Eastern 
Nigerian farmers already had centuries of agricultural knowledge and many 
years of commercial agriculture experience behind them, so the new system 
operated under different socio-economic conditions. 
Other factors worked against the settlement scheme. The policy of col-
lectivization was implemented under unfavourable social conditions and was 
imposed on an unwilling rural population. The settlement projects, which 
amounted to forced villagization and relocation of peasants, was not very 
successful in attracting settlers because the project was adapted in a capitalist 
system that lacked the force involved in most socialist societies where collec-
tivization had been adopted. The settlement schemes often took settlers away 
from their immediate localities, which tended to sever kinship-based labour 
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networks. The official report of the ENDC in 1963 acknowledged: “more at-
tention needs to be given to the social implications of plantation development 
and to the impact on society and the social structure.”66 Subsequent studies by 
a social anthropologist attached to the Uzouwani settlement agreed that the 
whole idea of a farm settlement was “strange.”67 He noted that dormitory life, 
communal feeding, and the separation from home were like “taking a plunge 
into the unknown.”68 Floyd and Adinde noted that sociologists or human 
geographers who studied the farm settlements could detect the phenomenon 
described as “settler shock,” and without difficulty.69 
Furthermore, the management of the settlements was not in line with 
indigenous ideas. The activities of government supervisors, the over-central-
ization of decision-making, and the bureaucratic approach of the civil service 
made work frustrating for those who had to do it.70 In addition, many settlers 
saw themselves as civil servants working for the government and did not re-
gard settlement farms as their own private, profit-oriented enterprises.71 This 
was more so for those settlers from the land-owning communities. Eugene 
Nwana, who was the administrator of the Ohaji Farm Settlement during the 
first five years of its establishment, explains: 
Settlers from the land-owning communities were less commit-
ted to their work than their mates from other parts of the region. 
They were more readily diverted by events in their native homes, 
such as a festival, death of a relative or friend and the mourning 
engagements that followed, meeting friends outside the settlement, 
and general laziness.… It appears that what attracted them was the 
stipend that settlers were paid during the period when the food 
farm and plantation were established.72 
The desire to create employment was not very successful. The farm settlements 
were semi-mechanized and capital-intensive rather than labour-intensive 
and, therefore, employed very little labour. The number of settlers (1,860) in 
1966 was very limited compared to the number of unemployed people in the 
region. Intakes of settlers continued to remain low, and, by 1970, the settle-
ments had only 3,350 families, which represented what Floyd called “a drop 
in the bucket” compared to the employment needs of the region.73 Similarly, 
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the system did not do as much to relieve congestion in high-density areas as 
had been envisaged. The Igbariam scheme drove a number of tenant farmers 
who had historically survived by working the land in the area to scatter. Since 
these tenant farmers were forced to forfeit their livelihoods in the Igbariam 
area, many moved to other parts of Onitsha Province, where they added to the 
rural over-population and under-employment.74 The growth of dependency 
on imported food items was an indication of the failure of that settlement and 
other agricultural schemes. 
There was much government control of settlers’ lives. The contracts 
which settlers were forced to enter into made them tenants-at-will to the gov-
ernment of the region for a period of thirty-five years, which was considered 
the length of the active working life of the first settler.75 Settlers undertook to 
work hard each day in accordance with a regimented timetable. Absence from 
work except in cases of certified illness incurred a fine of £1.76 A settler could 
not sublet or fragment his holdings. A tenancy could change hands under 
three conditions. First, a son could inherit his father’s holding on the death of 
his father. Second, the settler could be evicted if the conditions of entry into 
the settlement were violated. In this case, the new settler inherited the capital 
liabilities involved in establishing the holding. Third, a settler could leave 
the settlement voluntarily, after which the holding would be transferred to a 
new settler under the same conditions as above.77 It is doubtful that settlers 
could easily break away from their contracts since they were required to repay 
subsistence loans of three shillings per day provided for the first two years. 
Besides being forbidden to form trade unions, settlers were forced to belong 
to farm settlement co-operative societies and to sell their produce to the co-
operative societies for wholesale marketing.78 This organizational structure, 
the insecurity of tenure, the fear of eviction, and the regimented settlement 
life could not have made for optimum production. In actuality, the settlers 
were mere labourers instead of owner-operators. 
Acquisition of land was not easy. The alienation of large tracts of land 
created problems in some of the settlement communities. In the Ohaji settle-
ment, for example, Nwana noted that different communities owned the 6,085 
hectares of land acquired for the settlement. Since settlers were supposed to 
enjoy the right of ownership, tension arose between local and “foreign” ele-
ments in the settlement communities. Some villagers opposed the recruitment 
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of non-indigenes, in particular Igbo, into the settlements located in the non-
Igbo areas. Many in these areas viewed this as the colonization of their land 
by the Igbo, since each settler was perceived as enjoying rights of ownership 
of his plantation land in perpetuity. Others saw the project as “land snatching 
and rather than co-operate with it, even by copying good methods of agri-
culture, tried as much as possible to get even.”79 One village group remarked: 
“a time will eventually come when a large proportion of our productive land 
will pass into the ownership of non-indigenes. It is a dangerous threat to our 
interests and those of our posterity.”80 
There were demographic issues. About 7,828.05 acres of land had been 
alienated from rural communities for the settlement schemes by 1966.81 With 
population densities far above the national average in a land-hungry society, 
land alienation remained a potential source of conflict.82 In addition, farm 
settlements, the activities of migrant farmers, and the expansion of land-hun-
gry communities took a “heavy toll on the natural vegetation of the region.”83 
The entire program was far too costly, and any achievement came at a high 
environmental and ecological cost, and as had been the case with previous 
state-sponsored agricultural projects, the government was mainly concerned 
with export crop development. Few farm settlements cultivated food crops 
such as yams, cocoyams and maize in their compound lands, but all the 
farm settlements grew export crops.84 Because the mono-cropping system of 
agriculture practised in the settlements was based, for the most part, upon 
the practices of other societies, the issue of local conditions and sustainable 
practices was not fully considered by the government. 
Life in the settlements and the contractual arrangements there revealed 
an implicit and explicit bias against women. The notion of a self-supporting 
farming household inevitably drew women into the farming settlements, but 
the program emphasized their reproductive role as child bearers and their 
productive role as subsistence producers. Men were responsible for cash crop-
ping, while women provided domestic services, raised children, and tended 
food crops in the farm plot.85 Ony male settlers cound enter into a contract 
with the government for the duration of the contract.86 The conditions under 
which tenancy could change hands also favoured male children over a settler’s 
spouse or female children. Tenancy changed hands under three conditions 
– by a man’s son inheriting his deceased father’s holding, including assets 
T h e l a n d h a s Ch a n ged 212 
Table 6.3. marketing board purchase of palm oil and kernels, 1960–66 (in thousands of long 
tons). 
palm oil palm kernel 
Year nigeria Eastern region nigeria Eastern region 
1960 190 170 423 208 
1961 173 161 430 208 
1962 128 121 362 169 
1963 149 139 414 197 
1964 148 139 401 203 
1965 164 158 449 n.a. 
1966 130 128 415 n.a. 
note: one long ton is the equivalent of 2,240 pounds. 
Source: federation of nigeria, Federal Office of Statistics, Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1964 (1965) 
and Central bank of nigeria, Annual report and Statement of Accounts, 1966 (lagos, 1967). 
and liabilities, by the eviction of a settler if he violated the conditions of his 
contract, and by the voluntary relinquishment of a holding at the settlement. 
The settlement scheme was structured to benefit male farmers, and passing 
land and property from father to son(s) was the norm. 
The objective of social integration and improvement in the economic sta-
tus of settlers could not be attained. The scheme operated as a state enterprise 
in a region where peasants were historically the backbone of export produc-
tion. Although Floyd identified what he characterized as positive gains, re-
flected in neatly kept farms and modern houses as opposed to the “primitive” 
dwellings of the farmers,87 such a view is reflective of the official idea that the 
key to agricultural development lay in the “transformation of peasant life.”88 
Officials ignored indigenous knowledge and failed to recognize that peas-
ants had other interests and motivations that often did not fit into the official 
concept of development. The removal of settlers from their roots and commu-
nities and the setting up of settlements in new, unfamiliar locations was con-
trary to basic Igbo ideals that emphasized the primacy of locality and space as 
a source of individual and group identity. Moreover, the young boys who were 
supposed to be drawn into the program did not show interest in farming. By 
the 1960s, the civil service provided what most of them perceived as a more 
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prestigious form of work. Yet the regional government saw its mission as a 
noble one. It increased its hold on the peasants through market intervention 
and the extraction of peasant surplus and land. 
Overall, there was progress in the cash crop sector during the first few 
years of independence. By 1963, the government had made significant prog-
ress in the palm rehabilitation scheme, the rubber planting scheme, the cocoa 
improvement scheme, extension services, and in the extension of agricultural 
credit to farmers.89 Agriculture still contributed about 80.3 per cent of the 
total value of Nigeria’s exports in the first few years after independence with 
a significant percentage coming from the palm oil sector in Eastern Nigeria.90 
Although, Okpara’s policy began as a revolution in favour of rural farmers, 
the agricultural programs were state-centred and continued to be guided 
by government “experts.” But, the post-independence era differed in some 
respects from previous years.91 There was recognition of the need for a bal-
ance between export crop production and the production of food crops for 
the population. The incorporation of rural farmers was deemed essential to 
achieving the dual goal of expanding both cash crops and subsistence pro-
duction. 
food Crop developmenT 
Significant effort was made to improve food production through both direct 
and indirect support for peasants from 1958. The inclusion of foodstuffs and 
poultry production was to reduce the dependency on imported food. Although 
75 per cent of the capital outlay for agriculture in this era was allocated to tree 
crops, an important aspect of the regional agricultural program was inter-
cropping food crops in oil palm plantations. About 67 per cent of the land 
under the rehabilitation scheme was intercropped with food crops. Indeed, the 
allocation of 7.6 per cent of the agricultural budget to food crop production 
was a significant improvement over earlier years.92 Cassava accounted for 85 
per cent of the cultivated acreage. Yams accounted for 5.8 per cent, and maize, 
cocoyam, bananas, plantains, okra, pepper, and other vegetables made up the 
remaining proportion of crops.93 
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The cultivation of rice, for example, continued to expand into the mid-
1960s. The government distributed improved rice seeds (B.G. 79) to farmers. 
It increased the distribution of rice to farmers from 3,799 lbs. in the 1958/59 
planting season to 47,809 lbs. during the 1963/64 planting season.94 Rice cul-
tivation in Abakaliki, Ogoja, and Enugu Provinces received a major boost 
because of favourable growing conditions. In 1964, 145 of the 225 privately 
owned rice mills in the Eastern Region were located in Abakaliki.95 
The regional government also aggressively pursued cassava improvement. 
The Ministry of Agriculture developed a new strain of cassava, which doubled 
previous yields. In 1964/65, the government distributed 1,214 bundles of 50 
cuttings to farmers. This was one of several attempts to improve agricultural 
productivity by rural farmers.96 The popularity of gari and fermented cassava 
(akpu), the low cost of production and the ease of storage contributed to the 
extensive cultivation of cassava throughout the region.97 These advantages 
compelled increasing numbers of farmers to embrace cassava cultivation.98 
The expansion of cassava cultivation led to an increase in the quantity of 
gari exports to northern Nigeria.99 Once gari became a popular staple, Sarah 
Emenike of Item recalled, “Every man and woman turned their attention to 
cassava.”100 
In 1966, the Ministry of Agriculture published a guide as part of its overall 
development program, which included provisions for the extension of rural 
education to women. The department of agriculture argued that rural women 
need “an opportunity to develop their potential” and to “broaden their ex-
perience to meet and bridge the demands of a growing Nigeria.”101 Thus, the 
department sought to provide rural women with “an informal educational 
service in home economics and related and pertinent agricultural interests.” 
The specific areas of interest to women under this program were listed as food 
preparation, nutrition, clothing, home improvements, child care and care of 
family members, and garden and livestock production (for use in the home 
and marketing).102 This line of thinking was at the centre of the agricultural 
development strategy of the region. 
Overall, the state’s agricultural policies in the early post-independence 
period were pragmatic, but the broad contours of development ideology did 
not change radically. Indeed the revolution was incomplete. Onyegbule Ko-
rieh recalled that many rural farmers had hoped that prices of palm oil and 
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kernels would improve under the new government. According to him, “We 
hoped that our own people will provide better prices than the European of-
fered us. We thought that our conditions would improve, but this was not 
always really the case.”103 At the same time, the government’s policies devel-
oped bureaucratic and anti-peasant aspects that ignored the social and cul-
tural dynamics of the region’s people. The top-down approach that marked 
colonial agricultural development and the emphasis on cash crops continued 
in the post-colonial era. 
The government’s extension services did not reach the majority of rural 
farmers. This was especially the case for those who did not engage in cash 
crop production. Participation in official agricultural schemes was not often 
possible for women or the average rural farmer. A survey in 1968 indicated 
that the participants in government schemes were “not typical farmers.” The 
average participant was “a married man about 40 years old with some formal 
education and some non-farm and commercial experience.”104 Sybilia Nwosu, 
like many others, could not recall ever encountering an extension officer or 
receiving any support from the government with regard to her farming.105 
Despite the rhetoric, the exclusion of women from state-supported agricul-
tural programs, which began in the colonial era, continued. As Jerome Wells 
has noted, the agricultural policies of the post-independence state were pa-
triarchal, paternalistic, and reflected the anti-peasant stance of local bureau-
crats.106 
In spite of the temporary boom of the early years of independence in 
1960, the agricultural sector was in decline by the late 1960s. The most devas-
tating impact on agricultural and rural life were the outcomes of political cri-
sis linked to the Nigerian civil war and the structural changes in the overall 
economy rooted in the emergence of petroleum as a major source of revenue 
for Nigeria. These two issues and the responses of the state will be the focus 
of the rest of this chapter. 
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The nigerian Civil war and The 
agriCulTur al Crisis, 1967 –70 
Emergent Africa has known more than its share of strife and 
bloodshed, from the Mau Mau terror in Kenya to the carnage of 
Congolese secession. But in scope of suffering, in depth of bitter-
ness, in the seeming hopelessness of any solution short of wholesale 
slaughter, there is no parallel to the tragedy that has been gathering 
force the past 14 months in Nigeria – once Africa’s brightest hope 
for successful nationhood. One of the opposing forces, wielding a 
full array of modern weapons from Britain, Russia and much of 
Europe, is the federal government of Nigeria. It is determined to 
crush a rebellion that it feels will destroy its republic. On the other 
side, armed chiefly with determination, stands the secessionist 
state of Biafra, the home of Nigeria’s Ibo tribe. The Ibos [sic] are 
convinced that they are fighting not only for independence but for 
their survival as a people. – Time, 23 August, 1968 
The story of the Nigeria-Biafra civil war is frequently told in many Igbo fami-
lies. While the stories of the horrors visited on individuals are well known, 
the economic and social effects of the war, particularly for agriculture, have 
not been studied. The memories of men and women reveal that they starved 
and were desperate for food. The level of food insecurity and starvation was 
something that had not confronted the region before. “My son, do not remind 
me of that war. It is something you want to forget,”107 was how my own mother, 
Amarahiaugwu Korieh, began when I asked about her experiences during the 
war. Personal and community life was transformed. It is estimated that in the 
years of the war, 90 per cent of the Igbo population lived below starvation levels 
because of the disruption of agriculture and trade. “The horror of the war re-
mains indelible,” notes Onyegbule Korieh, concluding, “I have never seen hu-
man suffering and death on such a scale before.”108 Alpelda Korie recalls, “The 
war and the disruption it brought created the kind of poverty and hopelessness 
never experienced in the region before.”109 Charity Chidomere described it as 
a period “characterized by pain and hopelessness.”110 Most households were 
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not able to farm during the war. “I did not farm a lot under such insecurity … 
no one was sure of living to harvest the crop,” Susan Iwuagwu explained.111 
These memories provide an important entrée to an analysis of the social and 
economic changes that occurred among the Igbo because of the civil war. 
By the mid-1960s, the Nigerian federation was in a political crisis that led 
to a civil war between the predominantly Igbo-speaking people of eastern Ni-
geria and the rest of the federation.112 In January 1966, the civil government of 
Nigeria was overthrown in a coup carried out by army officers and replaced by 
a military government under Major General Aguiyi-Ironsi. In July, a second 
coup by Hausa officers from the Northern Region removed the government, 
which was headed by an Igbo. What followed were the massacre of Igbo men, 
women, and children in the north and the mass migration of many living 
elsewhere to their homes in the Eastern Region. Following the massacres in 
northern Nigeria and the failure of negotiations, Lt. Col. Chukuemeka Odu-
megwu Ojukwu proclaimed the secession of the Eastern Region from Nigeria 
on 30 May 1967 and declared the establishment of the Republic of Biafra. The 
federal government declared war and imposed economic sanctions on seces-
sionist Biafra. Despite initial successes in the war, the Biafran army suffered 
heavy losses, and there was large-scale disruption of economic life, including 
agriculture. Severe food shortages followed until the war ended in 1970. The 
severe nature of the economic crisis has to be understood in the context of 
the structural weakness of the prewar agrarian economy – an economy that 
did not have the capacity to withstand any significant disruption of its fragile 
base. 
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war and a food -reserve-defiCiT 
eConomy 
I do not want to see any Red Cross, any Caritas, any World 
Council of Churches, any Pope, any Mission, or any United Na-
tions Delegation. I want to stop every single I[g]bo being fed as 
long as these people refuse to capitulate. I do not want this war. But 
I want to win this war. – Major Benjamin Adekunle, August 1968 
Most parts of Igboland were what could be characterized as “food-reserve-
deficit economies.” As a period of “food reserve-deficit,” the war, despite its 
relatively short duration, left many households vulnerable and exacerbated the 
agricultural crisis that parts of Igboland were already facing because of popu-
lation and ecological factors. Igbo subsistence farmers, in most cases, were un-
able to produce enough to meet their food requirements exclusively from their 
own farms. Subsistence levels varied widely and were “nowhere very high,” 
W. T. Morrill noted for the Igbo.113 Food intake in most parts of Igbo territory 
was highest in November and December, but the hungry season or period of 
low food intake (unwu) occurred after the planting season, between February 
and June. People relied more on the market and wild food items during these 
annual periodic famines. 
Although the region was not prone to persistent drought, high popula-
tion and poor soil led to chronic food shortages. Low or late rains often upset 
the food security of the rural population. Early colonial reports mentioned 
the vulnerability of some areas to food insecurity. The district officer for Ow-
erri had reported as early as 1928 that “looking back over a period of years 
I cannot recollect seeing in the market any quantity of yams for sale.”114 By 
the middle of the twentieth century, these ecological variables had made it 
imperative for most parts of Igboland to depend on yams, rice, onions, meat, 
and other consumables from outside the region. However, most parts of Ig-
boland could support themselves in basic carbohydrate foodstuffs before the 
war. Kenneth Lindsay, former professor of history at the University of Nigeria 
(renamed the University of Biafra for the period of the war), writing in the 
Globe and Mail in 1968 noted that the areas under Biafran control in Septem-
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ber 1968, with a normal estimated population of two and a quarter million, 
produced about 2 million tons of yams and a substantial amount of cassava 
and plantains in peace time.115 So even in peacetime, production was less than 
needed. The disruption of regional trade made matters worse when the war 
broke out for many parts of Igboland that were already food-deficient. 
Although the unfavourable food outlook already endemic in some parts 
of Igboland did not lead to a food emergency as soon as the war broke out, the 
civil war fell upon the Igbo like an eclipse, judging by the experience of rural 
households. The Biafran government had some time to prepare for war after 
the initial massacre of Igbos in 1966. In the months following the massacre, 
the government turned its attention not only to building the necessary in-
frastructure for a possible war but also to increasing the food supply. An 
American CIA report stated that farmers were encouraged to plant more and 
“with additional labor available from the refugees, they almost certainly did 
so.”116 While cassava and yam production in the region was expected to al-
leviate the carbohydrate need, the CIA concluded that a “large segment of the 
population, however, will remain in need of protein from outside sources.”117 
Some Igbo areas faced a serious food crisis one year after the war began as 
the previous year’s harvest depleted. In addition, the use of food as a weapon 
of war by the federal government was quite effective.118 A Time report on 23 
August 1968 describes the food crisis faced by the Igbo: 
Crowded into hardwood forests and mangrove swamps that 
cannot possibly support them, Biafrans are starving to death, 
by a conservative estimate, at the rate of 1,000 a day. Most of the 
4,500,000 refugees from all corners of Nigeria who returned to the 
Ibo heartland live in makeshift camps, totally dependent on scanty 
government and missionary rations. The price of staple foods has 
risen fantastically (cost of a dozen eggs: $4), and salaried work is 
almost nonexistent.119 
In October 1968, UNICEF predicted a “serious famine crisis in Biafra in 
December 1968, when it was expected that supplies of yams and garri in the 
enclave would be exhausted.” An ICRC agricultural expert reached the con-
clusion in October 1968 that a “catastrophe of enormous dimensions was on 
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its way due to a forthcoming carbohydrate shortage.”120 Pacificist Lord Fenner 
Brockway, head of the Committee for Peace in Nigeria,121 in a speech at a Wash-
ington public meeting on 11 January 1968 said that the carbohydrate shortage 
and the lack of seedlings for the new farming season could mean 25,000 deaths 
daily “in a few months.”122 Mr. Nordrum, an ICRC agricultural expert, stated 
in an article in Aftenpost on 18 November 1968 that hunger had “forced a good 
many farmers to start harvesting too early with the result that total yields of 
foodstuffs were a good deal below that of a normal year.” At the same time, 
there was double the normal number of inhabitants. “It was therefore realistic 
that the fenced-in population in the enclave had only 40 percent of the amount 
of food which would have been consumed normally to last them until next 
harvest,”123 he concluded. In November 1968, the Biafrans were already “con-
suming next year’s seed crop, and once that had gone the area would be faced 
with famine on a massive scale,” a visitor to Biafra quoted the relief agencies.124 
The threat to household and farmers’ security was not limited to crops alone. 
Several families were killing off their domestic animals because they could 
not move with them as they left their homes to escape soldiers who ravaged 
villages seizing whatever valuable crop or animal they encountered. 
The food requirements within Biafra were not precisely known because 
of inadequate information about both population and food production. The 
population estimates ranged from 4 to 7 million. According to a British re-
port, the area under Biafran control supported perhaps about 3.5 million 
people before the second influx of refugees in 1968.125 With diminishing areas 
under Biafran control, much of the population required full feeding from 
various humanitarian agencies. The large number of returnees to Igboland 
exacerbated the food crisis. Refugee figures varied widely. Kenneth Lindsay 
estimated the number of Igbo refugees in Biafra at 4 million, of whom he 
thought 571,000 were in refugee camps.126 The International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC) based its November 1968 appeal for food in aid of Bi-
afra on an estimated refugee population of 3 million by February 1969.127 
The crisis was clear enough to attract considerable international atten-
tion, most of it not supporting the breakup of Nigeria but attempting to save 
Biafrans from genocidal starvation. The Catholic Church was particularly 
important, probably because of the role of Irish Catholic priests in Biafra. In 
North America, the Igbo Diaspora played a major role. They created aware-
6: The afriCan eliTe, agrarian revoluTion, and soCio-poliTiCal Change 221 
starving biafran children. (reproduced with kind permission of the bodleian library, univer-
sity of oxford.) rh, mss afr. s. 2399, britain – biafra association. 
ness and ran circles around the better funded representatives of the federal 
government of Nigeria. The members of the diaspora wrote articles, talked 
to newspaper editors, spoke to any group that would listen to them, and or-
ganized many propaganda efforts.128 “In the shadow of the Nazi Holocaust, 
and recalling the profound Jewish anxiety over the Arab threat to massacre 
Jews in Israel last year,” Marc H. Tanenbaum of the American Jewish Com-
mittee wrote, “clearly the Jewish conscience ought not to permit us to remain 
silent in the face of such an incredible tragedy.… We have an obligation as 
Jews and as human beings to help alleviate the suffering of so many men, 
women and children.”129 The American Jewish Committee combined ef-
forts with Catholics and Protestants as well as other organizations to raise 
money to defray the cost of airlifting food and medicine to Biafra. Each flight 
carried 13 tons of food and medicine at a cost of $6,300 to São Tomé (off the 
coast of Nigeria), from where it was transported to Biafra. It was hoped that 
such joint Christian and Jewish efforts would help sensitize the conscience of 
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biafran refugees returning from northern nigeria. (reproduced with kind permission of the 
bodleian library, university of oxford.) rh, mss afr. s. 2399, britain – biafra association. 
America and other countries to respond more generously. The Catholics and 
Protestants made it clear that they would welcome “even a single symbolic ef-
fort for its important publicity value.”130 This effort yielded significant results, 
including donations of medical supplies by Dr. Richard Hahn, director of the 
Alliance for Health, San Rafael, California. 
The large influx of returnees and displaced persons into the region cre-
ated social and economic problems never previously experienced in the area. 
In December 1968, a British agricultural expert estimated that there were two 
and a quarter million refugees living with relatives and 3 million refugees 
without relatives to help support them. Other reports supported this estimate. 
By October 1968, about 3 million people who had no family connections with 
local farmers were being fed at feeding centres, according to an ICRC agricul-
tural expert.131 The forced repatriation of Igbos into the Biafran territory put 
increasing pressure on the already fragile environment. Stealing of farm pro-
duce increased astronomically. Mbagwu Korieh recalled, “Refugees ravaged 
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farms and pulled out freshly planted seed yams from the ground for food.”132 
This type of abominable act that would have attracted severe sanctions and 
ritual cleansing in peacetime was a way of life during the war. “People had to 
survive at all costs,” Jonah Okere of Umuekwune, Ngor Okpala, remarked.133 
This was the beginning of a serious, prolonged agricultural crisis for many 
peasant farmers, as many never recovered from their losses. Many farmers 
related the experience of losing their yams during the war as marking the 
end of their farming occupation and role as breadwinners. It was difficult to 
rebuild decimated villages and the rural economy at the end of the war.134 
Federal policies from 1968 crippled the region by starving it of food 
supplies. Forced displacement and indiscriminate violence left hundreds of 
thousands of rural farmers in a precarious situation. The federal govern-
ment blockaded the considerable interregional and intraregional trade in 
foodstuffs that had taken place before the war.135 Food imports including 
cattle, soya beans, and corn from northern Nigeria and practically all fish 
and European products that came through Port Harcourt were blockaded. 
This eliminated the principal sources of high-quality protein that had added 
significantly to nutritional balance given the high carbohydrate diets derived 
from local food. 
The price of essential food items rose beyond the reach of even wealthy 
Biafrans. The greatest need was primarily salt, high protein foods, and baby 
food, which often came in the form of powdered eggs and fishmeal. Ofe mg-
bugbu or soup with no salt was normal for many families. Gari, a staple food 
among the Igbo, “rose in price by 18–36 times during the period [1968] to 
3–18 Nigerian shillings per cup; four bananas increased by 40 times to 10 
shillings; a pound of salt rose over 1,000 times to £N14-16.”136 By mid-1968, 
many parts of Biafra were in dire need of food as result of the federal block-
ade, a situation exacerbated by a high population density that was two and 
half times the national average.137 
Insecurity prevented any meaningful farming or internal trade. Yam, 
cassava, and rice production in the Abakiliki and Ohaozara areas was se-
verely disrupted. The supply of cassava and fish from Etche and Ikewere in 
the south faced similar disruption.138 The occupation of much of the east by 
federal troops by late 1968 led to the resumption of some trade, particularly 
along the borders of the region. Yet Biafra “remain[ed] almost totally cut off 
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from its normal sources of high-protein foods,” according to a CIA report.139 
Hunger continued to be widespread throughout the federally controlled por-
tions of the former Eastern Region because of unsettled conditions in these 
areas, the lack of central government authority, and the low level of cultiva-
tion.140 Toward the end of the war, however, USAID began a discussion with 
the Red Cross to purchase seeds and yams in the Abakiliki area for distribu-
tion to farmers in northeastern Igboland. Plans also were made to purchase 
100,000 machetes for farmers who had “resorted to sharing tools.”141 
food Crisis and “AHiA aT TaCk” 
“The last days of 1969 were the worst time we ever had,” recalls Chilaka 
Iwuagwu, of Umunomo, Mbaise. “We just wanted the war to end; we scarcely 
could get enough to eat.”142 The Biafran leader, Colonel Ojukwu, in a broadcast 
on 18 January 1969, launched an emergency food production program. Each 
community, he said, should be able to produce enough food for its people. 
Ojukwu enjoined every family to maintain a small vegetable garden. Farmers 
were urged to lend to others any land that they might not be able to cultivate 
themselves in order to utilize the “vast areas of uncultivated land” in the re-
gion. The Biafran leader emphasized that “Biafrans should not sit back and 
expect to be fed by relief organizations.”143 He urged individuals to keep small 
poultry farms and children to collect yam heads for planting. 
The Biafran government responded to the crisis by changing the priority 
of the former regional government, which had emphasized the production of 
cash crops for export.144 The Biafran government established the Biafra Devel-
opment Corporation (BDC) and Food Directorate to oversee and coordinate 
food production in the territory.145 From 1967 onward, the BDC utilized some 
of the forestland acquired by the government for the plantation programs for 
the production of maize, rice, onions, tomatoes, groundnuts, pigs, and poul-
try.146 By 1969, about 15,906 acres of land had been cultivated in this way. The 
BDC hoped to achieve three main objectives: to commence the production 
of food for the population immediately; to raise immediate cash revenue; to 
plough back any surplus into the tree crops program; and to convert available 
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Col. Chukuemeka odumegwu ojukwu, head of state of biafra. (reproduced with the kind per-
mission of the national archives, london. pro, inf 10/253.) 
land under the plantation program into farmland in order to increase food 
production and increase the potential for export. 
Biafrans did not wait to be reminded to be resourceful despite the hope-
lessness of their situation and the damage to the local economy. Both men 
and women went to war, but they fought on different fronts. One of the im-
mediate and enduring impacts of the war was the significant transformation 
in men’s and women’s roles in the economy. New doors opened to women in 
transregional trade as they struggled to feed their households in a time of 
war. The channelling of men’s labour to the war effort left women to support 
the household, with the result that women bore the burden of the crisis in the 
agricultural sector. The Biafran government capitalized on the availability of 
female labour, incorporating women into the food production drive. Women 
organized food campaigns, assisted in the food production effort, and sup-
ported the Land Army Program. 
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The destruction of the rural agricultural base and the food crisis in Ig-
boland forced many women to enter into long distance and cross-regional 
trade. Although rape was a constant threat, especially for young women 
and girls, they foraged for food and traded in areas where men could not. 
This was popularly known as ahia attack (trading on the war front). Those 
who survived the horror reminisced about this form of trading. Maria Gold 
Egbunike was a thirty-one-year-old school teacher at the beginning of the 
war in 1967. Maria, who traded salt and other goods during the war, recalls: 
“Many women traded during the war. Women would go to the relief centers 
and get stockfish, salt and other goods, and sometimes they will trade it with 
other people or sell it. This trade is what sustained the Biafran economy.”147 
Ezenwanyi Anichebe of Eziowelle town, Anambra, recalls: 
Igbo men, who were not soldiers, were afraid of both the Biafran 
soldiers as they were of the Nigerian troops, so trading across the 
war zone was essentially women’s business because of the potential 
danger men could face if caught by the Federal troops or the Bi-
afran soldiers. Women therefore took advantage of this situation to 
dominate the frontier trade.… The profit we made was enormous, 
and served in saving the families during this critical period.148 
The resourcefulness of the Igbo of both sexes and ages was important in their 
survival. Young children learned to survive on their own by collecting wild 
fruits, vegetables, and palm kernels. 
The women’s war effort was especially channelled toward cassava pro-
duction. The importance of cassava, previously regarded as a reserve against 
hunger and as food for the poor, increased tremendously during the war. This 
drastic change was induced both by the hunger that many families faced and 
by the policy of the Biafran government, which compelled rural people to 
cultivate the soil to ensure their own survival. The total acreage of cassava 
was estimated to have increased and gari production intensified to supply the 
“refugees and … the army.”149 A Reuters report of 15 January 1969 spoke of 
forest areas being “hacked down in late 1968 to grow cassava.”150 This crop 
had several advantages over yams under the war conditions. Amarahi-
augwu Korieh recounts that early maturing species known as Ofomi iwa 
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[Cameroon cassava], Nwa ocha [White child], which could be roasted and 
eaten, and Nwayi Umuokara [Umuokara lady] were introduced during the 
war to stave off hunger.”151 Women and children were resourceful in other 
ways. Snails, rats, ants, and grasshoppers collected from the forest provided 
much-needed protein supplements. Palm oil, the normal cooking ingredi-
ent, became a good supplement to the nutritional deficiencies of the available 
starchy food. 
The war also had a liberating effect on women, as Oruene Olaleye pointed 
out. The war forced them to assume new responsibilities as breadwinners of 
the family but at the same time enhanced their status.152 Women increased 
their participation in trade during the war to meet household food needs 
and to fill the void created by the recruitment of men into the Biafran army. 
Dependency on the market for household subsistence created avenues for 
women’s mobility on a scale unprecedented in Igboland.153 The war also broke 
the social barriers that had constrained women’s mobility in the past. Onyeg-
bule Korieh remembers, “the survival of the family depended largely on the 
resourcefulness of women who did not stand the risk of being conscripted 
into the army. Men allowed their wives to travel more freely than before. This 
did not stop at the end of the war.”154 Women’s changing roles eroded the 
patriarchal assumptions about the male as breadwinner, thereby introducing 
changes in gendered relations of production and power. The Igbo accepted, 
it seems, a reconfiguration of male and female roles in trade and a greater 
concentration of female labour effort on food production. 
At the end of the war, many rural people went back to their farms to eke 
out a living, but many women continued with the regional trade that they had 
started during the war. Nwadinma Agwu recalls how women sought to help 
each other through collective farming and pooling of resources to acquire 
land and seedlings, and the proceeds were shared among the contributors 
after the harvest. Thus, “women were able to raise money to start petty trad-
ing and sustain the household.”155 Others, like Edna Okoye of Umudunu, 
Abagana, left her village as a migrant farmer to escape “poverty and infertility 
of soil.”156 Migrant farming became a major source of income, which helped 
to sustain the domestic economy. Margaret Nwanevu of Amumara Mbaise, 
who had lost her home during the war, was able to rebuild it with the proceeds 
from her palm oil trade. “I was able to build a mud house with zinc roof where 
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the entire family lived after the war.… I sustained the family for a long time 
after the war because my husband had nothing and had to begin all over again 
in life.”157 Still others formed trading guilds to bring in essential commodities 
into places like Mbaise. Chinyere Iroha of Uvuru Mbaise recalls: 
Postwar hardship and poverty necessitated the formation of 
women trading guilds in our area, which brought fish and other 
seafood from the Rivers area into Mbaise. These were sold in local 
markets here as well as in neighboring towns by the women in the 
guild. With this, we were able to assume the role of providers for 
the families when our husbands were still disillusioned at the loss 
of a war. We really moved the economic fortunes of this area after 
the war.158 
The Nigerian Civil War had the most important long-term effect on agricul-
ture among the Igbo. The civil war ruined the Eastern Regional government 
agricultural programs and destroyed the optimism of the early 1960s. With 
the outbreak of the Nigerian Civil War in 1967, palm oil exports, the major 
cash crop for the Igbo, declined to 16,000 tons, compared with 165,000 tons in 
1961. Palm kernel export, a major source of income for women, also declined, 
to 162,000 tons in 1967 as against 411,000 tons in 1961.159 The trajectory of 
economic policy and governance followed a new path leading to the abandon-
ment of the agricultural projects. Thus, the potential ability to revolutionize 
agriculture and the rural landscape may never be known, as the war sowed the 
seeds of the agricultural crisis that was exacerbated by the development of the 
petroleum industry. 
The peTroleum er a and The agr arian 
Crisis in The 1980s 
Before the 1980s, Nigeria was the world’s leading exporter of palm oil and 
peanuts and a major producer of cocoa.160 Most of Igboland was also largely 
dependent on palm oil and kernel production for income. Beginning in 1970, 
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however, the Nigerian economy was significantly transformed by the expan-
sion of the petroleum industry. The struggle over control of the petroleum 
resources in the eastern part of Nigeria seems to have played a significant part 
in shaping policies before, during, and after the Nigerian Civil War. Many 
foreign countries recognized the important role Nigeria’s oil would play as the 
demand increased from the United States and the emerging nations such as 
China. A CIA intelligence memorandum rightly noted: “The brightest feature 
of Nigeria’s postwar economic scene is the rapid rise in oil revenues. After 
being hit hard in the early years of the war, the industry since has expanded 
dramatically … making Nigeria one of the ten largest oil-producing countries 
in the world.”161 “Paradoxically,” the CIA wrote, “the civil war played a major 
role in stimulating new production” and increasing federal revenue. “With the 
known oil-producing areas of eastern Nigeria cut off, the oil companies in-
tensified production in the mid-western region and offshore, and these areas 
currently are more important than the east.” Production increased signifi-
cantly, reaching an estimated 1.4 million barrels per day in January 1971.162 
The formation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) led to sharp increases in oil prices. Prices dramatically increased by 
130 per cent in 1979 with the formation of OPEC. The Arab-Israeli war in 
1973 and the oil embargo on Western countries that supported Israel caused 
dramatic increases in oil prices. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 led to an-
other oil shock, and prices rose by over 130 per cent. Similar occasional crises 
continued into the 1990s. These crises brought huge revenues to Nigeria. Oil 
prices rose from $3.78 per barrel in October 1973 to $14.69 per barrel by the 
beginning of 1974.163 The export boom led to an increase of nearly 10 per cent 
in GDP annual growth during the 1970s and early 1980s.164 Revenue went 
from $411 million in 1970 to $26.62 billion in 1980.165 
The dramatic rise in global oil prices coincided with the Second National 
Development Plan, 1970–74. Agriculture, mining, and manufacturing were 
projected to contribute 44.2 per cent 13.4 per cent, and 12.4 per cent, respec-
tively, to GDP. The actual contribution to GDP, however, was only 24.7 per 
cent for agriculture, 45.1 per cent for mining, and 4.8 per cent for manu-
facturing. Following the expansion in petroleum production, Nigeria’s GDP 
grew at 6 to 8 per cent, while non-oil exports declined by about 60 per cent 
between 1964 and 1980. The importance of crude oil to the economy in this 
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Table 6.4. production and resulting payments, 1965–70. 
year produCTion  paymenTs To The governmenT
(million barrels)a (in million us $) 
1965 99.4 36.0 
1966 152.4 53.2 
1967 116.5 75.6 
1968 51.9 44.8 
1969 197.2 78.4 
1970 395.7 280.0 
1971 620.5 b 600.0 
a. excluding production from the eastern states for the period april 1967–september 1968.
b. estimated.
Source: Central intelligence agency, “nigeria: The war’s economic legacy,” 10 may 1971.
Table 6.5. nigerian federal government revenue from crude petroleum, 1970–80. 
year oil revenue ToTal CurrenT 
revenue 
oil revenue as % 
of ToTal revenue 
1970 166.4 633.2 26.3 
1971 510.2 1,169.0 43.6 
1972 764.3 1,404.8 54.4 
1973 1,016.0 1,695.3 59.9 
1974 3,726.7 4,537.0 82.1 
1975 4,271.5 5,514.7 77.5 
1976 5,365.2 6,765.9 79.3 
1977 6,080.6 8,080.6 75.2 
1978 4,654.1 7,371.1 63.1 
1979 8,880.9 10,913.1 81.4 
1980+ 9,918.6 11,859.8 83.6 
+ nine-month period. 
Source: Toyin falola, economic reforms and Modernization in nigeria, 1945–1965 (kent, oh: kent 
state university press, 2004), 222. 
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Table 6.6. sectoral composition of nigerian output for selected years, 1960–75 (in %). 
seCTor 1960 1963 1970 1975 
agriculture 64.1 55.4 45.8 28.1 
oil and mining 1.2 4.8 12.2 14.2 
manufacturing 4.8 7.0 7.6 10.2 
building and  4.0 5.2 6.4 11.3 
Construction 
others 25.9 27.6 30.0 36.2 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: m. watts and p. lubeck, “The popular Classes and the oil boom: a political economy of 
rural and urban poverty,” in the Political Economy of nigeria, ed. i. w. zartman (new york: praeger, 
1983), 110. 
period is reflected in the significant rise in revenue from $189 million in 1964 
to $25.5 billion in 1980 – that is, from 1.3 per cent of GDP to 24.4 per cent.166 
As government revenue increased, the state adjusted to the new condi-
tions that emerged from the expanding oil sector. Indicative of the new power 
at the federal level was the allocation of a major part of revenue to the federal 
government. Allocations to the states also grew, from 323.8 million naira in 
1974 to 2,534 million in 1979–80.167 In general, the growth in the Nigerian 
economy was rapid, with an annual GNP growth of 7.4 per cent between 
1970 and 1979. This period, however, was qualitatively different from the pre-
1970s. The growth in the oil sector was accompanied by a significant sectoral 
transformation. These changes in sectoral composition reflected “not simply 
a growth in non-farm activities but a stagnant agrarian economy.”168 Invest-
ment in agriculture fell from 7 per cent of the budget in 1971 to 4 per cent in 
1981.169 While the tide had turned in favour of the state in the form of huge 
revenues from oil, the rural population was frustrated as the state turned its 
back on agriculture. Peasant production and dependency on agriculture went 
into serious decline. 
The Nigerian government’s interest in agriculture flagged considerably, 
shifting to the more lucrative oil sector.170 A number of scholars have linked 
the agricultural crisis in Nigeria to the emergence of petroleum as Nigeria’s 
main export product. Sara Berry suggests that, by the 1970s, farmers in 
western Nigeria, for example, were too busy scrambling for a share of the oil 
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an abandoned oil palm mill at owerrinta, abia state. (photo by author.) 
wealth in Nigeria to have time or energy to invest in expanding or upgrading 
their cocoa farms.171 The neglect of agriculture and dependence on oil com-
bined to expose the fragility of the Nigerian economy and heightened class 
contradictions.172 As Nicholas Shaxson has recently shown, the paradox of 
African oil is the enormous wealth it generates for a few, and the poverty and 
political and economic insecurity it brings for the majority in oil-exporting 
countries such as Nigeria.173 
As the government wavered between encouraging food production and 
importing food cheaply from abroad, massive importation of all kinds of 
foodstuffs, including those that could be produced locally, struck at the roots 
of the rural economy.174 In 1961, for example, the value of food imports into 
Nigeria was about 45.44 million naira. By 1974, Nigeria’s food import bill 
had tripled, and it increased still further to about 1.8 billion naira in 1981.175 
Toward the end of the 1980s, Nigeria’s food import costs had increased from 
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Table 6.7. share of food in total import value, 1971–85 (million naira). 
year ToTal imporTs food imporTs % share of food 
1971 1,069.1 88.3 8.2 
1972 990.0 95.8 9.7 
1973 1,241.1 128.0 10.3 
1974 1,737.3 154.8 8.9 
1975 3,721.5 297.9 8.0 
1976 5,148.5 440.9 8.0 
1977 7,093.7 786.4 10.4 
1978 8,217.1 1,020.7 12.4 
1979 6,169.2 952.4 15.4 
1980 6,217.1 1,049.0 12.8 
1981 12,602.5 1,820.2 14.4 
1982 10,100.2 1,642.2 16.0 
Sources: government of nigeria, Know nigeria Series no. 1: towards Self-Sufficiency in Food (lagos: 
federal ministry of information, 1991), and Central bank of nigeria, Economic and Financial review 
(various years). 
509.79 million naira in 1964 to 9,658.10 million naira.176 Consequently, be-
tween 1973 and 1980, there was an overall annual decline in agricultural 
production, while the GDP growth rate was more than halved.177 Revenue 
slumped to $13.1 billion between 1981 and 1982 and was reduced to approxi-
mately $7 billion in 1988. While the country gained from the expanding oil 
wealth, rural people faced a crisis that permeated every facet of their exis-
tence. The change in the accumulative base of the state had a direct impact 
on rural production, and increasing pauperization emerged as the economic 
fortunes of the country changed. 
The Igbo found themselves in a unique position because most of the oil 
fields were located in the southeastern region of Nigeria. They were able to 
deal with decreasing land and low productivity in rural agriculture by diver-
sifying household incomes. But the emphasis on the non-agricultural sector 
continued at all levels of the economy, as governments and individuals made 
choices that intensified the agricultural crisis at the national level but also 
ameliorated its effect for some rural dwellers. In rural Igboland, the aver-
age holding declined considerably. The average farm size in most of Igboland 
in 1974 was under 0.10 hectare per household. Only 5 per cent had between 
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2 and 3.99 hectares, which represented the largest holdings.178 However, 
the economic opportunities the non-agricultural sector offered to peasants 
brought them some relief. 
The increase in revenue from oil led to massive infrastructural develop-
ment, an extensive growth in the urban population, and the rapid growth of 
an industrial labour force. It was followed by the commoditization of urban 
social relations, a sharp upturn in the size of a disenfranchised and militant 
“floating population,” and new waves of migrants from rural to urban ar-
eas.179 At the same time, the expanding urban sector demanded semi-skilled 
labour for the construction industry and other service jobs. This develop-
ment was important in two ways to the Igbo countryside, which experienced 
a population growth rate of over 3.0 per cent but produced few jobs. It cre-
ated a favourable environment for rural urban drift and the loss of potential 
agricultural labour. From the 1980s, rural peoples sought new opportunities 
as the oil boom fuelled the explosion in infrastructural development. In most 
parts of Igboland, the rate of movement into the major cities in Nigeria and 
beyond was enormous. People migrated out of rural Igboland in large num-
bers. Lagos, Port Harcourt, Aba, and Enugu, as well as many cities in other 
parts of the country, became important destinations for many migrants from 
southeastern Nigeria. Lagos, for example, with a population of 665,000 in 
1960, grew to 1,153,000 in 1985. Port Harcourt, which attracted a large num-
ber of Igbo migrants, had a population of 315,000 people in 1985, rising from 
a population of 180,000 in 1960.180 
The contradictions of an urban-biased development policy and indus-
trialization and their effects on local agricultural sustainability left the rural 
population few choices. Many sought other sources of income. The most 
important development in this transformation was the high level of small-
scale and large-scale trading activities that became the hallmark of the Igbo 
economy – a new economy that became dominated by rural women. Many 
people responded to the circumstances of the oil boom era and the various 
constraints in other innovative ways. The lure of the city remained strong. 
Even with few skills, some found it easiest to migrate to the booming towns 
to find various forms of employment. Many moved to the cities without the 
promise of a job. Alban Eluwa, who left his village in 1974 for Lagos, recalls: 
“You know in those days, if you did not have the money to attend a secondary 
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school, your next options were to become an apprentice of some sort or move 
to the city sometimes with no specific aim. You have to leave when your mates 
have all left the village.”181 
Others tried to improve their conditions within the rural areas by pro-
ducing foodstuffs to feed the expanding urban population. Others found 
employment in the expanding service-oriented society that emerged with the 
increased importance of petroleum to the national economy and the huge ex-
penditure on infrastructure in the urban centres. Onyegbule Korieh, a former 
migrant, noted, “When I arrived at Obigbo in 1973, I found that there was 
money to be made from selling garri and part-time farming. I could make 
enough money out there to feed my family well and send my son to a second-
ary school in 1973.”182 For Onyegbule, like many others, survival in the rural 
areas was becoming outdated for many by the mid-1970s. 
Nigeria emerged in the 1980s as a robust semi-industrial economy from 
its prewar mercantile basis and dependence on the export of agricultural 
commodities.183 As the petro-economy expanded, a new entrepreneurial class 
of “contractors” emerged more clearly than before the 1980s. They engaged in 
the booming supply business and used their profits to invest in trading. Oth-
ers used their salaries to invest in agriculture. In Imo State, they leased land 
and hired labour to produce cassava in areas such as Ohaji and Egbema.184 Yet 
the condition of many peasants remained precarious because they lacked the 
land, labour, and cash to invest in agriculture. The general outlook was one 
of decreasing food and agricultural productivity. For the overnight petro-
contractors, their livelihood became very unstable as the oil revenue declined 
and the construction boom dried up from the 1980s onward. 
Concomitant with the increase in oil revenue was the expansion of so-
cial services such as education. By the end of 1959, the enrolment figure in 
the Eastern Region was 1.4 million185 out of an estimated total population of 
8.1 million.186 By the 1970s, school enrolment in southeastern Nigeria was 
above the national average. This trend continued in the oil boom era. The 
high enrolment figures meant a significant reduction of available household 
agricultural labour and an increase in the tasks of women, who had to take 
on farm tasks previously performed by children. Although school attendance 
was encouraged for two main reasons – social and economic mobility and 
status enhancement and the introduction of universal free primary educa-
T h e l a n d h a s Ch a n ged 236 
tion – the result was a labour crisis, since most educated household members 
never returned to farming. But young people who got good jobs elsewhere 
earned more money than they could have earned on the farm. 
The ruinous inflation that accompanied the oil wealth was reflected in 
the inability of farmers to survive on what they produced. As subsistence 
production became radically undermined by the petroleum economy, they 
and a large segment of the overall population suffered dire consequences. 
Andrew Ibekwe, a retired bank employee who now farms in his village, at-
tributed rural poverty to the fundamental changes in the economy that have 
taken place in recent times. He states, “The village landscape has changed to 
the extent that farming has become very insignificant in rural livelihood.”187 
Onyegbule Korieh attributed the difficulty of rural life to the cost of living, 
which had gone beyond the reach of many rural dwellers. He says, “Things 
are tough presently because of overpopulation, scarcity of farmland, and 
very high inflation. But our sources of earning a living have not changed at 
all.”188 Despite the boom, the rural and agricultural landscape and its associ-
ated problems remain relatively unchanged.189 As Michael Watts notes, some 
classes benefited materially from the commodity boom, as measured by the 
consumption of purchased imports, “but the majority of the urban and rural 
poor found any hard-won gains rapidly eroded by inflation.”190 Indeed, the 
post-1970s developments weakened the essentially agriculture-based econo-
my. The petroleum boom brought new opportunities, and the wealth created 
by the oil industry made the state and some people wealthy. It was also a 
period of ambivalence. The inequality and inflation that it generated in the 
1980s led to the devastation of the economy and to rural and urban poverty. 
The development of the petroleum industry and its emergence as a major 
revenue earner for Nigeria was perhaps the most profound structural change 
that shaped the countryside from the 1970s onward. As petroleum became 
a major source of state revenue, the agricultural orientation of both the gov-
ernment and rural communities was faced with powerful trends that drew 
both the population and the state away from agriculture. The intermittent 
attempts to reverse these trends have not been successful. 
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The sTaTe aT TempT To Come To The resCue 
Given the declining contribution of agriculture to the national economy at 
the end of the Second National Development Plan period, the Yakubu Gowon 
administration (1966–75) recognized that dependence on oil led to economic 
vulnerability. For this reason, agriculture received high priority during the 
Third National Development Plan period, 1975–80.191 About 57 per cent of the 
allocation to agriculture remained unspent in the previous development plan, 
and the Gowon administration interpreted this as indicative of a fundamental 
defect in the design and implementation of agricultural programs. The gross 
under-spending of the allocation to primary production revealed fundamental 
problems in the implementation of agricultural programs at the federal level. 
A substantial part of the remaining money was allocated to government 
projects such as farm settlements, irrigation schemes, and plantation projects 
for cash crop production. The new plan also recognized the need to check 
rural-urban migration through a balanced development agenda for both the 
rural and the urban sectors, but the continued expansion of the oil sector 
and the opportunities it provided for employment and trade continued to un-
dermine the agricultural sector. No direct support was provided for peasant 
farmers, who contributed over 95 per cent of both the export and domestic 
productions. The government’s support for farmers in the form of credits 
went to a few commercial farmers and bureaucrats disguised as farmers. 
Under these conditions, many peasants abandoned their farms to seek other 
forms of employment. 
The major intervention to deal with the agricultural crisis in the country 
came in 1976, when the Olusegun Obasanjo administration launched the 
Operation Feed the Nation (OFN) program. The objectives of the OFN pro-
gram included the mobilization of the nation toward self-sufficiency and self-
reliance in food production. However, these objectives were not achieved. The 
program collapsed for various administrative and logistical reasons. Political 
expediency inhibited its successful implementation. As a program designed 
to make fertilizers, in particular, available to farmers through the various 
state ministries of agriculture, the scheme faced many logistical problems. 
Fertilizers often arrived so late in some areas that they could not be applied to 
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crops. Storage facilities provided under the program were grossly inadequate. 
In many cases, bureaucrats hijacked the fertilizers and tried to resell them to 
peasant farmers at prices that many could not afford.192 Unfortunately, the 
OFN did not target the peasants who had been the backbone of the country’s 
agricultural production. The political elite usurped the gains that could have 
been made. Because the government did not deal directly with peasants, the 
peasants did not comply with the wishes of the government. All this needs 
to be seen against the massive importation of food by the end of the OFN 
program in 1979.193 
The government also intervened in the customary land tenure systems 
in Nigeria through the implementation of the Land Use Decree in 1978.194 
The decree sought to eliminate the problems associated with traditional land 
tenure systems.195 It also aimed to create a uniform tenure system and to 
eliminate any tenure arrangements that inhibited large-scale agricultural 
development.196 Farming became the favourite part-time occupation for the 
military elite. The decree created opportunities for the military and bureau-
cratic elite to take land from peasants. It vested authority over land in the gov-
ernor of each state. Although most rural areas remained relatively unaffected 
by the decree, communities located on the periphery of urban centres lost 
their land to urban development, with peasants continuing to be squeezed off 
their land as the cities expanded their housing and industrial projects. 
The creation of new states in 1976 was accompanied by more reforms 
at the state level. Like their predecessors, the new states continued to attach 
a great deal of importance to agriculture. At the top of the policy-making 
apparatus was the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources. One of 
the most important projects for agricultural development in Nigeria was the 
setting up of agricultural development programs (ADPs). The ADPs, which 
started in 1974, were federal programs implemented at the state level. These 
corporations were charged with the production and processing of agricultural 
products.197 In Imo State, for example, the ADP produced maize, cassava, and 
horticultural crops, including citrus and pineapple, all of which had become 
highly commercialized.198 The ADP also engaged in export crop production. 
The responsibility of the ADP was to cater to the needs of the small-scale 
farmers. However, Gavin Williams has noted that the benefits “accrued to 
the rich rather than the poor,” and that “some projects have excluded the 
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poor from access to productive resources and redistributed the assets and 
incomes to the rich.”199 These projects included oil palm projects at Ohaji, 
Ozuitem, Nkporo, and Ulonna North and South, and rubber plantations at 
Obitti, Emeabiam, Ameke Abam, and Ndioji Abam. 
The corporation’s projects did not revolutionize agriculture in the region. 
The commission of inquiry set up to review the activities of the ADP in 1980 
found that the cashew plantation at Mbala was unprofitable as an economic 
venture.200 Only 10 per cent of 4,092 hectares of mature rubber were being 
tapped in 1980. The oil palm development projects did not increase overall 
production from the region. The Pioneer Oil Mills (POM), located in Imo 
State, for example, could not break even. The commission of inquiry set up 
to examine the activities of the project observed that “the project cannot be 
a viable venture because of its structural rigidity, paucity of palm fruit supply 
and the salary/wage bill that has been too heavy for the small volume of busi-
ness the POM handles.”201 The food crop project, which was fully funded by 
the state, did not fare better than earlier projects. The establishment of the 
rice project at Ugwueke, the Commission of Inquiry argued, did not lead to 
profits because it appeared to be “politically motivated.”202 
The Fourth National Development Plan, 1981–85, sought to expand lo-
cal food production and the production of basic raw materials for industries 
under President Shehu Shagari’s Green Revolution program launched in May 
1980. The Green Revolution program called for an accelerated increase in 
agricultural production through the removal of the constraints to increased 
production and the provision of agricultural input and extension services to 
farmers.203 The government established eleven river basin development au-
thorities and nine integrated agricultural development projects. The projects 
were attempts to increase the production of rice, sugarcane, millet, sorghum, 
maize, wheat, cassava, and yams. The irrigation policy aimed to develop a 
system of multiple cropping in the northern arid zones of minimal annual 
rainfall. While the government allocated the substantial amount of 8.828 
billion naira to agriculture in this plan period, the legacy of incompetent 
management, corruption, nepotism, and lack of adequate feasibility studies 
hampered the chances of success.204 Like the OFN, the Green Revolution 
program ignored rural farmers and the program achieved very little due 
to weak and corrupt leadership.205 The government’s “quick fix” attitude 
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toward agriculture did not reflect its overall development ideology of rural 
development. The inherent contradiction in the state-peasant relationship 
was reflected in the failure to provide farmers with adequate incentives and 
support to permit the widespread adoption of improved techniques.206 
Huge agricultural projects and schemes generally did not succeed, and 
irrigation projects in particular did not revolutionize agriculture or increase 
food production. Government incentives benefited only commercial farmers, 
who often diverted agricultural credits to other uses.207 In addition, the loca-
tion of agricultural projects was often politically motivated. For example, the 
building of irrigation projects in parts of northern Nigeria was motivated by 
the need to distribute the benefits of the oil boom of the late 1970s.208 
Overall, the decades after the civil war were landmark years for many 
rural dwellers. The peasant class largely disappeared from the southeastern 
Nigerian agrarian scene during the period after the end of the war. Despite 
the increased involvement of the state in agriculture, rural peasants did not 
respond favourably. In Imo State, for example, the total area under cultivation 
fell from 203,000 hectares in 1976 to 52,000 in 1981, representing an annual 
decline of 32 per cent. The output of yams in 1981 was 22,000 tons, repre-
senting a 39 per cent decrease from the 1976 output. Likewise, the output of 
cassava fell by 78 per cent between 1976 and 1981.209 On the individual level, 
it was difficult to rebuild decimated Igbo villages and the rural economy after 
the civil war. Poverty struck all parts of Igboland, but it was worse in central 
Igboland with its high population and land scarcity. 
The 1960s were years of optimism for many African societies in both 
political and economic terms. This certainly was the case for Igbo society. 
However, by the 1970s, the euphoria of the early years of independence had 
turned to frustration. The agricultural revolution of the Okpara government 
had not borne much fruit before the Nigeria civil war broke out in 1967. The 
war changed Igboland and its economy irrevocably. Furthermore, the expan-
sion of the petroleum industry changed the economic landscape fundamen-
tally. The massive infrastructural development in the urban sectors with no 
corresponding development in the rural areas exacerbated the crisis already 
faced by rural dwellers. The government’s reforms in agriculture were a brutal 
failure as the problem of agrarian opportunities that they tried to address was 
exacerbated as inequality grew. The structural changes that emerged because 
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of the war undermined the institutions and practices that governed the local 
community, including agricultural practices and labour arrangements, and 
eroded rural identity. While the demand for palm oil continued within the 
domestic economy, the returns from sales have not kept up with the massive 
rise in the cost of living. This has left the rural population poorer, despite the 
rise in real income since the 1980s. As before, the greatest asset of the rural 
population has been their resilience in the face of major crises in the rural 
economy. The final chapter in this book sorts through the spirited attempts 
to deal with the crisis that seemed to engulf the rural population in the 1970s 
and 1980s, putting the events of these years in historical perspective. 
T h e l a n d h a s Ch a n ged 242 
 
    
   
          
           
        
      
            
         
            
            
           
           
           
           
            
            
             
    
         
          
                 
            
           
ChapTer seven 
O n T h e B R I n k : a g R I C u LT u R a L
C R I s I s a n d R u R a L s u R V I Va L 
When both the identity of self and of community becomes in-
distinguishable from that of the land and its fabric of life, adapta-
tion follows almost instinctively, like a pronghorn moving through 
sagebrush. – Donald Worster, Dust Bowl, 164 
By the end of the 1980s, low agricultural productivity, food insecurity, and en-
vironmental degradation became apparent in many parts of Igboland. Indeed, 
most of central Igboland struggled to feed a growing population on a dimin-
ishing area of farmland under the impact of years of neglect of agriculture 
in favour of a national economy dependent on the petroleum industry. These 
trends threatened the ability of farmers to increase productivity and to prac-
tice sustainable agriculture.1 The crisis in the rural areas forced many rural 
dwellers to rethink the approach to their livelihood and survival strategies.2 
This chapter goes beyond the focus in the colonial and early post-colonial pe-
riods to outline the condition of agriculture since the 1980s and to examine 
the way in which the Igbo, especially in central Igboland, have sought to deal 
with issues of livelihood historically. 
Although Nigeria experienced a degree of prosperity from oil revenue 
before the mid-1980s, this prosperity was short-lived. The dramatic fall in 
oil prices from more than $35 a barrel in 1980 to as low as $10 per barrel in 
1986 affected the economy at all levels.3 The changing fortunes of the state 
affected the rural economies as the country faced a recession and increased 
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debt burden. The introduction of painful austerity measures culminated in 
the implementation of World Bank and International Monetary Fund mac-
roeconomic policies in the form of a structural adjustment program (SAP) by 
the Ibrahim Babangida administration in 1986. The aim of the SAP was debt 
recovery in the short term and poverty reduction through economic growth 
in the long term. The liberalization of the economy involved the elimina-
tion of stimulus programs, abolition of subsidies, reduction in price control, 
export promotion, devaluation of the currency, privatization of state owned 
industries, and reduction in public spending. 
The structural adjustment program affected rural life. It led to an increase 
in rural poverty and in the prices of all necessities of life. Although the cost of 
living increased enormously, real wages actually fell under the SAP and mas-
sive lay-offs of workers and overall economic problems followed. Household 
consumption data collected between 1980 and 1996 and agricultural census 
information collected in 1993 and 1994 show an increasing level of poverty in 
the agricultural sector.4 In the mid-1990s, about 67 million people, or about 
65 per cent of the population, were identified as poor. A poverty assessment 
(PA) study carried out in parts of Nigeria revealed that 87 per cent of the core 
poor in 1985 were members of rural agricultural households.5 
Raluca and John Polimeni’s study of the impact of the globalizing trends 
of the 1980s on Igbo society show that the restructuring of the public sector 
diminished the capacity of rural people to cope, even through traditional in-
stitutions, including the extended family, attempted to help communities to 
“maintain cultural traditions.”6 Eugenia Otuonye, a rural dweller and mother 
of five children, reflected on the impact of the SAP era: “We have not had a 
good life since the government brought ota na isi [knock on the head]; life is 
much harder than words can describe.”7 A school teacher recalled how she 
embarked on backyard farming to help sustain her family. The case of Isidore, 
who lost his job as a construction worker in a Port Harcourt shipyard, was 
not an isolated case. “I have never held another paid job since I left Port Har-
court in 1989, and it has been a struggle to support my family.”8 Many young 
people faced similar uncertainties and experiences. Ota na isi as a metaphor 
for hardship became part of the political and economic discourse for many 
rural dwellers. Songs reflected the hardship of the era. 
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At the state levels, government agencies encouraged farmers to diver-
sify, with emphasis on food production. The federal and state governments 
throughout Nigeria, with the support of the World Bank, set up the Acceler-
ated Development Agricultural Programs (ADAPs). This was the outcome 
of the Nigeria Food Strategies Mission, which had been concerned with the 
deterioration of the food situation in the country.9 The Imo State Acceler-
ated Development Agricultural Program (ISADAP), which covered most of 
central Igboland, was established in September 1982 to capitalize on the food 
production functions of the Ministry of Agriculture and, at the same time, 
minimize the protracted problem of red tape in public sector activities. The 
reduction of government’s hold on the operational mechanism of ISADAP 
was a tacit acceptance of the constraints that state interventions had imposed 
on agricultural development in the past. 
The first three years of ISADAP witnessed improvements in extension 
and agronomy services. These involved about 707,983 farming families in 
Imo State, from whom 28,077 contact farmers were selected.10 The program 
also embarked on the provision of high-yield cassava cuttings and seed yams 
to farmers. While this represented an improvement on past years, only 380 
extension agents were provided, a very small number in relation to the num-
ber of farmers in the region. However, the production data from ISADAP 
in 1983 showed an improvement in food production. The total area under 
cultivation went up from 52,000 hectares in 1981 to 88,000 hectares in 1983. 
With an estimated increase of 16 per cent in cultivated area for 1984, ISADAP 
appeared to be the only state-owned agricultural project that made some 
gains. Cassava output in 1983 was 293,000 metric tons. This represented a 24 
per cent increase over the 1977 figures. Rice production increased from 5,000 
metric tons between 1980 and 1983 to 55,000 metric tons in 1985. The prices 
of major food items, including yams and gari, fell by between 29 and 52 per 
cent in different towns in the state.11 
ISADAP made some gains, but the fall in staple food prices may not have 
been directly related to its activities. The crisis of the 1980s brought both the 
rural and urban population face to face with a major rise in the cost of liv-
ing. Both rural and urban dwellers adopted a self-help strategy of producing 
more of their own food. In many Igbo households, the proverb, aka aja aja 
wetara onu nmanu nmanu (it is the soiling of the hands that brings about 
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the oiling of the mouth), came to be strictly applied in daily living. Open 
spaces in towns and backyards were suddenly converted to farms. The general 
economic decline in the country compelled many rural and urban dwellers to 
engage in some production. 
Yet these gains did not translate into an overall improvement in agricul-
ture. Government programs remained largely inefficient while rural farmers 
did not always respond favourably or put government advice into effect. In 
fact, the total area under cultivation had fallen over the longer term, from 
203,000 hectares in 1976 to 52,000 in 1981 in Imo State, representing an an-
nual decline of 32 per cent.12 The output of yams in 1981 was 22,000 tons, 
representing a 39 per cent decrease from the 1976 output. Likewise, the out-
put of cassava had also fallen by 78 per cent between 1976 and 1981. While 
these data may not be very reliable, they indicate an increasing crisis in the 
rural sector. 
The ADAP programs did not produce any significant change in the 
gendered pattern of previous policies. Women were ignored as independent 
farmers. The perception of women as “homemakers” excluded them from 
agricultural credits and other forms of support for farmers. The home eco-
nomics centres proposed by the federal government under the ADAP scheme 
focused on nutritional education for rural women.13 Moreover, women’s in-
ability to provide collateral such as land worked against them in obtaining 
credits and loans under the program.14 
Rural life continued to go through a severe crisis, despite attempts to 
revitalize agriculture. In most of Igboland, where the average holding had 
declined considerably, the economic opportunities provided by agricultural 
pursuits offered rural dwellers little relief. The average farm size in most of 
Igboland in 1974 was under 0.10 hectare per household. Only 5 per cent had 
between 2 and 3.99 hectares, which represented the largest holdings.15 It was 
the emphasis on the non-agricultural sector that often ameliorated the effect 
of agricultural decline on rural dwellers. 
While these problems persisted, the expanding urban sector demanded 
semi-skilled labour for the construction industry and other service sector 
jobs. This development was important in two ways for the Igbo countryside, 
which experienced a population growth rate of over 3.0 per cent but produced 
few jobs. First, the Igbo responded to the urban economic growth and the 
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Table 7.1. average size of farm and holding, 1984–85. 






























anambra 565 1,363 137 2.41 0.25 0.10 
imo 634 1,529 109 2.41 0.18 0.07 
national 6,066 12,141 6,608 2.00 1.14 0.57 
average 
Source: rural Agricultural Sample Survey, 1984/85, 1985/86 (lagos: federal office of statistics, 
1990), 16. 
opportunities it afforded them. It was by diversifying household incomes that 
the Igbo were able to deal with decreasing land and low productivity in ru-
ral agriculture. Second, the expansion that occurred in the petroleum sector 
stimulated new forms of economic activities outside agriculture, especially 
an expansion in the service sector and a booming supply business.16 Oth-
ers leased land as absentee farmers in areas such as Ohaji and Egbema and 
hired labour to produce cassava. But this was not the story of the majority 
of the population, who continued to struggle and to adapt to the changing 
landscape of rural Igboland. 
Given the role that migration and the adoption of crops such as cassava 
have played in recent years, the rest of this chapter will examine the resil-
iency of the rural population, the changing cropping patterns, and how many 
have coped with the changing rural landscape through migration. How these 
changing livelihood strategies have affected rural identity and rural gender 
roles will be examined. 
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ConTinuiT y and Change in rur al life 
The ability of rural Igbo, like many Africans, to eke out a living in the face 
of economic adversities beyond their control is remarkable. Even after all the 
structural changes that have occurred, a large portion of the Igbo population 
has remained in the rural areas. Igbo tenacity can be linked to a sense of place 
that comes from having a link with the land – ala – even as survival strategies 
have shifted enormously from dependency on farming to dependency on a 
variety of non-farm income-generating activities, including wage labour and 
migration. This sense of place defines rural adaptation in ways that reflect the 
important link between the land, farming, individuals, and group identity. 
Two conditions have influenced the way in which people have responded 
to the conditions in the rural economy: The first is the tendency for some ru-
ral dwellers to reinvest excess income in other income-generating activities. 
The second is what Bongo Adi identifies as the push factor. Here, some rural 
dwellers have no option but to diversify in response to declining agricultural 
productivity, land scarcity, and population pressure.17 Bryceson has argued 
that the attempt to eke out a living in some rural economies has led to de-
agrarianization, in which most rural farmers shift away from agriculture to 
non-agricultural income-generating activities. 
Most of central Igboland have exhibited such tendencies since the 1970s. 
The scarcity of land, poor soil, and population pressure has made diversifica-
tion inevitable for communities such as Mbaise, Mbano, Etiti, and others in 
central Igboland. Nwanyiafo Obasis, a rural farmer in Mbaise, explains: “We 
combine farming and trading in order to survive. If one is a trader with-
out a farm, one is taking a risk because the market could fail.”18 In Nguru, 
Mbaise, since the 1970s, Adi found that poor soil, scarcity of farmland and 
a very high population density has left the people “little option but to move 
away from agriculture as a significant source of income.”19 Here, as in other 
parts of Mbaise, the number of landless people has increased significantly 
while fallow periods have been eliminated altogether. The significant shift 
to non-agricultural activities came in response to the crisis in agriculture, 
and people responded to both the internal and external structural changes 
through their social institutions. According to Eugenia Otuonye, “We are left 
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with no option but to do other things in order to survive. I sell akara [bean 
cake] and do other odd jobs to provide food for my children.”20 
Yet we cannot generalize about the nature of the agricultural crisis 
because conditions differ markedly even within one region. While most of 
central Igboland faced a severe agricultural crisis, agriculture remained an 
important source of income for some parts of the region. Umuagwo, Ohaji, 
and Oguta have continued to engage in significant commercial and subsis-
tence food production that supports the local population as well as the urban 
population of Owerri. Here, relatively smaller population and the rich soil 
support both commercial and subsistence agriculture. Farmers’ incomes have 
remained relatively competitive because farm products have continued to at-
tract high prices due to the demand from other parts of the region and the 
urban areas. As Adi noted in a study of livelihood in Umuagwo, the average 
fallow period is between five and ten years because it is relatively abundant in 
comparison to the rest of the region, where the average land holding is about 
1.2 hectares per household. Umuagwo remains a significant source of cassava 
and gari for parts of central Igboland, an important food item among the 
Igbo today. The adoptation of cassava has radically transformed the agrarian 
culture of the Igbo, their dietary habit, and rural identity, as they eat more 
cassava than the traditional favourite – yam. 
C assava people aT hearT? 
Until the mid-nineteenth century, cassava was confined to the root crop belt of 
West Africa, primarily in the lowland tropical forests.21 As noted in chapter 1, 
the Igbo were a “yam people at heart,” but this icon of Igbo agriculture, mascu-
linity, culture, and identity has been put on a back burner in Igbo agriculture. 
Indeed, since the 1970s, the Igbo can be aptly described as a “cassava people 
at heart.” The adoption of cassava, as Simon Ottenberg argues, is an impor-
tant measure of the “index of the level of change,” among the Igbo.22 Susan 
Martin has stressed the major transformations that followed the introduction 
of capitalist agriculture (palm oil exportation) and how male control of the 
product and low-priced palm oil products sometimes forced women to divert 
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their labour to cassava production. The cultivation of cassava led to changes in 
food production methods, gender, and intergenerational relationships as rural 
families confronted the agricultural crisis of later years.23 
Nevertheless, the changes began much earlier. European accounts show 
that cassava reached Onitsha about 1857.24 Recollections of rural people 
confirm that the Igbo initially looked down upon cassava. An evangelist in 
Onitsha in 1863 noted that those who grew cassava were the poor who could 
not “afford to plant yams.”25 The early rejection and skepticism were partly 
associated with the poisonous characteristics of poorly processed cassava.26 
However, it began to “defuse less tardily” during the influenza pandemic of 
1918–19.27 The First World War and the famine that followed the pandemic, 
Don Ohadike had noted, increased the importance of cassava in parts of 
Igboland. By the 1920s, Ormsby-Gore observed that cassava had become a 
major supplement to the native food crops.28 In addition, a district officer in 
Owerri described cassava as the main supplementary foodstuff. He noted that 
the average amount of cassava planted was about the same as that of yam in 
1929.29 Its importance would increase in later years. 
Cassava gained prominence in Igboland for a number of reasons. Clearly, 
it provided a suitable alternative source of cheap carbohydrate and soon 
became a famine-relief crop that alleviated the traditional hungry period 
(unwu) preceding the yam harvest. Luke Osunwole remembers: “In those 
days there was famine, usually after yams had been planted. June and July 
were the worse months. Our people would do their best to survive on cassava, 
cocoyams, and yams set aside for eating (ji njakiri) that had been stored in the 
storage house (mkpuke).”30 
Advances in the production and utilization of the cassava tuber made it 
a popular food item in the urban areas. Processed cassava in the form of gari 
became very popular among the expanding urban and working class popula-
tion, which was dependent on a cheap source of food. Morgan observed that 
cassava was a cheap, easily transported food of increasing popularity among 
the majority of the employed population and had the “advantage of harvest 
in May and June when no other fresh food is available.”31 Often referred to as 
nri okopkoro (food for spinsters/bachelors), gari was a very convenient food 
because it was very easy to prepare – by simply pouring boiled water over the 
flour to make a dough eaten with soup. 
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women preparing gari at a government agricultural development Center, c. 1960s. (repro-
duced from the library of the national archives, enugu.) 
Soon, gari become an important item of trade. By 1938, Igbo traders were 
sending about 4,000 tons of cassava flour to the north, and by 1942, this had 
increased to over 6,000 tons of gari per annum. The trade created an oppor-
tunity for peasant farmers to increase their income.32 The Second World War 
and the high cost of imported food increased the importance of cassava as 
food for a wider population and the army. By the 1940s, it was spreading in 
areas such as Abakiliki that had relied heavily on yam production.33 
Although cassava was seen as less prestigious than yams, and therefore 
as a woman’s crop, its overall importance as a source of income for women 
increased dramatically over time. Morgan observed that cassava profoundly 
altered the economic and social relations between husbands and wives and 
fostered economic opportunities for women as it become an important source 
of cash income for them.34 Phoebe Ottenberg, who studied the Afikpo Igbo 
in the early 1950s, confirms that the introduction of cassava, considered “be-
neath the dignity of men,” was a major source of change in women’s economic 
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fortunes.35 Ottenberg states, “If a woman’s husband did not give her food, 
she was in a sorry plight; [with cassava] now it is possible for her to subsist 
without the aid of her husband.”36 Though Ottenberg’s comments were an 
uncritical characterization of women’s economic position, the crop afforded 
them opportunities for capital accumulation, self-esteem, and a higher degree 
of economic independence. “Nowadays women do not care if the husband 
doesn’t give them any food, for they can go to the farm and get cassava,” an 
elderly Afikpo women confirms. “If a woman has any money she buys [rents] 
land and plants cassava. The year after she does this she can have a crop for 
cassava meal, which she can sell and have her own money. Then she can say, 
‘What is man’? I have my own money!”37 Hence, women strongly resented any 
attempt to challenge their dominance in cassava production and trade. As 
early as 1925, for example, they complained about unfair male competition in 
what was regarded as women’s trade.38 
The high rate of agricultural involution from the end of the Second World 
War contributed to the apparent decline in yam cultivation and the ascen-
dancy of cassava. By the 1950s, yam was “a rich man’s food” and one that 
required substantial investment in labour and money to produce. “Cassava 
helps us to feed the family more than any other crop,” Robert Ibe said.39 Linus 
Anabalam recalls: “Unlike the past when yams and cocoyam were the main 
crops, it is not unusual to find a farmer with four or five plots under cassava 
crops alone.”40 Related to the labour question is an aging rural agricultural 
population. “What can an old man and his wife do as farmers?” Linus Ana-
balam asked, as he reflected on the labour problem. 
Cassava has no specific harvesting age and is, therefore, a convenient 
crop when alternative income-producing activities “compete for the farm-
er’s time.”41 Given the greater labour involved in yam cultivation, Morgan 
observed, “more money may be obtained from the growth of cheaper cas-
sava sold in Aba Township or sent in the form of gari to Port Harcourt and 
Calabar Province.”42 Significant focus shifted to cassava production because 
it required less labour. The ease of transporting food of increasing popularity 
among the majority of the employed population, the advantage of a harvest 
in May and June when no other fresh food is available, and the ability to pro-
duce cassava on land with short fallows resulted in the expansion of cassava 
growing at the expense of yams.43 While many in the rural areas adapted to 
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the changing agrarian landscape, others, especially the younger population, 
migrated in search of better opportunities. 
migr aTion and rur al livelihood 
Migration from the Igbo region typically occurred because of demographic 
and geographical conditions and the pressure on available agricultural land.44 
A disproportionately higher percentage of Igbo migrants came from the 
densely populated central region than from elsewhere.45 References to popula-
tion pressure found in missionary letters and travellers’ journals suggest that 
the size of the population was already an economic problem by the end of the 
nineteenth century. A missionary from the Owerri region reported in 1866 that 
“population is so great that if they hear we shall want carriers, they come in 
great numbers begging to be used, even during the farming season.”46 Thomas 
Northcote linked the poor quality of the soil, the shortage of land, poverty, 
and subsistence insecurity in the region in the early twentieth century. Signifi-
cant labour migration from the barren lands of the Onitsha-Awka axis to more 
favoured regions already existed by this time.47 As Kenneth Dike confirms, 
“The density of population which was and still is a main feature of the I[g]bo 
country.… Hence the I[g]bos pressing against limited land resources had, of 
necessity to seek other avenues of livelihood outside.”48 
Like Dike, Simon Ottenberg observed that poor soil incapable of sup-
porting more than subsistence agriculture was a major factor that forced 
the Igbo to seek sources of livelihood elsewhere.49 R. K. Udo, writing about 
Eastern Nigeria, paints a picture of densely populated areas like Mbaise and 
Awka from which people were forced to migrate as tenant farmers even before 
the colonial era.50 British anthropologist Sylvia Leith-Ross described Nguru 
Mbaise, in central Igboland in 1935, in these words: 
The over-population of this area is well known, with its 
consequent land and, possibly, food shortages. I saw it at its 
poorest time, when last season’s yams were finished, and only 
a few of the new season’s (women’s) yams were ready to be dug. 
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The population depended on cassava and cocoyam and a small 
amount of very poor corn for its daily food. The over farmed 
land produced smaller and smaller crops.51 
Emmanuel Ude recorded that land scarcity in Mgbowo forced the people to 
migrate to other parts of Igboland such as Ezioha, Inyi, and Ndeaboh by the 
beginning of the nineteenth century.52 Similar observations were made by 
Ikenna Nzimoro about the Awka, who migrated as squatter farmers to other 
parts of Igboland because of poor soil. Poor soil in the Nnewi area, he noted, 
caused a switch from farming to trade.53 This trend also explains the migration 
into Owerri (Oratta-Ikwere), and eventually across the Imo River into Aba 
(Ngwa) and from these across the Aba River to the Aza, where the movement 
was stopped by the British conquest.54 The westward migrants settled on the 
borders of Benin (among the northern and southern Ika). To the northeast, 
they invaded the Cross River lowlands and established a frontier on the Ok-
pauku River. There the Igbo reproduced the grassland pattern of fortified 
settlements in which compounds were loosely grouped together. To the south, 
they reproduced the forest pattern of dispersal.55 
Linked to the demographic pressure in the Igbo region is the environ-
mental degradation that has become a part of the landscape in several parts 
of the Igbo country.56 Continued use of the land and human activity has led 
to a breakdown in agricultural productivity. Floyd had predicted that this 
would happen under the traditional farming methods used in the region.57 
For the 1940s, Forde and Jones estimated a population of between 600 and 
1,000 persons per square mile over much of Okigwe Division.58 A population 
of more than 1,000 persons per square mile has been recorded in northern 
Ngwa, Owerri, and Orlu.59 According to the 1963 census, the regional popu-
lation density had reached more than four times the Nigerian average.60 Land 
scarcity, land degradation, and a high level of non-farm activities have been 
noticeable in areas such as Isu and Mbaise, where population density was 
over 1,000/sq. km by the middle of the twentieth century.61 The very high 
concentration of population in the Igbo region gave rise to extensive modifi-
cation of the natural environment and exposed the soil in many parts of the 
region to leaching and erosion. 
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The pressure on the land is reflected in internal migration rates as well 
as migration out of the region. Many men from the over-populated parts of 
Igboland were forced to work as migrant farmers on the lands of others. Ac-
curate figures for these moves are not obtainable, but from oral sources, it can 
be seen that certain area such as Okigwe, Obigbo, and Etche attracted tenant 
farmers and labourers from the more crowded areas of Mbaise, Owerri, Mba-
no, and Etiti, among others. Charles Takes, who carried out rural sociological 
research in the Okigwe Division of Owerri Province in 1962, noted that there 
were considerable differences in density. The population in the area north of 
Okigwe Township still contained virgin land available for cultivation. In the 
southern part of the division, however, towns such as Mbano and Etiti faced 
extreme scarcity of land, such that many people no longer found a living in 
agriculture.62 Luke Osunwoke of Umuorlu recalls: “Our people went outside 
the community to look for food. They lacked sufficient land and there were 
no thick forests. So they often migrated to Elele, Ahaoda, and Ikwerre where 
they worked as agricultural laborers.”63 The members of the Nguru clan of 
Mbaise, struggling with the demands of an expanding population on leached, 
eroding land, supplemented their income by working as migrant labourers 
for the Etche clan.64 Some parts of eastern and western Nigeria have served as 
recipients of Igbo migrants from the less agriculturally favourable areas such 
as Awka, Owerri, Mbaise, Isu, Mbano, and Obowo, who have relentlessly 
sought ways to improve their lives through migration. For the Mbaise Igbo 
in general, high population density and increased intensification became the 
only way out of their economic problems. Many migrated as tenant and sea-
sonal farmers within and outside the region. According to Isichei, the Ezza, 
who had ample land, performed herculean feats of industry on their own yam 
farms and then travelled west to toil on the farms of others.65 
The land tenure system, which led to progressive fragmentation of farm-
land and to primogeniture, made life in rural areas difficult.66 By the 1950s, 
fallow periods had been significantly reduced in many part of central Igbo-
land such as Mbaise, Mbano, Obowo, and Etiti.67 The fragmentation of land 
holdings resulting from the land tenure system made agriculture frustrating 
and inefficient and prompted many young men to migrate. Stanley Diamond 
explains the pull and push factors in Igbo migration: 
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Population pressure and land scarcity remained the most im-
portant determinants of migration. Population pressure on dete-
riorating forestlands (1,000 plus per square mile) in, for example, 
Owerri Province at the heart of the Eastern Region, had, in con-
junction with the social character of the I[g]bo, led to a continuous 
migration of I[g]bo to all regions of Nigeria; the largest number 
of migrants, of course, found their way north since the Region so 
designated represents three-quarters of the country. Moreover, 
the educational level of I[g]bo was higher than that of the average 
Northerner, enabling them to get jobs in the civil service, trading, 
[and] utilities. Nigeria becomes, in effect, an I[g]bo Diaspora.68 
The population of Igboland has increased progressively. Part of what constitut-
ed Owerri Province (in Imo and Abia States) now has an estimated population 
of over 6.8 million according to the 2006 population census of Nigeria.69 This 
population explosion has meant unprecedented pressure on available land, 
considerable deterioration of the environment, and high levels of poverty. I 
have seen in my own village that even firewood and water have become com-
modities that most rural households have to pay for. This was not the case two 
decades ago. 
Colonialism had its inevitable impact on the rate of migration as improved 
communications and structural changes increased mobility and opportunity. 
Clearly, the rate of migration was caused by structural changes as well as the 
motivation of individuals, mainly men, to acquire wealth and improve their 
lives. During the early parts of the colonial period, large numbers of Igbo 
people moved out of Igboland following the development of towns and the 
expansion of the railway and roads. Many also responded to the growth and 
expansion of the trade in European goods and the public service sector, and 
the increased opportunities for economic independence.70 
The discovery of bitumen coal in Udi near Enugu in 1903 was crucial 
in the shaping of colonial policy toward this section of southeastern Nige-
ria. After geological assessments in 1903 and further tests in 1908–1909, the 
government planned a railway to the seaport at Port Harcourt to facilitate 
the evacuation of coal and other resources from the region. This southern 
railway, which joined the northern one, reached Makurdi in 1910 and reached 
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its terminus at Oturkpo in the Benue area in the following year. Owerri Prov-
ince supplied Port Harcourt, the colliery, and the brickfields with a large 
number of labourers. The railway, which linked up other eastern towns such 
as Umuahia, Omoba, and Aba, facilitated the evacuation of palm products 
to the coast. Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, the railway 
remained the most effective mode of transport, hauling almost all of Nigeria’s 
foreign trade traffic. It was only after the extension of infrastructure by the 
colonial state (railways, creek clearing) that European firms seriously began 
building up hinterland stations.71 
Railways and road construction accelerated the rate of agricultural out-
put and stimulated market opportunities, and administrative reorganization 
and the introduction of rudimentary technology and research in agriculture 
motivated and sustained local interest in production. A unique “rail culture,” 
marked by the growth of retail and service sectors dominated by women food 
vendors, developed along the railroads. Developments in transportation in 
turn led to the rise of cities and urban areas as trading centres where the 
raw materials produced by the local people were exchanged for European 
manufactured goods.72 These developments created an increasingly mobile 
Igbo population that swelled the emerging colonial cities and commercial 
centres. Gradually, inland transport and port facilities were developed, and 
banking and other financial institutions were organized to facilitate the ever-
increasing use of a single modern currency as the means of exchange over all 
of Nigeria.73 
The Great Depression of the late 1920s and early 1930s exacerbated the 
migration from the oil-palm-producing areas, which had been accustomed 
to cash incomes.74 Local people were severely affected by the fall in the price 
of palm oil and kernels. Low returns from export crops and the general eco-
nomic decline forced many rural dwellers to seek their fortune elsewhere. 
As Jones observed, “the depression of the palm oil trade and the lack of any 
alternative exports stimulated the drive towards migrant labour,” despite the 
attempt by the government and commercial agencies to improve palm oil 
cultivation and local systems of agriculture.75 
The introduction of taxation in late 1927 created problems for young 
adult males who could not meet their tax and other needs from the resources 
available in the rural areas. Taxation forced many young men to respond to 
7: on The brink: agriCulTural Crisis and rural survival 257 
opportunities in the expanding cocoa industry in the West and the rubber 
and timber industry in the mid-west. Migrants’ income became the major 
source of cash for the payment of income tax, for marriage, education, the 
building of homes, and support for family members, especially the elderly. 
This trend was already visible by the late 1930s. Sylvia Leith-Ross was told 
during a visit to [E]Inyiogugu village, Mbaise in 1935, that “about a hundred 
young men had migrated, during recent times, to Oluko in Umuneke Court 
area, ‘where there is plenty of good land and the people do not mind,’” where 
they have “settled for good as farmers.”76 Harris’s study of the economy of six-
teen persons among the Ozuitem Igbo shows that off-farm sources of income 
including remittance contributed substantially to the total annual income 
of these individuals in 1939.77 Although income from outside was changing 
rural lifestyles and occupations irrevocably, Linus Anabalam remarked: 
The migration of men and young men and women also placed a 
heavy burden on women and the elderly as the expansion of West-
ern education and opportunities for work in the public service 
led to a dramatic exodus of young educated people from the rural 
areas in search of white-collar jobs.78 
Urban towns drew a large Igbo population, including traders who became 
very active throughout the country. It is estimated that the Igbo population 
in Northern Nigeria increased from 3,000 in 1921 to about 12,000 in 1931. By 
1953, the Igbo population in the North had reached an estimated 127,000. J. B. 
Davies, who worked with the United African Company (UAC) for many years 
in Northern Nigeria, remembers: 
In the early years, they formed a nucleus of the commercial staff 
of all commercial companies. They filled the clerical jobs, acted 
as depot clerks and depot buyers. They were very efficient and 
particularly hard working. During this period, they were also the 
major transporters in the north and owned most of the commer-
cial vehicles.79 
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Lagos alone had 32,000 of the estimated 57,000 Igbo living in Western Nige-
rian towns and villages.80 By the 1950s, the Igbo made up more than half of 
the non-indigenous population of Lagos, Benin, and the northern towns of 
Kano and Kaduna.81 A significant number of the nearly 10,000 easterners in 
the British mandate territory of Cameroon were Igbo.82 
Migration intensified after the Second World War. Linus Anabalam, 
who had migrated to Northern Nigeria in the 1940s with a group of other 
young men who worked as sawyers, recalled that many young men, some 
as young as twelve years, migrated to other regions in Nigeria. According to 
him, “We were all motivated to leave the village when we saw the returning 
soldiers, the kind of dresses they wore and their new lifestyle. You could not 
have a life like that from farming in the village.”83 Their high rate of migration 
meant that the Igbo came to dominate the civil service sector even in pre-
dominantly non-Igbo areas of the Eastern Region and Northern Nigeria. The 
domestic staff of the Calabar Catering Rest House in 1949, for example, was 
predominantly Igbo, most of them cooks, stewards, and houseboys.84 Others, 
including a large number of Igbo ex-servicemen, worked in the rubber estates 
in the Calabar District. A petition by ex-servicemen to the district officer for 
Calabar seeking payment of bonuses was signed by a predominantly Igbo 
group. Over 80 per cent of the 59 petitioners were Igbo, an indication of their 
overwhelming numbers in other parts of the region.85 
The report of a commission of inquiry set up to look into the affairs of 
the formers Eastern Nigeria Development Corporation Plantations found in 
1968 that only 27 of the 300 senior staff came from Calabar Province where 
the plantations were located. The overwhelming majority were Igbo who were 
viewed as non-indigenes.86 The report further noted: 
In so far as the functional administration of the former ENDC 
was concerned, the supreme authority rested with a single execu-
tive who was stationed at Enugu with his senior staff, mostly Ibos, 
spread out to all the plantations. The result was that senior and 
junior posts including labour were filled by their kith and kin. It 
therefore became impossible to give effective participation to the 
indigenes of the areas where the plantations were situated.87 
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The situation left the plantations with a labour crisis when the Igbos left dur-
ing the civil war – a vacuum that the indigenes were unable to fill. The effects 
of large-scale migration of the Igbo have thus been a source of conflict with 
their neighbours as much as an avenue to survival in what has been a difficult 
economic environment. 
Igbo migration escalated beyond the confines of Nigeria in the 1940s. 
British-administered southern Cameroon attracted a significant Igbo popu-
lation when Britain inherited the territory as a mandate colony after the First 
World War.88 Cameroonian towns such as Kumba, Tiko, and Victoria had a 
large Igbo population, most of whom were engaged in small-scale distributive 
trade in foodstuffs and imported goods. The migration of the Igbo into the 
territory was encouraged by the British to relieve the Igbo region of its very 
high population.89 
A large number of Igbo people responded to the opportunities created by 
dwindling labour in Spanish plantations on the island of Fernando Po.90 The 
decline in the indigenous Bubi population by the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century forced plantation owners to look elsewhere for labour. The 
island’s palm oil and cocoa plantations become a strong attraction for a large 
population of Igbo people. Thousands more migrated after the Spanish gov-
ernment of Fernando Po and Rio Muni concluded a labour agreement in 1942 
with British Nigeria for the recruitment of Nigerian labourers. The agreement 
was also meant to check the illegal recruitment of labour from Nigeria as well 
as regulate the conditions of service for Nigerian migrants in a place that had 
a reputation for its harsh working conditions. According to the 1944 report of 
the Nigerian Labor Department, the labour agreement sought to regularize 
what had become “a large scale traffic in laborers and to endeavor to eliminate 
the unscrupulous native ‘black birder’ who earned a lucrative livelihood by 
kidnapping the ignorant peasants from the Ibo and Ibibio areas.”91 
The propaganda encouraging people to migrate to Fernando Po for work 
came from the government, churches, friends, and relatives. Many men mi-
grated to “improve their lives,” recalled Udochukwu, a former migrant.92 Al-
though many had migrated to better their lives, the conditions in the Spanish 
plantations did not create an opportunity for accumulation. Wages were very 
low and many migrants were afflicted by disease and poverty. Yet, the num-
ber of migrants swelled. In 1961, there were around 4,000 Spaniards, 10,000 
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indigenous people – the Bubis – and over 50,000 Nigerians working on the 
cocoa plantations.93 Their number had increased to about 85,000 by the mid-
1960s, with Igbo, Ibibio, and Efik comprising two-thirds of the island’s popu-
lation.94 This agreement remained in force after the independence of both 
countries in the 1960s. 
While the Anglo-Spanish Employment Agency at Calabar recruited only 
men aged 18 to 45, some women migrated to the islands as wives, while a few 
more, mostly widows, went on their own. Life for many Igbo migrants to Fer-
nando Po did not improve, as many returned more impoverished than before. 
The difficulties of plantation life and the very low wages forced some of the 
women into prostitution. Loise, a former migrant, notes that some men who 
could not deal with the hardship of plantation life “sent their wives to ‘New-
Bill,’ a public square, for prostitution.” Prostitution enabled some families to 
survive, since the Spanish government “would stop providing food items as 
was stipulated in the labor agreement, if one left the plantation.”95 
The end of the Nigerian Civil War witnessed further large-scale migra-
tion from Igboland. Approximately 90 per cent of young people regularly 
moved out of the rural areas after the war. They found the challenges of rural 
areas too great. These movements are connected to the demise of a way of life 
and are embedded in the individual and collective biographies of many men 
and women. Alban Eluwa recalls: 
You know in those days, if you did not have the money to attend 
a secondary school, your next options were to become an appren-
tice of some sort or move to the city sometimes with no specific 
aim. You had to leave when your mates had all left the village.96 
Onyegbule Korieh, a former migrant, recalls, “When I arrived at Obigbo in 
1973, I found that there was money to be made from selling gari and part-time 
farming. I could make enough money out there to feed my family well and 
send my son to a secondary school in 1973.”97 For many men like Alban and 
Onyegbule, survival in the rural areas had become a thing of the past due 
to the devastating impact of the civil war. Alban summed up the dilemma 
young people faced: “As a young man, if you stay in the village here, people 
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will always suspect you when a neighbor’s chicken is missing. We had to seek 
opportunities to survive by leaving the village.”98 
Overall, the migratory pattern that emerged in Igboland was a response 
to the economic, ecological, and demographic factors in different parts of the 
region. Migration has given the Igbo an edge in small retail trade in the urban 
and rural areas throughout Nigeria and beyond, where they have operated 
retail shops or worked as artisans. While some elderly folks interpret the ab-
sence of young people from farm work as an “unwillingness of young people 
to cultivate the land,” the cash income generated outside Igboland has helped 
to transform many Igbo societies and provided an alternative income that 
supported a rapidly disappearing rural agrarian society. Remittance has also 
increased local purchasing power and the ability of elderly men and women 
to hire labour for farm work. Onyegbule Korieh explains: “Many of us depend 
on money remitted by our children to survive today. The rural area is very 
‘dry.’”99 Such remittances into Igboland have contributed to the economic 
advancement of individuals, households, and entire Igbo communities. In-
deed the changing rural life, social expectation, support of the elderly, and 
demands of the extended family system force young men and women to find 
quicker and more “honourable” ways of earning cash than farming. This 
pattern has transformed the rural landscape and further reduced the values 
attached to agriculture. 
migr aTion, hosT CommuniTies, and new 
idenTiT y 
The migration trend has continued in recent times and most households have 
migrants living elsewhere. However, the host communities did not always 
welcome the Igbo. Indeed, their presence, even in other parts of southeastern 
Nigeria, often angered locals who resented what they perceived as Igbo aggres-
sive tactics. J. B. Davies, an agent of the United African Company in Northern 
Nigeria, recalls: 
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There was always a certain amount of animosity. I think it went 
right back to the early years. When I first went to Nigeria in the 
1930’s practically every single commercial employer was other 
than Hausa, they were mainly I[g]bo’s and Yoruba’s. Practically 
every artisan was a westerner or easterner, and in the Public Works 
Dept of the native authorities, practically all the road labour were 
Ibo. This worked well for a time, but once the Hausa started to feel 
his feet and wanted to get on, wanted to start learning, wanted to 
earn money, wanted to get out of his farm and move into other 
fields, then he found he was blocked. He found that easterners and 
westerners were very happy and quite content to block him.… I 
think this was one of the things that tended to create a big rift be-
tween the northerner and the southerner.100 
In Southern Cameroons, the Igbo dominated public sector employment, 
trade, and education until the plebiscite of 1961, when the region voted to join 
Cameroon. There was the notion that the Igbo would unquestionably continue 
to dominate the local population if the region became part of Nigeria.101 The 
Igbo fear-factor was a political and economic reality in the Southern Cam-
eroons from the early 1950s among the indigenous population. Sera Wil-
liams, daughter of Manga Williams, who was then king of the Victoria area, 
campaigned seriously from the early 1950s for “Southern Cameroons” to join 
the rest of Cameroon. She is reported to have once demanded from a crowd: 
“Any woman wey Igboman never slapa’am for this market place, make e-put 
ye hand for up!” No hand was raised in response to her question asking any 
woman in the crowd who had not been slapped by an Igbo man in the market 
to raise her hand.102 W. A. Robinson, British plebiscite administrator, remem-
bers the “obvious distrust of Nigerians and in particular of the I[g]bos who 
were numerous in the frontier areas.”103 Similar hostility to the Igbo was found 
in Fernando Po, leading to the expulsion of 40,000 Nigerians, mostly Igbo, 
from the island in 1975 during Macias Nguema’s rule. 
New forms of ethnic consciousness and identity often emerged among 
the Igbo in diaspora communities. But the development of ethnic conscious-
ness or identity is not automatic. Such developments occur in a particular 
context and are influenced by the receiving community’s view of the migrant 
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community. Once outside the homeland, a greater sense of cohesion, coop-
eration, and identification, at least based on a common language and experi-
ence, emerges in response to particular ecological and contextual factors. For 
the same reason, attitudes toward immigrant populations have often been 
informed by attempts to protect individual and group interests as host com-
munities perceive their own survival as threatened. Both the perceived threat 
to the host community and the confrontational attitude toward the immi-
grant community gives rise to new senses of identity, often conflict-driven. 
The Igbo responded to the contestation for resources with the host com-
munity by forging a new sense of community in the spirit of igwe bu ike (there 
is strength in numbers). This sense of community led to the formation of 
what have been described as “home associations” within the Igbo diaspora 
communities. G. I. Jones notes: 
The greatest advantage possessed by migrants from the I[g]bo 
area, whether these were traders, craftsmen, labourers or in supe-
rior employment, was their segmentary social structure and the at-
titudes derived from it, and also their traditional trading organisa-
tion. Both came to play as soon as I[g]bo moved outside their home 
neighbourhoods. On their home ground the I[g]bo were an aggre-
gation of independent towns or villages each competing and on 
guard against its neighbours. In other parts of Nigeria, the I[g]bo 
felt themselves to be a solid and united group. Anyone speaking 
the language was a fellow tribesman, a relative with whom one was 
in duty bound to combine for mutual aid.104 
Ideally, no Igbo person can have two homes, since “home” is not just a geo-
graphical expression but the place where one was born, where the ancestors 
are buried, or where one can connect with the past. The Igbo society remains 
one in which kinship plays a crucial and dominant role. The ethnic unions that 
emerged among Igbo migrants, therefore, acted as a bridge between their tem-
porary location and their original homes. Town unions remained very active 
in this regard, while ethnic unions remained more effective in protecting Igbo 
interests in relation to other groups. In this context, erinma or solidarity, 
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… drew inspiration from the awareness that all members of each 
unit or segment of the Igbo socio-political structure [were] kins-
men or kins-women whose rights and privileges were the concern 
of all.… Thus, for the Igbo, erinma (an abstraction contracted from 
eriri omumu nwa or the umbilical cord) implies familyhood and 
symbolizes the organic link between people of common ances-
try.105 
As important as erinma has been in bridging the divide between individual-
ism and cooperativism, erinma seem to have expressed itself among migrant 
groups in the form of a greater tendency toward cooperation despite a strong 
desire for individual achievement. This new conception of erinma emerges to 
serve the collective interest of the new community in the diaspora based on 
common experience and interests rather than on kinship. The expression of er-
inma among host communities becomes a form of collective action expressed 
by the group to protect its own political, social, and economic interests. 
agriCulTur al deCline and Changing 
idenTiTies 
We have always been farmers, but today, we depend on the mar-
ket to survive. – an Mbaise Elder 
This comment by an elder from Mbaise in 1999 captures the changing rural 
identity of the Igbo. The agrarian culture and structures of rural populations 
have been disappearing rapidly. An often-neglected aspect of understanding 
agricultural crises in rural societies is the impact of values and the constraints 
they may impose in dealing with contemporary social and economic issues. 
Values influence how people conceptualize problems and find solutions. 
While agricultural policies have been set by governments in an attempt to 
bring about desired ends within a society, they often do not take into account 
the values that local people attach to agriculture or its link to their identity as 
individuals or groups. Rural societies, farmers themselves, and the land upon 
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which they farm operate within a structural framework imbued with values 
and norms, which have consequences for the survival and continuity of rural 
life. Thus, some of the policies designed to solve the agricultural problem at 
one time or another have exacerbated the problems by neglecting to consider 
the way in which rural societies employ local value systems in making eco-
nomic decisions and structuring people’s lives. For instance, the economic 
crisis in the rural areas of Igboland has affected the quality of life and dietary 
habits. Much of the local diet is overwhelmingly composed of carbohydrates. 
Protein-rich food items like beans and meat are not frequently eaten by most 
families, as was the case in the past, because they cannot now afford them. 
Dwindling agricultural production and lack of agricultural labour have made 
rural areas more vulnerable to food shortages for the first time since the end 
of the civil war. But the attempt to negotiate the changing rural landscape has 
also entailed fundamental changes in other aspects of rural life including the 
roles that men and women have historically played. 
Yet the most corrosive effects on rural identity have occurred in the con-
text of a national economy that has continued to draw from the rural popu-
lation. The Igbo have consistently combined farming with other economic 
activities. The economic returns from trading, for many households, are far 
greater than what they could ever earn from exhausted lands. Nwanyiafo 
Obasi maintains, “It is best to combine farming and trade. If your trading 
capital falls, you can have something to fall back on.”106 Over 80 per cent of 
household income in central Igboland comes from non-agricultural activi-
ties. While most of Igboland remains agrarian in outlook, various forces have 
acted to modify and transform its agrarian characteristics. 
The contested nature of gender ideology, especially contemporary pat-
terns and changes in the self-image of rural men, reveals the most significant 
change in male and female identity. The challenges to male identity and mas-
culinity have become even more insistent as structural changes connected 
with the destabilizing effects of agricultural decline transform gender roles 
and challenge male domination and economic power in rural settings. The 
change in gender roles and the challenge to the quintessential male author-
ity, identity, and power have often led to conflicts between men and women. 
Phanuel Egejuru’s The Seed Yam Have Been Eaten illustrates this change 
as reflected in the civil war agricultural economy of the Igbo. Jibundu, the 
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protagonist in the novel, expresses perhaps the prevailing view of many Igbo 
people. “Cassava has displaced yam in our occupation,” he laments: 
We clear the bushes as usual and burn them. The women and 
the children plant cassava. It is less demanding. It leaves us men at 
home with little or nothing to do. We drink palm-wine from morn-
ing till evening when we eat our gari of fermented cassava foo-foo, 
and then resume our drinking till far into the night. Sometimes 
when we can coax our wives into giving us some extra change, we 
buy some home brew akamere to top off the palm-wine. Have you 
ever heard a man begging his wife for pocket money? Yes that’s 
what we do now. One must learn to be the vanquished in a war.107 
Linus Anabalam, like many other men, lamented that “things have changed 
because cassava is now king.”108 This reflects a fractured identity among many 
Igbo men since the 1970s as the Nigerian Civil War and the structural changes 
that followed the development of the petroleum industry have eroded peas-
ant identities, replacing them with multiple sources of livelihood that lay less 
emphasis on farming. 
The changes that have occurred have had fundamental implications for 
gender relations and the roles men and women historically played in rural 
society. Women have increasingly dominated the non-agricultural sec-
tor through petty trading, food production, and food processing and they 
shoulder the household food burden. Households have become increasingly 
dependent on female income, not only in female-headed households but also 
in many marginal rural households, where female incomes are significant 
and sometimes constitute higher contributions to total income than those 
of males.109 I spoke to men who saw themselves as “good for nothing.” They 
had lost their identity as men. For these men, the decline of a yam-based 
agrarian culture has engendered a crisis of masculinity and male identity in 
rural Igboland. “We are like castrated men today,” stated a rural dweller, who 
was ashamed of his dependency on his wife’s meagre trade for survival. Jonas 
Onwukwe, a retired worker at a government rubber estate at Emeabiam in 
Owerri Province, agreed: “We depend on our wives for subsistence because 
of their control over cassava production and marketing.”110 The historical 
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trajectory of changes in gender roles is not unique to Igboland, yet its effect 
on many Igbo men has been quite traumatic. Unlike the situation in many 
other societies, however, agricultural decline in Igboland, especially the 
decline in yam production and the palm oil trade, has made men hapless 
victims of the commercial drift of the 1970s and 1980s. 
What has followed is a considerable transgression of gender norms, 
changes in the nature of family, kinship, human relations, and work, from 
the 1970s onward. Such transgressions have redefined issues of masculinity, 
femininity, sexuality, childhood, parenthood, the interaction between gen-
der and sexuality, and household production strategies. All this has brought 
about a considerable crisis in many households that have to struggle to meet 
their daily needs. The dramatic changes in the rural economy, traditional 
norms, and household survival strategies are emblematic of the constantly 
shifting and renegotiated facets of African domestic and formal economy. 
These processes are especially complex for societies such as the Igbo because 
they are intertwined with the national and international economy. As men 
lose control of the social and economic structures of rural life, many have 
interpreted these changes as abnormal behaviour, particularly on the part of 
women. 
The most visible change in rural areas has occurred in the control of in-
come from the sale of palm produce, especially in parts of central Igboland, 
where it remains an important source of rural income. Many informants 
agree that women have largely taken over the control of income from palm oil 
– income previously seen as belonging to male household heads. Onyegbule 
Korieh provides some explanations: “Things have changed. When women 
process palm produce these days, they take both the oil and kernels. Women 
now own both the oil and kernels.”111 Linus Anabalam agrees: “Very few men 
today have control over the palm oil produced in their house. Men do not care 
much any more.… It is a woman’s own today.”112 Eugenia Otuonye’s view of 
the changing nature of resource control is expressed powerfully: “Any man 
who would demand the money from oil is crazy in the head.… Where should 
we [women] get the money to feed the family?”113 While palm oil continues 
to provide a substantial part of rural household income, households have 
altered the previous system of allocating oil to the man and kernels to the 
woman. “Ask my wife,” Onyegbule Korieh challenged. “I do not know what 
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happens to the oil sold in my house anymore.”114 For many Igbo households 
the structural changes in the economy have eroded the long-standing system 
of provisioning for the household and the control of income from palm pro-
duce. The shift highlights the crisis of identity engendered by major structural 
changes among the Igbo and the ways in which both men and women have 
tried to negotiate it. 
Although the priority given to agriculture has diminished, rural Igbo-
land remains largely agrarian in outlook. Facing increasing difficulties in 
surviving as farmers because of population growth, poor soil, and the major 
changes that resulted from the war and the expansion of the oil industry, the 
Igbo began to adapt. But those who remained in the rural areas have refused 
to be entirely uprooted from their agrarian roots. The persistent agrarian 
outlook has influenced the value attached to farming in rural communities 
and the strong link between farming and rural identity. Rural dwellers still 
consider themselves primarily farmers, but like people in many other African 
societies, they have adopted a dual strategy that combines non-agricultural 
income earning with persistence in subsistence agriculture. Such a strategy 
has enabled rural African peasants to retain the security that subsistence 
agriculture offers during periods of economic crisis. The case of central Ig-
boland suggests that agricultural and rural transformation and the ways in 
which people have responded has been shaped by this psychological depen-
dence on agriculture, but all this has also been mediated by gender and the 
link with the capitalist world. 
Most parts of Igboland have adopted a dual strategy of farming and trade 
in order to survive rural poverty. This is especially pronounced in central 
Igboland. While subsistence farming is a way of life that has virtually ceased 
for the majority of rural dwellers – since many purchase their food from 
markets – the idea of obtaining part of household subsistence from the farm 
continues to be highly prized among the elderly, who remain emotionally 
attached to agriculture. Rural farmers claim, and rightly so, that combining 
farming with other economic activities is an insurance against insecurity. 
This perception has remained strong in the psyches of rural Igbo people. 
The persistence in agriculture is a rational economic behaviour and a 
practical expression of the belief among the Igbo that one ought not to de-
pend on the market for basic subsistence. Igbo persistence in farming also has 
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much to do with Igbo identity. Victor Uchendu summarized this notion thus: 
“To remind an Igbo that he is ori mgbe ahia loro [one who eats only when the 
market holds] is to humiliate him.”115 This observation was quite true when 
Uchendu wrote it in 1965. However, persistence in farming has followed 
many trajectories since the end of the civil war. The Igbo have adopted several 
strategies, developed alternative income-generating activities, and adopted 
radical changes in their agricultural practices. While there remains a psycho-
logical dependence on agriculture, such dependency has mediated new forms 
of adaptation, especially the increased growth in cassava production. 
Yet, the transition from a yam-based subsistence economy and a palm oil 
cash-based economy to a cassava-based agrarian system reflects the ability 
of peasants to adapt to a changing social and economic environment. Thus, 
from their early identification as a “yam people at heart,” the Igbo have be-
come a “cassava people at heart.” 
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C O n C L u s I O n 
The focus of this book has been to analyze the complexities surrounding the 
changing world of rural farmers in the context of various historical epochs, 
highlighting the structural changes that occurred as a result of these changes, 
and stressing the importance of restoring the voices of rural people in the his-
tory of the changes. Drawing on rural farmers’ responses to official policies, 
their memories of events, and the impact of the ecological, environmental, 
and demographic factors that are endemic to Igbo society, this book has dem-
onstrated the need for a more inclusive framework for explaining the dynam-
ics of agricultural change in an African society. As this case study shows, the 
trajectory of agricultural change in Igboland has been the result of a complex 
array of factors – some external in origin, and others the result of factors 
that derive from internal social, political, demographic, environmental, and 
economic conditions. The study emphasizes the importance of government 
policies, resource endowment, demographic factors, changes in national and 
regional economies, and, not least, the role of social values in the processes of 
agricultural development and change. It is not enough to show that African 
societies have experienced significant transformations; it is perhaps more im-
portant to explain how different groups, regions, and genders in rural Africa 
have been affected by state intervention and the other structural changes that 
have occurred and how they have responded to these challenges. Such an anal-
ysis challenges previously held assumptions about African farming systems, 
in regard to the capacity of peasants to increase productivity, that were based 
only on the broader picture. The book highlights the need to complement any 
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general theory about African agricultural change with detailed case studies 
to produce a coherent outline that incorporates local specificities. To fully un-
derstand the history of rural Africa in the colonial and post-colonial periods, 
we must also explore the roles, actions, and responses of the rural population 
in the context of the changes that occurred. This is what this book has done. 
The debate that emerged in the 1980s on the nature and explanations 
of African agricultural decline exposed complex conceptual and theoretical 
dilemmas. Clearly, the analysis of agricultural change masks important re-
gional and historical issues about the nature of change in particular settings. 
The externalist paradigm explains only one aspect of many contributory fac-
tors, while the internalist perspective ignores important historical anteced-
ents. Both explanatory models were found wanting due to their overwhelm-
ing emphasis on macroeconomic indicators while they ignored peasants as 
historical actors and the centrality of gender to any meaningful analysis of 
agricultural change. The role of external and internal factors remains cru-
cial to any meaningful analysis, but only if they are considered together with 
myriad other variables, including the actions of the rural population. Obvi-
ously, empirical evidence challenges general explanatory models, which do 
not provide important details about the forms and nature of the change, or 
details of how local variables and social dynamics, including gender, have 
influenced the nature of change and local responses. 
Another conceptual concern in this study centres on the gender question, 
as it constituted a serious omission in previous analysis. The most obvious 
limitation of general explanatory models is that they tend to ignore the way 
that the dynamics of agricultural change were mediated by gender ideology 
in African farming systems. Assumptions about the sexual division of labour 
as a given operate at various levels of the discourse on women in agricultural 
production. For policy-makers, these assumptions, especially the idea that 
men are the genuine farmers, have informed perceptions and ideas about 
male and female agricultural roles. Gender as a category of analysis has been 
taken as self-evident in the study of African agricultural decline. However, 
this neglect became a significant discursive context for feminists with re-
gard to the roles of women and men in general, and in the debates about 
the gendered nature of official agricultural and development policies. I have 
explained how this relates to Igbo agriculture, and the limitations imposed 
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by the neglect of gender analysis. In terms of a feminist-informed political 
economy, the most obvious limitation of the mainstream analysis of agri-
cultural change was the exclusion of gender as a social category and as an 
essential framework for the analysis of agricultural change, particularly in 
Africa. However, this study has shown that ideas about gender as a category 
of analysis or about the impact of gender ideology in the economy are diverse 
and vary from one society to another. This book has outlined the source of 
tension in feminist debates over the notion of gender and the impasse of uni-
versalizing gender experiences. Although useful in explaining the realities of 
colonial and post-colonial African economies, the political economy model, 
on which the Western conception of gender is based, has marginalized local 
gender relations and treated male experiences only peripherally. Although 
conclusions from a particular region and historical context should not be 
extrapolated to all of Africa, the agricultural and societal transformations in 
central Igboland have been examined in these broad contexts. 
Agriculture and agriculture-related commerce were the central elements 
of pre-colonial Igbo society and economy, and they defined livelihood and 
identity. Before the beginning of colonial rule in 1900, the domestic economy 
was heavily dependent on yam production. Other economic activities and 
social practices were directly or indirectly linked to this agricultural system. 
The importance of the yam, the food security it provided, and the social sta-
tus it conferred on big yam farmers shaped the production pattern of central 
Igboland in many significant ways. The production of yams was also directly 
linked to Igbo masculinity and social stratification, gender ideology, and la-
bour practices. Successful production of yams required a large labour force, 
a considerable amount of time, and significant investment in agricultural in-
puts. The significance of yams in the life of the Igbo man suggests that there 
was already an increase in agricultural intensification and ecological change 
in the nineteenth century. The production of yams for subsistence and pres-
tige purposes encouraged farmers to produce above subsistence levels. This 
book suggests that intensive yam production explains the high population 
density of central Igboland and the depleted soil in many parts of the region. 
Unfortunately, the available data do not permit a refined analysis of rural 
life for this period. The paucity of demographic and environmental data on 
Igboland has prevented a detailed examination of the influence of popula-
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tion growth on the rate of environmental transformation and change prior 
to 1900. However, one can speculate that ecological and demographic factors 
had already imposed constraints on the ability of farmers to increase agricul-
tural productivity on the eve of colonial rule. 
There is no doubt that a complex interaction of internal and external 
forces shaped the economy of many African societies from the late nine-
teenth century onward. Africa’s encounter with colonialism is particularly 
significant in this regard. The agrarian system built before European contact 
had prepared the Igbo to play a central role from the era of the slave trade and 
throughout the colonial period. The Igbos’ agricultural potential, especially 
in the production of yams and later palm oil, and their population, fed the At-
lantic trade. As chapter 1 demonstrates, a high degree of commercialization 
and commercial relations had developed between the Igbo and other parts of 
the Atlantic World before the colonial encounter. Both the Igbo and the Brit-
ish built upon this existing network to inaugurate the significant transforma-
tion of economic and social life at the beginning of the twentieth century. 
When the British first imposed colonial rule in the region in 1900, they 
were essentially interested in extracting the agricultural products needed to 
support the colonial economy without changing the fundamental structure 
of the local production system. The political change that followed in the form 
of indirect rule was instituted to create an infrastructure that would enable 
the achievement of these economic objectives. The emphasis on export pro-
duction, the new regulations encouraging local production, and the ever-in-
creasing requirement for cash pushed the Igbo to expand the production of 
palm oil and kernels. However, the top-down approach of colonial officials 
often neglected local production systems while the patriarchal assumption 
governing African farming systems neglected female farmers. The inability 
of the colonial state to work within the pre-colonial production system, the 
channeling of agricultural development programs mostly to male farmers to 
the exclusion of women, and the neglect of the subsistence sector significantly 
transformed the agricultural economy of the Igbo. The analysis of gender in 
this book reveals that the roles of women and men in agriculture became dif-
ferentiated because of the British notion of the “male farmer.” This new gen-
der ideology imposed on the Igbo ran contrary to the complementary nature 
of men’s and women’s roles in the production system. Amid the inconsistent 
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agricultural policies of the colonial era, Igbo producers were integrated into 
the world economy, which fundamentally changed the rural economy and 
the people. 
The impact of agricultural development and the exploitation of the ag-
ricultural resource base stimulated increased production and revolutionized 
production methods in some areas. This led to further agricultural intensi-
fication. The colonial economy also created specialist traders and oil palm 
harvesters, who significantly transformed rural life and employment. Un-
like previous works, this study has explored the long-term implications of 
increased agricultural commercialization and agricultural intensification in 
a densely populated region of Nigeria. I have argued that the colonial govern-
ment’s development ideology and the transformation of other sectors of the 
economy encouraged agricultural involution and contributed to the declin-
ing importance of agriculture in the region. Like other African societies in 
the colonial period, the Igbo were part of the making of their own history, but 
not “necessarily under conditions of their own choosing.”1 
The half-century following colonial rule was marked by significant 
events, which had a direct impact on Africa and Africans, even though they 
occurred in faraway Europe. The discussion of global crises such as the Great 
Depression and the two World Wars suggests that these events had a direct 
impact on the lives of rural Africans. Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrate that the 
colonial economy created a local dependency on income from the sale of cash 
crops and increased the vulnerability of peasants to the slumps that often 
occurred in the local and international markets. I have shown that the lo-
cal population was visibly distressed by the declining income from palm oil, 
the high prices for food, and the insecurity engendered by the depression of 
the late 1920s and early 1930s. The discussion of the 1929 Women’s Revolt in 
1929 (in chapter 4) suggests that the revolt was deeply rooted in the agrarian 
economy of the region. Previous studies have emphasized the feminist origin 
of the revolt and the introduction of income tax by the British in Eastern 
Nigeria in 1928. However, the report of the Aba Commission of Inquiry, 
which examined the immediate and remote causes of the revolt in 1930, and 
the “Notes of Evidence” recorded during the inquiry demonstrate that the 
depression, which was rooted in the agricultural economy, was paramount 
in the minds of the local people. Frequent references were made to the low 
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price of palm produce and the significant rise in the price of foodstuffs. Over-
all, the tax problems provided an opportunity for the people to demonstrate 
their anger regarding the state of the economy and the political policies of the 
British. The 1929 revolt would become one of several popular protests and 
locally initiated agitations that would characterize African-British relations 
in colonial eastern Nigeria into the early 1950s. 
The analysis provided of the World War II period in chapter 5 is sig-
nificant in regard to both the contribution of rural African societies and 
the impact of the war on their lives. In Nigeria, Britain sought and received 
the commitment of Nigerians to support the war effort. Across the country, 
communities mobilized in various ways to support the war effort. This book 
demonstrates that the local population contributed financial support both 
directly and indirectly. Igbos supplied soldiers in a variety of capacities and 
provided resources, including food items for the troops. Igbo farmers were 
forced to increase the production of palm oil even though prices remained 
lower than before the war. However, the biggest problem faced by the co-
lonial administration was how to curb the rising cost of living that became 
prominent due to labour shortages created by the war, low levels of import 
and export, and shortages of locally produced food items, such as rice, yams, 
cassava, and salt, and imported products such as sugar. 
The demands of the war forced the British to restructure the local econ-
omy to ensure that Africans produced the commodities needed to support 
the British war effort, including food and export products such as palm oil. 
The government introduced new regulations and laws to effectively control 
peasant production and the distribution of essential food items through the 
Nigeria General Defense Regulations (Law No. 75 of 1941). Those directly 
affected by the new regulations and controls were farmers and traders en-
gaged in the sale of produce including yam and gari. Both local and urban 
populations were visibly distressed due to the food crisis, especially because 
of the British management of the local production system and the insecurity 
that this engendered, as reflected in the petition of a local trader in Aba who 
petitioned a British district officer to consider “the lives of a family which may 
perish as a result of the measures … taken to restrict the garri trade.”2 And 
Mr. Muoma, who had been prevented from carrying on his normal trade in 
gari, deemed it “abnormal” and an “injustice,” since cutting him out of the 
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gari trade “deprived him of his livelihood.”3 The Aba Community League, 
an organization representing various community associations and unions, 
wrote to the local district officer on 12 August 1942 about the negative effects 
of food restrictions on the residents of the town.4 
The agrarian roots of the various petitions written by the local popula-
tion remain evidence of their struggles to survive the depressed economy of 
the war and their strategies for coping with the crisis engendered by the war. 
This fills an important gap in the history of World War II in relation to rural 
African colonial history and challenges the dominant Western-centred nar-
rative of the war that lays less emphasis on the contributions of the African 
population and the impact of the war on their society as described in chapter 
5. Since most of those who petitioned officials during the war were small trad-
ers and rural farmers, the exploration of their petitions and the economic, 
cultural, and social conditions that gave rise to them is a major contribution 
to the historical analysis of the conditions faced by African societies, espe-
cially the lower classes, during the war. It provides scholars with new and 
groundbreaking materials about World War II and corrects the impression 
that the effects of the war on the “home front” applied to European societies 
alone. Yet, the war also created opportunities for Igbo farmers and traders 
who took advantage of the high prices for gari to increase production and sale 
of the product in Northern Nigerian cities. 
It is facile, however, to speak of government policies and external in-
fluences as if they represent the overwhelming determinant of agricultural 
change among the Igbo. Obviously, all these factors must be considered in 
tandem with the impact of the palm produce trade since the nineteenth-cen-
tury commercial transition in Igboland. Government policies cannot be iso-
lated from pre-existing ecological and demographic factors that increased the 
rate of agricultural involution. These factors exacerbated the situation caused 
by government intervention in the rural economy and were coupled with the 
problem of the expanding urban sector, which attracted a large portion of the 
rural population. 
The early post-colonial period was revolutionary in many ways. Although 
the regional government in Eastern Nigeria continued the agricultural pro-
grams of the colonial regime, which emphasized production for export, the 
government also broke away from the earlier rejection of plantation agricul-
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ture. The indigenous political elite intervened even more directly in peasant 
agriculture than the colonial government had done. 
From 1962 onward, the regional government tightened its grip on the ag-
ricultural economy through the establishment of produce marketing boards, 
community plantation projects, and new farm settlements. From the govern-
ment’s point of view, agricultural expansion, the participation of the state in 
agricultural projects, and the integration of rural peasants into these projects 
were essential to the rapid development of the region. Yet, the condition of 
peasants deteriorated while the state and marketing boards profited from the 
control of the peasant surplus. The continued neglect of the perspectives of 
rural farmers and the gendered ideology of the “male farmer” did not change 
in the post-colonial period. 
By focusing on the Nigerian Civil War and the development of the pe-
troleum industry, the study highlights the impact of these factors on rural 
agrarian life. The agricultural economy of the Igbo went into a deep crisis 
because of the civil war. The local food production capacity of Igboland could 
not meet the needs of the army and the rest of the population, despite the 
efforts of peasants and the Biafran regime to sustain production during the 
war. The severe food crisis that emerged after the outbreak of the war in 1967 
revealed the inability of the region to feed itself on locally produced food. 
This had already created a high level of Igbo dependency on other regions be-
fore the war broke out. The war, overall, produced a high rate of agricultural 
involution in terms of a movement toward non-agricultural activity, due in 
part to people’s frustration with rural poverty, especially among the younger 
members of the population. 
The development of the petroleum industry worsened the crisis in the 
food sector. As oil exports and revenues increased, the overall importance 
of agriculture declined, while expenditure on food importation increased. 
The dependency on petroleum revenue had serious negative effects on the 
rural areas, as it induced a high level of out-migration to the urban areas. 
The high rate of urban infrastructural development and industrialization in 
the petroleum era made agriculture unattractive and drained rural labour. 
The “boom and bust” cycles that followed the development of the petroleum 
industry affected rural peasants, as the high inflation rate that followed the 
development of this industry made it more difficult for the rural population 
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to cope. The situation continued into the 1980s and led to a decline in the 
quality of urban life as well. 
Overall, the realities of agricultural decline and food insecurity were in-
fluenced by government policies and the general attitude toward agriculture. 
The agricultural policies of the government often reflected the “boom and 
bust” cycles of the petroleum economy. The worsening economic situation 
of the 1980s forced the government to introduce new agricultural programs 
aimed at increasing the levels of food production. However, government in-
terventions did not result in significant increases in levels of production, due 
to mismanagement, corruption, and nepotism. 
Paralleling the changing nature of rural agriculture there were also sig-
nificant shifts in the rural economy, in farming practices, and in employment 
opportunities. Overall, the Igbo have adapted remarkably well. The agricul-
tural crisis in the region compelled the Igbo to increase their non-agricultural 
forms of employment. These changes, while contributing to income diversi-
fication outside agriculture, did not totally disrupt the agricultural base of 
the rural economy. Some members of the rural population have continued to 
farm, but under difficult circumstances, including less fertile soil, decreased 
availability of labour, and scarcity of land. Given the increasingly tight straits 
in which the Igbo found themselves, it is not surprising that income diversi-
fication has become the norm. Younger persons, in particular, have favoured 
migration, and remittances remain an important source of household suste-
nance and economic development. 
However, the combined effects of a declining agricultural economy and 
opportunities outside agriculture have undermined aspects of traditional 
Igbo agricultural ideology. The importance of the yam as the icon of Igbo 
agriculture and masculinity and its social and ritual importance have de-
clined because of the decreasing importance of agriculture. The increased 
importance of cassava in Igbo agriculture and food security has increased 
the role of women in household food security and income. The changes in 
the local economy and the transformations in the region have worked to em-
power women in significant ways. Women have assumed greater control over 
household resources and have ventured into areas traditionally regarded as 
male spheres of influence. The changing nature of the roles that women and 
men have played in the economy demonstrates the contested nature of gender 
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ideology and challenges mainstream ideas about gender division of labour 
and resource control. 
The picture of socio-economic change that emerges from this study is 
a complex one. The combination of state policies, peasant actions, and en-
vironmental and demographic factors accounts for the trajectory and pace 
of change and the rural strategies for survival. For the Igbo, like many other 
societies in Africa, the internal dynamics of change have been influenced by 
external factors created by a capitalist world economic system that has de-
pended on developing economies for cheap raw materials. However, the Igbo 
case points to some of the complexities associated with agricultural transfor-
mation and the problems that emerge from a simplistic analysis. 
In historical perspective, the tragedy of the Igbo agrarian experience owes 
much to the policies implemented by the colonial and post-independence au-
thorities. The most common threads in the post-independence era have been 
the role of the state in the expansion of cash-crop production, the state’s di-
rect intervention in the peasant economy, and the lack of any radical change 
in colonial ideology and attitudes toward the rural farmer. Another common 
thread has been the neglect of the sociocultural and economic background 
of local societies by both the colonial and the post-independence states. The 
neglect of peasant perspectives in the design of government agricultural 
programs has limited whatever progress the programs might have made in 
agricultural transformation. To argue that local perspectives matter and that 
they have much to offer to improve agricultural production is not to suggest 
that peasants have a monopoly of all of the necessary agricultural knowledge. 
Rather, agricultural improvement programs would have gained much from 
incorporating the perspectives of peasants to ensure lasting sustainability. 
Throughout this study, an attempt has been made to highlight the importance 
of demography and of the ecology of the Igbo territory in explaining the na-
ture of agricultural change. This book has demonstrated that only through an 
examination of how both internal and external factors interacted with each 
other vis-à-vis the local environment, and the inclusion of the actions and 
voices of rural people as agents of history and change, can the agrarian his-
tory and current crisis of the Igbo be understood in its entirety. 
In spite of the fact that the state provided the institutional and structural 
framework within which local farmers operated, the goal of transforming 
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and modernizing agriculture has not always been reached. Rural response to 
modernization has not always been in congruence with official expectations. 
The transformations that took place occurred not just as a result of state poli-
cies, they happened because African institutions, structures, and initiatives 
played significant roles. In the political sphere, greater success was achieved 
despite the constant resistance of the Igbo population to British rule. 
In the final analysis, the twentieth century remains a period in which 
the agricultural past was represented by significant growth as much as by 
weaknesses and decline. By the end of the twentieth century, the lives of rural 
dwellers in rural Igboland had been transformed by the effects of public poli-
cies and the actions of rural dwellers themselves. The attempt to modernize 
agriculture and the encouragement given by the colonial state to rural farm-
ers to produce palm oil and kernels transformed people’s lives and increased 
their dependency on the market for survival. In addition, the dual impact of 
the depression of the late 1920s and early 1930s and the world wars as his-
torical by-products of a globalizing world, coupled with increased structural 
changes that strengthened in the wake of European contact, facilitated the 
rapid transformation of rural lives. The result was a profound change in liveli-
hood strategies. The level of non-agricultural income-generating activities in 
the rural areas increased in the post-independence period, especially from 
the end of the civil war in 1970, when agriculture ceased to provide a decent 
standard of living for the rural population. 
The high rate of agricultural involution that began at end of the war was 
accelerated in the late 1970s by the dependency of the state on income from 
the sale of petroleum. This period has been described as a period of agricul-
tural crisis for many African societies, and this was certainly so for the Igbo. 
In this economic environment, the importance of agriculture in rural life 
and livelihood changed significantly with the increased dependency on non-
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A century ago, agriculture was the dominant eco-
nomic sector in much of Africa. By the 1990s, how-
ever, African farmers had declining incomes and 
were worse off, on average, than those who did not 
farm. Colonial policies, subsequent ‘top-down’ stat-
ism, and globalization are usually cited as primary 
causes of this long-term decline. In this unprec-
edented study of the Igbo region of southeastern 
Nigeria, author Chima Korieh points the way to a 
more complex and inclusive approach to this issue. 
Using agricultural change as a lens through which to 
view socio-economic and cultural change, political 
struggle, and colonial hegemony, Korieh shows that 
regional dynamics and local responses also played 
vital roles in this era of transformation.
British attempts to modernize the densely popu-
lated Igbo region were focused largely on intensive 
production of palm oil as a cash crop for export and 
on the assumption of male dominance within a con-
ventional western hierarchy. This colonial agenda, 
however, collided with a traditional culture in which 
females played important social and political roles 
and male status was closely tied to yam cultivation. 
Drawing on an astonishing array of sources, includ-
ing oral interviews, newspapers, private journals, 
and especially letters of petition from local farmers 
and traders, Korieh puts the reader in direct contact 
with ordinary people, evoking a feeling of what it was 
like to live through the era. As such, the book reveals 
colonial interactions as negotiated encounters be-
tween officials and natives and challenges simplistic 
notions of a hegemonic colonial state and a compli-
ant native population. 
CHIMA J. KORIEH teaches African History in the 
Department of History at Marquette University. He 
has published extensively in the areas of African so-






“This book is an important 
study of the monumental 
position of agricultural de-
velopment in the dynamics 
of socio-economic change 
in colonial and early-post 
colonial Nigeria. The study 
is original, well researched, 
and presented in elegant 
style. This will be a major 
source book for historians, 
economists, sociologists, 
and policy makers for a 
long time.”
U. D. ANYANWU
Professor of History and 
Deputy Vice-Chancellor, 
Imo State University, 
Nigeria
